Mark Greenberg has a joint appointment in the law school and the philosophy department. From 2000 to 2004, he was a member of the philosophy department at Princeton University, where he taught philosophy of mind, ethics, and philosophy of law. Greenberg received his B.A. from the Johns Hopkins University and his J.D. from Boalt Hall. He served as law clerk to the Honorable Ruth Bader Ginsburg on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. He was awarded a Marshall Scholarship to study at Oxford University, where he earned both his B.Phil. and D.Phil. in philosophy. He has also been a Fulbright Scholar at the University of Stockholm, a research fellow at the Research School of Social Sciences of the Australian National University, and a Harrington Fellow at the University of Texas at Austin.
Before teaching at Princeton, Greenberg served as Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the U.S. Department of Justice. His work focused on criminal law and policy, constitutional law (especially equal protection and First Amendment issues), and appellate litigation. He also worked as a federal prosecutor in the U.S. Attorney’s Offices for the Eastern District of Virginia and the Western District of Pennsylvania. He has written or co-written numerous articles and book chapters, including "Dual Prosecutions: A Model for Concurrent Federal Jurisdiction," in The Federal Role in Criminal Law (543 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science) 72 (1996); "The Meaning of Original Meaning," 86 Georgetown Law Journal 569 (1998); "Goals versus Memes: Explanation in the Theory of Cultural Evolution," in Susan Hurley and Nick Chater, eds., Perspectives on Imitation, MIT Press (2004); "Conceptual Role Semantics," in Ernie Lepore and Barry Smith, eds., Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language (2006); "How Facts Make Law," 10 Legal Theory 157-198, reprinted in Scott Hershovitz, ed., Exploring Law’s Empire, Oxford University Press (2005); "A New Map of Mental Content: Putting Normativity in Its Place," E. Sosa and E. Villanueva, eds., 15 Philosophical Issues (2005); On Practices and the Law, 12 Legal Theory 113 (2006), reprinted in Law: Metaphysics, Meaning and Objectivity, 2 Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy 95 (2007); Reasons Without Values?, Law: Metaphysics, Meaning and Objectivity, 2 Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy 133 (2007); “Naturalism and Normativity in the Philosophy of Law” (forthcoming).