[EL] Check out Study shows who breaks campaign laws - The Pueblo Chieftai...

[BZall at aol.com]

What if one sees the effect of one's past actions (in this case, creating a 
 regulatory scheme which has the effect of causing hardship to those 
without the  means to hire capable counsel), decries that effect, and then does 
the same  thing again? 
 
Like the ABA Administrative Law Section, which got the ABA to enact a  
resolution to create a lobbying regulatory agency similar to the FEC, despite  
having been told by the ABA Tax Section and its Exempt Organization 
Committee's  Political Subcommittee that the result will be the same as creating the  
FEC?
 
_http://www.abanow.org/wordpress/wp-content/files_flutter/1312830542104bREV.
pdf_ 
(http://www.abanow.org/wordpress/wp-content/files_flutter/1312830542104bREV.pdf) 
 
It's hard enough to encourage small exempt organizations to exercise their  
legitimate rights to speak truth to power, to assemble to be heard, and to  
petition the government for redress of grievances in light of incredibly  
complicated IRS rules differentiating issue advocacy from electioneering 
(see,  e.g., Rev. Rul  2004-6, with 14 factors to consider). If this proposal  
is put in place, there likely will be even more rules than there are now 
under  the IRC and the LDA. Does anyone seriously think that a new regulatory 
agency  will REDUCE complexity?
 
There are, arguably, many possible purposes and many possible consequences  
of such a proposal, but clearly there was foreknowledge that at least one 
might  be the creation of a barrier to the rights of association and 
petition. At what  point does "purpose" get inferred from prior warning?
 
Barnaby Zall
Of Counsel
Weinberg, Jacobs & Tolani,  LLP
11300 Rockville Pike, Suite 1200
Rockville, MD 20852
301-231-6943  (direct dial)
_www.wjlaw.com_ (http://www.wj/) 
bzall at aol.com



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In a message dated 8/10/2011 2:13:50 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,  
VOLOKH at law.ucla.edu writes:

 
Let me offer a friendly amendment:  One can indeed assume (as a factual  
matter) that people intend – in the sense of purposefully aim at – the 
natural  and probable consequences of their acts, but only if there are no other  
natural and probable consequences of note.  Thus, even in criminal  law, if 
I point a loaded gun at someone and pull the trigger, a jury is  entitled 
(though not required) to infer that I intended to kill the person, or  at 
least seriously wound him, since that’s the main significant consequence of  my 
action – though even there one could imagine circumstances that would rebut  
the inference. 
But such an inference stops being sensible when an action has many natural 
and  probable consequences.  There, as Brian points out, one could act with  
the purpose of creating one consequence, and in spite of (i.e., without the 
 purpose of creating) another consequence.  Thus, to consider a crime that  
famously turns on purpose – treason – say that I organize a strike during  
wartime, knowing that it will foreseeably interfere with the war effort and 
 help the enemy.  That might be treason if I’m doing it with the  purpose 
of helping the enemy, but it’s not if I’m doing with the purpose  of getting 
better wages for members of my union, even if I know that it  likely will 
help the enemy.  Nor would it be sound for a jury to infer a  purpose to help 
the enemy simply because that is a natural and probable  consequence of my 
actions:  Because there are two natural and probable  consequences (raising 
wages, and helping the enemy), the mere act does not  tell us what its 
purpose likely was. 
Eugene 
 
 





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