[EL] Check out Study shows who breaks campaign laws -
dasmith
dasmith at ufl.edu
Wed Aug 10 12:59:49 PDT 2011
My post the other day on the CA radio ads discouraging signing
initiative petitions, including who's funding them, is available here:
http://electionsmith.wordpress.com/2011/07/31/ballot-measure-signature-gathering-in-ca-and-supposed-identity-fraud/
daniel a. smith, ph.d.
professor& uf research foundation professor (2010-2012)
coordinator, political science internship program
department of political science
003 anderson hall | phone: 352-273-2346
po box 117325 | fax: 352-392-8127
university of florida | email: dasmith at ufl.edu
gainesville, fl 32611-7325 | www.clas.ufl.edu/users/dasmith/
http://twitter.com/#!/electionsmith
On 8/10/2011 3:36 PM, Larry Levine wrote:
> Are you sure they really are "labor groups"? I heard on of those ads
> on the radio this morning and the disclaimer was so vague I came away
> with no idea who was behind them. Remember, anyone can form a "labor
> group". Doesn't mean they really are labor union groups. I suspect
> we'll find out more about who is funding these ads in the next few
> days. I suspect it's Walmart trying to discourage people from signing
> the Amazon referendum.
> Larry
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> *From:* Scarberry, Mark <mailto:Mark.Scarberry at pepperdine.edu>
> *To:* Justin Levitt <mailto:levittj at lls.edu> ; BZall at aol.com
> <mailto:BZall at aol.com> ; law-election at uci.edu
> <mailto:law-election at uci.edu>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, August 10, 2011 12:25 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [EL] Check out Study shows who breaks campaign laws
> -The Pueblo Chieftai...
>
> There are now ads on the radio in California (paid for by labor
> groups) telling people that they shouldn't sign petitions because
> people will find out where they live and because they may be
> subject to identity theft.
>
> Mark S. Scarberry
>
> Pepperdine Univ. School of Law
>
> Malibu, CA 90263
>
> (310)506-4667
>
> *From:*law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu
> <mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu>
> [mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] *On Behalf
> Of *Justin Levitt
> *Sent:* Wednesday, August 10, 2011 12:11 PM
> *To:* BZall at aol.com; law-election at uci.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [EL] Check out Study shows who breaks campaign laws
> - The Pueblo Chieftai...
>
> This is an interesting discussion about the downside of regulatory
> requirements that make it incrementally difficult for some
> individuals seeking to exercise their constitutional rights, for
> what's perceived to be an insufficiently compelling purpose.
> (And to be clear, I'm _sympathetic_ to the argument that
> large-scale disclosure of low-level contributors can create some
> substantial practical burdens.)
>
> But take Mr. Zall's complaint about the fact that "it's hard
> enough to encourage _small exempt organizations_ to exercise their
> legitimate rights to speak truth to power, to assemble to be
> heard, and to petition the government for redress of grievances"
> given existing regulatory requirements, his admonition that
> legislators and regulatory officials have been warned about the
> likely burdens of incremental requirements, and his conclusion
> that the effect of the burden must be intended. Now replace
> "_small exempt organizations_" with "_poor, historically
> disengaged voters_." It almost sounds like an argument against
> unduly strict ID rules at the polls...
>
> Justin
>
> On 8/10/2011 11:42 AM, BZall at aol.com <mailto:BZall at aol.com> wrote:
>
> What if one sees the effect of one's past actions (in this case,
> creating a regulatory scheme which has the effect of causing
> hardship to those without the means to hire capable counsel),
> decries that effect, and then does the same thing again?
>
> Like the ABA Administrative Law Section, which got the ABA to
> enact a resolution to create a lobbying regulatory agency similar
> to the FEC, despite having been told by the ABA Tax Section and
> its Exempt Organization Committee's Political Subcommittee that
> the result will be the same as creating the FEC?
>
> http://www.abanow.org/wordpress/wp-content/files_flutter/1312830542104bREV.pdf
>
> It's hard enough to encourage small exempt organizations to
> exercise their legitimate rights to speak truth to power, to
> assemble to be heard, and to petition the government for redress
> of grievances in light of incredibly complicated IRS rules
> differentiating issue advocacy from electioneering (see, e.g.,
> Rev. Rul 2004-6, with 14 factors to consider). If this proposal
> is put in place, there likely will be even more rules than there
> are now under the IRC and the LDA. Does anyone seriously think
> that a new regulatory agency will REDUCE complexity?
>
> There are, arguably, many possible purposes and many possible
> consequences of such a proposal, but clearly there was
> foreknowledge that at least one might be the creation of a barrier
> to the rights of association and petition. At what point does
> "purpose" get inferred from prior warning?
>
> Barnaby Zall
> Of Counsel
> Weinberg, Jacobs & Tolani, LLP
> 11300 Rockville Pike, Suite 1200
> Rockville, MD 20852
> 301-231-6943 (direct dial)
> www.wjlaw.com <http://www.wj/>
> bzall at aol.com <mailto:bzall at aol.com>
>
>
>
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> In a message dated 8/10/2011 2:13:50 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
> VOLOKH at law.ucla.edu <mailto:VOLOKH at law.ucla.edu> writes:
>
> Let me offer a friendly amendment: One can
> indeed assume (as a factual matter) that people intend -- in
> the sense of purposefully aim at -- the natural and probable
> consequences of their acts, but /only if there are no other
> natural and probable consequences of note/. Thus, even in
> criminal law, if I point a loaded gun at someone and pull the
> trigger, a jury is entitled (though not required) to infer
> that I intended to kill the person, or at least seriously
> wound him, since that's the main significant consequence of my
> action -- though even there one could imagine circumstances
> that would rebut the inference.
>
> But such an inference stops being sensible
> when an action has many natural and probable consequences.
> There, as Brian points out, one could act with the purpose of
> creating one consequence, and in spite of (i.e., without the
> purpose of creating) another consequence. Thus, to consider a
> crime that famously turns on purpose -- treason -- say that I
> organize a strike during wartime, knowing that it will
> foreseeably interfere with the war effort and help the enemy.
> That might be treason if I'm doing it /with the purpose/ of
> helping the enemy, but it's not if I'm doing with the purpose
> of getting better wages for members of my union, even if I
> /know /that it likely will help the enemy. Nor would it be
> sound for a jury to infer a purpose to help the enemy simply
> because that is a natural and probable consequence of my
> actions: Because there are two natural and probable
> consequences (raising wages, and helping the enemy), the mere
> act does not tell us what its purpose likely was.
>
> Eugene
>
>
>
>
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>
> --
>
> Justin Levitt
>
> Associate Professor of Law
>
> Loyola Law School | Los Angeles
>
> 919 Albany St.
>
> Los Angeles, CA 90015
>
> 213-736-7417
>
> justin.levitt at lls.edu <mailto:justin.levitt at lls.edu>
>
> ssrn.com/author=698321
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