[EL] McCommish & "triggers"

Smith, Brad BSmith at law.capital.edu
Tue Jun 28 14:41:21 PDT 2011


Under the first hypothetical, everybody will take the money. Why not? Even if you don't make the qualifying numbers, nothing lost.
 
But the second still attempts to limit speech. It says, if you spend over this limit, then we (the state) will work to make sure that you don't win. We will try to disadvantage you, by altering our agreement. It amounts to a $100,000 penalty for the candidate who decides that more should be spent. To take advantage of his "right" to spend more, he has to face a 1-way subsidy that benefits only his opponent, while placing no restraints on that opponent. That's the problem here. 
 
You can think about this way: Suppose there is no spending limit, and each candidate is raising money.  Two months before the election, the government just gives one candidate, but only 1 candidate, $100,000, no strings attached. Constitutional? I don't think so.
 
As I see it, Regime A, under the usual reading given Buckley, is OK.  So would be a new Regime A1 - you get your $100,000, and agree not to spend more than $110,000 K, and your opponent can spend whatever (essentially the original matching fund schemes that the Court ruled on in Buckley).  But Regime B is not. Regime B always places the non-participating candidate at a disadvantage compared to the participating candidate. Either the candidate must limit his spending, which by definition appears not to be in his interest (or he would be a participating candidate), or the candidate will be penalized through a 1 way subsidy to his opponent, that comes with no trade off for that opponent. That is not a "voluntary" system.
 
Eventually, however, I do think that the Court will have to realize that Burger's dissent in Buckley was correct.  Having the government pay for campaigns is certainly not wise precisely because of the ability of legislators and reformers to cook up endless variations that will help the type of candidate they prefer. It is not incompatible with a generally free and democratic society, at least not over the short and mid-term, but it is ultimately incompatible with the type of accountability and dynamic democracy that our Constitution envisions. 
 
Bradley A. Smith
Josiah H. Blackmore II/Shirley M. Nault Designated Professor of Law
Capital University Law School
303 E. Broad St.
Columbus, OH 43215
(614) 236-6317
http://www.law.capital.edu/Faculty/Bios/bsmith.asp

________________________________

From: law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu on behalf of Elmendorf, Christopher
Sent: Tue 6/28/2011 3:43 PM
To: Daniel Meek, Attorney; law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
Subject: Re: [EL] McCommish & "triggers"


Let me state the "release" hypothetical more precisely.  (This is, in a sense, a variant on the hypo Kagan gave on pp. 17-18 of the slip opinion.  But it's even more arresting I think.) 

 

Regime A: Unconditional Lump Sum Awards for Grassroots Candidates.  Under this regime, any candidate who raises, let us say, $10,000 in contributions of $10 or less is offered a lump sum grant from the state of $100,000.  Accepting the $100,000 grant does not oblige the candidate to abide by any expenditure limitation or restriction on fundraising, other than restrictions (such as ordinary contribution limits) that apply to all candidates.  The grant of funds is unconditional.

 

Regime B:  Lump Sum Award for Grassroots Candidates, Subject to Expenditure Limit and Release.  This regime is identical to Regime A, except that in order to receive the $100,000 grant, the candidate must also agree to limit her total expenditures to $110,000.  However, if a nonparticipating candidate spends more than $110,000, the expenditure limit for the participating candidate is waived, and she may raise and spend additional funds on the same terms as all other candidates.   

 

It's hard for me to see how Regime B could possibly be said to burden the speech of opponents of the participating candidate more than Regime A.  The only difference between the two regulatory systems is that, in the second regime, the participating candidate agrees to self-muffle unless someone speaks very loudly (expensively) against her, whereas under Regime A, there is no self-muffling that goes with an acceptance of public funds.  It is a bizarre jurisprudence which holds that the regime that features self-muffling creates a *greater* burden on the speech people who *oppose* the provisionally muffled candidate than the regime without self-muffling.   

 

(If Regime B is not per-se unconstitutional, then one can argue with a straight face for certain other trigger/matching fund arrangements, along the lines of what I suggested yesterday.)

 

Chris

 

Christopher S. Elmendorf
Professor of Law
University of California at Davis
400 Mrak Hall Drive
Davis, CA 95616
tel: 530.752.5756
________________________________

From: law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu [law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] On Behalf Of Daniel Meek, Attorney [dan at meek.net]
Sent: Monday, June 27, 2011 7:48 PM
To: law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
Subject: Re: [EL] McCommish & "triggers"


The McComish (AFECFCPAC) appears to forbid any trigger which depends on the amount of money raised or spent by an opponent.  Both of your models change the requirements applicable to the participating candidate when the non-participating candidate exceeds a certain amount in spending.  Thus, your models would appear to be vulnerable under McComish.

There could be a trigger that in no way depends on the amount of money raised or spent by a non-participating candidate.  For example, the program could provide supplemental funding to any participating candidate who is opposed by one or more non-participants and is shown by professional polls (say 30 days before the election) to be not more than say 10% of the vote away from winning the seat.  This would focus the supplemental funds on participating candidates who are likely to be able to use the additional funds to win and thus allow each supplemental fund grant to be larger than otherwise.

Five justices believe that individuals and groups have a First Amendment right to spend unlimited sums on campaigns and a First Amendment right not to be penalized (relative to a publicly-funded candidate) for the level of those expenditures.  I have seen no case which holds that anyone has a First Amendment right to win an election or to preserve a lead in the polls.


Daniel Meek
Attorney

10949 S.W. 4th Avenue
Suite 1000
Portland, OR 97219
503-293-9021 phone
866-926-9646 fax
dan at meek.net 

On 6/27/2011 1:46 PM, Elmendorf, Christopher wrote: 

	Here's a question for the list, germane to Rick's "New York City as a Model" post:  Are "triggers" necessarily dead after McCommish?  Consider two scenarios.
	 
	1.  The "Release" Model.  In this model, the state or city with a public financing program simply releases participating candidates from the expenditure cap if spending by a nonparticipating candidate exceeds the cap for participating candidates.  In some sense this "penalizes" speech by the nonparticipating candidate, but the penalty is nothing but the restoration of the libertarian or quasi-libertarian status quo that would have obtained absent the public financing program.  Unconstitutional?
	 
	2.  The "Matching Funds & Tightened Contribution Limit" Model.   If such a "release" from the applicable expenditure limit is not unconstitutional, then how about the following variant, which makes use of matching funds.  Assume a spending limit of $100,000 for participating candidates, and a contribution limit of $1000, which applies to all candidates.  In the event that a nonparticipating candidate spends more than $100,000, the spending limit for the participating candidate is raised in an amount equal to the "excess" spending by the nonparticipating candidate, provided, however, that the new spending must come from contributions of $200 or less, which contributions are matched 2:1 with public funds.  
	 
	Is scenario #2 per-se unconstitutional, because the state is not merely releasing the participating candidate from spending limits (restoring the libertarian baseline), but rather is subsidizing speech antagonistic to the speech of the nonparticipating candidate exercising her First Amendment rights?  But what if it's actually much more difficult under scenario #2 for participating candidates to combat the speech of nonpaticipating candidates than in scenario #1?  In that case, it's hard to see how the "burden" placed on constitutionally protected speech under scenario #2 could rise to the level of constitutional significance, assuming that there's no constitutional objection to scenario #1.  (On the other hand, it would be no easy task for the courts to make this relative burden judgment . . .)
	 
	Thoughts?
	 
	-- Chris  
	 
	Christopher S. Elmendorf
	Professor of Law
	University of California at Davis
	400 Mrak Hall Drive
	Davis, CA 95616
	tel: 530.752.5756
________________________________

	From: law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu [law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] On Behalf Of Rick Hasen [rhasen at law.uci.edu]
	Sent: Monday, June 27, 2011 1:12 PM
	To: law-election at uci.edu
	Subject: [EL] more news 6/27/11
	
	

	"New York City as a Model?" <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19748>  

	Posted on June 27, 2011 <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19748>  by Rick Hasen <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>  

	I have written this post <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/27/the-court-and-the-future-of-public-financing/new-york-city-as-a-model-for-campaign-finance-laws>  for the New York Times' "Room for Debate" discussion, "Where to Now on Public Financing?"  Other contributors so far are Guy Charles <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/27/the-court-and-the-future-of-public-financing/the-courts-battle-of-ideology> , Brad Smith <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/27/the-court-and-the-future-of-public-financing/the-courts-separation-of-campaign-and-state> , and Zephyr Teachout <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/27/the-court-and-the-future-of-public-financing/matching-funds-what-the-court-didnt-touch> .

	My contribution begins:

		It wasn't all bad news for campaign finance reformers in the Supreme Court decision stripping Arizona's matching funds provision from its law giving public financing for state candidates. Among other things <http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/90834/arizona-campaign-finance-supreme-court> , the court confirmed that whether governments enact public financing is "not our business." The issue is how the plans provide the financing, and the big question now is whether New York City's system can become a model for the country.

	 

	Share <http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D19748&title=%E2%80%9CNew%20York%20City%20as%20a%20Model%3F%E2%80%9D&description=> 
	Posted in campaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>  | Comments Off 

	Meanwhile, in Chicago <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19745>  

	Posted on June 27, 2011 <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19745>  by Rick Hasen <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>  

	Blagojevich guilty <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/28/us/28blagojevich.html?hp> .

	Share <http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D19745&title=Meanwhile%2C%20in%20Chicago&description=> 
	Posted in chicanery <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=12>  | Comments Off 

	Investigation Coming to Wisconsin Supreme Court? <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19740>  

	Posted on June 27, 2011 <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19740>  by Rick Hasen <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>  

	Howard <http://howappealing.law.com/062711.html#042137> has the update.

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	Posted in chicanery <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=12> , judicial elections <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=19>  | Comments Off 

	Meanwhile, at the FEC <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19737>  

	Posted on June 27, 2011 <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19737>  by Rick Hasen <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>  

	The Republican Commissioners take another step away <http://electionlawblog.org/wp-content/uploads/11044293607.pdf>  from effective disclosure.

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	Posted in Uncategorized <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=1>  | Comments Off 

	What Does Today's Opinion Mean for NYC and FENA? <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19734>  

	Posted on June 27, 2011 <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19734>  by Rick Hasen <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>  

	Stay tuned. <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate> 

	Share <http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D19734&title=What%20Does%20Today%E2%80%99s%20Opinion%20Mean%20for%20NYC%20and%20FENA%3F&description=> 
	Posted in campaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>  | Comments Off 

	"Chief Justice Roberts to Arizona: Take Your Thumb Off the Scale!" <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19731>  

	Posted on June 27, 2011 <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19731>  by Rick Hasen <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>  

	Hoersting <http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/270581/chief-justice-roberts-arizona-take-your-thumb-scale-stephen-m-hoersting>  at Bench Memos.

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	"Is the Court Energized by Its Critics?" <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19727>  

	Posted on June 27, 2011 <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19727>  by Rick Hasen <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>  

	Paul Clement <http://www.slate.com/id/2297410/entry/2297808/> on the Arizona case [Corrected post, original post said that this Breakfast Table entry was written by Dahlia Lithwick].

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	"The Arizona Campaign Finance Law: The Surprising Good News in the Supreme Court's New Decision" <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19725>  

	Posted on June 27, 2011 <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19725>  by Rick Hasen <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>  

	I have written this commentary <http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/90834/arizona-campaign-finance-supreme-court>  for The New Republic.  It begins:

		Campaign finance laws have now gone 0 for 5 in the Roberts Court. Monday's Supreme Court decision <http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/10-238.pdf>  striking down the matching funds portion of Arizona's voluntary public financing law-which provided extra public financing for candidates facing free-spending opponents or major outside spending-was no surprise. Indeed, I predicted <http://electionlawblog.org/archives/011095.html>  laws like Arizona's were doomed back in 2008, on the day the Court struck down <http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5092223370493741422&q=davis+v.+federal+election+commission&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_vis=1>  a portion of the McCain-Feingold law which raised contribution limits for candidates facing millionaire opponents. The Roberts Court saw both laws as impermissibly trying to level the electoral playing field. Since 2005, the Court has also struck down <http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13551506278581494953&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr>  Vermont's campaign contribution limits as too low, narrowly interpreted <http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12228748998297097461&q=wisconsin+right+to+life+v+fec&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_vis=1>  the McCain-Feingold rules governing corporate campaign spending, and then dealt a death blow to those limits in its most controversial decision to date, Citizens United <http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6233137937069871624&q=citizens+united+v.+fec&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_vis=1> .

		Yet today's decision brings three pieces of unexpected good news to those of us who believe that reasonable campaign finance regulation is not only constitutional, but essential to prevent corruption and ensure fairness in our democracy.

	Share <http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D19725&title=%E2%80%9CThe%20Arizona%20Campaign%20Finance%20Law%3A%20The%20Surprising%20Good%20News%20in%20the%20Supreme%20Court%E2%80%99s%20New%20Decision%E2%80%9D&description=> 
	Posted in campaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>  | Comments Off 

	More Statements on McComish <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19722>  

	Posted on June 27, 2011 <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19722>  by Rick Hasen <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>  

	Campaign Finance Institute <http://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/11-06-27/CFI_Statement_on_McComish_Decision.aspx> ; Demos <http://www.demos.org/press.cfm?currentarticleID=D1F2E593-3FF4-6C82-551601FCFF7BAE2A> .

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	Posted in campaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>  | Comments Off 

	IJ Wins, with Links Galore on Arizona Case <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19719>  

	Posted on June 27, 2011 <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19719>  by Rick Hasen <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>  

	See here <http://www.makenolaw.org/blog/8-government/205-free-speech-wins-ij-a-goldwater-score-major-supreme-court-victory> .

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	Timely <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19716>  

	Posted on June 27, 2011 <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19716>  by Rick Hasen <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>  

	A Special Edition of Gavel to Gavel looks at: Public Financing of Judicial Campaign <http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/gaveltogavel/Public%20Financing%20Special%20Edition.pdf> s.

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	Posted in campaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10> , judicial elections <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=19>  | Comments Off 

	News and Reactions on AZ Case <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19712>  

	Posted on June 27, 2011 <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19712>  by Rick Hasen <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>  

	NY Times; <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/28/us/politics/28campaign.html>  AP <http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_SUPREME_COURT_CAMPAIGN_FINANCE?SITE=AP&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT> ; SF Examiner <http://www.sfexaminer.com/blogs/beltway-confidential/2011/06/supreme-court-overturns-arizona-campaign-finance-law> ; CCP <http://www.campaignfreedom.org/newsroom/detail/supreme-court-strikes-down-matching-funds-provision> ; Brennan Center <http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/supreme_court_strikes_down_trigger_funds_but_public_financing_laws_remain_i> ; Justice at Stake <http://www.gavelgrab.org/?p=22009> ; Democracy21 <http://bit.ly/meDJWQ> ; Heather Gerken <http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/06/campaign-finance-and-doctrinal-death.html> 

	More to come.

	My New Republic piece is being edited and will be up shortly.

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	My Thoughts on Today's Ruling are Coming <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19709>  

	Posted on June 27, 2011 <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19709>  by Rick Hasen <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>  

	My initial thoughts will appear at The New Republic and I'll be linking.

	I actually see a couple of silver linings.

	Stay tuned....

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	Posted in campaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>  | Comments Off 

	Justice Kagan's Response on the Website Point <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19706>  

	Posted on June 27, 2011 <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19706>  by Rick Hasen <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>  

	"Finally, the Court remarks in a footnote that the Clean Elections Commission's website once stated that the ''Act was passed by the people of Arizona . . . to level the playing field.' Ante, at 24, n. 10. I can understand why the majority does not place much emphasis on this point.Some members of the majority have ridiculed the practice of relying on subsequent statements by legislators to demonstrate an earlier Congress's intent in enacting a statute. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U. S. 617, 631-632 (1990) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part); United States v. Hayes, 555 U. S. 415, 434-435 (2009) (ROBERTS,
	C. J., dissenting). Yet here the majority makes a much stranger claim: that a statement appearing on a government website in 2011 (written by who-knows-whom?) reveals what hundreds of thousands of Arizona's voters sought to do in 1998 when they enacted the Clean Elections Act by referendum. Just to state that proposition is to know it is wrong."

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	More Gold from J. Kagan <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19702>  

	Posted on June 27, 2011 <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19702>  by Rick Hasen <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>  

	"Pretend you are financing your campaign through private donations. Would you prefer that your opponent receive a guaranteed, upfront payment of $150,000, or that he receive only $50,000, with the possibility-a possibility that you mostly get to control-of collecting another $100,000 somewhere down the road? Me too."

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	Posted in campaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>  | Comments Off 

	And this from J. Kagan <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19699>  

	Posted on June 27, 2011 <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19699>  by Rick Hasen <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>  

	"If an ordinary citizen, without the hindrance of a law degree, thought this result an upending of First Amendment values, he would be correct."

	Share <http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D19699&title=And%20this%20from%20J.%20Kagan&description=> 
	Posted in campaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>  | Comments Off 

	The Dissent's Ouch! <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19696>  

	Posted on June 27, 2011 <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19696>  by Rick Hasen <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>  

	Justice Kagan: "So they are making a novel argument: that Arizona violated their First Amendment rights by disbursing funds to other speakers even though they could have received (but chose to spurn) the same financial assistance. Some people might call that chutzpah."

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	Ouch! <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19693>  

	Posted on June 27, 2011 <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19693>  by Rick Hasen <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>  

	A fn. in CJ Roberts' opinion: "Prior to oral argument in this case, the Citizens Clean Elections Commission's Web site stated that " 'The Citizens Clean Elections Act was passed by the people of Arizona in 1998 to level the playing field when it comes to running for office.' " AFEC Brief 10, n. 3 (quoting http://www.azcleanelections.gov/about-us/get-involved.aspx); Tr. of OralArg. 48. The Web site now says that "The Citizens Clean Elections Actwas passed by the people of Arizona in 1998 to restore citizen participa-tion and confidence in our political system."

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	Posted in campaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>  | Comments Off 

	Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom PAC v. Bennett (McComish) Decided <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19690>  

	Posted on June 27, 2011 <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=19690>  by Rick Hasen <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>  

	The opinion is here <http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/10-238.pdf> . It is 5-4, as expected, striking down the matching funds provision.

	More to come after I've read and analyzed the 68 pages.

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	-- 
	Rick Hasen
	Visiting Professor
	UC Irvine School of Law
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	Loyola Law School
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