[EL] new study of density/compactness and district bias/responsiveness

[Jason C. Miller]

>would be better aligned with  principles of partisan fairness if there were
a deliberate effort to balance
population density across legislative district

Whatever the "principles of partisan fairness" may be, this proposal seems
to reduce the likelihood of districts lining up with actual communities and
communities that share the same legislative interests.  For example,
ensuring that ever district has a slice of rural voters and a slice of urban
voters--and thus a similar degree of population density--means spreading
rural voters across many districts and ensures that no district will be
dominated by a rural constituency and possibly causing the elected
representatives to ignore the rural issues.  Moreover, given the demands of
the Voting Rights Act and attempts to create majority-minority or
minority-influence districts, it seems particular hard to keep density the
same..

On Fri, May 20, 2011 at 3:03 PM, <JBoppjr at aol.com> wrote:

>  What are the "principles of partisan fairness?" Jim Bopp
>
>  In a message dated 5/20/2011 4:28:47 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
> kierandwilliams at yahoo.com writes:
>
> http://www.bepress.com/spp/vol2/iss1/3/
>
> Using a Density-Variation/Compactness Measure to Evaluate RedistrictingPlans
> for Partisan Bias and Electoral Responsiveness
> Thomas R. Belin, University of California, Los Angeles
> Heidi J. Fischer, University of California, Los Angeles
> Corwin M. Zigler, Harvard University
>
> Abstract
> The clear association between population density and partisan preference
> in
> elections suggests that redistricting plans would be better aligned with
> principles of partisan fairness if there were a deliberate effort to
> balance
> population density across legislative districts. To balance population
> density
> without sacrificing geometric compactness, we define a
> density-variation/compactness (DVC) measure that can serve as a one-number
> summary of a proposed redistricting plan. After analyzing voter
> registration
> data from California to guide the choice of a specific DVC measure, we
> evaluate
> its performance in both actual and hypothetical redistricting plans using
> election data from Texas during the past decade. Using a well-established
> political-science model of the relationship between legislative
> representation
> and the proportion of votes received, higher DVC scores corresponded to
> estimates of partisan bias with smaller magnitude across a range of
> redistricting scenarios; meanwhile, contrary to expectations that reduced
> partisan bias would be accompanied by reduced electoral responsiveness,
> there
> was no discernible pattern between DVC scores and estimates of electoral
> responsiveness. Although there are apt to be multiple considerations in
> choosing
> a redistricting plan, we discuss how the use of DVC measures could provide
> a
> check on attempts to introduce partisan bias into the redistricting
> process.
>
>
>
>
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-- 
Jason C. Miller
Attorney & Counselor at Law
(517) 204-3213
(720) 258-6073
jcmiller at gmail.com
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