[EL] ALEC Boycott

JBoppjr at aol.com JBoppjr at aol.com
Thu Apr 12 06:21:29 PDT 2012


Why would someone say this obviously erroneous statement:
 
"No corporation gives to ALEC because it "does good work" in the  abstract."
 
Of course they would.  ALEC is pro free enterprise and most companies  like 
the free enterprise system.  There are, of course, conservative  
businessmen out there who like conservative policies and legislators..
 
I assume the corporations that give to the Brenan Center also do so because 
 they do "good works" in the view of the donor.  Jim Bopp
 
 
In a message dated 4/11/2012 10:32:28 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,  
schmitt.mark at gmail.com writes:

The problem with that theory is that ALEC isn't a public  good. Corporate 
giving to ALEC is entirely transactional -- companies give  because corporate 
sponsors get X number of seats at the annual conference, and  opportunities 
to weigh in on some of the task forces. If you don't give, you  lose that 
access. No corporation gives to ALEC because it "does good work" in  the 
abstract. 

To some extent, in demonizing ALEC, the left has  exaggerated what it is. 
It's just a network for lobbyists connected to a  network of legislators. 


Mark Schmitt
Senior Fellow, _The Roosevelt Institute_ (http://www.newdeal20.org/) 
202/246-2350
gchat or  Skype: schmitt.mark
_ at mschmitt9_ (https://twitter.com/#!/mschmitt9) 

On 4/11/2012 4:36 PM, Volokh,  Eugene wrote:  
 
It’s possible, but this might also be a classic public goods situation –  
even if a corporation thinks ALEC is doing superb work, the marginal effect  
of that corporation’s withdrawal of its contribution is likely to be fairly 
 modest, so that the corporation might stop  contributing. 
 
 
 
From:  _law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu_ 
(mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu)  
[_mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu_ (mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu) ]  On 
Behalf Of Mark Schmitt
Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2012  12:50 PM
To: _law-election at department-lists.uci.edu_ (mail
to:law-election at department-lists.uci.edu) 
Subject:  Re: [EL] ALEC Boycott


It's interesting how quickly some of the corporations  have abandoned ALEC 
based on a very small boycott. That suggests to me that  the corporations 
didn't feel they were getting much value from their  involvement with ALEC, or 
not enough to offset the very small cost of a  little of bad publicity in a 
limited community. A boycott effort by  colorofchange.org is simply not 
going to prevent a company from doing  something it really wants to do.

Most likely, no one at a  particularly high level of the companies had even 
been involved in the  decision to fund ALEC. It was probably a decision 
made by the company's DC  office, as a way of ensuring access to the ALEC 
member legislators, rather  than an act of political speech. 

The effect of the boycott, then is  to make the corporation notice what its 
lobbyists are doing and ask whether  it makes any sense. That seems like a 
healthy development. 


On  4/10/2012 12:15 PM, Rick Hasen wrote:  
These are all excellent questions, and I'd recommend _Economic Boycotts as 
Harassment: The Threat to First  Amendment Protected Speech in the Aftermath 
of Doe v.  Reed_ 
(http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2776&context=llr) 



On 4/10/2012 8:57 AM, Smith, Brad wrote:   
“While I’ve heard some conservatives saying that political activism from  
liberals to get groups to not support ALEC is intimidation, it looks to me  
like_ protected  First Amendment boycott-like activity_ 
(http://electionlawblog.org/?p=31462) .” 
Of course, it can be both. One question we are going to have to ask  
ourselves is whether we want the meanness of the society that is shaping up.  
While boycotts have some honorable history and can be a useful tool, nobody  
really much wants to live in a boycott world. Labor law has long prohibited  
secondary boycotts, largely for that reason.  
We’ll also have to address more honestly whether the government has a  
compelling interest in forcing people to disclose activity that may subject  
them to boycotts and other forms of harassment. Notice that those boycotting  
and organizing boycotts are not required to disclose themselves, neither  
their identity nor their sources of financing.  
Justice Scalia has voiced concern that a world without compulsory  
disclosure would be particularly nasty. I think he’s got it backwards –  compulsory 
disclosure, supported primarily because it enables opponents of  speech to 
engage in boycotts and other harassment, is creating an increasing  nasty 
political environment.  
One can certainly see something as protected First Amendment activity  
while recognizing it as intimidation as well. And that raises the question  as 
to what interest the government has in enabling  intimidation. 
 
Bradley  A. Smith 
Josiah  H. Blackmore II/Shirley M. Nault  
Designated  Professor of Law 
Capital  University Law School 
303  East Broad Street 
Columbus,  OH 43215 
(614)  236-6317 
_bsmith at law.capital.edu_ (mailto:bsmith at law.capital.edu)  
_http://www.law.capital.edu/faculty/bios/bsmith.asp_ 
(http://www.law.capital.edu/faculty/bios/bsmith.asp) 




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