[EL] ALEC Boycott
Smith, Brad
BSmith at law.capital.edu
Thu Apr 12 09:41:39 PDT 2012
Actually ben, they are doing exactly that - see numerous reports on boycotts after prop 8.
Bradley A. Smith
Josiah H. Blackmore II/Shirley M. Nault
Designated Professor of Law
Capital University Law School
303 East Broad Street
Columbus, OH 43215
(614) 236-6317
bsmith at law.capital.edu<mailto:bsmith at law.capital.edu>
http://www.law.capital.edu/faculty/bios/bsmith.asp
From: law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu [mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] On Behalf Of Ben Adler
Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 11:49 AM
To: Sean Parnell
Cc: JBoppjr at aol.com; law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
Subject: Re: [EL] ALEC Boycott
I accidentally sent this reply just to Brad, I'm new to the list and learning its ways:
Hello everyone, I'm Ben Adler, a writer--mostly for The Nation--and this is my first time posting to the list. I'm with Mark.
Brad, I think your analogies are obviously way off. People aren't boycotting restaurants because one employee gave to a political cause. They aren't boycotting companies because one employee gave to ALEC. They are boycotting companies that gave the company's money to ALEC. The proper analogy would be if people boycotted a restaurant which gives its own money to a cause, not one employee donating. When a company gives its funds to a political cause they are stating that their purpose and the political organization's purpose are one and the same. If so, then it's perfectly logical and appropriate that people who disagree with that political organization will conclude that they should not give their money to that purpose. In other words, when companies donate to ALEC they are saying "we are a conservative organization." People who aren't conservatives, having just learned that a company is conservative, will naturally consider not buying their products. This isn't silencing speech, it's a perfect exercise of speech. If companies decide that it no longer behooves them to be openly conservative, they haven't been silenced. The marketplace of ideas has worked. If you--and the companies giving to ALEC--think the free market is such a wonderful, efficient mechanism, then you should applaud this, not bemoan it.
On Thu, Apr 12, 2012 at 10:35 AM, Sean Parnell <sean at impactpolicymanagement.com<mailto:sean at impactpolicymanagement.com>> wrote:
"It's interesting how quickly some of the corporations have abandoned ALEC based on a very small boycott. That suggests to me that the corporations didn't feel they were getting much value from their involvement with ALEC, or not enough to offset the very small cost of a little of bad publicity in a limited community. A boycott effort by colorofchange.org<http://colorofchange.org> is simply not going to prevent a company from doing something it really wants to do."
Wait, what? I thought the entirety of the angst over ALEC, indeed over corporate political involvement in general, is that this activity provides significant and unfair advantages in the public policy process to corporations. Hence you have wild claims of legislators being bought, of corporations reaping vast and undeserved profits by excess influence over elected officials (Here's an NPR story reporting on the supposed 22,000 percent return on investment for corporations lobbying on the repatriation of overseas profits: http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2012/01/06/144737864/forget-stocks-or-bonds-invest-in-a-lobbyist).
Are we to understand that this line of thinking was a mistake, that corporations actually don't get much value out of their lobbying efforts? Or at the least that ALEC is a particularly ineffective venue for lobbying and advancing corporate public policy interests?
If that were the case, of course, we probably wouldn't have this hysterical crusade against ALEC and corporate political engagement.
Sean Parnell
President
Impact Policy Management, LLC
6411 Caleb Court
Alexandria, VA 22315
571-289-1374<tel:571-289-1374> (c)
sean at impactpolicymanagement.com<mailto:sean at impactpolicymanagement.com>
From: law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu> [mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu>] On Behalf Of JBoppjr at aol.com<mailto:JBoppjr at aol.com>
Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 9:21 AM
To: schmitt.mark at gmail.com<mailto:schmitt.mark at gmail.com>; law-election at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:law-election at department-lists.uci.edu>
Subject: Re: [EL] ALEC Boycott
Why would someone say this obviously erroneous statement:
"No corporation gives to ALEC because it "does good work" in the abstract."
Of course they would. ALEC is pro free enterprise and most companies like the free enterprise system. There are, of course, conservative businessmen out there who like conservative policies and legislators..
I assume the corporations that give to the Brenan Center also do so because they do "good works" in the view of the donor. Jim Bopp
In a message dated 4/11/2012 10:32:28 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, schmitt.mark at gmail.com<mailto:schmitt.mark at gmail.com> writes:
The problem with that theory is that ALEC isn't a public good. Corporate giving to ALEC is entirely transactional -- companies give because corporate sponsors get X number of seats at the annual conference, and opportunities to weigh in on some of the task forces. If you don't give, you lose that access. No corporation gives to ALEC because it "does good work" in the abstract.
To some extent, in demonizing ALEC, the left has exaggerated what it is. It's just a network for lobbyists connected to a network of legislators.
Mark Schmitt
Senior Fellow, The Roosevelt Institute<http://www.newdeal20.org/>
202/246-2350<tel:202%2F246-2350>
gchat or Skype: schmitt.mark
@mschmitt9<https://twitter.com/#%21/mschmitt9>
On 4/11/2012 4:36 PM, Volokh, Eugene wrote:
It's possible, but this might also be a classic public goods situation - even if a corporation thinks ALEC is doing superb work, the marginal effect of that corporation's withdrawal of its contribution is likely to be fairly modest, so that the corporation might stop contributing.
From: law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu> [mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] On Behalf Of Mark Schmitt
Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2012 12:50 PM
To: law-election at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:law-election at department-lists.uci.edu>
Subject: Re: [EL] ALEC Boycott
It's interesting how quickly some of the corporations have abandoned ALEC based on a very small boycott. That suggests to me that the corporations didn't feel they were getting much value from their involvement with ALEC, or not enough to offset the very small cost of a little of bad publicity in a limited community. A boycott effort by colorofchange.org<http://colorofchange.org> is simply not going to prevent a company from doing something it really wants to do.
Most likely, no one at a particularly high level of the companies had even been involved in the decision to fund ALEC. It was probably a decision made by the company's DC office, as a way of ensuring access to the ALEC member legislators, rather than an act of political speech.
The effect of the boycott, then is to make the corporation notice what its lobbyists are doing and ask whether it makes any sense. That seems like a healthy development.
On 4/10/2012 12:15 PM, Rick Hasen wrote:
These are all excellent questions, and I'd recommend Economic Boycotts as Harassment: The Threat to First Amendment Protected Speech in the Aftermath of Doe v. Reed<http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2776&context=llr>
On 4/10/2012 8:57 AM, Smith, Brad wrote:
"While I've heard some conservatives saying that political activism from liberals to get groups to not support ALEC is intimidation, it looks to me like protected First Amendment boycott-like activity<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=31462>."
Of course, it can be both. One question we are going to have to ask ourselves is whether we want the meanness of the society that is shaping up. While boycotts have some honorable history and can be a useful tool, nobody really much wants to live in a boycott world. Labor law has long prohibited secondary boycotts, largely for that reason.
We'll also have to address more honestly whether the government has a compelling interest in forcing people to disclose activity that may subject them to boycotts and other forms of harassment. Notice that those boycotting and organizing boycotts are not required to disclose themselves, neither their identity nor their sources of financing.
Justice Scalia has voiced concern that a world without compulsory disclosure would be particularly nasty. I think he's got it backwards - compulsory disclosure, supported primarily because it enables opponents of speech to engage in boycotts and other harassment, is creating an increasing nasty political environment.
One can certainly see something as protected First Amendment activity while recognizing it as intimidation as well. And that raises the question as to what interest the government has in enabling intimidation.
Bradley A. Smith
Josiah H. Blackmore II/Shirley M. Nault
Designated Professor of Law
Capital University Law School
303 East Broad Street
Columbus, OH 43215
(614) 236-6317<tel:%28614%29%20236-6317>
bsmith at law.capital.edu<mailto:bsmith at law.capital.edu>
http://www.law.capital.edu/faculty/bios/bsmith.asp
_______________________________________________
Law-election mailing list
Law-election at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:Law-election at department-lists.uci.edu>
http://department-lists.uci.edu/mailman/listinfo/law-election
_______________________________________________
Law-election mailing list
Law-election at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:Law-election at department-lists.uci.edu>
http://department-lists.uci.edu/mailman/listinfo/law-election
_______________________________________________
Law-election mailing list
Law-election at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:Law-election at department-lists.uci.edu>
http://department-lists.uci.edu/mailman/listinfo/law-election
--
Ben Adler
Contributing Writer, The Nation
347-463-0429
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://webshare.law.ucla.edu/Listservs/law-election/attachments/20120412/03329bf4/attachment.html>
View list directory