[EL] Illinois Eliminates Contribution Limits when Super PACs spend

JBoppjr at aol.com JBoppjr at aol.com
Thu Jul 12 05:14:55 PDT 2012


 
_Click  here: Illinois Issues blog: New law could roll back some limits on 
campaign  money_ 
(http://illinoisissuesblog.blogspot.com/2012/07/new-law-could-roll-back-some-limits-on.html)  

 
    This is just the first domino to fall.  Low  contribution limits have 
distorted the system, maded it less transparent  and accountable, and 
rendered candidates increasingly irrelevant.  The only  solution is to fix the 
cause of the problem by raising or eliminating  contribution limits. It is 
interesting that it is a solid blue state that is the  first one to do it. Jim 
Bopp
 
In a message dated 7/12/2012 1:03:46 A.M. Eastern Daylight  Time, 
rhasen at law.uci.edu writes:

 
 
_Was Chief Justice  Roberts Most Unprincipled in Applying the Doctrine of 
Constitutional Avoidance  in the Health Care Case, in NAMUDNO (the Voting 
Rights Act Case) or in  Citizens United?_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36823) 
 
Posted  on _July 11, 2012 9:57 pm_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36823)  
by _Rick Hasen_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3)   
 
In _my initial post _ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36309) on the health  
care decision, I stated “Once again, the Chief _has  manipulated the 
doctrine of constitutional avoidance_ 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1436669)  to do what he wanted  to do in a high profile, important 
case.” 
I hadn’t had a chance to go back and expand on this issue since I wrote  
that, but Nicholas Rosenkranz’s _very  smart post_ 
(http://electionlawblog.org/cotusreport.com/2012/07/11/roberts-was-wrong-to-apply-the-canon-of-constitut
ional-avoidance-to-the-mandate/)  has prompted me to do so.  Rosenkranz 
persuasively argues  that Roberts’ use of the avoidance canon in the health 
care case is not your  typical application of the canon: rather than apply it, 
as is typically done,  to a textual ambiguity (such as to the question 
whether a ban on “vehicles” in  the park covers bicycles), the Chief applies to 
to alternative “constitutional  characterizations” of an unambiguous law 
(the health care mandate is either an  unconstitutional “penalty” or a 
constitutional “tax”). 
As poor as this analysis is as an application of the avoidance canon, CJ  
Roberts engaged in two worse applications of the canon in recent years.   In 
the _NAMUDNO _ (http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2008/2008_08_322) case,  
considering the constitutionality of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 
the  Court read the Voting Rights Act to allow for a utility district to “bail 
out”  from coverage under the  Act, an interpretation that the Chief 
Justice  advanced to avoid the constitutional question whether section 5 was  
unconstitutional.  Unlike the health care case, in NAMUDNO the  Court did 
confront a question about textual meaning (did the Voting Rights Act  give the 
utility district a chance to “bail out” from coverage of the  act?).  But the 
unprincipled part of the decision was that the textual  meaning advanced by 
the Chief Justice was wholly unsupported by the text or  the legislative 
history of the Act.  I devote about half of my article,  _Constitutional  
Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court_ 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1436669) , 2009 Supreme Court  Review 181, to 
demonstrating the truth of this assertion. Below the fold, I’ve  included an excerpt 
from my article explaining why the district court so  thoroughly rejected 
the argument that it should avoid the constitutional  question by 
interpreting the Act to allow the utility district to bail  out. 
As with the taxing power analysis by the Chief in the health care case, the 
 bailout analysis in NAMUDNO was a total surprise. See Heather Gerken,  
_The  Supreme Court Punts on Section 5,_ 
(http://%20balkin.blogspot.com/2009/06/supreme-court-punts-on-section-5.html)  Balkinization (June 22, 2009) (“the 
 statutory argument is one that almost no one (save Greg Coleman, the 
lawyer  who argued the case and who is now entitled to be described as a mad 
genius)  thought was particularly tenable because of prior Court opinions.”); 
Richard  L. Hasen, Sordid Business: Will the Supreme Court Kill the Voting 
Rights  Act? Slate (Apr 27, 2009), online at _http://www.slate.com/id/2216888/_ 
(http://www.slate.com/id/2216888/)   (“Since there’s no good statutory 
loophole, the larger constitutional question  seems unavoidable.”). 
And then there’s _Citizens  United_ 
(http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2008/2008_08_205) , the well known case in which the Supreme Court on a 5-4 
vote  struck down the limits on independent corporate spending in elections.  
Constitutional avoidance was an issue there too.  As I explain in my  
article, a week after NAMUDNO was issued, the Court announced it  would not be 
deciding Citizens United by the Court’s summer break as  scheduled. Instead, 
the Court set the case for reargument in September (before  the start of the 
new Court Term), expressly asking the parties to brief the  question whether 
the Court should overturn two of its precedents upholding the  
constitutionality of corporate spending limits in candidate elections. The  
constitutional issue had been abandoned by the law’s challengers in the court  below and 
was not even mentioned in the challengers’ jurisdictional statement.  
Moreover, the constitutional question could easily be avoided through a  plausible 
interpretation of the applicable campaign finance statute. Among  other 
things, the the Court could have held that video-on-demand, which  requires a 
cable subscriber to choose to download video for viewing, is not a  “
broadcast, cable or satellite communication that refers to a  candidate for federal 
office” as defined by BCRA. 
When the Court finally issued Citizens United, Chief Justice  Roberts 
issued a separate concurring opinion, the main thrust of which  appeared to be to 
justify not applying the doctrine of constitutional  avoidance.  He said 
that the interpretation offered to avoid the  constitutional issue simply was 
not a plausible one. “This approach [of the  dissent to apply avoidance] is 
based on a false premise: that our practice of  avoiding unnecessary (and 
unnecessarily broad) constitutional holdings somehow  trumps our obligation 
faithfully to interpret the law. It should go without  saying, however, that 
we cannot embrace a narrow ground of decision simply  because it is narrow; 
it must also be right.” 
In my earlier article, I tried to explain why the Court applied a canon of  
avoidance in NAMUDNO but of anti-avoidance (reach out and decide a 
difficult  constitutional question even if there is a plausible statutory 
construction to  avoid it) in Citizens United.  I came up with three possible  
theories: First, the fruitful dialogue explanation posits that the  Court will use 
constitutional avoidance only when doing so would further a  dialogue with 
Congress that has a realistic chance of actually avoiding  constitutional 
problems through redrafting. On this reading, the Voting Rights  Act got “
remanded” to Congress because Congress may fix it in ways that do not  violate 
the Constitution, but the corporate spending limits provision of  federal 
campaign finance law perhaps does not deserve remand because the  campaign 
finance laws are not constitutionally fixable. Second, the  political legitimacy 
explanation posits that the Court uses the  constitutional avoidance 
doctrine when it fears that a fullblown  constitutional pronouncement would harm 
its legitimacy. Some evidence supports  this understanding. In the same Term 
that the Court avoided the constitutional  question in NAMUDNO, it used the 
same avoidance canon to narrowly  construe a different provision of the 
Voting Rights Act in Bartlett v  Strickland, and it applied constitutional 
avoidance (in deed if not in  name) to narrowly construe Title VII of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act in Ricci  v DeStefano, the controversial New Haven 
firefighters case. Each of these  cases involved tough questions of race relations 
whose resolution could harm  the Court’s legitimacy. In contrast, campaign 
finance issues are much lower  salience to the public, and are less likely to 
arouse the passion of interest  groups and perhaps the ire of Congress. Third, 
the political calculus  explanation posits that the Court uses 
constitutional avoidance to soften  public and Congressional resistance to the Court’s 
movement of the law in a  direction that the Court prefers as a matter of 
policy. 
The Chief Justice’s application of the constitutional avoidance canon in  
the health care case fits with the second and third rationales. The Chief  
could have engaged in the questionable act of avoidance to preserve the  Court’
s legitimacy. Alternatively, as others have suggested he may be playing  
the long game, sacrificing a chance to strike down the health care law in  
order to set new markers on issues including the commerce clause and the  
spending power. 
But what these three opinions have in common is the Chief Justice’s  
selective manipulation of the constitutional avoidance doctrine for legal and  
political ends.  This does not make the Chief Justice unique as a Supreme  
Court Justice—far from it.  But it hardly makes him the neutral umpire he  
fancies himself. 
_Continue reading →_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36823#more-36823)  
 
 
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%20the%20Doctrine%20of%20Constitutional%20Avoidance%20in%20the%20Health%20Ca
re%20Case,%20in%20NAMUDNO%20(the%20Voting%20Rights%20Act%20Case)%20or%20in%2
0Citizens%20United?&description=) 


Posted in _campaign finance_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10) ,  
_statutory  interpretation_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=21) , _Voting Rights 
Act_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=15)   | Comments Off 

 
_“Money gap may not  matter so much in November”_ 
(http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36820)  
Posted  on _July 11, 2012 8:55 pm_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36820)  
by _Rick Hasen_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3)   
 
_An  important piece,_ 
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/romney-surpasses-obama-in-june-fundraising/2012/07/09/gJQA6RMZYW_story.html)  which 
reaffirms my conviction that the more important  role of Super PACs and c4s in 
this election will be about control of the  Senate (and potentially, though 
less likely, the House). 
 
 
(http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36820&title=“Money%20gap%20may%20not%20matter%20so%20much%20in%20November”
&description=) 


Posted in _campaign finance_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10)   | 
Comments Off 

 
_“New Court Challenge  Filed Against FEC Restrictions on Corporate PACs”_ 
(http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36817)  
Posted  on _July 11, 2012 8:49 pm_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36817)  
by _Rick Hasen_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3)   
 
_Bloomberg  BNA_ 
(http://news.bna.com/mpdm/MPDMWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=27295083&vname=mpebulallissues&jd=a0d3m6w5m2&split=0) : “A new court 
challenge to Federal Election Commission rules for  corporate political action 
committees was filed July 10 in federal district  court in Washington (Stop This 
Insanity Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. FEC,  D.D.C., Civil No. 12-1140, 
filed 7/10/12). The court filing came after FEC  deadlocked in March on an 
advisory opinion request asking whether a corporate  political action 
committee (PAC) may solicit unlimited contributions to pay  for independent 
campaign expenditures.” 
 
 
(http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36817&title=“
New%20Court%20Challenge%20Filed%20Against%20FEC%20Restrictions%20on%20Corporate%20PACs”&description=) 


Posted in _campaign finance_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10)   | 
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_“Senate Expected to  Hold Cloture Vote On Bill to Disclose Political Ad 
Funding”_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36815)  
Posted  on _July 11, 2012 8:47 pm_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36815)  
by _Rick Hasen_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3)   
 
_Bloomberg  BNA_ 
(http://news.bna.com/mpdm/MPDMWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=27295082&vname=mpebulallissues&jd=a0d3m6t0v8&split=0) : “Reformers say they 
do not know yet whether they will pick up enough  Republican votes needed to 
reach the 60-vote margin for cloture on the  so-called DISCLOSE Act—or any 
GOP votes. Every Republican senator who voted  when it last came up in 2010, 
voted to block the disclosure legislation.” 
 
 
(http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36815&title=“
Senate%20Expected%20to%20Hold%20Cloture%20Vote%20On%20Bill%20to%20Disclose%20Political%20Ad%20Funding”&description=) 


Posted in _campaign finance_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10)   | 
Comments Off 

 
_Breaking News: Senate  Will Vote on Cloture for Disclose Act on July 16_ 
(http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36812)  
Posted  on _July 11, 2012 11:50 am_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36812)  
by _Rick Hasen_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3)   
 
So reports subscription-only Bloomberg BNA’s Money and Politics report, in  
an email alert. 
 
 
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se%20Act%20on%20July%2016&description=) 


Posted in _campaign finance_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10)   | 
Comments Off 

 
_“NRSC to Nevada SOS:  What happens if Berkley withdraws from the U.S. 
Senate race?”_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36809)  
Posted  on _July 11, 2012 11:42 am_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36809)  
by _Rick Hasen_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3)   
 
Jon Ralston r_eports_ 
(http://www.lasvegassun.com/blogs/ralstons-flash/2012/jul/11/nrsc-nevada-sos-what-happens-if-berkley-withdraws-/) . 
 
 
(http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36809&title=“
NRSC%20to%20Nevada%20SOS:%20What%20happens%20if%20Berkley%20withdraws%20from%20the%20U.S.%20Senate%20race?”&description=) 


Posted in _campaigns_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=59)   | Comments Off 

 
_Understanding Election  Fraud Allegations in the Recent Mexican Election_ 
(http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36807)  
Posted  on _July 11, 2012 11:41 am_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36807)  
by _Rick Hasen_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3)   
 
_This  post_ 
(http://themonkeycage.org/blog/2012/07/11/post-election-report-ii-revisiting-fraud-and-the-2012-mexican-presidential-election/)  at the 
Monkey Cage is well worth reading. 
 
 
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Mexican%20Election&description=) 


Posted in _chicanery_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=12) , _election  
administration_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=18)  | Comments Off 

 
_“Txt 4 Ur  Candidate”_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36804)  
Posted  on _July 11, 2012 11:23 am_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36804)  
by _Rick Hasen_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3)   
 
Ann Ravel, Jared Demarnis and Hyla Wagner have _this  piece _ 
(http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/text-donations-to-2012/) at NYT’s “
Campaign Stops” blog. 
 
 
(http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36804&title=“Txt%204%20Ur%20Candidate”&description=) 


Posted in _campaign finance_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10)   | 
Comments Off 

 
_“Broadcasters Make  Emergency Motion to Block Transparency Rule”_ 
(http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36801)  
Posted  on _July 11, 2012 11:15 am_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36801)  
by _Rick Hasen_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3)   
 
ProPublica _reports_ 
(http://www.propublica.org/article/broadcasters-make-emergency-motion-to-block-transparency-rule) . 
 
 
(http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36801&title=“
Broadcasters%20Make%20Emergency%20Motion%20to%20Block%20Transparency%20Rule”&description=) 


Posted in _campaign finance_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10)   | 
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_“Misleading Data on  Outside Spending”_ 
(http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36798)  
Posted  on _July 11, 2012 11:11 am_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36798)  
by _Rick Hasen_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3)   
 
Jonathan Backer _blogs_ 
(http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-backer/misleading-data-on-outsid_b_1664562.html) . 
 
 
(http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36798&title=“Misleading%20Data%20on%20Outside%20Spending”&description=) 


Posted in _campaign finance_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10)   | 
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_“The ‘CBO Canon’ and  the Debate Over Tax Credits on Federally Operated 
Health Insurance  Exchanges”_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36795)  
Posted  on _July 11, 2012 10:06 am_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36795)  
by _Rick Hasen_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3)   
 
The following is a guest post from Abbe Gluck [cross-posted from 
_Balkinization_ 
(http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/07/cbo-canon-and-debate-over-tax-credits.htmlhttp://) ]: 
Abbe Gluck 
The latest fracas over health reform—the challenge to subsidies for the  
federal exchanges—offers a long-overdue opportunity to think about how  
particular features of modern lawmaking might lead to new interpretive  
presumptions for statutory interpretation. This is the first of series of  posts in 
which I will flesh out that idea. Here, I will focus on the role of  the 
Congressional Budget Office, and how the “budget score” (the budgetary  estimate 
of the effects of legislation) might be a useful tool of modern  statutory 
interpretation, and how it sheds light on the current debate over  the 
federal exchanges. 
In a forthcoming article based on an empirical study of congressional  
drafting (co-authored with Lisa Bressman), we have argued for a new “CBO  canon”
: An interpretive presumption that ambiguities in legislation should be  
construed in the way most consistent with the assumptions underlying the  
congressional budget score on which the initial legislation was based. Both  our 
empirical study and numerous articles in the political science and popular  
literature substantiate the notion that Congress now drafts in the shadow 
of  the score. In the context of health reform, there was widespread 
reporting to  this effect. As just one of many examples, the New York Times reported 
in  March 2010: “Democrats have spent more than a year working with the  
nonpartisan budget office… Whenever the budget office judged some element or  
elements of the bill would cause a problem meeting the cost and  
deficit-reduction targets, Democrats just adjusted the underlying legislation  to make 
sure it would hit their goal.” 
Indeed, I would suggest that the budget score offers better evidence of  
congressional “intent” than other commonly consulted non-textual tools,  
including legislative history. This is because, unlike some types of  
legislative history, the budget score is produced by a nonpartisan office,  widely 
publicized, often debated and usually the focus of many members and  staffers. 
This gives it indicia of reliability that critics of legislative  history 
have often thought lacking for that tool, and yet to my knowledge the  Court 
has never used the score to help resolve statutory ambiguities. 
This brings us to the most recent ACA-related scuffle. The ACA’s opponents  
have raised a challenge to the IRS’s interpretation that the Act allows  
subsidies not only for those who buy insurance on state-operated exchanges,  
but also for those who live in states with federally-operated exchanges. The  
dispute stems from what was most certainly sloppy drafting in the statute—
in  particular, the separation into two different sections of those 
provisions  concerning the state exchanges and those provisions allowing the federal  
government to operate an exchange if states are unwilling or unable to do 
so.  (This issue of how courts should construe such hastily-enacted and 
lengthy  statutes is another one that we take up in our forthcoming article and 
to  which I will return in a future post). 
In my view, the overall structure of the Act and its legislative history,  
plus the confirmatory language in the health reform reconciliation bill, 
amply  support the IRS’s position. If more is wanting, however, the CBO 
evidence  makes it a slam dunk. Throughout the debates and reporting over health 
reform,  legislators, the Administration and the media repeatedly discussed 
and debated  the ACA’s CBO score, and at all times that score was based on the 
provision of  subsidies to all qualifying purchasers on the exchanges, 
regardless of whether  those exchanges were operated by the states or the 
federal government. The  “CBO canon” clearly supports the agency’s 
interpretation. 
 
 
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%20and%20the%20Debate%20Over%20Tax%20Credits%20on%20Federally%20Operated%20Health%20Insurance%20Exchanges”&description=) 


Posted in _legislation and  legislatures_ 
(http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=27) , _statutory  interpretation_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=21)  | 
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_Politifact Rates as  “Mostly True”: Eric Holder says recent studies show 
25 percent of African  Americans, 8 percent of whites lack government-issued 
photo IDs_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36792)  
Posted  on _July 11, 2012 9:32 am_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36792)  
by _Rick Hasen_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3)   
 
_Here_ 
(http://www.politifact.com/texas/statements/2012/jul/11/eric-holder/eric-holder-says-recent-studies-show-25-percent-af/) . 
 
 
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:%20Eric%20Holder%20says%20recent%20studies%20show%2025%20percent%20of%20African%20Americans,%208%20per
cent%20of%20whites%20lack%20government-issued%20photo%20IDs&description=) 


Posted in _election  administration_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=18) , 
_The Voting Wars_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=60) , _voter id_ 
(http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=9) , _Voting Rights Act_ 
(http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=15)   | Comments Off 

 
_Updated Book Tour  Information for The Voting Wars_ 
(http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36789)  
Posted  on _July 11, 2012 8:25 am_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36789)  
by _Rick Hasen_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3)   
 
Here’s the latest version of _the schedule_ 
(http://thevotingwars.com/book-tour/)  (more about the  imminent release of_  the book_ 
(http://www.amazon.com/The-Voting-Wars-Election-Meltdown/dp/0300182031/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=13
42020278&sr=8-1&keywords=the+voting+wars)  at _thevotingwars.com)_ 
(http://thevotingwars.com/) : 
 
_The  Voting Wars_ (http://thevotingwars.com/) 

    *   _front page_ (http://thevotingwars.com/)   
    *   _About the Author_ (http://thevotingwars.com/about-the-author/)   
    *   _About the Book_ (http://thevotingwars.com/)   
    *   _Book Tour_ (http://thevotingwars.com/book-tour/)   
    *   _Endorsements_ (http://thevotingwars.com/reviews/)   
    *   _Media Coverage_ (http://thevotingwars.com/media-appearances/)   
    *   _Pre-Order the Book_ (http://thevotingwars.com/pre-order-the-book/) 
  
    *   _Reviews_ (http://thevotingwars.com/reviewsmedia/)  

Book Tour
Times/dates are subject to change 
July 2, 630 PM London (H.S. Chapman Society) (_details_ 
(http://www.hschapman.org.uk/html/future_programme.html) ) 
September 10, 12 PM New York City (Brennan Center for  Justice) (details to 
come) 
September 10, 7 PM Washington D.C. (University of  California D.C. Center) 
(details to come) 
September 11, 12 pm Boston (Harvard Law School – American  Constitution 
Society) (details to come) 
September 12, 12 pm Chicago (Northwestern University Law  School – American 
Constitution Society) (details to come) 
September 20, 7 pm Los Angeles (details to come–part of  panel program for 
LA ALOUD) 
October 1, 12 pm, Stanford (Stanford Law School – American  Constitution 
Society) (details to come) 
October 1, 5 pm, UC Berkeley (UC Berekely Law School –  American 
Constitution Society) (details to come) 
October 2, 12 pm, Sacramento (American Constitution  Society (details to 
come) 
October 8, 12 pm, Williamsburg, VA (William & Mary Law  School) (details to 
come) 
October 10, 12 pm, Lexington, KY (University of Kentucky  Law School) 
(details to come) 
October 18, time TBA, Bakersfield, CA (part of Zocalo  panel program) 
(details to come) 
 
 
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iption=) 


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_Marilyn Marks Oped on  Her Battle With the City of Aspen_ 
(http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36786)  
Posted  on _July 11, 2012 8:19 am_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36786)  
by _Rick Hasen_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3)   
 
_Here_ 
(http://www.aspentimes.com/article/20120711/COLUMN/120719981/1021&parentprofile=1061) .  More news on the battle _here_ 
(http://www.aspentimes.com/article/20120711/NEWS/120719984/1077&ParentProfile=1058) . 
 
 
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0Aspen&description=) 


Posted in _election  administration_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=18)  
| Comments Off 

 
_“Romney surging, but  Obama well ahead in campaign cash”_ 
(http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36784)  
Posted  on _July 11, 2012 8:17 am_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36784)  
by _Rick Hasen_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3)   
 
Sunlight _reports._ 
(http://reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/2012/fundraising-analysis/)  
 
 
(http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36784&title=“
Romney%20surging,%20but%20Obama%20well%20ahead%20in%20campaign%20cash”&description=) 


Posted in _campaign finance_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10)   | 
Comments Off 

 
_Is Eric Holder Right  on Voter ID?_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36781)  
Posted  on _July 11, 2012 8:16 am_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36781)  
by _Rick Hasen_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3)   
 
_I’ve  posted some thoughts_ 
(http://www.politico.com/arena/perm/Richard_Hasen_D882E526-3599-4C82-9A7D-21A65E2C8281.html)  over at Politico’s Arena. 
 
 
(http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36781&title=Is%20Eric%20Holder%20Right%20on%20Voter%20ID?&description=) 


Posted in _Department of  Justice_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=26) , 
_fraudulent fraud  squad_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=8) , _The Voting 
Wars_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=60) , _voter id_ 
(http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=9) , _Voting Rights Act_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=15)   
| Comments Off 

-- 
Rick Hasen
Chancellor's Professor of Law  and Political Science
UC Irvine School of Law
401 E. Peltason Dr., Suite  1000
Irvine, CA 92697-8000
949.824.3072 - office
949.824.0495 -  fax
_rhasen at law.uci.edu_ (mailto:rhasen at law.uci.edu) 
_http://law.uci.edu/faculty/page1_r_hasen.html_ 
(http://law.uci.edu/faculty/page1_r_hasen.html) 
_http://electionlawblog.org_ (http://electionlawblog.org/) 
Pre-order  The Voting Wars: _http://amzn.to/y22ZTv_ (http://amzn.to/y22ZTv) 
  


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Law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
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