[EL] Illinois Eliminates Contribution Limits when Super PACs spend

[Bill Maurer]

It’s interesting that Rod Blagojevich’s campaign finance misdeeds mirror Richard Nixon’s.  We hear so much about how big contributions cause corruption because contributors are trying to “buy” the allegiance of elected officials.  In both the Nixon and Blagojevich situations, the elected official instead used the vast power of unrestrained government to either impose burdens or withhold benefits from those who must or choose to interact with the government.  I can’t say I understand the reasoning for limiting contributions based on these situations.  All it would do is make the amount for which the person is getting shaken down smaller and make the pool of potential candidates for being shaken down larger.

Of course, there is also the illogic of looking at someone who is being essentially blackmailed and saying “the problem here is the amount of the blackmail.”  No, the problem is a government official willing to abuse his office and blackmail someone.  If I were an Illinois citizen, besides looking into moving, I would not be happy with the idea that my First Amendment rights need to be curtailed in order help force future Rod Blagojeviches live ethical lives.  “Stop us before we’re corrupt again!” is a particularly bad justification for curtailing fundamental First Amendment rights.

From: law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu [mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] On Behalf Of Dan Johnson
Sent: Thursday, July 12, 2012 1:53 PM
To: JBoppjr at aol.com
Cc: law-election at uci.edu
Subject: Re: [EL] Illinois Eliminates Contribution Limits when Super PACs spend

These contribution limits in Illinois were implemented after then-Governor Blagojevich was indicted, impeached and convicted for, among other things, allegedly shaking down hospital executives and owners of road construction companies for five- and six-figure contributions as an inducement for official government action (payment to a children's hospital and a large tollway expansion project, respectively).

The legislators who imposed these contribution limits from contractors to elected officials who personally procure these contracts then reluctantly reversed them universally blamed the Supreme Court 5 for the unfortunate and clear result of an easier opportunity for corruption to occur in the relationship between large contributions and official government action.

I wonder whether, if the dominos do fall and other states are compelled by the Supreme Court's action to eliminate anti-corruption measures like the post-Blagojevich contribution limits will put any pressure on the finding that -- as a matter of law -- the government's anti-corruption rationale is not appropriately applied towards limits on independent expenditures.

More than one Illinois legislator said when witnesses asked then not to roll back these laws with a clear anti-corruption rationale: "Bring it up with John Roberts."

Dan

P.S. Query for better First Amendment lawyers than I: can state legislative history changing state laws as a direct result of Citizens United be used in future litigation to demonstrate a potentially unintended consequence of CU? In other words, is it appropriate for a future Supreme Court (or lower court) to reconsider whether the anti-corruption argument for limiting independent expenditures can be resurrected, given the directly-attributable rollback of laws that are clearly based and constitutionally-authorized on an anti-corruption rationale?


On Thu, Jul 12, 2012 at 7:14 AM, <JBoppjr at aol.com<mailto:JBoppjr at aol.com>> wrote:
Click here: Illinois Issues blog: New law could roll back some limits on campaign money<http://illinoisissuesblog.blogspot.com/2012/07/new-law-could-roll-back-some-limits-on.html>

    This is just the first domino to fall.  Low contribution limits have distorted the system, maded it less transparent and accountable, and rendered candidates increasingly irrelevant.  The only solution is to fix the cause of the problem by raising or eliminating contribution limits. It is interesting that it is a solid blue state that is the first one to do it. Jim Bopp
In a message dated 7/12/2012 1:03:46 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, rhasen at law.uci.edu<mailto:rhasen at law.uci.edu> writes:
Was Chief Justice Roberts Most Unprincipled in Applying the Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance in the Health Care Case, in NAMUDNO (the Voting Rights Act Case) or in Citizens United?<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36823>
Posted on July 11, 2012 9:57 pm<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36823> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

In my initial post <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36309> on the health care decision, I stated “Once again, the Chief has manipulated the doctrine of constitutional avoidance<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1436669> to do what he wanted to do in a high profile, important case.”

I hadn’t had a chance to go back and expand on this issue since I wrote that, but Nicholas Rosenkranz’s very smart post<http://electionlawblog.org/cotusreport.com/2012/07/11/roberts-was-wrong-to-apply-the-canon-of-constitutional-avoidance-to-the-mandate/> has prompted me to do so.  Rosenkranz persuasively argues that Roberts’ use of the avoidance canon in the health care case is not your typical application of the canon: rather than apply it, as is typically done, to a textual ambiguity (such as to the question whether a ban on “vehicles” in the park covers bicycles), the Chief applies to to alternative “constitutional characterizations” of an unambiguous law (the health care mandate is either an unconstitutional “penalty” or a constitutional “tax”).

As poor as this analysis is as an application of the avoidance canon, CJ Roberts engaged in two worse applications of the canon in recent years.  In the NAMUDNO <http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2008/2008_08_322> case, considering the constitutionality of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the Court read the Voting Rights Act to allow for a utility district to “bail out” from coverage under the  Act, an interpretation that the Chief Justice advanced to avoid the constitutional question whether section 5 was unconstitutional.  Unlike the health care case, in NAMUDNO the Court did confront a question about textual meaning (did the Voting Rights Act give the utility district a chance to “bail out” from coverage of the act?).  But the unprincipled part of the decision was that the textual meaning advanced by the Chief Justice was wholly unsupported by the text or the legislative history of the Act.  I devote about half of my article, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1436669>, 2009 Supreme Court Review 181, to demonstrating the truth of this assertion. Below the fold, I’ve included an excerpt from my article explaining why the district court so thoroughly rejected the argument that it should avoid the constitutional question by interpreting the Act to allow the utility district to bail out.

As with the taxing power analysis by the Chief in the health care case, the bailout analysis in NAMUDNO was a total surprise. See Heather Gerken, The Supreme Court Punts on Section 5,<http://%20balkin.blogspot.com/2009/06/supreme-court-punts-on-section-5.html> Balkinization (June 22, 2009) (“the statutory argument is one that almost no one (save Greg Coleman, the lawyer who argued the case and who is now entitled to be described as a mad genius) thought was particularly tenable because of prior Court opinions.”); Richard L. Hasen, Sordid Business: Will the Supreme Court Kill the Voting Rights Act? Slate (Apr 27, 2009), online at http://www.slate.com/id/2216888/ (“Since there’s no good statutory loophole, the larger constitutional question seems unavoidable.”).

And then there’s Citizens United<http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2008/2008_08_205>, the well known case in which the Supreme Court on a 5-4 vote struck down the limits on independent corporate spending in elections. Constitutional avoidance was an issue there too.  As I explain in my article, a week after NAMUDNO was issued, the Court announced it would not be deciding Citizens United by the Court’s summer break as scheduled. Instead, the Court set the case for reargument in September (before the start of the new Court Term), expressly asking the parties to brief the question whether the Court should overturn two of its precedents upholding the constitutionality of corporate spending limits in candidate elections. The constitutional issue had been abandoned by the law’s challengers in the court below and was not even mentioned in the challengers’ jurisdictional statement. Moreover, the constitutional question could easily be avoided through a plausible interpretation of the applicable campaign finance statute. Among other things, the the Court could have held that video-on-demand, which requires a cable subscriber to choose to download video for viewing, is not a “broadcast, cable or satellite communication that refers to a candidate for federal office” as defined by BCRA.

When the Court finally issued Citizens United, Chief Justice Roberts issued a separate concurring opinion, the main thrust of which appeared to be to justify not applying the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.  He said that the interpretation offered to avoid the constitutional issue simply was not a plausible one. “This approach [of the dissent to apply avoidance] is based on a false premise: that our practice of avoiding unnecessary (and unnecessarily broad) constitutional holdings somehow trumps our obligation faithfully to interpret the law. It should go without saying, however, that we cannot embrace a narrow ground of decision simply because it is narrow; it must also be right.”

In my earlier article, I tried to explain why the Court applied a canon of avoidance in NAMUDNO but of anti-avoidance (reach out and decide a difficult constitutional question even if there is a plausible statutory construction to avoid it) in Citizens United.  I came up with three possible theories: First, the fruitful dialogue explanation posits that the Court will use constitutional avoidance only when doing so would further a dialogue with Congress that has a realistic chance of actually avoiding constitutional problems through redrafting. On this reading, the Voting Rights Act got “remanded” to Congress because Congress may fix it in ways that do not violate the Constitution, but the corporate spending limits provision of federal campaign finance law perhaps does not deserve remand because the campaign finance laws are not constitutionally fixable. Second, the political legitimacy explanation posits that the Court uses the constitutional avoidance doctrine when it fears that a fullblown constitutional pronouncement would harm its legitimacy. Some evidence supports this understanding. In the same Term that the Court avoided the constitutional question in NAMUDNO, it used the same avoidance canon to narrowly construe a different provision of the Voting Rights Act in Bartlett v Strickland, and it applied constitutional avoidance (in deed if not in name) to narrowly construe Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in Ricci v DeStefano, the controversial New Haven firefighters case. Each of these cases involved tough questions of race relations whose resolution could harm the Court’s legitimacy. In contrast, campaign finance issues are much lower salience to the public, and are less likely to arouse the passion of interest groups and perhaps the ire of Congress. Third, the political calculus explanation posits that the Court uses constitutional avoidance to soften public and Congressional resistance to the Court’s movement of the law in a direction that the Court prefers as a matter of policy.

The Chief Justice’s application of the constitutional avoidance canon in the health care case fits with the second and third rationales. The Chief could have engaged in the questionable act of avoidance to preserve the Court’s legitimacy. Alternatively, as others have suggested he may be playing the long game, sacrificing a chance to strike down the health care law in order to set new markers on issues including the commerce clause and the spending power.

But what these three opinions have in common is the Chief Justice’s selective manipulation of the constitutional avoidance doctrine for legal and political ends.  This does not make the Chief Justice unique as a Supreme Court Justice—far from it.  But it hardly makes him the neutral umpire he fancies himself.









Continue reading →<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36823#more-36823>
[http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36823&title=Was Chief Justice Roberts Most Unprincipled in Applying the Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance in the Health Care Case, in NAMUDNO (the Voting Rights Act Case) or in Citizens United?&description=]<http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D36823&title=Was%20Chief%20Justice%20Roberts%20Most%20Unprincipled%20in%20Applying%20the%20Doctrine%20of%20Constitutional%20Avoidance%20in%20the%20Health%20Care%20Case%2C%20in%20NAMUDNO%20%28the%20Voting%20Righ>
Posted in campaign finance<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>, statutory interpretation<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=21>, Voting Rights Act<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=15> | Comments Off
“Money gap may not matter so much in November”<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36820>
Posted on July 11, 2012 8:55 pm<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36820> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

An important piece,<http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/romney-surpasses-obama-in-june-fundraising/2012/07/09/gJQA6RMZYW_story.html> which reaffirms my conviction that the more important role of Super PACs and c4s in this election will be about control of the Senate (and potentially, though less likely, the House).
[http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36820&title=“Money gap may not matter so much in November†&description=]<http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D36820&title=%E2%80%9CMoney%20gap%20may%20not%20matter%20so%20much%20in%20November%E2%80%9D&description=>
Posted in campaign finance<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10> | Comments Off
“New Court Challenge Filed Against FEC Restrictions on Corporate PACs”<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36817>
Posted on July 11, 2012 8:49 pm<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36817> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

Bloomberg BNA<http://news.bna.com/mpdm/MPDMWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=27295083&vname=mpebulallissues&jd=a0d3m6w5m2&split=0>: “A new court challenge to Federal Election Commission rules for corporate political action committees was filed July 10 in federal district court in Washington (Stop This Insanity Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. FEC, D.D.C., Civil No. 12-1140, filed 7/10/12). The court filing came after FEC deadlocked in March on an advisory opinion request asking whether a corporate political action committee (PAC) may solicit unlimited contributions to pay for independent campaign expenditures.”
[http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36817&title=“New Court Challenge Filed Against FEC Restrictions on Corporate PACs†&description=]<http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D36817&title=%E2%80%9CNew%20Court%20Challenge%20Filed%20Against%20FEC%20Restrictions%20on%20Corporate%20PACs%E2%80%9D&description=>
Posted in campaign finance<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10> | Comments Off
“Senate Expected to Hold Cloture Vote On Bill to Disclose Political Ad Funding”<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36815>
Posted on July 11, 2012 8:47 pm<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36815> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

Bloomberg BNA<http://news.bna.com/mpdm/MPDMWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=27295082&vname=mpebulallissues&jd=a0d3m6t0v8&split=0>: “Reformers say they do not know yet whether they will pick up enough Republican votes needed to reach the 60-vote margin for cloture on the so-called DISCLOSE Act—or any GOP votes. Every Republican senator who voted when it last came up in 2010, voted to block the disclosure legislation.”
[http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36815&title=“Senate Expected to Hold Cloture Vote On Bill to Disclose Political Ad Funding†&description=]<http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D36815&title=%E2%80%9CSenate%20Expected%20to%20Hold%20Cloture%20Vote%20On%20Bill%20to%20Disclose%20Political%20Ad%20Funding%E2%80%9D&description=>
Posted in campaign finance<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10> | Comments Off
Breaking News: Senate Will Vote on Cloture for Disclose Act on July 16<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36812>
Posted on July 11, 2012 11:50 am<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36812> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

So reports subscription-only Bloomberg BNA’s Money and Politics report, in an email alert.
[http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36812&title=Breaking News: Senate Will Vote on Cloture for Disclose Act on July 16&description=]<http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D36812&title=Breaking%20News%3A%20Senate%20Will%20Vote%20on%20Cloture%20for%20Disclose%20Act%20on%20July%2016&description=>
Posted in campaign finance<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10> | Comments Off
“NRSC to Nevada SOS: What happens if Berkley withdraws from the U.S. Senate race?”<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36809>
Posted on July 11, 2012 11:42 am<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36809> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

Jon Ralston reports<http://www.lasvegassun.com/blogs/ralstons-flash/2012/jul/11/nrsc-nevada-sos-what-happens-if-berkley-withdraws-/>.
[http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36809&title=“NRSC to Nevada SOS: What happens if Berkley withdraws from the U.S. Senate race?†&description=]<http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D36809&title=%E2%80%9CNRSC%20to%20Nevada%20SOS%3A%20What%20happens%20if%20Berkley%20withdraws%20from%20the%20U.S.%20Senate%20race%3F%E2%80%9D&description=>
Posted in campaigns<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=59> | Comments Off
Understanding Election Fraud Allegations in the Recent Mexican Election<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36807>
Posted on July 11, 2012 11:41 am<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36807> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

This post<http://themonkeycage.org/blog/2012/07/11/post-election-report-ii-revisiting-fraud-and-the-2012-mexican-presidential-election/> at the Monkey Cage is well worth reading.
[http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36807&title=Understanding Election Fraud Allegations in the Recent Mexican Election&description=]<http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D36807&title=Understanding%20Election%20Fraud%20Allegations%20in%20the%20Recent%20Mexican%20Election&description=>
Posted in chicanery<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=12>, election administration<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=18> | Comments Off
“Txt 4 Ur Candidate”<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36804>
Posted on July 11, 2012 11:23 am<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36804> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

Ann Ravel, Jared Demarnis and Hyla Wagner have this piece <http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/text-donations-to-2012/> at NYT’s “Campaign Stops” blog.
[http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36804&title=“Txt 4 Ur Candidate†&description=]<http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D36804&title=%E2%80%9CTxt%204%20Ur%20Candidate%E2%80%9D&description=>
Posted in campaign finance<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10> | Comments Off
“Broadcasters Make Emergency Motion to Block Transparency Rule”<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36801>
Posted on July 11, 2012 11:15 am<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36801> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

ProPublica reports<http://www.propublica.org/article/broadcasters-make-emergency-motion-to-block-transparency-rule>.
[http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36801&title=“Broadcasters Make Emergency Motion to Block Transparency Rule†&description=]<http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D36801&title=%E2%80%9CBroadcasters%20Make%20Emergency%20Motion%20to%20Block%20Transparency%20Rule%E2%80%9D&description=>
Posted in campaign finance<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10> | Comments Off
“Misleading Data on Outside Spending”<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36798>
Posted on July 11, 2012 11:11 am<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36798> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

Jonathan Backer blogs<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-backer/misleading-data-on-outsid_b_1664562.html>.
[http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36798&title=“Misleading Data on Outside Spending†&description=]<http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D36798&title=%E2%80%9CMisleading%20Data%20on%20Outside%20Spending%E2%80%9D&description=>
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“The ‘CBO Canon’ and the Debate Over Tax Credits on Federally Operated Health Insurance Exchanges”<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36795>
Posted on July 11, 2012 10:06 am<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36795> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

The following is a guest post from Abbe Gluck [cross-posted from Balkinization<http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/07/cbo-canon-and-debate-over-tax-credits.htmlhttp:/>]:

Abbe Gluck

The latest fracas over health reform—the challenge to subsidies for the federal exchanges—offers a long-overdue opportunity to think about how particular features of modern lawmaking might lead to new interpretive presumptions for statutory interpretation. This is the first of series of posts in which I will flesh out that idea. Here, I will focus on the role of the Congressional Budget Office, and how the “budget score” (the budgetary estimate of the effects of legislation) might be a useful tool of modern statutory interpretation, and how it sheds light on the current debate over the federal exchanges.

In a forthcoming article based on an empirical study of congressional drafting (co-authored with Lisa Bressman), we have argued for a new “CBO canon”: An interpretive presumption that ambiguities in legislation should be construed in the way most consistent with the assumptions underlying the congressional budget score on which the initial legislation was based. Both our empirical study and numerous articles in the political science and popular literature substantiate the notion that Congress now drafts in the shadow of the score. In the context of health reform, there was widespread reporting to this effect. As just one of many examples, the New York Times reported in March 2010: “Democrats have spent more than a year working with the nonpartisan budget office… Whenever the budget office judged some element or elements of the bill would cause a problem meeting the cost and deficit-reduction targets, Democrats just adjusted the underlying legislation to make sure it would hit their goal.”

Indeed, I would suggest that the budget score offers better evidence of congressional “intent” than other commonly consulted non-textual tools, including legislative history. This is because, unlike some types of legislative history, the budget score is produced by a nonpartisan office, widely publicized, often debated and usually the focus of many members and staffers. This gives it indicia of reliability that critics of legislative history have often thought lacking for that tool, and yet to my knowledge the Court has never used the score to help resolve statutory ambiguities.

This brings us to the most recent ACA-related scuffle. The ACA’s opponents have raised a challenge to the IRS’s interpretation that the Act allows subsidies not only for those who buy insurance on state-operated exchanges, but also for those who live in states with federally-operated exchanges. The dispute stems from what was most certainly sloppy drafting in the statute—in particular, the separation into two different sections of those provisions concerning the state exchanges and those provisions allowing the federal government to operate an exchange if states are unwilling or unable to do so. (This issue of how courts should construe such hastily-enacted and lengthy statutes is another one that we take up in our forthcoming article and to which I will return in a future post).

In my view, the overall structure of the Act and its legislative history, plus the confirmatory language in the health reform reconciliation bill, amply support the IRS’s position. If more is wanting, however, the CBO evidence makes it a slam dunk. Throughout the debates and reporting over health reform, legislators, the Administration and the media repeatedly discussed and debated the ACA’s CBO score, and at all times that score was based on the provision of subsidies to all qualifying purchasers on the exchanges, regardless of whether those exchanges were operated by the states or the federal government. The “CBO canon” clearly supports the agency’s interpretation.
[http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36795&title=“The ‘CBO Canon’ and the Debate Over Tax Credits on Federally Operated Health Insurance Exchanges†&description=]<http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D36795&title=%E2%80%9CThe%20%E2%80%98CBO%20Canon%E2%80%99%20and%20the%20Debate%20Over%20Tax%20Credits%20on%20Federally%20Operated%20Health%20Insurance%20Exchanges%E2%80%9D&description=>
Posted in legislation and legislatures<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=27>, statutory interpretation<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=21> | Comments Off
Politifact Rates as “Mostly True”: Eric Holder says recent studies show 25 percent of African Americans, 8 percent of whites lack government-issued photo IDs<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36792>
Posted on July 11, 2012 9:32 am<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36792> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

Here<http://www.politifact.com/texas/statements/2012/jul/11/eric-holder/eric-holder-says-recent-studies-show-25-percent-af/>.
[http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36792&title=Politifact Rates as “Mostly True†: Eric Holder says recent studies show 25 percent of African Americans, 8 percent of whites lack government-issued photo IDs&description=]<http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D36792&title=Politifact%20Rates%20as%20%E2%80%9CMostly%20True%E2%80%9D%3A%20Eric%20Holder%20says%20recent%20studies%20show%2025%20percent%20of%20African%20Americans%2C%208%20percent%20of%20whites%20lack%20gover>
Posted in election administration<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=18>, The Voting Wars<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=60>, voter id<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=9>, Voting Rights Act<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=15> | Comments Off
Updated Book Tour Information for The Voting Wars<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36789>
Posted on July 11, 2012 8:25 am<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36789> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

Here’s the latest version of the schedule<http://thevotingwars.com/book-tour/> (more about the imminent release of the book<http://www.amazon.com/The-Voting-Wars-Election-Meltdown/dp/0300182031/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1342020278&sr=8-1&keywords=the+voting+wars> at thevotingwars.com)<http://thevotingwars.com/>:

The Voting Wars<http://thevotingwars.com/>

  *   front page<http://thevotingwars.com/>
  *   About the Author<http://thevotingwars.com/about-the-author/>
  *   About the Book<http://thevotingwars.com/>
  *   Book Tour<http://thevotingwars.com/book-tour/>
  *   Endorsements<http://thevotingwars.com/reviews/>
  *   Media Coverage<http://thevotingwars.com/media-appearances/>
  *   Pre-Order the Book<http://thevotingwars.com/pre-order-the-book/>
  *   Reviews<http://thevotingwars.com/reviewsmedia/>
[cid:image002.jpg at 01CD6037.19F55A30]
Book Tour

Times/dates are subject to change

July 2, 630 PM London (H.S. Chapman Society) (details<http://www.hschapman.org.uk/html/future_programme.html>)

September 10, 12 PM New York City (Brennan Center for Justice) (details to come)

September 10, 7 PM Washington D.C. (University of California D.C. Center) (details to come)

September 11, 12 pm Boston (Harvard Law School – American Constitution Society) (details to come)

September 12, 12 pm Chicago (Northwestern University Law School – American Constitution Society) (details to come)

September 20, 7 pm Los Angeles (details to come–part of panel program for LA ALOUD)

October 1, 12 pm, Stanford (Stanford Law School – American Constitution Society) (details to come)

October 1, 5 pm, UC Berkeley (UC Berekely Law School – American Constitution Society) (details to come)

October 2, 12 pm, Sacramento (American Constitution Society (details to come)

October 8, 12 pm, Williamsburg, VA (William & Mary Law School) (details to come)

October 10, 12 pm, Lexington, KY (University of Kentucky Law School) (details to come)

October 18, time TBA, Bakersfield, CA (part of Zocalo panel program) (details to come)
[http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36789&title=Updated Book Tour Information for The Voting Wars&description=]<http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D36789&title=Updated%20Book%20Tour%20Information%20for%20The%20Voting%20Wars&description=>
Posted in The Voting Wars<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=60> | Comments Off
Marilyn Marks Oped on Her Battle With the City of Aspen<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36786>
Posted on July 11, 2012 8:19 am<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36786> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

Here<http://www.aspentimes.com/article/20120711/COLUMN/120719981/1021&parentprofile=1061>. More news on the battle here<http://www.aspentimes.com/article/20120711/NEWS/120719984/1077&ParentProfile=1058>.
[http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36786&title=Marilyn Marks Oped on Her Battle With the City of Aspen&description=]<http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D36786&title=Marilyn%20Marks%20Oped%20on%20Her%20Battle%20With%20the%20City%20of%20Aspen&description=>
Posted in election administration<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=18> | Comments Off
“Romney surging, but Obama well ahead in campaign cash”<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36784>
Posted on July 11, 2012 8:17 am<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36784> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

Sunlight reports.<http://reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/2012/fundraising-analysis/>
[http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36784&title=“Romney surging, but Obama well ahead in campaign cash†&description=]<http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D36784&title=%E2%80%9CRomney%20surging%2C%20but%20Obama%20well%20ahead%20in%20campaign%20cash%E2%80%9D&description=>
Posted in campaign finance<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10> | Comments Off
Is Eric Holder Right on Voter ID?<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36781>
Posted on July 11, 2012 8:16 am<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36781> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

I’ve posted some thoughts<http://www.politico.com/arena/perm/Richard_Hasen_D882E526-3599-4C82-9A7D-21A65E2C8281.html> over at Politico’s Arena.
[http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http://electionlawblog.org/?p=36781&title=Is Eric Holder Right on Voter ID?&description=]<http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D36781&title=Is%20Eric%20Holder%20Right%20on%20Voter%20ID%3F&description=>
Posted in Department of Justice<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=26>, fraudulent fraud squad<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=8>, The Voting Wars<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=60>, voter id<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=9>, Voting Rights Act<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=15> | Comments Off
--
Rick Hasen
Chancellor's Professor of Law and Political Science
UC Irvine School of Law
401 E. Peltason Dr., Suite 1000
Irvine, CA 92697-8000
949.824.3072<tel:949.824.3072> - office
949.824.0495<tel:949.824.0495> - fax
rhasen at law.uci.edu<mailto:rhasen at law.uci.edu>
http://law.uci.edu/faculty/page1_r_hasen.html
http://electionlawblog.org<http://electionlawblog.org/>
Pre-order The Voting Wars: http://amzn.to/y22ZTv


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