[EL] Too Brave for the "Home of the Brave"?

JBoppjr at aol.com JBoppjr at aol.com
Wed May 2 05:08:39 PDT 2012


If the candidate already agrees with the contributor before he  
contributes, as your statement of the "problem" says, then there is no  quid-pro-quo.  
That a contributor supports someone who already  agrees with them on the 
issues and as a result they win is not corruption or  bribery. And if the 
politician does what he said he would do in office is  not evil but a honest 
politician.  And all the average people who voted for  this guy benefited from 
the monetary support the candidate received from  the contributor since their 
candidate won.
 
It appears that you just don't like the way democratic elections  work. 
What system do you prefer, a monarchy?  
 
Furthermore, there are huge providers of money behind every political  
party, every ideology and almost every candidate I can think of.  So no  matter 
who wins there are rich people behind them.  There is no such thing  as only 
people of average means behind one candidate and only rich people behind  
another.
 
If you look at the overall demographics of voting in the U.S.   The 
Democrats are predominately supported by (1) the very rich and (2) the  very poor. 
So if your theory is that the rich line up against the  poor, it is actually 
flat wrong.
 
The Republicans, however, are supported by the great middle class from  the 
blue collar voter to the upper middle class.
 
But while I am envious that the Democrats get disproportionate  support 
from the wealthy, I don't think they should be prohibited because  of their 
foolishness.  We just have to figure out how to compete with  it.  Jim Bopp
 
 
In a message dated 5/2/2012 1:05:30 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,  
dan at meek.net writes:

Why is  this a problem?  For the same reasons that bribery and quid pro quo 
 corruption are problems:  Because it is antithetical to democracy, to the  
principle of one-person one-vote, and to the goal that each individual 
citizen  has a meaningful say in electing government officers.  Arranging, 
through  contribution and/or expenditure of huge sums of money, to elect only 
those who  agree with the providers of the money results in government actions 
that  benefit the providers at the expense of persons of average means or  
less.

So let me ask you, why is bribery a problem?  Why is quid  pro quo 
corruption a problem?

Dan  Meek
_dan at meek.net_ (mailto:dan at meek.net) 
10949 S.W. 4th Ave
Portland, OR 97219 503-293-9021
866-926-9646 fax



On  4/30/2012 11:00 AM, _JBoppjr at aol.com_ (mailto:JBoppjr at aol.com)   wrote: 
  
Why is this a problem?
 
The problem is that the contributors and expenders select the winning  
candidates by funding their campaigns. They select persons who already share  
their points of view.
 
There is no quid-pro-quo and this is just democracy -- supporting a  
politician who agrees with you already.  So it is corrupt to support a  politician 
who agrees with you!  Jim Bopp
 
 
In a message dated 4/29/2012 5:55:19 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, 
_dan at meek.net_ (mailto:dan at meek.net)  writes:

Anonymity of contributions (and/or  independent expenditures), even if 
somehow the officeholders could not find  out who made the contributions or 
expenditures (highly unlikely), is a  solution to only a small part of the 
problem.  The problem is not  primarily that contributions or expenditures 
influence an officeholder who  is otherwise a blank slate.  The problem is that 
the contributors and  expenders select the winning candidates by funding their 
campaigns.   They select persons who already share their points of view.  
It does  not matter whether the candidate knows where the money originates.

Dan  Meek
_dan at meek.net_ (mailto:dan at meek.net) 
10949 S.W. 4th  Ave
Portland, OR 97219 503-293-9021
866-926-9646 fax



On  4/29/2012 8:26 AM, Mark Schmitt wrote: Here's a third objection (and 
there  are surely others): Let's stipulate that the executive branch works as 
you  claim it does: agency officials routinely take arbitrary regulatory 
actions  to reward the sitting president's political friends and punish his 
political  enemies. Even if that were the case, your solution of blocking 
campaign  spending disclosure would work, at best, on only one side of the 
problem,  because it hides only one side of the transaction. It might make 
retribution  harder. But the party in power would still know exactly who its 
friends are,  and could reward them. But no one else would know. Journalists, 
opposing  campaigns, researchers, and congressional investigators and even 
prosecutors  would have no ability to determine whether the administration was, 
in fact,  rewarding its financial backers. And if the agency administrators 
are the  unprincipled political operatives you depict, they're also unlikely 
to be  ignorant about who the administration's political opponents are. 
(Whether  they are named on a campaign-affiliated web site or not.)

Ian Ayres'  solution (in the 2002 book Voting with Dollars, with Bruce 
Ackerman)  of mandatory anonymity on contributions was theoretically appealing. 
If  every single legislative or administrative action could take place 
behind a  veil of total ignorance, on all sides, about who the donors were, that 
might  be as effective, in its own way, as total disclosure. But it's a 
thought  experiment, not a realistic proposal, because of course elected 
officials  will know exactly who their financial supporters are, even if they're 
not  sure of the exact amounts. And they know who their opponents' backers 
are,  just as they can know with reasonable accuracy what share of the vote  
they'll get from a given county or state or demographic category. 

In  the dystopian "government by waiver" coupled with massive cronyism and  
revenge that you depict, the broadest possible disclosure would be  
absolutely essential, in order to actually reveal or test the patterns of  
favoritism and revenge you see. For example, in your 2011 National Review  article, 
you cite three examples of the administration taking action against  
businesses: the NLRB action against Boeing; the move by the HHS Inspector  General 
to exclude Forest Laboratories from participation in federal health  
programs, following three criminal guilty pleas on fraud charges; and an EPA  
rejection of Shell's permits to drill in the Arctic. Without disclosure, we  
would have no evidence at all about whether these decisions were politically  
motivated. With disclosure, they become testable propositions. As it  happens, 
Boeing is primarily a Democratic donor and, as a Chicago company, a  huge 
source of money for Obama;  Forest Labs CEO Howard Solomon is  exclusively a 
Democratic donor and a big one; and only Shell is  mostly a Republican 
donor. These may have been bad administrative decisions,  but there's no reason 
to think they were retribution for political spending.  Without disclosure, 
we can't even try to answer that question.

All  three actions have since been settled, dropped, or reversed, also by  
administration officials.



On 4/27/2012 1:05 PM, Steve  Hoersting wrote:  
In the event I was not clear, the kind of  retribution I of which I speak 
is largely regulatory/economic.

I am  not speaking just of crony capitalism.  I am speaking of the  
increased importance of political participation in an environment Richard  Epstein 
describes as "Government by Waiver." Among the ideas is that, as  agency 
power is subject to less review from the other branches, and more  and more 
statutes vest vast powers in administrators with repeated  statements such as, 
"The Secretary shall...," a businessman speaking  against the team empowered 
to decide, on a multitude of unverifiable  factors, whether he will be a 
medical provider at all in, say, a  nationalized medical system is not 
"Brave."  Rather he is something  beyond brave where the team, officeholder or 
official he would speak  against has shown a predilection to reward allies and 
frustrate opponents,  and has a 50-50 chance of winning.

Two objections I expect... And  two quick replies:

1) Socialist Workers only protects  dissidents and the like, certainly not 
business leaders or the  wealthy.  Not so.  The paradigmatic case -- NAACP 
v. Ala.  -- protected all contributors to the NAACP.  This must have included 
 some of the wealthiest, established persons in Birmingham at the  time.  
The exemption goes to those who need it.

2) You'll  never prove retribution.  It is important to remember, this 
isn't  tort law.  No one is saying the official is liable here.  And  the 
official cannot say he would be "damaged" by full political  participation, 
particularly after Carolene Products.   The  "reasonable probability of 
retribution" standard of Socialist Workers,  Doe v Reed and the like, is within the 
context of the 1st Am. -- and  exists only to free political speakers.  It 
should be a far lower  standard than in tort law.

Steve

On Fri, Apr 27, 2012 at 12:04 PM, Steve Hoersting  <_hoersting at gmail.com_ 
(mailto:hoersting at gmail.com) > wrote:

Dear Rick,

When last you and  I chatted about disclosure and its exceptions, I closed 
on this  point:

But ask yourself, for a later discussion:  Can you imagine actions taken 
with the aid of public disclosure that  even "someone important" [and I'm sure 
you meant J. Scalia] might likely  say is too much, even for "the  Brave?"


Everyone discussing disclosure  exemptions, Doe v. Reed, Civic Courage and 
The Brave do so on the  premise of managing the problem of 
citizen-on-citizen retribution.   But they ignore a quickly shifting landscape.  The real 
question is  quickly becoming this: What about the rights of a potential 
speaker who  witnesses or reads of government-on-citizen retribution visited  on 
others?  This person wants to participate in the election, but  doesn't want 
to risk being the next one made an example of.

An  op-ed today, by WSJ's Kim Strassel, brings this issue to the  fore.

_http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304723304577368280604524916.h
tml?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEADTop_ 
(http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304723304577368280604524916.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEADTop) 

If the regulatory process is soon to be so divorced from  congressional 
budgetary processes and meaningful judicial review -- and  I am thinking now of 
the powers vested in an IPAB or Dodd-Frank's new  consumer czar -- the 
prospect of post hoc regulatory decisions,  made by winning officeholders who 
have already demonstrated a  willingness to reward friends and frustrate 
opponents, can intimidate  businessmen deciding whether to speak at all in the 
election. 

An  answer to this drain on popular sovereignty is for business-men and  
-women to 1) seek the Socialist Workers exemption 2) to campaign  disclosure 
of independent communications (not candidate donations) 3)  for potential 
speakers who 4) have observed the actions of abusive  officials of any party, 
want to speak against them in the election, and  do not want to be "next."  
These business men or women would file  as John Does or Jane Does to protect 
their anonymity while the district  court adjudicates their application.  If 
the request is denied,  they would have the choice to proceed or stay 
silent -- forming a record  for appellate review.

If no one receives the Socialist  Workers exemption from a district court, 
appellate courts will have  to consider that fact when revisiting not only 
Socialist Workers'  efficacy as a safety valve, but the importance of "the 
informational  interest" itself.  If no lower court will grant the exemption,  
then, in the new wave of regulatory power sure to come, the Carolene  
Products compromise -- that economic deprivations will not be  handled in the 
courts but rather in robust political processes -- is all  but dead.  

Even after the Judicial Revolution of 1937, and  irrespective of who wins 
in November, regulatory power is only  legitimate if it is the result of 
robust political processes.

Now back to Scalia, our discussion, and the Home of the Brave.   Where 
citizen-on-citizen intimidation is facilitated by disclosure, as  in the Prop 8 
cases and Doe v. Reed, Scalia wants citizens to  toughen up and get some 
"civic courage."  But I believe where  government-on-citizen intimidation is 
facilitated by public  disclosure Scalia would not look favorably upon this at 
 all.  Scalia knows our Founders pledged their lives, fortunes  and honor 
in their 18th century campaign against the King.  But  these men were already 
acting outside the political system of their day,  not within it.  Their 
"Courage" cannot be the model Scalia would  hold businessmen to while U.S. 
courts are open.  The reasonable  probability of government-on-citizen 
retribution can be a difference in  kind.

It is conventional wisdom that Scalia likes what he calls  "real" 
constitutional law -- not just adjudicating rights under the  first ten amendments, 
but deciding questions about relative power  distributed among co-equal 
branches.  Scalia would recognize that,  after 1937 and the Carolene compromise 
of 1938, regulatory  legitimacy derives almost entirely from robust political 
 processes.  I have to believe he would understand that those asked  to 
speak electorally in an atmosphere of a probable government  retribution 
knowing their is a 50-50 chance their side will lose the  coming election are not 
"Brave" but martyrs or fools.

Most  importantly, Scalia knows that when robustness is chilled, the  
Carolene compromise itself is called into question.  Not  only are speech rights 
deprived, the electoral crucible that ensures  popular sovereignty begins to 
produce tainted results; and the very  structure of government and relative 
power among the branches risks  being altered.

This is a theory I will be promulgating when I get  the opportunity, in 
addition to this old op-ed.  _http://www.nationalreview.com/blogs/print/266623_ 
(http://www.nationalreview.com/blogs/print/266623)    If anyone else wants 
to develop it, please be my guest.

-- 
Stephen M.  Hoersting






--  
Stephen M. Hoersting




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