[EL] Campaign finance reform and social choice

JBoppjr at aol.com JBoppjr at aol.com
Thu May 3 06:41:37 PDT 2012


Dan, thank you for your response.  I have a comment regarding 2 of  your 
points:
 
(1) "I expected a more reasoned argument from Mr.  Bopp."
 
    I set out my reasoning in my  comment before I ask you this question.  
My reasoning was also set out in  previous comments on this thread.
 
  Again, my point was that you were saying that  it is a problem that rich 
people support candidates who agree with them.   If it is a problem when 
contributors support candidates who agree with  them, and it is a problem when 
a contributor supports a candidate  who disagrees with him or her in order 
to influence the candidates  vote (quid-pro-quo) then no one can support any 
candidate without it being a  problem.  You then cannot conduct elections at 
all without these  "problems.".  So my questions was:  what system do you  
support?
 
(2) "How about "insurgent" candidates even in the  Democratic and Republic 
primaries who have not already been selected by the  big-money donors?"
 
First, there are many "insurgent" candidates supported  by big 
contributors, but under the campaign finance contribution limits it is  hard for them to 
do it and thus become know. Stewart Mott's support of Gene  McCarthy is one 
example before contribution limits, and the rich folks who gave  to Super 
PACs supporting Santorum and Gingrich are others.
 
But you ask the question in a way that means that I  can never give an 
answer acceptable to you.  You say tell me about  "insurgents" "who have not 
already been selected by the big-money  donors."  Well that means that as soon 
as a big-money donor  contributes -- the example is eliminated. There are 
never any insurgents, who  are selected for support by at least one-money 
donor, who is also not  selected for support by at least one-money donor.
 
Jim
 
 
In a message dated 5/3/2012 1:10:15 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,  
dan at meek.net writes:

Returning to Mr. Bopp's reply to  me:

"It appears that  you just don't like the way democratic elections work. 
What system do you  prefer, a monarchy?"

I expected a more reasoned argument from  Mr. Bopp.  Elections are more 
"democratic" when there are reasonable  limits on political contributions and 
independent expenditures and when the  identities of the contributors and 
independent expenders are disclosed.   Mr. Bopp seems to believe that the only 
"democratic" election is one in which  voters can be swayed by campaigns 
funded by unlimited contributions and  expenditures.  I am not sure whether he 
thinks the sources of those funds  should be disclosed.

"Furthermore, there  are huge providers of money behind every political 
party, every ideology and  almost every candidate I can think of.  So no matter 
who wins there are  rich people behind them.  There is no such thing as 
only people of  average means behind one candidate and only rich people behind  
another."

No, there are not huge providers of money  behind political 
parties/candidates besides the general election candidates of  the 2 major parties.  Can 
Mr. Bopp really think of Green candidates with  huge providers of money?  How 
about non-affiliated candidates?  How  about "insurgent" candidates even in 
the Democratic and Republic primaries who  have not already been selected by 
the big-money donors?  His thinking  seems to be limited to only the 
general election nominees of the 2 major  parties and nothing else.  But those 
elections are typically between two  candidates, each of whom has already been 
selected by the large contributors  and/or expenders.

"If you look at the  overall demographics of voting in the U.S. The 
Democrats are predominately  supported by (1) the very rich and (2) the very poor. 
So if your theory is  that the rich line up against the poor, it is actually 
flat  wrong."

Of course, that is not my theory and is  not relevant to my statement.  
Further, both the Democrats and the  Republicans are predominantly supported by 
corporations and wealthy  individuals, while the Democrats also receive 
most of the monetary support  from unions.  The Republicans use part of this 
money to persuade  low-income "Christian conservatives" to vote for them, 
while the Democrats use  part of this money persuade other low-income folks to 
vote for them.  The  result is election of candidates selected by the big 
contributors and  independent expenders.

Poor folks make virtually no monetary political  contributions.  I recently 
read that 94% of Americans make zero political  contributions, while 99.5% 
contribute less than $200.  In Oregon, under a  regime of no enforcement of 
limits on political contributions, over 87% of the  funds contributed to 
campaigns in 2010 came in amounts of $500 or more per  contribution.  Poor 
folks are not using money to select the candidates  who win.

Dan  Meek
_dan at meek.net_ (mailto:dan at meek.net) 
10949 S.W. 4th Ave
Portland, OR 97219 503-293-9021
866-926-9646 fax



On  5/2/2012 10:52 AM, Milyo, Jeffrey D. wrote:  
Overstatement? Well, I never!  



Dan makes a good point that the claim about public interest is unnecessary, 
but being told you are partly correct is sort of like being only mostly 
dead... Ken M.'s response is correct and sufficient as a response, but in the 
custom of this company, I'll expound further:



Dan is correct that there are special cases (e.g., the median voter 
theorem) in which it may make sense to speak of a "public interest" (I would argue 
even those cases); but as a general proposition, definitely not... 



In general and in the abstract (absent institutional constraints) majority 
rule processes are intransitive (unpredictable); further, even when 
institutions constrain majority rule to some equilibrium outcome, there are in 
general, multiple equilibria.  Further, pure majority rule is but one process, 
and different collective choice rules (institutions) can lead to different 
outcomes even holding constant individual preferences.  That is the basis for 
my claim that the most important lesson from social choice theory in the last 
50 years is that *in general* the concept of a public interest is 
nonsense...  (and I thought was being understated; I really think it is the most 
important lesson from social choice *ever*... see all of the crimes against 
humanity committed for some supposed greater good).



As for the claim that because there is some correlation between democracy 
and what I called "good outcomes," there must be a notion of the public 
interest that defines "good outcomes"... I only mean that when some scholars hold 
up some outcomes as desirable, you may well find some correlation... but if 
you want to say that this implies there exists a consensual public interest 
to prevent famine or reduce infant mortality, I guess I could go along with 
it that far... (although some current and historical governments might 
disagree).  I'll look forward to the evidence that campaign finance reforms 
prevent famines or improve life expectancy... But if you mean something more 
fine-grained by "public interest", that's nonsense -- on stilts.





Jeff



-----Original Message-----

From: Lowenstein, Daniel [_mailto:lowenstein at law.ucla.edu_ 
(mailto:lowenstein at law.ucla.edu) ] 

Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2012 11:31 AM

To: Milyo, Jeffrey D.; Kurt Walters; _JBoppjr at aol.com_ 
(mailto:JBoppjr at aol.com) ; _dan at meek.net_ (mailto:dan at meek.net) 

Cc: _law-election at department-lists.uci.edu_ 
(mailto:law-election at department-lists.uci.edu) 

Subject: RE: [EL] Campaign finance reform and social choice



          Prudence suggests caution before taking issue with Jeff Milyo, 
but caution be damned, it is an overstatement for him to say "50 years of 
social choice theory have taught us ... that there is no such thing as 'the' 
public interest."  Indeed, it was precisely 50 years ago that one of the three 
or four most important founders of social choice theory, Anthony Downs, 
published an article in Social Research entitled "The Public Interest: Its 
Meaning in a Democracy."  Jeff's 50-year period embraces the 40-year life span of 
an influential journal, in which major social choice theorists such as 
Downs and Mancur Olson frequently published, entitled "The Public Interest."  
Jeff's own message claims that "there are some broad correlations between 
democracy and good national outcomes."  What can he mean by "good national 
outcomes" other than outcomes that are in the public interest?  Indeed, outcomes 
that are in "the" public interest.



           Jeff does not need to base his argument on such a falsely strong 
premise.  The plausible view of Downs and many, many others is that while 
there is a public interest that can advance or decline, many and probably 
most of the matters that make up day-to-day political struggles either pit one 
legitimate interest against another and therefore cannot be resolved by 
applying the concept of the public interest, or affect the public interest so 
obliquely and uncertainly, that as a practical matter, again, it is not 
helpful or at least not decisive to analyze in terms of the public interest.  That 
is a sufficient premise for the argument Jeff makes in his message.



             Best,



             Daniel H. Lowenstein

             Director, Center for the Liberal Arts and Free Institutions 
(CLAFI)

             UCLA Law School

             405 Hilgard

             Los Angeles, California 90095-1476

             310-825-5148





________________________________

From: _law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu_ 
(mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu)  
[_law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu_ (mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu) ] On Behalf 
Of Milyo, Jeffrey D. [_milyoj at missouri.edu_ (mailto:milyoj at missouri.edu) ]

Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2012 8:25 AM

To: Kurt Walters; _JBoppjr at aol.com_ (mailto:JBoppjr at aol.com) ; 
_dan at meek.net_ (mailto:dan at meek.net) 

Cc: _law-election at department-lists.uci.edu_ 
(mailto:law-election at department-lists.uci.edu) 

Subject: Re: [EL] Campaign finance reform and social choice



The "home of the brave" debate has morphed into an argument that is more a 
disagreement based on different premises about how democracy "works" ...  
(Kurt W. is romantic; Jim B. is enlightened...)



If the last 50 years of social choice theory have taught us anything, it's 
that there is no such thing as "the" public interest; it is a fundamentally 
nonsensical concept.  Once we move away from the Romantic fantasy that it is 
possible to construct a set of institutions that implement a General Will, 
the argument for reform becomes a little more challenging... It is not 
sufficient to just claim that money perverts democracy and this or that 
regulation is obviously better simply because it reduces the flow of money into 
campaigns and lobbying.  So (putting aside the constitutional constraints on 
reform), it is necessary to evaluate how reforms actually work in practice, not 
just assert that any impediment to some special interest influence is 
necessarily an improvement.



Democracy is a set of procedures that describe the rules of the game by 
which special interests duke it out; that's it:  no theoretical reason to think 
you get good, wise or sensible policy out of such a process (although 
thankfully, there are some broad correlations between democracy and good national 
outcomes).  Hindering some special interests, or blocking one route that 
special interests influence politics have theoretically ambiguous implications 
for outcomes.



So not only isn't it obvious what regulations accomplish in practice; in 
fact, many empirical studies do not bear out the world-view of reformers 
regarding the influential and pernicious role of money in American politics.  But 
if the perennial calls for more government control of politics teach us 
anything, it is that you can never underestimate the statists' faith in their 
own powers of introspection, even in the face of contrary evidence...



Jeff



From: _law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu_ 
(mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu)  
[_mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu_ (mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu) ] On 
Behalf Of Kurt Walters

Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2012 9:31 AM

To: _JBoppjr at aol.com_ (mailto:JBoppjr at aol.com) ; _dan at meek.net_ 
(mailto:dan at meek.net) 

Cc: _law-election at department-lists.uci.edu_ 
(mailto:law-election at department-lists.uci.edu) 

Subject: Re: [EL] Too Brave for the "Home of the Brave"?



You're completely misrepresenting Dan's argument. He is emphatically not 
saying that contributors/expenders selecting candidates (even who genuinely 
agree with them in their heart of hearts) is quid pro quo. He's saying that 
both the selection problem (for lack of a better term) and quid pro quo are 
problematic for the same reason: that it "results in government actions that 
benefit the providers at the expense of persons of average means or less."



I would venture that for Dan and many others, whether the politician in 
question is an "evil" person is beside the point. The important matter is 
whether government is acting in the interests of the public at large or in the 
interests of a select few.



Also, lobbing out

It appears that you just don't like the way democratic elections work. What 
system do you prefer, a monarchy?

is a diversion and immaterial to the discussion. Saying that the method of 
democratic elections can be improved is not advocating monarchy.



Finally, you pull out another strawman when you argue that "There is no 
such thing as only people of average means behind one candidate and only rich 
people behind another." Again, that's not anyone's argument. I think the 
argument is more that selection bias affects which candidates are eventually 
available to vote on, a filtering effect that would happen much earlier than 
the general election. Saying that there is at least some big money behind 
every party/ideology, even if that is true, is not the same as arguing that 
wealth and ideology do not correlate at all, which would be an... interesting 
claim.



-Kurt Walters













From: "_JBoppjr at aol.com_ (mailto:JBoppjr at aol.com) _<mail
to:JBoppjr at aol.com>_ (mailto:JBoppjr at aol.com) " <_JBoppjr at aol.com_ (mailto:JBoppjr at aol.com) 
_<mailto:JBoppjr at aol.com>_ (mailto:JBoppjr at aol.com) >

Date: Wed, 2 May 2012 08:08:39 -0400

To: "_dan at meek.net_ (mailto:dan at meek.net) _<mailto:dan at meek.net>_ 
(mailto:dan at meek.net) " <_dan at meek.net_ (mailto:dan at meek.net) _<mailto:dan at meek.net>_ 
(mailto:dan at meek.net) >

Cc: "_law-election at department-lists.uci.edu_ 
(mailto:law-election at department-lists.uci.edu) _<mailto:law-election at department-lists.uci.edu>_ 
(mailto:law-election at department-lists.uci.edu) " 
<_law-election at department-lists.uci.edu_ (mailto:law-election at department-lists.uci.edu) 
_<mailto:law-election at department-lists.uci.edu>_ (mailto:law-election at department-lists.uci.edu) >

Subject: Re: [EL] Too Brave for the "Home of the Brave"?



If the candidate already agrees with the contributor before he contributes, 
as your statement of the "problem" says, then there is no quid-pro-quo.  
That a contributor supports someone who already agrees with them on the issues 
and as a result they win is not corruption or bribery. And if the 
politician does what he said he would do in office is not evil but a honest 
politician.  And all the average people who voted for this guy benefited from the 
monetary support the candidate received from the contributor since their 
candidate won.



It appears that you just don't like the way democratic elections work. What 
system do you prefer, a monarchy?



Furthermore, there are huge providers of money behind every political 
party, every ideology and almost every candidate I can think of.  So no matter 
who wins there are rich people behind them.  There is no such thing as only 
people of average means behind one candidate and only rich people behind 
another.



If you look at the overall demographics of voting in the U.S.  The 
Democrats are predominately supported by (1) the very rich and (2) the very poor. So 
if your theory is that the rich line up against the poor, it is actually 
flat wrong.



The Republicans, however, are supported by the great middle class from the 
blue collar voter to the upper middle class.



But while I am envious that the Democrats get disproportionate support from 
the wealthy, I don't think they should be prohibited because of their 
foolishness.  We just have to figure out how to compete with it.  Jim Bopp



In a message dated 5/2/2012 1:05:30 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, 
_dan at meek.net_ (mailto:dan at meek.net) _<mailto:dan at meek.net>_ (mailto:dan at meek.net)  
writes:

Why is this a problem?  For the same reasons that bribery and quid pro quo 
corruption are problems:  Because it is antithetical to democracy, to the 
principle of one-person one-vote, and to the goal that each individual citizen 
has a meaningful say in electing government officers.  Arranging, through 
contribution and/or expenditure of huge sums of money, to elect only those 
who agree with the providers of the money results in government actions that 
benefit the providers at the expense of persons of average means or less.



So let me ask you, why is bribery a problem?  Why is quid pro quo 
corruption a problem?



Dan Meek

_dan at meek.net_ (mailto:dan at meek.net) _<mailto:dan at meek.net>_ 
(mailto:dan at meek.net) 



10949 S.W. 4th Ave

Portland, OR 97219



503-293-9021

866-926-9646 fax







On 4/30/2012 11:00 AM, _JBoppjr at aol.com_ (mailto:JBoppjr at aol.com) 
_<mailto:JBoppjr at aol.com>_ (mailto:JBoppjr at aol.com)  wrote:

    Why is this a problem?



The problem is that the contributors and expenders select the winning 
candidates by funding their campaigns. They select persons who already share 
their points of view.



There is no quid-pro-quo and this is just democracy -- supporting a 
politician who agrees with you already.  So it is corrupt to support a politician 
who agrees with you!  Jim Bopp



In a message dated 4/29/2012 5:55:19 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, 
_dan at meek.net_ (mailto:dan at meek.net) _<mailto:dan at meek.net>_ (mailto:dan at meek.net)  
writes:

Anonymity of contributions (and/or independent expenditures), even if 
somehow the officeholders could not find out who made the contributions or 
expenditures (highly unlikely), is a solution to only a small part of the problem. 
 The problem is not primarily that contributions or expenditures influence 
an officeholder who is otherwise a blank slate.  The problem is that the 
contributors and expenders select the winning candidates by funding their 
campaigns.  They select persons who already share their points of view.  It does 
not matter whether the candidate knows where the money originates.



Dan Meek

_dan at meek.net_ (mailto:dan at meek.net) _<mailto:dan at meek.net>_ 
(mailto:dan at meek.net) 



10949 S.W. 4th Ave

Portland, OR 97219



503-293-9021

866-926-9646 fax







On 4/29/2012 8:26 AM, Mark Schmitt wrote: Here's a third objection (and 
there are surely others): Let's stipulate that the executive branch works as 
you claim it does: agency officials routinely take arbitrary regulatory 
actions to reward the sitting president's political friends and punish his 
political enemies. Even if that were the case, your solution of blocking campaign 
spending disclosure would work, at best, on only one side of the problem, 
because it hides only one side of the transaction. It might make retribution 
harder. But the party in power would still know exactly who its friends are, 
and could reward them. But no one else would know. Journalists, opposing 
campaigns, researchers, and congressional investigators and even prosecutors 
would have no ability to determine whether the administration was, in fact, 
rewarding its financial backers. And if the agency administrators are the 
unprincipled political operatives you depict, they're also unlikely to be 
ignorant a

 bout who the administration's political opponents are. (Whether they are 
named on a campaign-affiliated web site or not.)



Ian Ayres' solution (in the 2002 book Voting with Dollars, with Bruce 
Ackerman) of mandatory anonymity on contributions was theoretically appealing. If 
every single legislative or administrative action could take place behind a 
veil of total ignorance, on all sides, about who the donors were, that 
might be as effective, in its own way, as total disclosure. But it's a thought 
experiment, not a realistic proposal, because of course elected officials 
will know exactly who their financial supporters are, even if they're not sure 
of the exact amounts. And they know who their opponents' backers are, just 
as they can know with reasonable accuracy what share of the vote they'll get 
from a given county or state or demographic category.



In the dystopian "government by waiver" coupled with massive cronyism and 
revenge that you depict, the broadest possible disclosure would be absolutely 
essential, in order to actually reveal or test the patterns of favoritism 
and revenge you see. For example, in your 2011 National Review article, you 
cite three examples of the administration taking action against businesses: 
the NLRB action against Boeing; the move by the HHS Inspector General to 
exclude Forest Laboratories from participation in federal health programs, 
following three criminal guilty pleas on fraud charges; and an EPA rejection of 
Shell's permits to drill in the Arctic. Without disclosure, we would have no 
evidence at all about whether these decisions were politically motivated. 
With disclosure, they become testable propositions. As it happens, Boeing is 
primarily a Democratic donor and, as a Chicago company, a huge source of 
money for Obama;  Forest Labs CEO Howard Solomon is exclusively a Democratic 
donor 

 and a big one; and only Shell is mostly a Republican donor. These may have 
been bad administrative decisions, but there's no reason to think they were 
retribution for political spending. Without disclosure, we can't even try 
to answer that question.



All three actions have since been settled, dropped, or reversed, also by 
administration officials.







On 4/27/2012 1:05 PM, Steve Hoersting wrote:

In the event I was not clear, the kind of retribution I of which I speak is 
largely regulatory/economic.



I am not speaking just of crony capitalism.  I am speaking of the increased 
importance of political participation in an environment Richard Epstein 
describes as "Government by Waiver." Among the ideas is that, as agency power 
is subject to less review from the other branches, and more and more statutes 
vest vast powers in administrators with repeated statements such as, "The 
Secretary shall...," a businessman speaking against the team empowered to 
decide, on a multitude of unverifiable factors, whether he will be a medical 
provider at all in, say, a nationalized medical system is not "Brave."  Rather 
he is something beyond brave where the team, officeholder or official he 
would speak against has shown a predilection to reward allies and frustrate 
opponents, and has a 50-50 chance of winning.



Two objections I expect... And two quick replies:



1) Socialist Workers only protects dissidents and the like, certainly not 
business leaders or the wealthy.  Not so.  The paradigmatic case -- NAACP v. 
Ala. -- protected all contributors to the NAACP.  This must have included 
some of the wealthiest, established persons in Birmingham at the time.  The 
exemption goes to those who need it.



2) You'll never prove retribution.  It is important to remember, this isn't 
tort law.  No one is saying the official is liable here.  And the official 
cannot say he would be "damaged" by full political participation, 
particularly after Carolene Products.   The "reasonable probability of retribution" 
standard of Socialist Workers, Doe v Reed and the like, is within the context 
of the 1st Am. -- and exists only to free political speakers.  It should be 
a far lower standard than in tort law.



Steve

On Fri, Apr 27, 2012 at 12:04 PM, Steve Hoersting <_hoersting at gmail.com_ 
(mailto:hoersting at gmail.com) _<mailto:hoersting at gmail.com>_ 
(mailto:hoersting at gmail.com) > wrote:



Dear Rick,



When last you and I chatted about disclosure and its exceptions, I closed 
on this point:

But ask yourself, for a later discussion: Can you imagine actions taken 
with the aid of public disclosure that even "someone important" [and I'm sure 
you meant J. Scalia] might likely say is too much, even for "the Brave?"



Everyone discussing disclosure exemptions, Doe v. Reed, Civic Courage and 
The Brave do so on the premise of managing the problem of citizen-on-citizen 
retribution.  But they ignore a quickly shifting landscape.  The real 
question is quickly becoming this: What about the rights of a potential speaker 
who witnesses or reads of government-on-citizen retribution visited on others? 
 This person wants to participate in the election, but doesn't want to risk 
being the next one made an example of.



An op-ed today, by WSJ's Kim Strassel, brings this issue to the fore.



_http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304723304577368280604524916.h
tml?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEADTop_ 
(http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304723304577368280604524916.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEADTop) 



If the regulatory process is soon to be so divorced from congressional 
budgetary processes and meaningful judicial review -- and I am thinking now of 
the powers vested in an IPAB or Dodd-Frank's new consumer czar -- the 
prospect of post hoc regulatory decisions, made by winning officeholders who have 
already demonstrated a willingness to reward friends and frustrate opponents, 
can intimidate businessmen deciding whether to speak at all in the election.



An answer to this drain on popular sovereignty is for business-men and 
-women to 1) seek the Socialist Workers exemption 2) to campaign disclosure of 
independent communications (not candidate donations) 3) for potential 
speakers who 4) have observed the actions of abusive officials of any party, want 
to speak against them in the election, and do not want to be "next."  These 
business men or women would file as John Does or Jane Does to protect their 
anonymity while the district court adjudicates their application.  If the 
request is denied, they would have the choice to proceed or stay silent -- 
forming a record for appellate review.



If no one receives the Socialist Workers exemption from a district court, 
appellate courts will have to consider that fact when revisiting not only 
Socialist Workers' efficacy as a safety valve, but the importance of "the 
informational interest" itself.  If no lower court will grant the exemption, 
then, in the new wave of regulatory power sure to come, the Carolene Products 
compromise -- that economic deprivations will not be handled in the courts but 
rather in robust political processes -- is all but dead.



Even after the Judicial Revolution of 1937, and irrespective of who wins in 
November, regulatory power is only legitimate if it is the result of robust 
political processes.



Now back to Scalia, our discussion, and the Home of the Brave.  Where 
citizen-on-citizen intimidation is facilitated by disclosure, as in the Prop 8 
cases and Doe v. Reed, Scalia wants citizens to toughen up and get some "civic 
courage."  But I believe where government-on-citizen intimidation is 
facilitated by public disclosure Scalia would not look favorably upon this at all. 
 Scalia knows our Founders pledged their lives, fortunes and honor in their 
18th century campaign against the King.  But these men were already acting 
outside the political system of their day, not within it.  Their "Courage" 
cannot be the model Scalia would hold businessmen to while U.S. courts are 
open.  The reasonable probability of government-on-citizen retribution can be 
a difference in kind.



It is conventional wisdom that Scalia likes what he calls "real" 
constitutional law -- not just adjudicating rights under the first ten amendments, but 
deciding questions about relative power distributed among co-equal 
branches.  Scalia would recognize that, after 1937 and the Carolene compromise of 
1938, regulatory legitimacy derives almost entirely from robust political 
processes.  I have to believe he would understand that those asked to speak 
electorally in an atmosphere of a probable government retribution knowing their 
is a 50-50 chance their side will lose the coming election are not "Brave" 
but martyrs or fools.



Most importantly, Scalia knows that when robustness is chilled, the 
Carolene compromise itself is called into question.  Not only are speech rights 
deprived, the electoral crucible that ensures popular sovereignty begins to 
produce tainted results; and the very structure of government and relative 
power among the branches risks being altered.



This is a theory I will be promulgating when I get the opportunity, in 
addition to this old op-ed.  _http://www.nationalreview.com/blogs/print/266623_ 
(http://www.nationalreview.com/blogs/print/266623)   If anyone else wants to 
develop it, please be my guest.



--

Stephen M. Hoersting







--

Stephen M. Hoersting









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