[EL] Check out N.Y. Lawmakers Charged in Plot to Buy Spot onMayoral Ball...
JBoppjr at aol.com
JBoppjr at aol.com
Wed Apr 3 13:44:57 PDT 2013
benadler1, I have answered this rant already.
Yes, I do understand what this case is about and my point remains that
bribes in cases like this are helpful in determining what is the going rate, at
least among some people, for money exchanged for political favors. There
are obviously differences that need to be understood in applying this
analogy. For instance, if campaign contributions cannot be used personally,
then I would think that a candidate would insist on a larger campaign
contribution than a personal one, like here. Another difference is that a
candidate is the bribor and political party officials are the bribees. This may or
may not effect the going rate.
But the general point remains, looking at what it took here to bribe
political party officials to provide a political favor, and at what it took to
bribe Congressmen Jefferson ($99,000 in cold hard cash) and Cunningham
(minimum $140,000), it is apparent that contribution limits are way below a large
contribution that could tempt a candidate to sell his vote. Jim Bopp
I guess the others on the list serve can determine for themselves how
"half-assed" my comments are. But I have never found argument by adjective very
persuasive. Jim Bopp
In a message dated 4/3/2013 2:33:30 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
benadler1 at gmail.com writes:
Jim, are you joking? I honestly can't tell. You do understand that the
bribes here were in direct payments, cash in envelopes, not campaign
contributions, right? So what does any of this have to do with campaign
contributions or the laws governing them? Are you suggesting that because it requires a
larger personal bribe than the maximum campaign contribution that the
campaign contributions are too low to buy politicians votes? That's ridiculous!
The two are unrelated. They are two completely different kinds of money.
The amount of money required to buy a politician's vote with a legal
contribution might be higher or lower than the amount required to buy his vote
with an illegal bribe. This case deals only with the former and thus tells us
nothing about the latter. Moreover, this case does not deal primarily with
bribing elected officials, or how they vote, it deals with borough party
chairs and signatures to allow a candidate on a ballot. Maybe the (somewhat
unusual) favor of allowing someone from the opposing party on your party's
ballot fetches a higher than normal price. Maybe borough party chairs require
larger bribes than mere state legislators. Or maybe it's the reverse. Who
knows? Certainly not you, based on nothing but your half-assed assertion.
On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 2:02 PM, Smith, Brad <_BSmith at law.capital.edu_
(mailto:BSmith at law.capital.edu) > wrote:
One of the costs of big government will be an increase in rent-seeking and
an increase in the "extortion" function by unethical officials. This
doesn't mean we shouldn't have big government. We just have to recognize that it
is one of the costs of big government, just like one cost of a particular
program - social security - is loss of control of a significant portion of
one's wages, and ability to save for one's future on one's own terms.
Doesn't mean we shouldn't have it (though some might conclude that). Just means
you want to be sure you're considering all the costs and all the benefits.
Conversely, one cost of a strong First Amendment is putting up with lots of
speech you'd rather not hear. Many of the checks put in place in our
system of government to prevent rent-seeking and extortion have been eroded or
in some cases all but abolished - federalism, bicameralism, the takings
clause, and especially the doctrine of enumerated powers. These things may have
been done for what was seen to be good reason, but nevertheless one cost
was to erode checks on the abuse of power by officials and rent seeking by
factions.
Liberals, who are more wedded to big government, naturally tend to seek to
solve this problem by placing still more restrictions on freedom and
giving more power to government. Conservatives, who are less wedded to big
government, naturally tend to seek to solve this problem by reducing the size
and power of government in other areas, rather than expanding it in this.
If you are skeptical of public officials, you will not generally want to
increase their power, especially in a sensitive area that directly pertains
to criticism of officials and efforts to replace them. That limits on
contributions might be seen as an effort to limit their de facto power (by
making it harder to extort) doesn't get us far, because it does so by increasing
their de jure and de facto power in that key area of free speech.
Practical consequences then come into play. The track record of government when
given this new power is not very good. In fact, it is really bad. The fact
that the arguments made by most regulatory advocates do not follow the
argument Joe makes (some do, and it is clearly recognized by people on both sides
of the debate, but let's not kid ourselves, that is not the basic
pro-regulatory argument), but instead argue the need in order to protect government
from the citizenry (rather than citizens from government) further makes
conservatives extremely wary.
My own experience is that most potential donors aren't really swayed by
the extortion threat, though some can be and are. This is one reason for
being wary about excessive compulsory disclosure laws. But potential large
donors are usually pretty successful people with ample experience in turning
folks down. Donors do get tired up being hit up, and they can complain about
it, and they might use the extortion line. I've heard it, to be sure. But
it's much the same as the corrupting effect of contributions. It's not that
it is never there, but it can be overstated. And usually, in my view, it is
self-inflicted - once you've paid the Dane Geld, it's hard to get rid of
the Dane. There are a lot of various scenarios here and nuances that I won't
go into; we'll just say that the disease does not merit the harms inflicted
by the cure. And if a cure is necessary, other cures or partial cures
would be better.
Jess Unruh is quoted as having said, "If you can't drink a lobbyist's
whiskey, take his money, sleep with his women and still vote against him in the
morning, you don't belong in politics."
Perhaps donors need to learn something along the same lines: If you can't
take a lawmaker's earmarks, welcome him to your plant, dine with him at
Lincoln or Jackson Day dinners, listen to his threats, and still tell him no,
you don't belong in business.
Bradley A. Smith
Josiah H. Blackmore II/Shirley M. Nault
Professor of Law
Capital University Law School
303 E. Broad St.
Columbus, OH 43215
_614.236.6317_ (tel:614.236.6317)
http://law.capital.edu/faculty/bios/bsmith.aspx
________________________________________
From: _law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu_
(mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu)
[_law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu_ (mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu) ] on behalf
of Joseph Birkenstock [_jbirkenstock at capdale.com_
(mailto:jbirkenstock at capdale.com) ]
Sent: Wednesday, April 03, 2013 11:04 AM
To: _JBoppjr at aol.com_ (mailto:JBoppjr at aol.com) ;
_margaret.groarke at manhattan.edu_ (mailto:margaret.groarke at manhattan.edu)
Cc: _law-election at uci.edu_ (mailto:law-election at uci.edu)
Subject: Re: [EL] Check out N.Y. Lawmakers Charged in Plot to Buy Spot
onMayoral Ball...
I agree that many contribution limits are too low, and that as a general
proposition we'd do better to index them for inflation. But, that said, I
wanted to raise a different point about the utility of contribution limits in
the abstract, including the aggregate limits being litigated in McCutcheon.
Perhaps it's because I work more with donors than with candidates these
days, but for a while now the federal limits have looked more to me like
extortion limits than contribution limits. Meaning, I'm sure there are some
donors who sincerely want to give more of their hard-earned money to specific
public officials, but there are also lots of donors who are quite relieved
to be able to "max out" (either or both with respect to a particular
candidate or with respect to federal candidates, party committees, or PACs as a
whole).
And relieved to do so at a large-but-still-less-than-stratospheric level,
since once they've coughed up their $2,600 per election they can truthfully
tell a candidate "Look Joe, I'd love to give more if I could give it
directly to Birkenstock for Grand Poobah, but unless you can promise me every
dollar I give will be spent at your direction I'd really rather not give to
parties or PACs and just hope it ends up helping you." Might not be
completely convincing to the candidate making the ask (for a joint fundraising
committee, for example), but it's not like the candidate can disprove it and it
allows the donor at least a facially reasonable pretext to start turning
down further dunning opportunities at some point.
But if there were no contribution limits, and to a large extent if there
were no aggregate limits, that dynamic would change drastically. Not only
would the donor lose the use of the limits as a diplomatic way to put away
his or her checkbook, but now the candidate could turn the game around:
"Shame you can't see your way clear to sending another check, Mickey - turns out
Daffy and Goofy each just wrote another hundred k. You sure you don't want
to keep up?"
And that's what most confuses me about the conservative attack on
contribution limits: skepticism of public officials and of the power entrusted to
public officials is one of the best things I've learned from the
conservative school of thought. But the goal of reducing or eliminating limits on how
much money these officials can solicit from their constituents seems to be
in tension with that lesson, so I'm hoping Jim or anyone else from that
point of view might address this concern: is there a workable way to keep the
"extortion limit" function of the current contribution limits regime if
the limits themselves are overturned, or am I misunderstanding whether
conservatives see that function as a worthwhile policy goal in the first place?
________________________________
Joseph M. Birkenstock, Esq.
Caplin & Drysdale, Chtd.
One Thomas Circle, NW
Washington, DC 20005
_(202) 862-7836_ (tel:(202)%20862-7836)
_www.capdale.com/jbirkenstock_ (http://www.capdale.com/jbirkenstock)
*also admitted to practice in CA
-----Original Message-----
From: _law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu_
(mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu) on behalf of _JBoppjr at aol.com_
(mailto:JBoppjr at aol.com)
Sent: Wed 4/3/2013 10:04 AM
To: _margaret.groarke at manhattan.edu_
(mailto:margaret.groarke at manhattan.edu)
Cc: _law-election at uci.edu_ (mailto:law-election at uci.edu)
Subject: Re: [EL] Check out N.Y. Lawmakers Charged in Plot to Buy Spot
onMayoral Ball...
You have hit on the other interesting point about this. NYC contribution
limits for Mayor are $4,950 and less for other offices. Each of the bribees
demanded much more. This seems to be further anecdotal evidence that
current contribution limits are too low. (See also Congressmen Jefferson
and
Cunningham) Jim Bopp
In a message dated 4/3/2013 9:58:22 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
_margaret.groarke at manhattan.edu_ (mailto:margaret.groarke at manhattan.edu)
writes:
Au contraire, we New Yorkers just want to make sure that bribing public
officials is affordable! The desire to get one's way shouldn't bankrupt a
person.
More seriously, the limits we have in NYS are really generous (I would be
permitted to donate $41,000 to a gubernatorial candidate in the general
election). And these allegations are about donations to parties, about
which I
don't have the rules handy. But a LOT of things need to change in NY.
On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 9:01 AM, <_JBoppjr at aol.com_
(mailto:_JBoppjr at aol.com_ (mailto:JBoppjr at aol.com) )
> wrote:
_Click here: N.Y. Lawmakers Charged in Plot to Buy Spot on Mayoral Ballot
- NYTimes.com_
(http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/03/nyregion/state-senator-and-city-councilma
n-accused-of-trying-to-rig-mayors-race.html?hp&_r=0)
Thank goodness NYC has contribution limits. It has sure fixed the
corruption problem there. Jim Bopp
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