[EL] impact of disclosure on candidate contributions

[Larry Levine]

I've seen evidence of your findings as well contra-actions by donors in
campaigns in which I've been the lead political consultant. With a $100
threshold for reporting of the names, addresses and occupations of donors,
I've seen some - not a lot, but some - who will give $99. Usually, this is
out of a concern that disclosure of the source of the donation could cause a
problem for the candidate, not because of a shyness on the part of the
donor. On the other hand, with a limit of $700 for a contribution to an L.A.
City Council candidate, I've had measurable numbers of people give that
amount and tell me they were doing so either to avoid being solicited later
for amounts that would bring them up to the maximum, or because it made them
feel good to have actually "maxed out" on a candidate. Limits on state
legislative campaigns, state constitutional campaigns and federal races are
higher and many of those donors don't think of "maxing out" in those
campaigns.

Larry

 

From: law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu
[mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] On Behalf Of Ray La
Raja
Sent: Saturday, January 19, 2013 10:04 AM
To: Lorraine Minnite
Cc: law-election at uci.edu
Subject: Re: [EL] impact of disclosure on candidate contributions

 

Hi Lorraine,

Thanks for reading the paper and your comments.   The findings apply to all
likely donors (not just a subset).   ALL donors systemically choose to give
at amounts less than the threshold when told that donations above $50 would
be public. So instead of giving $100 (like in the control group), they might
give $50.  That's a lot of small donations to lose when multiplied over the
population.   Only the cross-pressured donors decided to STOP donating
totally when faced with disclosure.  But these cross-pressured citizens make
up more than 10% of population of donors  -- not insignificant -- and it's a
group that is already reluctant to participate in politics (see Diana Mutz's
work).  

 

Good suggestion on varying the question to see if I scared them with my
wording. In some ways, I felt like i downplayed it too much by saying 'names
of donors are made public".  I think many respondents skipped over this line
and only respond when they see a number.  (I should have tried: "names of
donors above $1 are made public" ).  And I imagine the response might be
pretty sharp if I asked them to insert their name and address on an Internet
form, like many candidates do.

 

At any rate, the key point is that potential donors really changed their
behavior on the downside. And this happens among citizens with high
socio-economic status who typically engage in politics more than everyone
else.

 

Best,

Ray

 

 

On Jan 19, 2013, at 12:08 PM, Lorraine Minnite wrote:





Ray:

 

This is a very interesting study.  I think it would be fascinating to test
different versions of the key question of your experiment,: "Please note:
names of donors are made public on the Internet."  It sounds simple and
straightforward, but to me there is an undertone.  The wording is more
active than what the word "disclosure" suggests.  I'd think that my name,
donation level and candidate choice were going to be announced and
advertised on the Internet.  I take your point that the issue here is that
information once simply disclosed to election agencies (passive anonymity)
is now more widely available through the medium of the Internet, but we also
know how sensitive survey results are to question wording.  Were other
versions of this questions tested?  For example, "Please note: donations to
candidates are public information," or "Please note: campaign finance laws
require disclosure of contributions over X."  Would you think it would make
a difference?

 

Also, the paper abstract somewhat over-states the findings (the abstract
says, that the paper "demonstrates how individuals refrain from making
contributions or reduce their donations to avoid disclosing their
identities").  Aren't your findings of a negative effect of publicity on
donating restricted to a relatively small sub-set of cross-pressured voters
(i.e., "...the findings demonstrate that citizens who are surrounded by
people who do not share their views are more likely to refrain from or limit
making political contributions," p. 3; and "The only set of voters who react
negatively to disclosure are those who feel they are surrounded by those
with different views." p. 14; also, the finding that the $1 threshold for
disclosure had no affect on any group of voters, p. 16)? 

 

Again, a fine paper I'd encourage all interested in this subject to read. 

 

Lori Minnite

On Sat, Jan 19, 2013 at 10:27 AM, Ray La Raja <laraja at polsci.umass.edu>
wrote:

Here is some evidence that low disclosure thresholds potentially affects the
willingness of small donors to make contributions.

 

Abstract

This study assesses whether public disclosure of campaign contributions
affects citizens' willingness to give money to candidates. In the American
states, campaign finance laws require disclosure of private information for
contributors at relatively low thresholds ranging from $1 to $300. Drawing
on social influence theory, the analysis suggests that citizens are
sensitive to divulging private information, especially those who are
surrounded by people with different political views. Using experimental data
from the 2011 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies, it demonstrates
how individuals refrain from making contributions or reduce their donations
to avoid disclosing their identities. The experimental findings compare
favorably to observational data on political contributions across states
with different disclosure thresholds. The conclusion discusses the
implications of transparency laws for political participation, especially
for small donors.

 

The working paper is available here:

La Raja, Raymond J., Political Participation and Civic Courage: The Negative
Effect of Transparency on Making Campaign Contributions (November 29, 2012).
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2202405

Best,

Ray L.

 

 

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