[EL] impact of disclosure on candidate contributions

[Douglas Johnson]

I believe I agree with Mr. Levine's comments, but I think he misstates his
point when he writes the ridiculously low donation limits "have caused some
professional treasurers to swear off doing city races." What's actually
happening (and Larry chime in if you disagree) is that professional
treasurers (and just about all campaign professionals) are swearing off
working for the candidates themselves. They're working on city races, but
only for independent expenditure campaigns.

 

In LA, Santa Monica (where the donation limit was recently raised from $250
to something like $315), and other similar jurisdictions where "reform"
efforts have crippled donation levels, IEs are becoming all-powerful and
candidates are simply campaign figureheads.

 

[I'm not saying all donation limits are a bad idea, but I'm certainly
against limits so low that it's impossible to fund a real campaign.]

 

-        Doug

 

Douglas Johnson, President

National Demographics Corporation

djohnson at NDCresearch.com

310-200-2058 

 

 

 

From: law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu
[mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] On Behalf Of Larry
Levine
Sent: Saturday, January 19, 2013 9:26 AM
To: 'Lorraine Minnite'; 'Ray La Raja'; law-election at uci.edu
Subject: Re: [EL] impact of disclosure on candidate contributions

 

What happens when the contribution limit is so low that a maximum donation
could not reasonably be thought to produce corruption? In Los Angeles City
Council elections the contribution limit is $700. Many candidates receive
many contributions of the maximum allowable amount. Is $700 going to corrupt
someone? How about when it is counter balanced by like donations from
sources holding opposing views. Yet, in the name of transparency the city
has enacted a snarled web of disclosure requirements that have caused some
professional treasurers to swear off doing city races anymore and at least
one fundraiser to say "they are making my job impossible." Full compliance
here and in many other jurisdictions has become all but impossible and
enforcement agencies, without the resources to pursue cases of possibly
serious transgressions, busy themselves by playing gotcha with
inconsequential violations. 

Larry

 

From: law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu
[mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] On Behalf Of Lorraine
Minnite
Sent: Saturday, January 19, 2013 9:09 AM
To: Ray La Raja; law-election at uci.edu
Subject: [EL] impact of disclosure on candidate contributions

 

Ray:

 

This is a very interesting study.  I think it would be fascinating to test
different versions of the key question of your experiment,: "Please note:
names of donors are made public on the Internet."  It sounds simple and
straightforward, but to me there is an undertone.  The wording is more
active than what the word "disclosure" suggests.  I'd think that my name,
donation level and candidate choice were going to be announced and
advertised on the Internet.  I take your point that the issue here is that
information once simply disclosed to election agencies (passive anonymity)
is now more widely available through the medium of the Internet, but we also
know how sensitive survey results are to question wording.  Were other
versions of this questions tested?  For example, "Please note: donations to
candidates are public information," or "Please note: campaign finance laws
require disclosure of contributions over X."  Would you think it would make
a difference?

 

Also, the paper abstract somewhat over-states the findings (the abstract
says, that the paper "demonstrates how individuals refrain from making
contributions or reduce their donations to avoid disclosing their
identities").  Aren't your findings of a negative effect of publicity on
donating restricted to a relatively small sub-set of cross-pressured voters
(i.e., "...the findings demonstrate that citizens who are surrounded by
people who do not share their views are more likely to refrain from or limit
making political contributions," p. 3; and "The only set of voters who react
negatively to disclosure are those who feel they are surrounded by those
with different views." p. 14; also, the finding that the $1 threshold for
disclosure had no affect on any group of voters, p. 16)? 

 

Again, a fine paper I'd encourage all interested in this subject to read. 

 

Lori Minnite

On Sat, Jan 19, 2013 at 10:27 AM, Ray La Raja <laraja at polsci.umass.edu>
wrote:

Here is some evidence that low disclosure thresholds potentially affects the
willingness of small donors to make contributions.

 

Abstract

This study assesses whether public disclosure of campaign contributions
affects citizens' willingness to give money to candidates. In the American
states, campaign finance laws require disclosure of private information for
contributors at relatively low thresholds ranging from $1 to $300. Drawing
on social influence theory, the analysis suggests that citizens are
sensitive to divulging private information, especially those who are
surrounded by people with different political views. Using experimental data
from the 2011 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies, it demonstrates
how individuals refrain from making contributions or reduce their donations
to avoid disclosing their identities. The experimental findings compare
favorably to observational data on political contributions across states
with different disclosure thresholds. The conclusion discusses the
implications of transparency laws for political participation, especially
for small donors.

 

The working paper is available here:

La Raja, Raymond J., Political Participation and Civic Courage: The Negative
Effect of Transparency on Making Campaign Contributions (November 29, 2012).
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2202405

Best,

Ray L.

 

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