[EL] Should We Reform the Electoral College?
Thomas J. Cares
Tom at TomCares.com
Thu Mar 21 19:19:53 PDT 2013
(sorry, but I have more...)
That (what you forwarded) was one of the most intellectually dishonest
things I've ever read.
He actually makes it surreal by concluding that his meritless proposal
could never happen because *others* will inevitably forgo merit for desired
political outcomes.
He acknowledges that the EC distortion in Bush/Gore, stimulated this
debate, but fails to acknowledge that his proposal does nothing to mitigate
that distortion (The distortion was kind of that states get 2 extra votes
just for being states. From memory, Bush won 30 states and Gore won 20 + DC
- meaning this population-dismissing entitlement of statehood netted Bush a
18 EC vote advantage, which was more than his EC margin of victory).
Then, much of his thesis refers to candidates "ignor[ing] states where the
outcome of the popular vote is evident",
Yet, he can't have the honesty to concede that an even-much-smaller
population resides in US congressional swing districts, than in swing
states.
So, inappropriate as it may be for me to be so critical, I'm going to say
that was one of the most intellectually dishonest things I have ever read.
-Thomas Cares
On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 8:26 AM, Jon Roland <jon.roland at constitution.org>wrote:
> **
> Should We Reform the Electoral College?<http://www.cato.org/policy-report/marchapril-2013/should-we-reform-electoral-college>
> By
> Robert A. Levy <http://www.cato.org/people/robert-levy>
>
> Let’s start with the basics: In presidential races, each state has
> electoral votes equal to the number of its House representatives plus two
> for its senators. Currently, there are 435 House members and 100 senators,
> plus three votes for Washington, D.C. (thanks to the 23rd Amendment), for a
> total of 538. The candidate who garners a majority — 270 or more — wins,
> even if he loses the popular vote.
>
> That’s what happened in the 2000 Bush versus Gore election, which sparked
> the effort to switch to popular voting for presidential elections.
> Ordinarily, that switch would require a constitutional amendment; but a
> group of activists came up with a scheme — the National Popular Vote
> Interstate Compact (NPVIC) — that could work without a constitutional
> amendment.
>
> Article II of the Constitution gives states broad authority to decide how
> their electoral votes are selected and divided among the candidates. In 48
> states, the candidate who gets the most votes wins all of the state’s
> electoral votes. But the Constitution doesn't require that rule. Maine and
> Nebraska have implemented district- by-district voting. One electoral vote
> goes to the winner in each congressional district, and the remaining two
> electoral votes are awarded to the winner of the statewide popular vote.
>
> Assume, however, that a state enacts a law giving all its electoral votes
> to the presidential candidate who wins the national popular vote. And
> assume further that the law says it will not be effective unless enough
> other states pass the same law to yield a total of at least 270 electoral
> votes. That would be perfectly valid under Article II. It would force a
> majority of electoral votes to be cast for the national popular vote winner
> — without amending the Constitution.
>
> But is it a good idea? The Framers meticulously crafted an electoral model
> that reduced sectionalism and reinforced minority rights. Instead, popular
> voting would favor regions with high voter density and large states over
> small. “One man, one vote” may be the rallying cry of a democracy; but that
> is not our form of governance. We are a constitutional republic; political
> outcomes are not always determined by majority rule. For example, it takes
> two-thirds of Congress to override presidential vetoes, approve treaties,
> impeach a president, or expel a member of Congress. Imagine if NPVIC had
> been operative in 2004: George W. Bush would have received all of
> California’s electoral votes even though John Kerry trounced Bush statewide
> by 10 percentage points.
>
> Still, the existing electoral structure may be unwise. Winner-take-all
> means that candidates will ignore states where the outcome of the popular
> vote is evident (e.g., California and Texas) even if a number of districts
> within the state are competitive. Interestingly, 15 California districts
> elected Republican representatives; 12 Texas districts elected Democrats.
> Currently, presidential voters in those districts are powerless. But that
> problem can be mitigated without resort to pure popular voting. The
> Maine-Nebraska alternative encourages candidates to campaign in competitive
> districts even when they have little chance statewide. As an added benefit,
> our presidential election would no longer depend so heavily on a few swing
> states, such as Florida and Ohio.
>
> Yes, there are downsides to district-by-district voting. First, it would
> increase the number and influence of marginal candidates who have little
> chance to win statewide majorities. Recall 1992, when Ross Perot captured
> nearly 19 percent of the national vote, but not a single state. If he had
> won a significant percentage of electoral votes, the election would have
> been thrown into the House of Representatives. Second, winner-take-all
> eliminates the pernicious effect of gerrymandering from presidential
> elections. Under a district based system, gerrymandering would impact
> presidential outcomes as well as congressional results. Third, less
> populated and closely divided states might attract candidates if the law
> provided for winner-take-all, but not if electoral votes were narrowly
> split.
>
> Finally, a practical problem: district-by-district voting would have to be
> enacted by state legislatures. Because the dominant party would probably
> lose electoral votes, repeal of winner-take-all would be an uphill battle.
> Politicians in both parties understand what might have transpired in the
> recent election. President Obama routed Mitt Romney, 332 to 206 electoral
> votes. But the Republicans won 24 states and 234 House seats. If the split
> in the House approximated the district-by-district voting for president, a
> district-based system would have given the Republicans 282 electoral votes
> — enough to win the presidency.
>
> Regrettably, many legislators will decide on winner take-all versus
> district-by-district versus popular voting based on expected political
> outcomes. On the merits, however, there’s much to recommend the
> Maine-Nebraska system — if for no other reason than to foreclose the
> popular voting option.
> Robert Levy <http://www.cato.org/people/robert-levy> is chairman of the
> Cato Institute’s board of directors.
> ------------------------------
> Forwarder's comment:
>
> The president should not be the popular choice of the people at all. He
> should be the best qualified person to execute the laws Congress makes who
> doesn't want the job. We need Cincinnati, not Caesars.
>
> The original concept of the Electoral College was that electors would not
> be unknown persons nominated by presidential candidates or their parties
> and pledged to vote for one, but the wisest citizens who would
> independently and carefully consider the candidates and deliberate among
> themselves before making their choices. Granted that model had fallen apart
> by the election of 1800, but it still has merit. The solution is not some
> kind of national popular vote, but reform of the electoral selection
> process to get truly wise and independent electors.
>
> I have proposed the following amendment<http://constitution.org/reform/us/con_amend.htm>to the U.S. Constitution that would hopefully do that:
>
> *Selecting electors for president and vice-president* The electors for
> president and vice-president shall be selected in each state by the
> following procedure:
>
> 1. An initial panel of citizens qualified to vote in that state equal
> to one hundred times the number of electors to be selected from that state
> shall be selected at random, in a process that shall be supervised by a
> randomly-selected grand jury specially empaneled for that task;
> 2. Members of this initial panel shall take an examination in which
> each shall recite from memory 20 randomly selected clauses of this
> Constitution, and shall receive a score of one for each clause he or she is
> able to recite without error;
> 3. A second panel shall be selected from the first, consisting of ten
> times the number of electors to be selected, with the odds of selecting
> each weighted by the score he or she received in the examination, and with
> exclusion of any who scored zero;
> 4. Members of the second panel shall meet, and each shall rank all the
> others in descending order of civic virtue, giving a score indicating the
> rank consisting of the number of panelists for the highest down to one for
> the lowest;
> 5. The electors shall then be selected from this second panel at
> random, but weighted by his or her average rank from the previous round of
> peer assessments.
>
> The randomization phases are intended to dispel undue influence of
> special interests or rent-seekers. None of the participants could control
> the ultimate result, so all would have an incentive to choose wisely.
>
> -- Jon
>
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> Constitution Society http://constitution.org
> 2900 W Anderson Ln C-200-322 twitter.com/lex_rex
> Austin, TX 78757 512/299-5001 jon.roland at constitution.org
> ----------------------------------------------------------
>
>
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