[EL] Limits of scientific method for policy decisions (was: Incidents of fraud ID ...)

Thu Aug 7 04:45:09 PDT 2014

John:
This all of course assumes that the debate is meant to be an evidence-based
debate and not ideology.

I will also leave you with my favorite quote for Wittgenstein:
"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."
–Ludwig Witgenstein

On Wed, Aug 6, 2014 at 9:25 PM, John Tanner <john.k.tanner at gmail.com> wrote:

> I think it is fair to say that the evidence on all sides of the issue is
> extraordinarily incomplete and lacking in rigor - and highly dependent on
> the many and large variations among states.  But that shouldn’t stop anyone
> from arguing their case.
>
> On Aug 6, 2014, at 10:04 PM, Justin Riemer <jjustinriemer at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> Can someone point me to the study that showed photo ID laws did not in
> fact increase voter confidence in the system? To the best of my knowledge
> (I could certainly be wrong), there was only one report of note that
> indicated as much. It seems awfully hard to reconcile the overwhelmingly
> strong public support for the laws, by anyone's measure really, and their
> supposed lack of positive impact on voter confidence.
>
> Thanks in advance.
>
>
> J Justin Riemer
> 772-559-1567
> JJustinRiemer at gmail.com
>
>
> On Wed, Aug 6, 2014 at 9:42 PM, Schultz, David A. <dschultz at hamline.edu>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon:
>>
>> You respond as if both sides in the debate are equal in their approach to
>> evidence.  This is not the case.  Repeatedly those who believe that wide
>> spread fraud exist have have had their evidence debunked over time.  The
>> line of debate, at least the way I approach it, is between those who assert
>> that fraud exists despite what the evidence says versus those (when I argue
>> it at least) who make it an empirical claim to test.  Yes there are limits
>> to scientific knowledge and you wax well about it in your e-mail but all
>> that you argue is mostly irrelevant to what is supposed to be an empirical
>> debate.  My point is that arguing with those who believe in voter fraud is
>> like arguing with those who believe a second shooter existed in Dallas in
>> 1963.  No matter what you argue you cannot win.  And that is the point--in
>> the end claims about voter fraud are not empirical, they are either
>> political or simply based on belief.  They are powerful tools  to move
>> people.  Finally, I just disagree with your assertions about the use of
>> evidence in the making of public policy.  I have written an entire book on
>> this topic that you should read after you read my book on election law.
>> Perhaps if we had more evidence-based policy the government would do fewer
>> dumber things like enact voter id laws, subsidize professional sports
>> teams, or enact laws that restrict immigration or public assistance on the
>> belief that immigrants and welfare recipients are a financial drain on the
>> economy.  Too much of our policy making is based on fear, ignorance, and
>> prejudice.
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Aug 6, 2014 at 6:34 PM, Jon Roland <jon.roland at constitution.org>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>  As powerful as scientific method <http://pynthan.org/> is, for
>>> situations that lend themselves to it, it is important to understand its
>>> limitations, particularly for making policy decisions that do not always
>>> allow for the level of certainty that scientific method can provide, but
>>> have to be made anyway, on perhaps flimsy evidence, if the evidence on all
>>> sides of an issue is flimsy.
>>>
>>> The old saw is, "What is the rate of occurrence of undetectable crimes?"
>>>
>>> Game/decision theory can provide some insight. A confidence function
>>> applied to a proposition assigns a value on the unit interval, [0,1], where
>>> 0 is falsity and 1 is certainty. Those extreme values are only for
>>> propositions in mathematics or logic. Empirical model propositions get
>>> levels of confidence in between.
>>>
>>> A policy choice is usually cast in terms of which of several
>>> alternatives have the highest level of confidence, but it is possible for
>>> every alternative to have a confidence level of less than .5. The
>>> alternatives might even all have levels close to zero.
>>>
>>> The obvious question then is, if the confidence levels of every
>>> alternative are close to zero, why choose any of them? The answer is that
>>> there are other confidence measures that come into play.
>>>
>>> One of these is confidence in the estimates of the costs and benefits of
>>> deferring a decision, and of getting the choice wrong. If the estimate of
>>> the chance of an adverse outcome is low, but the cost of choosing the
>>> alternative is low, and the cost of such outcome is high, one may
>>> rationally make a prudent choice on weak evidence of the chances of the
>>> alternative happening. (Precautionary principle
>>> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Precautionary_principle>.)
>>>
>>> There is a separate assessment of when a decision is needed. It is often
>>> possible to have a high level of confidence that a decision is urgent, even
>>> if one cannot have a high level of confidence in any of the decision
>>> alternatives. This leads to a second dimension of analysis, in which
>>> confidence levels in the costs and benefits of alternative decisions,
>>> including not choosing any of the positive actions, are plotted against
>>> time, which may result in an assessment of the optimum decision time, which
>>> could be immediately, or it could be never.
>>>
>>> Systems analysis, combined with a knowledge of human nature, provides
>>> another approach. One such approach is opportunity analysis: If a system
>>> affords an opportunity to commit an offense ("defect"), there are players
>>> with motive, method, and opportunity to do so, at little risk and a high
>>> payoff, then one can reasonably presume that if it can happen, someone is
>>> doing it, even it the defections are undetectable. It may be worth the cost
>>> to close off some such opportunities ("temptations") even if no violations
>>> are detected.
>>>
>>> In the field of elections, we need to analyze the kinds of vote fraud
>>> that can be done (such as ballot access, registration, impersonation, box
>>> stuffing, counting, and reporting), and the costs/risks/benefits of each
>>> method that might be used. Clearly, the payoffs are very high, so one can
>>> expect the temptation to cheat will be irresistible to some. That leads to
>>> comparing the relative costs/risks/benefits of each opportunity and
>>> exploitation method. There is no strong incentive for fraudsters to risk
>>> impersonation fraud if they have rigged the counting.
>>>
>>> My own admittedly informal analysis is that the cost and risk of
>>> impersonation fraud is too high for the payoff of getting a few more votes.
>>> That leaves registration and counting. Clearly, voter ID cards will not
>>> prevent registration fraud, unless people try to vote multiple times at the
>>> same polling places with different ID cards and some poll worker recognizes
>>> them. That means such impersonators would have to scatter their illegal
>>> votes at multiple polling places and that adds to the cost for the small
>>> payoff.
>>>
>>> That leaves box stuffing and  counting. If measures are taken to prevent
>>> the first, then it is counting where the system vulnerability lies, and
>>> where efforts for reform need to focus.
>>>
>>> On another note, it is unconstitutional to require government-issued ID
>>> as proof of eligibility, because that that adds a qualification not in any
>>> constitution. It is reasonable to require proof of citizenship and
>>> residence, but government-issued ID gives anonymous bureaucrats the power
>>> to decide who gets to vote, and that amounts to an opportunity for
>>> registration fraud.
>>>
>>> -- Jon
>>>
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------
>>> Constitution Society               http://constitution.org
>>> 13359 N Hwy 183 #406-144               twitter.com/lex_rex
>>> Austin, TX 78750 512/299-5001  jon.roland at constitution.org
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------
>>>
>>>
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>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> David Schultz, Professor
>> Editor, Journal of Public Affairs Education (JPAE)
>> Hamline University
>> Department of Political Science
>> 1536 Hewitt Ave
>> MS B 1805
>> St. Paul, Minnesota 55104
>> 651.523.2858 (voice)
>> 651.523.3170 (fax)
>> http://davidschultz.efoliomn.com/
>> http://works.bepress.com/david_schultz/
>> http://schultzstake.blogspot.com/
>> Twitter:  @ProfDSchultz
>> My latest book:  Election Law and Democratic Theory, Ashgate Publishing
>> http://www.ashgate.com/isbn/9780754675433
>> FacultyRow SuperProfessor, 2012, 2013
>>
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-- 
David Schultz, Professor
Editor, Journal of Public Affairs Education (JPAE)
Hamline University
Department of Political Science
1536 Hewitt Ave
MS B 1805
St. Paul, Minnesota 55104
651.523.2858 (voice)
651.523.3170 (fax)
http://davidschultz.efoliomn.com/
http://works.bepress.com/david_schultz/
http://schultzstake.blogspot.com/
Twitter:  @ProfDSchultz
My latest book:  Election Law and Democratic Theory, Ashgate Publishing
http://www.ashgate.com/isbn/9780754675433
FacultyRow SuperProfessor, 2012, 2013
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