[EL] WARNING: SNARK AHEAD RE: Supreme Court and campaign finance
JBoppjr at aol.com
JBoppjr at aol.com
Tue Jul 1 05:29:50 PDT 2014
Thanks Tyler, you are right; it was so easy and I change my mind. Where
do I sign up to be a "reformer" and have everyone like me? Jim Bopp
In a message dated 6/30/2014 7:58:05 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
tyler at rethinkmedia.org writes:
I didn't mean to imply that this is necessarily the *real* reason
Republicans oppose the amendment but rather to show Mr. Bopps argument is easily
turned on its head.
--
Tyler Creighton
_tyler at rethinkmedia.org_ (mailto:tyler at rethinkmedia.org)
Sent from my phone
On Jun 30, 2014, at 7:24 PM, "Sean Parnell"
<_sean at impactpolicymanagement.com_ (mailto:sean at impactpolicymanagement.com) > wrote:
All I can say is that if I possessed the type of mindreading abilities
displayed here on the matter of why Republicans *really* oppose a
Constitutional amendment giving Congress the powers sought by Mr. Creighton, I wouldn’
t be typing out e-mails to the election law listserve, I’d be sitting at a
poker table in Vegas.
Best,
Sean Parnell
President
Impact Policy Management, LLC
6411 Caleb Court
Alexandria, VA 22315
571-289-1374 (c)
_sean at impactpolicymanagement.com_ (mailto:sean at impactpolicymanagement.com)
From: _law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu_
(mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu) [mailto:law-election-bounces at depar
tment-lists.uci.edu] On Behalf Of Tyler Creighton
Sent: Monday, June 30, 2014 6:31 PM
To: _law-election at UCI.edu_ (mailto:law-election at UCI.edu)
Subject: Re: [EL] Supreme Court and campaign finance
The "campaign finance is incumbency protection" argument is a tired trope
that doesn't hold water. The argument implies that Congressional inaction
to regulate campaign finance is as much an incumbency protection racket as
Congressional action to do the same. In other words not writing any rules is
in fact writing the rules. Republicans in Congress refuse to support a
constitutional amendment empowering Congress to place contribution limits on
independent expenditure groups because they wish to preserve a leg up over
challengers who cannot attract large sums of IEs. Republicans in Congress
refuse to support a constitutional amendment empowering Congress to
re-enforce aggregate contribution limits because incumbents can join together to
solicit multi-million dollar contributions to JFCs.
Moreover, the argument is completely divorced from hard data and the
reality of modern day fundraising. The data shows us that incumbents are
disproportionately advantaged in raising large sums of money with higher
contribution limits. Incumbents have ready made fundraising networks and connections
to industry and lobbyists who are willing to write checks and host
fundraisers. Of the _top 20 State Assembly fundraisers in 2012 in Texas_
(http://www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/state_candidates.phtml?s=TX&y=2012&
f=H) , a state with no individual contribution limit to candidates, 14
were incumbents while a mere 4 were challengers and 2 were for open seats. A
challenger doesn't crack the top 7. _Only one true challenger is in the top
20 list_
(http://www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/state_candidates.phtml?s=TX&y=2012&f=S) for State Senate candidates. _A much more
exhaustive look at contribution limits_
(http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/Electoral.Competition.pdf) and electoral
competition by the Brennan Center (itself supported by _this GMU research_
(http://brennan.3cdn.net/82542437c8f479e0e9_3em6iyowv.pdf) ) substantiates this
quick glance at the data in Texas.
One can certainly envision a contribution limit sufficiently low as to
advantage incumbents over challengers, but high contribution limits is the
other side of the same coin. If your goal is electoral competition, public
financing of elections, _as demonstrated in Connecticut_
(http://www.demos.org/publication/fresh-start-impact-public-campaign-financing-connecticut) and
elsewhere, should be your goal, not abolishment of all contribution caps.
Tyler Creighton | _tyler at rethinkmedia.org_ (mailto:tyler at rethinkmedia.org)
| Media Associate
_ReThink Media_ (http://rethinkmedia.org/) | _(202) 449-6960_
(tel:(202)%20449-6960) office | _(925) 548-2189_ (tel:(925)%20548-2189) mobile
_ at ReThinkDemocrcy_ (https://twitter.com/rethinkdemocrcy) |
_ at ReThink_Media_ (https://twitter.com/rethink_media) | _ at TylerCreighton_
(http://www.twitter.com/tylercreighton)
On Mon, Jun 30, 2014 at 3:46 PM, Rick Hasen <_rhasen at law.uci.edu_
(mailto:rhasen at law.uci.edu) > wrote:
If anyone responds to this, please use this (or another) subject line (and
not ELB News and Commentary)
On 6/30/14, 12:44 PM, _JBoppjr at aol.com_ (mailto:JBoppjr at aol.com) wrote:
Regarding this:
The Court has shown no such deference when it comes to the need for
campaign finance regulation or to protect the voting rights of racial minorities
and others. The Roberts Court has overturned or limited every campaign
finance law it has examined (aside from disclosure laws). It has struck down a
key provision of the Voting Rights Act. How much deference did Congress
get in those cases? None.
Well when is Congress wise and entitled to deference? When the Court
agrees with Congress’s approach. Let’s call that “faux deference,” to go with
the “f_aux-nanimity_
(http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2014/scotus_roundup/scotus_end_of_term_massachusetts_
abortion_clinic_buffer_zone_law_goes_down.html) ” of the rest of the term.
Rather than deference, a much better argument could be made for scepticism
when it comes to Congress writing campaign finance laws. After all, with
campaign finance laws, members of Congress are writing the rules for their
own election specifically and when citizens can criticize them generally.
There are no subjects that they are more intensely self-interested.
Ironically, "reformers" should know this. Some of them believe that
members of Congress thirst so strongly for campaign contributions that they
would sell their votes for just a few hundred dollars. If this is true, then
surely they would write campaign finance laws to benefit themselves. Jim
Bopp
In a message dated 6/30/2014 1:05:54 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
_rhasen at law.uci.edu_ (mailto:rhasen at law.uci.edu) writes:
_#HobbyLobby: When is Congress “Wise?” When the Court Agrees with Congress
’s Wisdom_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=62877)
Posted on _June 30, 2014 8:50 am_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=62877)
by _Rick Hasen_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3)
Near the end of Justice Alito’s majority opinion in the _Hobby Lobby_
(http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/13-354_olp1.pdf) case today, he
writes that it is not the Court’s job to question the “wisdom” of Congress in
using the compelling interest test in RFRA, but the Court applies that
RFRA test strongly, and in a way which shows the Court apparently giving great
deference to Congress’s judgment about how to balance the government’s
interest in generally applicable laws with the accommodations of religious
freedoms. It reminded me of Justice Scalia’s pleas in _Windsor _
(http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/12-307_6j37.pdf) last term for deference to
Congress on the need for the Defense of Marriage Act.
The Court has shown no such deference when it comes to the need for
campaign finance regulation or to protect the voting rights of racial minorities
and others. The Roberts Court has overturned or limited every campaign
finance law it has examined (aside from disclosure laws). It has struck down a
key provision of the Voting Rights Act. How much deference did Congress
get in those cases? None.
Well when is Congress wise and entitled to deference? When the Court
agrees with Congress’s approach. Let’s call that “faux deference,” to go with
the “f_aux-nanimity_
(http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2014/scotus_roundup/scotus_end_of_term_massachusetts_
abortion_clinic_buffer_zone_law_goes_down.html) ” of the rest of the term.
--
Rick Hasen
Chancellor's Professor of Law and Political Science
UC Irvine School of Law
401 E. Peltason Dr., Suite 1000
Irvine, CA 92697-8000
_949.824.3072_ (tel:949.824.3072) - office
_949.824.0495_ (tel:949.824.0495) - fax
_rhasen at law.uci.edu_ (mailto:rhasen at law.uci.edu)
http://www.law.uci.edu/faculty/full-time/hasen/
_http://electionlawblog.org_ (http://electionlawblog.org/)
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