[EL] WARNING: SNARK AHEAD RE: Supreme Court and campaign finance

Sun Jul 6 10:54:56 PDT 2014

A very cogent and good point, Larry.

On 2014-07-06 13:35, Larry Levine wrote:
> I’ve been preaching this message to reformers and reporters for
> decades. People who opposed the war in Vietnam gave to anti-war
> candidates, not pro-war candidates; people who support reproductive
> choice give to one set of candidates; anti-choice advocates give to
> different candidates. All this is why I believe contribution limits
> are an abridgment of the right of redress. When is free speech more
> necessary than in pursuit of redress. If my government is trying to
> break the union movement and I am pro-labor I should be permitted to
> contribute to pro-labor candidates in unlimited amounts. The notion
> that I would give to an anti-labor candidate to change his or her 
> vote
> is foolish. Were I to do so with the express agreement that the vote
> would change, that would be bribery and we have laws to cover that.
>
> Larry
>
> FROM: law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu
> [mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] ON BEHALF OF
> JBoppjr at aol.com
> SENT: Sunday, July 06, 2014 7:22 AM
> TO: catbird at pipeline.com; BSmith at law.capital.edu
> CC: law-election at uci.edu
> SUBJECT: Re: [EL] WARNING: SNARK AHEAD RE: Supreme Court and campaign
> finance
>
> Regarding:
>
> _It's interesting how easily and unquestioningly some people say that
> "the vast majority of campaign contributors have no corrupt
> intentions," when in the vast majority of elections — that is, local
> elections — most large contributions come from "restricted sources,"
> that is, those regulated by, employed by, or seeking special benefits
> from the government (directly or for their clients)._
>
> As has been explained, there are two strategies for contributing, (1)
> find someone who agrees with you and then contribute to him or her to
> help get him or her get elected, or (2) find someone who opposes your
> views or is indifferent and then contribute to her to change her 
> mind.
> Strategy (2) is rare because it is so dumb. What are the chances of
> changing someone's mind with a contribution, particularly one limited
> by contribution limits? If that happens, what are the chances of the
> politician staying bought?
>
> Strategy (1) is way more successful.
>
> This is so for anyone wanting benefits from government, including
> those wanting "special benefits." Lets say someone wants an increase
> in food stamp allowances. It is much smarter to contribute to a
> liberal Democrat than to a conservative Republican. And it does not
> matter if it is a "special benefit," whatever that is. Let's say one
> wants increased public employee union pensions and health care
> benefits. Well find a politician who thinks that is good public
> policy, ie, your average union official or everyday liberal Democrat,
> and contribute to him or her and you actually have a chance that the
> politician might support that public policy in office.
>
> "Pay to play" is Strategy (2) and I can only hope that all the
> liberals and progressives actually employ this strategy. I have a 
> nice
> long list of conservative Republicans for them to "pay to play."
>
> However, we know they don't, so what does that say about the validity
> of their argument?. Jim Bopp
>
> In a message dated 7/5/2014 6:18:23 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
> catbird at pipeline.com [33] writes:
>
>> It's interesting how easily and unquestioningly some people say that
>> "the vast majority of campaign contributors have no corrupt
>> intentions," when in the vast majority of elections — that is,
>> local elections — most large contributions come from "restricted
>> sources," that is, those regulated by, employed by, or seeking
>> special benefits from the government (directly or for their
>> clients). In local elections, there is little ideology and lots of
>> pay to play, expected contributions from employees and appointed
>> officials, and the desire to preserve access and influence in order
>> to keep, get, or prevent very specific things, such as contracts,
>> permits, grants, and regulations. The vast majority of these
>> contributors meet with officeholders.
>>
>> The world does not consist of the federal government. In the world
>> where I work, you cannot get elected without money from restricted
>> sources unless you are independently wealthy or participate in a
>> public campaign financing program. Are elected local and state
>> officials decent and honorable people stuck in a situation of legal,
>> institutional corruption? No one can know an individual's character,
>> but we can know the laws they pass and fail to pass.
>>
>> We also cannot know how many decent, honorable people choose not to
>> run because of what they would have to do to run a winning campaign.
>>
>> Robert Wechsler
>> City Ethics [30]
>>
>> On 7/3/2014 6:11 PM, Smith, Brad wrote:
>>
>>> As I read this thread, a few thoughts occur to me:
>>>
>>> 1. Chief Justice Roberts made a very good point in the McCutcheon
>>> decision, when he pointed out that contribution limits are
>>> themselves a "prophylactic." That is to say, THE VAST MAJORITY OF
>>> CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTORS HAVE NO CORRUPT INTENTIONS, AND IN FACT
>>> NEVER EVEN SEEK A MEETING WITH AN OFFICEHOLDER. They merely want
>>> what they consider to be good policy and good government.
>>> Similarly, the substantial majority of officeholders are NOT
>>> CORRUPT, BUT DECENT, HONORABLE MEN AND WOMEN trying to do a very
>>> difficult job. Thus, contribution limits inherently infringe on a
>>> great deal of political activity - speech activity - that is
>>> outside the scope of "corruption" as, I think, most Americans
>>> think of "corruption," and as the Supreme Court defines it for
>>> purposes of a compelling government interest that might overcome
>>> First Amendment rights.
>>>
>>> 2. The reform movement has not pursued narrowly targeted
>>> approaches aimed at specific, actual corruption with much vigor.
>>> Yes, virtually all reformers I know dislike Leadership PACs, but
>>> they have devoted, on the whole, little effort to reforming them.
>>> They have done very little to revise "personal use" laws (I
>>> believe I can say that during my time on the FEC, I was the
>>> toughest commissioner on the question of personal use). They have
>>> paid little attention to the types of events that Joe writes about
>>> below (But ask Bob Ney if there are limits). They have not put a
>>> major emphasis on limiting direct promises of access for
>>> contributions. Lobbying abuses, including lobbying by immediate
>>> family members, have always been a secondary target. Again, I
>>> emphasize that of course reformers have bemoaned abuses in these
>>> areas, but they have not been a major point of the reform lobby's
>>> legislative efforts. Those efforts have been reserved for much
>>> broader, "prophylactic" measures that necessarily limit a great
>>> deal of First Amendment activity that is not corrupting, and that
>>> have created an ever more complex set of rules that have,
>>> themselves, distorted the process. (As Larry notes, there was a
>>> time, before contribution limits, when massive IE campaigns were
>>> unheard of, to give just one example). Even the 1990s law that
>>> finally prohibited officeholders from converting campaign funds to
>>> personal funds on retirement was not led by the reform community,
>>> but by talk radio hosts, term limit enthusiasts, and other tea
>>> party precursors upset about perceived congressional abuses in the
>>> late '80s and early '90s that included the House banking scandal
>>> and more.
>>>
>>> 3. I suspect there would be room for cooperation and broad
>>> consensus on some of these narrow corruption issues, if reformers
>>> were prepared to drop their more utopian ideas and blunderbuss
>>> measures and place their focus here.
>>>
>>> _Bradley A. Smith_
>>>
>>> _Josiah H. Blackmore II/Shirley M. Nault_
>>>
>>> _ Professor of Law_
>>>
>>> _Capital University Law School_
>>>
>>> _303 E. Broad St._
>>>
>>> _Columbus, OH 43215_
>>>
>>> _614.236.6317_
>>>
>>> _http://law.capital.edu/faculty/bios/bsmith.aspx [10]_
>>>
>>> -------------------------
>>>
>>> FROM: law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu [11]
>>> [law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu [12]] on behalf of
>>> Joe Birkenstock [birkenstock at sandlerreiff.com [13]]
>>> SENT: Thursday, July 03, 2014 10:38 AM
>>> TO: larrylevine at earthlink.net [14]; JBoppjr at aol.com [15]
>>> CC: law-election at uci.edu [16]
>>> SUBJECT: Re: [EL] WARNING: SNARK AHEAD RE: Supreme Court and
>>> campaign finance
>>>
>>> Fair question Larry, but it’s the “stays with” that really
>>> illustrates my point. What does that mean when that money replaces
>>> money spent on skiing?
>>>
>>> My real point with all this: Jim & his clients are litigating
>>> away/have litigated away the administrative rules that used to
>>> draw these kinds of lines. What’s left are a set of criminal
>>> laws that Jim says he supports (his words: selling access
>>> “should be” illegal) but which exist primarily in the eye of
>>> the beholder.
>>>
>>> Ask Scott Walker (or Don Seigelman) whether we’re better off
>>> using criminal laws to police officeholder self-dealing than we
>>> were when these were issues addressed first and foremost with
>>> fines and conciliation agreements.
>>>
>>> Sent from my iPhone
>>>
>>> FROM: Larry Levine <larrylevine at earthlink.net [17]>
>>> REPLY-TO: "larrylevine at earthlink.net [18]"
>>> <larrylevine at earthlink.net [19]>
>>> DATE: Thursday, July 3, 2014 at 10:16 AM
>>> TO: Joe Birkenstock <birkenstock at sandlerreiff.com [20]>, Jim Bopp
>>> <jboppjr at aol.com [21]>
>>> CC: "law-election at uci.edu [22]" <law-election at uci.edu [23]>
>>> SUBJECT: RE: [EL] WARNING: SNARK AHEAD RE: Supreme Court and
>>> campaign finance
>>>
>>> And what if the money stays with the campaign committee for
>>> communications with voters and eliminates the cause for
>>> independent expenditures?
>>>
>>> Larry
>>>
>>> FROM: law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu [24]
>>> [mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu [25]] ON
>>> BEHALF OF Joe Birkenstock
>>> SENT: Thursday, July 03, 2014 6:52 AM
>>> TO: JBoppjr at aol.com [26]
>>> CC: law-election at uci.edu [27]
>>> SUBJECT: Re: [EL] WARNING: SNARK AHEAD RE: Supreme Court and
>>> campaign finance
>>>
>>> "Who gets the $100k?" That's a good question, isn't it?
>>>
>>> In practice it goes back to the campaign committee that paid for
>>> the weekend. So if you accept that money is fungible it seems as
>>> true to say the weekend attendees get it - at least get the
>>> benefit of it (including the senator).
>>>
>>> Sent from my iPhone
>>>
>>> On Jul 3, 2014, at 9:47 AM, "JBoppjr at aol.com [28]"
>>> <JBoppjr at aol.com [29]> wrote:
>>>
>>>> As Trevor's "example" demonstrates, there is a lot of sloppy,
>>>> vague and broad language used by "reformers" here. So, as to
>>>> Joe's hypo, who get the $100K -- assuming it does not violate
>>>> any contribution limits? Jim
>>>>
>>>> In a message dated 7/3/2014 9:40:23 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
>>>> birkenstock at sandlerreiff.com [9] writes:
>>>>
>>>>> Sure does. What if a US senator (also a public official)
>>>>> raises the same $100k from the same sources for a private ski
>>>>> weekend in Aspen all paid by campaign funds. Still a bribe?
>>>>>
>>>>> Sent from my iPhone
>>>>>
>>>>> On Jul 3, 2014, at 9:34 AM, "JBoppjr at aol.com [7]"
>>>>> <JBoppjr at aol.com [8]> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Can the Director of the IRS -- a government official --
>>>>>> charge and pocket $100,000 for a meeting with him at IRS
>>>>>> headquarters? Sounds like a bribe to me Jim Bopp
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In a message dated 7/3/2014 9:30:42 A.M. Eastern Daylight
>>>>>> Time, birkenstock at sandlerreiff.com [6] writes:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Now *this* is an interesting way to start a long holiday
>>>>>>> weekend. Serious question: this is "already illegal" under
>>>>>>> what law?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ___________________________________
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Joseph M. Birkenstock
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Sandler Reiff Lamb Rosenstein & Birkenstock, P.C.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 1025 Vermont Avenue, NW, Suite 300
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Washington, DC 20005
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 202.479.1111
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *also admitted to practice in CA
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> FROM: Jim Bopp <jboppjr at aol.com [1]>
>>>>>>> DATE: Thursday, July 3, 2014 at 8:18 AM
>>>>>>> TO: Trevor Potter <tpotter at capdale.com [2]>
>>>>>>> CC: "law-election at uci.edu [3]" <law-election at uci.edu [4]>
>>>>>>> SUBJECT: Re: [EL] WARNING: SNARK AHEAD RE: Supreme Court
>>>>>>> and campaign finance
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Trevor, you are so silly. This is already illegal and
>>>>>>> should be. Jim
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In a message dated 7/2/2014 7:37:19 P.M. Eastern Daylight
>>>>>>> Time, tpotter at capdale.com [5] writes:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> right to buy and sell meetings with government officials
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>>
>>> Law-election mailing list
>>>
>>> Law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
>>>
>>> http://department-lists.uci.edu/mailman/listinfo/law-election
>>
>> _______________________________________________
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>
>
> Links:
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> [30] http://www.cityethics.org/
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