[EL] Wisconsin John Doe decision

Wed May 7 08:41:11 PDT 2014

To quote my grandfather, this ruling was pure chutzpah.

I certainly understand the unbridled glee coming from the dereg people, but
let's face facts: they're forwarding an argument that it's basically
impossible to corrupt an election. That's an insulting notion to the
average voter. And while I applaud the victories of my opponents, I suggest
folks curb their enthusiasm. It's getting gauche.

The judge here practically celebrated the notion that WI CFG found a way to
circumvent established law. So yeah, this goes beyond the Roberts notion
that coordination laws were some sort of firewall to corruption (a
willfully ignorant notion itself). Apparently we're not even pretending
that corruption is even a thing anymore.

Josh Orton

Progressives United

Russ Feingold, Founder

608.831.7877

On Wed, May 7, 2014 at 10:09 AM, Steve Hoersting <hoersting at gmail.com>wrote:

> Because content-based restrictions on speech are disfavored and/or
> impermissible under the 1st Am, a good way to think about what has come to
> be called the "content standard" for commencing a coordination
> investigation is "subject matter jurisdiction."
>
> Election Commissions regulate Expenditures (express advocacy, *see
> Buckley*) and Electioneering Communications -- and regrettably, some
> "public communications". Allowing a coordination investigation to commence
> into speech outside these constructs -- on the theory that issue-speech
> when coordinated is somehow a campaign finance "contribution" (that is,
> something of value given for the purpose of influencing an election) --
> would lead to all of the horrors the Wisconsin case illuminates and Brad
> well describes above.
>
> To those new to issue: When thinking "content standard," think "subject
> matter jurisdiction" for the agency to open a coordination investigation.
>
> Steve
>
>
> On Wed, May 7, 2014 at 9:52 AM, Smith, Brad <BSmith at law.capital.edu>wrote:
>
>>  This is an extremely important ruling. Under the theory advanced by the
>> state, a great many of the individuals on this list, and the organizations
>> with which many are affiliated, including many "reform" organizations,
>> could be subjected to the same type of investigations that were underway in
>> Wisconsin. People in politics know each other and work together on
>> projects. Issues can and do affect campaigns for office. The decision does
>> not dramatically alter federal law, but it makes clear that sweeping
>> allegations of "coordination," and ensuing investigations, cannot be used
>> as a substitute for the outright suppression of speech that many wish were
>> in the law.
>>
>>  Coordination allegations are easily made. We know, for example, that
>> Craig Holman is up on the Hill all the time, and we know some of the
>> members with whom he speaks; we know of Trevor Potter's tight relationship
>> with certain members of the Keating 5; we know that Fred Wertheimer and
>> Norm Ornstein work closely with various members. We know that the groups
>> with which they are affiliated trumpet issues of importance to these
>> members, often favorably quote these members, sometimes give them awards at
>> big dinners in New York City that raise hundreds of thousands for the
>> Brennan Center, which can put those funds back into promoting these same
>> issues and the candidates affiliated with them. A knows B who knows C who
>> knows D, and they are all talking about X. Voila! Coordination! If, as most
>> in the reform camp argue, there need be no election advocacy to bring an
>> allegedly coordinated communication within the regulatory purview of the
>> law, than the routine communications by all these groups could easily be
>> deemed "coordinated." Fortunately, there has generally been some
>> self-restraint in pushing coordination allegations, perhaps because all
>> involved realize that under the expansive theories of "coordination" some
>> advocate, a huge swath of routine and highly valuable political activity
>> would suddenly be illegal.
>>
>>  But allegations are made at times, and once made, coordination
>> investigations are among the most intrusive the government can undertake.
>> By definition, they involve pawing through organizational records, learning
>> who meets with whom, what they talk about, how officeholders and advocacy
>> groups coordinate messages and work to pass legislation. They involve
>> numerous depositions and demands for countless documents. Conducting these
>> investigations under criminal law - and in secret, no less - merely makes
>> the problem greater. Jim Bopp, Heidi Abegg and others have written about
>> this at length in numerous law review pieces. Steve Hoersting and I
>> addressed the problem in an Election Law Journal article, "A Toothless
>> Anaconda," and also in my Statement of Reasons in FEC MUR 4626, available
>> here: http://www.fec.gov/members/former_members/smith/smithreason6.htm. As
>> I note in the outset to that SOR,
>>
>>  "Despite the fact that the Commission has now found no violations in
>> this case, I strongly suspect that the original complainant, the Democratic
>> National Committee, considers its complaint to have been a success.  The
>> complaint undoubtedly forced their political opponents to spend hundreds of
>> thousands, if not millions of dollars in legal fees, and to devote
>> countless hours of staff, candidate, and executive time to responding to
>> discovery and handling legal matters.  Despite our finding that their
>> activities were not coordinated and so did not violate the Act, I strongly
>> suspect that the huge costs imposed by the investigation will discourage
>> similar participation by these and other groups in the future."
>>
>>  There are very few federal court decisions on coordination, but they
>> have generally taken a similar hard line against the government. See FEC v.
>> Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp.2d 45 (D.D.C. 1999). So in that sense, the
>> Wisconsin decision does not make new law. But it does emphasize good law in
>> an area that has been largely unsupervised by the courts.
>>
>>  A potentially unique element is that Wisconsin substantive law requires
>> "express advocacy" even for "coordinated communications." This clearly
>> shows the wisdom of having some type of "content standard" for determining
>> if something is "coordinated"  as a threshold barrier to exactly this type
>> of intrusive investigation. As I point in MUR 4626 quoted above, absent a
>> "content" threshold, coordination allegations are very easy to make and the
>> process is itself the punishment, as we saw both in MUR 4626 and in this
>> very case in Wisconsin. The key paragraph to understanding yesterday's
>> ruling is the paragraph beginning at the bottom of page 19,  and footnote 7
>> which immediately precedes this paragraph. I'll quote it here in it's
>> entirety,:
>>
>>  "fn.7
>>  Moreover, if Wisconsin could regulate issue advocacy — coordinated or
>> otherwise — it
>> would open the door to a trial on every ad ―on the theory that the
>> speaker actually intended to affect
>> an election, no matter how compelling the indications that the ad
>> concerned a pending legislative or
>> policy issue. No reasonable speaker would choose to run an ad . . . if
>> its only defense to a criminal
>> prosecution would be that its motives were pure.‖ WRTL at 468.
>>
>>  TEXT: "Defendants‘ attempt to construe the term ―political purposes‖ to
>> reach issue
>> advocacy would mean transforming issue advocacy into express advocacy by
>> interpretative legerdemain and not by any analysis as to why it would
>> rise to the level
>> of quid pro quo corruption. As the defendants argue, the Club would
>> become a
>> ―subcommittee‖ of a campaign committee simply because it coordinated
>> therewith.
>> Wis. Stat. § 11.10(4). If correct, this means that any individual or
>> group engaging in
>> any kind of coordination with a candidate or campaign would risk
>> forfeiting their right
>>  to engage in political speech. The legislative tail would wag the
>> constitutional dog.8
>>
>>  fn8
>>  For example, if the Boy Scouts coordinated a charitable fundraiser with
>> a candidate for
>> office, the Boy Scouts would become a campaign subcommittee subject to
>> the requirements and
>> limitations of Wisconsin campaign-finance laws, exposing them to civil
>> and criminal penalties for
>> touting the candidate‘s support. See, e.g, Clifton v. Fed. Election
>> Comm’n, 114 F.3d 1309, 1314 (1st
>> Cir. 1997) (―it is beyond reasonable belief that, to prevent corruption
>> or illicit coordination, the
>> government could prohibit voluntary discussions between citizens and
>> their legislators and candidates
>> on public issues‖). Similarly, if a 501(c)(4) organization like the Club
>> coordinated a speech or
>> fundraising dinner with a Wisconsin political candidate, all of its
>> subsequent contributions and
>> expenditures would be attributable to that candidate‘s committee and
>> subject to the limitations of
>> Wisconsin law. This would preclude the organization from making any
>> independent expenditures
>> after initially engaging in coordinated issue advocacy. Wis. Stat.§§
>> 11.05(6), 11.16(1)(a). It would
>> also bar the organization from accepting corporate contributions which
>> could then, in turn, be used for
>> independent expenditures. § 11.38."
>>
>>  So this is a very important decision - a ruling the other way would
>> have really led to some nasty politics, because, I've noted, it is very
>> easy to file these complaints, if there is no content standard, and believe
>> me, we would have started to see them being filed all over. I have a long
>> list of organizations and their activities and contacts that would be ripe
>> for coordination complaints under the type of theory advanced here by the
>> State of Wisconsin.
>>
>>
>>
>>  *Bradley A. Smith*
>>
>> *Josiah H. Blackmore II/Shirley M. Nault*
>>
>> *   Professor of Law*
>>
>> *Capital University Law School*
>>
>> *303 E. Broad St.*
>>
>> *Columbus, OH 43215*
>>
>> *614.236.6317 <614.236.6317>*
>>
>> *http://law.capital.edu/faculty/bios/bsmith.aspx
>> <http://law.capital.edu/faculty/bios/bsmith.aspx>*
>>   ------------------------------
>> *From:* law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu [
>> law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] on behalf of Confessore,
>> Nicholas [nconfess at nytimes.com]
>> *Sent:* Wednesday, May 07, 2014 8:35 AM
>> *To:* Law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
>> *Subject:* [EL] Wisconsin John Doe decision
>>
>>    Hello everyone,
>>  Curious to hear folks' opinion on the district judge's ruling in the
>> Wisconsin case. Apart from one's views on the politics of the
>> investigation, does this ruling change push federal law in a new direction
>> on the question of coordination rules? Or is it relatively narrow?
>>  best regards,
>> Nick Confessore
>>
>> --
>>   Nicholas Confessore
>>  The New York Times
>>  W (212) 556-5911
>>  C  (917) 456 2446
>>  gchat: @nconfessore
>>
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>
>
>
> --
> Stephen M. Hoersting
>
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