[EL] Dependency Corruption & Re: Unlimited contributions vs IEs - was Re: smith on cu

[Thomas J. Cares]

I don't think an honest definition of corruption is so difficult to
construct.

If Exxon very-substantively helped me get elected to the legislature, be it
through IEs or contributions, and if I liked being a legislator, and I felt
that my re-election could hinge on their repeated support, my ability to
vote in the interest of my constituents, where that interest conflicts with
Exxon's would be corrupted. Of course, I like to think that I personally
would choose my constituents over Exxon. But, you know, politicians tend to
be egotistical, and egotistical people have a way of justifying things -
"This Bill might be a little bad for my constituents, but voting for it
will get me the money I need to be re-elected allowing me to do so many
other things that do more good for my constituents than this does bad. It's
actually a good deal for my constituents that I vote for this. Whoever
would replace me would not do the great things that I would do in my 2nd
term. It's really in their best interest that I screw them on this; it's
actually the right thing to do."

The fact is, in such a situation, where maybe it's a close call whether
it's a good bill or a bad bill, and you vote on the side of Exxon, I feel
like even you, the legislator, can't really know if the money corrupted
you. People tend not to understand the depths of their psychology well
enough. "No, no, the tax revenue is worth the environmental harm, we can
spend that money to do more good for the environment than the little bit of
bad this does."

But you can never really know if you would have made that same
justification had your career not depended on it. Maybe you would have, but
maybe it was too convenient for you to accept, that you couldn't take the
affirmative mental action of internally challenging that justification such
to discover that it was not truly merited.

In any event, if Exxon's support is a major factor in whether you'll be
re-elected, your ability to consider your constituent's interests over
Exxon's has been corrupted.

That's your appropriate definition of corruption. (I suppose this is
Lessig's 'dependency corruption').

Redefining it as quid quo pro is just convenient for the 'anti-reformers'.

Also, for what it's worth, I naively ran for State Assembly when I was 20
years old (I say "naively", because I thought my superior policy goals (
http://tomcares.com/index901.html ) would give me an actual chance). It's
very hard to imagine I would ever try that again without having first
achieved a personal financial wealth that would allow me to self-fund.
Before, I didn't realize how absolutely-necessary 6-figure fundraising was;
I was thinking David vs. Goliath. It's more like a butterfly vs Goliath (I
mean, from my experience, I was the only one really pounding hard talking
about policy, I put in tons of effort. I got 5% of the vote, like a
butterfly getting one cheap shot in Goliath's eye, before getting swatted.
No one takes you seriously if you don't have campaign cash. Yes, my resume
was weaker (which I perhaps did overcome, because I got about as many votes
as the current mayor of Lawndale, who also had no real money), but If I had
6 figures, I would have been taken more seriously, and also could have
reached more voters).

Anyway, why do I strongly doubt I would ever attempt that again without the
ability to self-fund? Because I'm not sure I trust myself to not think
something like "This Bill might be a little bad for my constituents, but
voting for it will get me the money I need to be re-elected allowing me to
do so many other things that do more good for my constituents than this
does bad. It's actually a good deal for my constituents that I vote for
this. Whoever would replace me would not do the great things that I would
do in my 2nd term. It's really in their best interest that I screw them on
this; it's actually the right thing to do."

I'm afraid that If I had to raise the money to win, I wouldn't win. The
person holding the office wouldn't quite be me (I guess it would be a
corrupted me). (Though to be honest, even if I became very wealthy - maybe
doing the whole tech start up thing - I still doubt I'd ever run for
anything again, because I've "matured" into thinking there are probably
better ways for me to have a positive influence. I'd probably totally try
to be a much better version of the Kochs though.)



As for your last paragraph, about corrupting safe incumbents, doesn't the
California Medical Association contribute to every single state legislator?
I don't think they do this because they really like each and all of them. I
think they do it to "magically" immunize them to concern that the Micra cap
hasn't adjusted for inflation in 40+ years, as well as other things.

And then back to IEs vs. contributions. I guess we'll agree to disagree on
whether the fact that IEs can be less effective, for the reasons you stated
-

> I find most IEs to be absolutely ineffective. My cynical perspective on
> IEs is that an interest group makes money available to a consultant, who
> then spends it with no accountability and with no need to assess how it
> might help or hurt the candidate involved. All that after taking 15% off
> the top as a fee and then marking up everything for additional commissions.
> Often, the candidate has to disavow the actions of an IE that litters a
> district with signs on public property or does an over-the-line hit piece.
> That pulls the candidate off message and actually can hurt the campaign.

- provides a worthwhile candidate appreciation deficit, compared to direct
contributions, which proves to be important in preventing corruptive
effects of special interest money ("Exxon's IE is probably more likely, or
at least just as likely, to hurt me than help me. #$%@ them.")

Also, your proposal really just gives them more options. If a special
interest thinks a dirty smear that the candidate would never do themselves
would help the candidate more than money or be appreciated more than money
they'll still IE it. Unrestricting contributions won't get rid of the dirty
stuff in IEs; it just gifts them flexibility. Essentially the point Justin
Levitt made a few days ago:

> IEs provide an avenue for individuals or groups to promote their own
> messages in ways that get them power and attention, which may serve the
> interest of some individuals or groups far better than a contribution.  And
> IEs also provide an avenue for negative ads that give candidates plausible
> deniability, which may serve the interest of some candidates far better
> than a contribution.
>



-Thomas Cares

On Sun, Apr 5, 2015 at 10:00 AM, Larry Levine <larrylevine at earthlink.net>
wrote:

> One of the difficulties of this discussion is the perception and
> definition of corruption. Reformers tend to see corruption everywhere they
> look; without corruption they would have no purpose. Some have argued that
> the advocacy of reforms is one of the factors causing the perception of
> corruption. I have argued for many years that in my 45 years of political
> consulting and 12 years as a news reporter I found the overwhelming
> majority of elected officials to be honest people who were sincerely
> interested in good public policy and law making. Reformers argue back that
> the simple act of giving a contribution that results in increased access to
> an elected official is in itself a form of corruption because the “average”
> – non-contributing – citizen doesn’t have that same access. And from there
> the reformers try to eliminate, or limit, the money going from any source
> to the campaign of the elected official. With that wide a gap in the
> interpretation of corruption, I’m not sure the two camps can ever agree.
>
>
>
> As to one of your other points, I find most IEs to be absolutely
> ineffective. My cynical perspective on IEs is that an interest group makes
> money available to a consultant, who then spends it with no accountability
> and with no need to assess how it might help or hurt the candidate
> involved. All that after taking 15% off the top as a fee and then marking
> up everything for additional commissions. Often, the candidate has to
> disavow the actions of an IE that litters a district with signs on public
> property or does an over-the-line hit piece. That pulls the candidate off
> message and actually can hurt the campaign.
>
>
>
> I did what may have been the most effective IE in history (fact, not brag)
> in 2013. Nury Martinez had finished 20 points behind Cindy Montanez in a
> Los Angeles City Council Primary. With six weeks to go before the runoff
> election, I was hired to do a $100,000 IE for Martinez. The result was a
> 10-point victory for Martinez – a 30-point turn around in six weeks. City
> Council President Herb Wesson said, “In 800 years of politics, I’ve never
> seen anything like this.” What was different about this IE? I live in the
> district and had the opportunity to watch the two campaigns as a consumer
> in the Primary. I had a feel for what needed to be done from the start and
> before getting started we built a strategy as we would have if we were
> doing the actual campaign instead of an IE. Most IEs don’t do that. They
> are cookie-cutter operations that take little or no heed of the particulars
> of the race at hand. When I’m doing a race and know there will be an IE for
> my candidate, I get very nervous. In one recent race I saw an IE produce
> five pieces of mail “supporting” my candidate with messages that had
> nothing to do with the message of our campaign. Later, I learned the
> consultant had done those same mail pieces for other candidates in other
> races.
>
>
>
> Finally, while some “safe” incumbents may take advantage of their safe
> incumbency to cross the line, in most cases these are the people who have
> the least motivation to cross that line. They are safe and the contributing
> entity needs them more than they need the contribution. In general I
> believe people give money to candidates who represent positions with which
> they already agree and who will advocate for that position, not someone who
> disagrees and who they hope will change positions because of the
> contribution. That is true whether it’s a direct contribution to the
> candidate, or participation in an IE. I am not going to give money to the
> conservative, anti-union candidate because I hope he or she will suddenly
> become a  vote for or advocate of stronger pro-labor measures. The reverse
> also is true.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Larry
>
>
>
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