[EL] Dependency Corruption & Re: Unlimited contributions vs IEs - was ...

[JBoppjr at aol.com]

If a candidate will receive campaign contributions regardless of which side 
 the supports, isn't he free to pick the side he thinks best serves the 
public  interest.  Game, set, match for Sean.  Jim Bopp
 
 
In a message dated 4/7/2015 6:34:28 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,  
APearson at commoncause.org writes:

Ironically, this response really cinches the point. Whether it's one  
donor's x% or another opposing donor's x or 2x%, the problem is the same.  Either 
way, the desire for those resources creates an inherent conflict of  
interest between donors and voters.  


One does not have to assume corruption or bad motives to recognize that  
that conflict is inherently unhealthy for a democratic system that is supposed 
 to represent the interests of voters, regardless of their ability to  pay:


Comparable conflicts of interest are not tolerated in most other realms,  
whether there's a fiduciary duty at stake or something more common.  We  
don't want financial advisors who financially benefit by promoting someone  
else's bottom line; employees who get paid by competitors; police who  
personally benefit from selectively enforcing (or not enforcing) public laws;  or 
umpires who get paid by teams.


We would all benefit by finding ways to realign the sources of campaign  
funding and voters.  That's the best way to minimize the risk that the  money 
required to obtain and keep political power does not distort public  policy 
priorities or undermine public faith in the integrity or our  government.  


Supermajorities of voters, across all party lines, understand the problem  
and are hungry for common sense solutions.

Sent from my iPhone

On Apr 7, 2015, at 5:08 PM, "Sean Parnell" 
<_sean at impactpolicymanagement.com_ (mailto:sean at impactpolicymanagement.com) >  wrote:



   
 
There’s  also the option of “If I don’t do this thing Exxon wants, they won
’t give me  x% of what I need to run an effective campaign, but I’ll bet 
Tom Steyer  would be more than happy to give me that x%, maybe even  2x%.” 
I  was the fundraiser for Congressman Greg Gankse from ’99 to ’02, and I 
always  got a good laugh when I heard people explaining that the Patients’ 
Bill of  Rights couldn’t passed in Congress because of all that big money HMOs 
were  throwing at campaigns. The reason for my merriment was that Ganske 
was the  lead sponsor of the PBoR and we were raking in campaign contributions 
 hand-over-fist from doctors, medical associations, trial lawyers, and 
others  who wanted to see the legislation passed.  
Best, 
Sean  Parnell 
President 
Impact  Policy Management, LLC 
6411  Caleb Court 
Alexandria,  VA  22315 
571-289-1374  (c) 
_sean at impactpolicymanagement.com_ (mailto:sean at impactpolicymanagement.com)  
From: _law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu_ 
(mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu)   
[mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu]  On Behalf Of Thomas J. Cares
Sent: Tuesday, April 07, 2015  4:04 PM
To: Larry Levine
Cc: Election  Law
Subject: [EL] Dependency Corruption & Re: Unlimited  contributions vs IEs - 
was Re: smith on cu 
 
I don't think an honest definition of corruption is so  difficult to 
construct. 
 

 
If Exxon very-substantively helped me get elected to the  legislature, be 
it through IEs or contributions, and if I liked being a  legislator, and I 
felt that my re-election could hinge on their repeated  support, my ability to 
vote in the interest of my constituents, where that  interest conflicts 
with Exxon's would be corrupted. Of course, I like to  think that I personally 
would choose my constituents over Exxon. But, you  know, politicians tend to 
be egotistical, and egotistical people have a way  of justifying things - 
"This Bill might be a little bad for my constituents,  but voting for it will 
get me the money I need to be re-elected allowing me  to do so many other 
things that do more good for my constituents than this  does bad. It's 
actually a good deal for my constituents that I vote for  this. Whoever would 
replace me would not do the great things that I would do  in my 2nd term. It's 
really in their best interest that I screw them on  this; it's actually the 
right thing to do."
 


 
The fact is, in such a situation, where maybe it's a  close call whether 
it's a good bill or a bad bill, and you vote on the side  of Exxon, I feel 
like even you, the legislator, can't really know if the  money corrupted you. 
People tend not to understand the depths of their  psychology well enough. 
"No, no, the tax revenue is worth the environmental  harm, we can spend that 
money to do more good for the environment than the  little bit of bad this 
does."
 

 
 
But you can never really know if you would have made that  same 
justification had your career not depended on it. Maybe you would have,  but maybe it 
was too convenient for you to accept, that you couldn't take  the affirmative 
mental action of internally challenging that justification  such to 
discover that it was not truly merited.
 

 
In any event, if Exxon's support is a major factor in  whether you'll be 
re-elected, your ability to consider your constituent's  interests over 
Exxon's has been corrupted.
 

 
That's your appropriate definition of corruption. (I  suppose this is 
Lessig's 'dependency corruption').
 

 
Redefining it as quid quo pro is just convenient for the  'anti-reformers'.
 

 
Also, for what it's worth, I naively ran for State  Assembly when I was 20 
years old (I say "naively", because I thought my  superior policy goals ( 
http://tomcares.com/index901.html  ) would give me an actual chance). It's 
very hard to imagine I would ever  try that again without having first achieved 
a personal financial wealth  that would allow me to self-fund. Before, I 
didn't realize how  absolutely-necessary 6-figure fundraising was; I was 
thinking David vs.  Goliath. It's more like a butterfly vs Goliath (I mean, from 
my experience,  I was the only one really pounding hard talking about 
policy, I put in tons  of effort. I got 5% of the vote, like a butterfly getting 
one cheap shot in  Goliath's eye, before getting swatted. No one takes you 
seriously if you  don't have campaign cash. Yes, my resume was weaker (which I 
perhaps did  overcome, because I got about as many votes as the current 
mayor of  Lawndale, who also had no real money), but If I had 6 figures, I 
would have  been taken more seriously, and also could have reached more  voters).
 

 
Anyway, why do I strongly doubt I would ever attempt that  again without 
the ability to self-fund? Because I'm not sure I trust myself  to not think 
something like "This Bill might be a little bad for my  constituents, but 
voting for it will get me the money I need to be  re-elected allowing me to do 
so many other things that do more good for my  constituents than this does 
bad. It's actually a good deal for my  constituents that I vote for this. 
Whoever would replace me would not do the  great things that I would do in my 
2nd term. It's really in their best  interest that I screw them on this; it's 
actually the right thing to  do."
 

 
I'm afraid that If I had to raise the money to win, I  wouldn't win. The 
person holding the office wouldn't quite be me (I guess it  would be a 
corrupted me). (Though to be honest, even if I became very  wealthy - maybe doing 
the whole tech start up thing - I still doubt I'd ever  run for anything 
again, because I've "matured" into thinking there are  probably better ways for 
me to have a positive influence. I'd probably  totally try to be a much 
better version of the Kochs  though.)
 
 

 

 

 
As for your last paragraph, about corrupting safe  incumbents, doesn't the 
California Medical Association contribute to every  single state legislator? 
I don't think they do this because they really like  each and all of them. 
I think they do it to "magically" immunize them to  concern that the Micra 
cap hasn't adjusted for inflation in 40+ years, as  well as other things.
 

 
And then back to IEs vs. contributions. I guess we'll  agree to disagree on 
whether the fact that IEs can be less effective, for  the reasons you 
stated -

I  find most IEs to be absolutely ineffective. My cynical perspective on 
IEs  is that an interest group makes money available to a consultant, who then 
 spends it with no accountability and with no need to assess how it might  
help or hurt the candidate involved. All that after taking 15% off the top  
as a fee and then marking up everything for additional commissions. Often,  
the candidate has to disavow the actions of an IE that litters a district  
with signs on public property or does an over-the-line hit piece. That  pulls 
the candidate off message and actually can hurt the  campaign.
 
- provides a worthwhile candidate appreciation deficit,  compared to direct 
contributions, which proves to be important in preventing  corruptive 
effects of special interest money ("Exxon's IE is probably more  likely, or at 
least just as likely, to hurt me than help me. #$%@  them.")
 

 
Also, your proposal really just gives them more options.  If a special 
interest thinks a dirty smear that the candidate would never do  themselves 
would help the candidate more than money or be appreciated more  than money 
they'll still IE it. Unrestricting contributions won't get rid of  the dirty 
stuff in IEs; it just gifts them flexibility. Essentially the  point Justin 
Levitt made a few days ago:

IEs provide an avenue  for individuals or groups to promote their own 
messages in ways that get  them power and attention, which may serve the interest 
of some individuals  or groups far better than a contribution.  And IEs 
also provide an  avenue for negative ads that give candidates plausible 
deniability, which  may serve the interest of some candidates far better than a  
contribution.  
 

 

 

 
-Thomas Cares
 
 
On Sun, Apr 5, 2015 at 10:00 AM, Larry Levine <_larrylevine at earthlink.net_ 
(mailto:larrylevine at earthlink.net) > wrote: 
 
 
One  of the difficulties of this discussion is the perception and 
definition of  corruption. Reformers tend to see corruption everywhere they look; 
without  corruption they would have no purpose. Some have argued that the 
advocacy of  reforms is one of the factors causing the perception of corruption. 
I have  argued for many years that in my 45 years of political consulting 
and 12  years as a news reporter I found the overwhelming majority of elected  
officials to be honest people who were sincerely interested in good public  
policy and law making. Reformers argue back that the simple act of giving a 
 contribution that results in increased access to an elected official is in 
 itself a form of corruption because the “average” – non-contributing –  
citizen doesn’t have that same access. And from there the reformers try to  
eliminate, or limit, the money going from any source to the campaign of the  
elected official. With that wide a gap in the interpretation of corruption, 
 I’m not sure the two camps can ever agree.  
As  to one of your other points, I find most IEs to be absolutely 
ineffective.  My cynical perspective on IEs is that an interest group makes money  
available to a consultant, who then spends it with no accountability and  with 
no need to assess how it might help or hurt the candidate involved. All  
that after taking 15% off the top as a fee and then marking up everything  for 
additional commissions. Often, the candidate has to disavow the actions  of 
an IE that litters a district with signs on public property or does an  
over-the-line hit piece. That pulls the candidate off message and actually  can 
hurt the campaign.  
I  did what may have been the most effective IE in history (fact, not brag) 
in  2013. Nury Martinez had finished 20 points behind Cindy Montanez in a 
Los  Angeles City Council Primary. With six weeks to go before the runoff  
election, I was hired to do a $100,000 IE for Martinez. The result was a  
10-point victory for Martinez – a 30-point turn around in six weeks. City  
Council President Herb Wesson said, “In 800 years of politics, I’ve never  seen 
anything like this.” What was different about this IE? I live in the  
district and had the opportunity to watch the two campaigns as a consumer in  the 
Primary. I had a feel for what needed to be done from the start and  before 
getting started we built a strategy as we would have if we were doing  the 
actual campaign instead of an IE. Most IEs don’t do that. They are  
cookie-cutter operations that take little or no heed of the particulars of  the race 
at hand. When I’m doing a race and know there will be an IE for my  
candidate, I get very nervous. In one recent race I saw an IE produce five  pieces 
of mail “supporting” my candidate with messages that had nothing to  do with 
the message of our campaign. Later, I learned the consultant had  done 
those same mail pieces for other candidates in other  races. 
Finally,  while some “safe” incumbents may take advantage of their safe 
incumbency to  cross the line, in most cases these are the people who have the 
least  motivation to cross that line. They are safe and the contributing 
entity  needs them more than they need the contribution. In general I believe 
people  give money to candidates who represent positions with which they 
already  agree and who will advocate for that position, not someone who 
disagrees and  who they hope will change positions because of the contribution. 
That is  true whether it’s a direct contribution to the candidate, or 
participation  in an IE. I am not going to give money to the conservative, anti-union 
 candidate because I hope he or she will suddenly become a  vote for or  
advocate of stronger pro-labor measures. The reverse also is true.   
Thanks, 
Larry 











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