[EL] Dependency Corruption & Re: Unlimited contributions vs IEs - was ...

Tue Apr 7 15:59:46 PDT 2015

Mr. Pearson,

You say that “the desire for those resources creates an inherent conflict of interest between donors and voters.”

With all due respect, why is that and how do you know that? I would assume that donors, like voters, support people that they think will bring about good policy in office. What evidence is there that the interests of donors and voters are not only not aligned, but inherently in conflict?

Thanks in advance,

Bill Maurer

From: law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu [mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] On Behalf Of JBoppjr at aol.com
Sent: Tuesday, April 07, 2015 3:44 PM
To: APearson at commoncause.org; sean at impactpolicymanagement.com
Cc: Law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
Subject: Re: [EL] Dependency Corruption & Re: Unlimited contributions vs IEs - was ...

If a candidate will receive campaign contributions regardless of which side the supports, isn't he free to pick the side he thinks best serves the public interest.  Game, set, match for Sean.  Jim Bopp

In a message dated 4/7/2015 6:34:28 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, APearson at commoncause.org<mailto:APearson at commoncause.org> writes:
Ironically, this response really cinches the point. Whether it's one donor's x% or another opposing donor's x or 2x%, the problem is the same. Either way, the desire for those resources creates an inherent conflict of interest between donors and voters.

One does not have to assume corruption or bad motives to recognize that that conflict is inherently unhealthy for a democratic system that is supposed to represent the interests of voters, regardless of their ability to pay:

Comparable conflicts of interest are not tolerated in most other realms, whether there's a fiduciary duty at stake or something more common.  We don't want financial advisors who financially benefit by promoting someone else's bottom line; employees who get paid by competitors; police who personally benefit from selectively enforcing (or not enforcing) public laws; or umpires who get paid by teams.

We would all benefit by finding ways to realign the sources of campaign funding and voters.  That's the best way to minimize the risk that the money required to obtain and keep political power does not distort public policy priorities or undermine public faith in the integrity or our government.

Supermajorities of voters, across all party lines, understand the problem and are hungry for common sense solutions.

Sent from my iPhone

On Apr 7, 2015, at 5:08 PM, "Sean Parnell" <sean at impactpolicymanagement.com<mailto:sean at impactpolicymanagement.com>> wrote:
There’s also the option of “If I don’t do this thing Exxon wants, they won’t give me x% of what I need to run an effective campaign, but I’ll bet Tom Steyer would be more than happy to give me that x%, maybe even 2x%.”

I was the fundraiser for Congressman Greg Gankse from ’99 to ’02, and I always got a good laugh when I heard people explaining that the Patients’ Bill of Rights couldn’t passed in Congress because of all that big money HMOs were throwing at campaigns. The reason for my merriment was that Ganske was the lead sponsor of the PBoR and we were raking in campaign contributions hand-over-fist from doctors, medical associations, trial lawyers, and others who wanted to see the legislation passed.

Best,

Sean Parnell
President
Impact Policy Management, LLC
6411 Caleb Court
Alexandria, VA  22315
571-289-1374 (c)
sean at impactpolicymanagement.com<mailto:sean at impactpolicymanagement.com>

From: law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu> [mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] On Behalf Of Thomas J. Cares
Sent: Tuesday, April 07, 2015 4:04 PM
To: Larry Levine
Cc: Election Law
Subject: [EL] Dependency Corruption & Re: Unlimited contributions vs IEs - was Re: smith on cu

I don't think an honest definition of corruption is so difficult to construct.

If Exxon very-substantively helped me get elected to the legislature, be it through IEs or contributions, and if I liked being a legislator, and I felt that my re-election could hinge on their repeated support, my ability to vote in the interest of my constituents, where that interest conflicts with Exxon's would be corrupted. Of course, I like to think that I personally would choose my constituents over Exxon. But, you know, politicians tend to be egotistical, and egotistical people have a way of justifying things - "This Bill might be a little bad for my constituents, but voting for it will get me the money I need to be re-elected allowing me to do so many other things that do more good for my constituents than this does bad. It's actually a good deal for my constituents that I vote for this. Whoever would replace me would not do the great things that I would do in my 2nd term. It's really in their best interest that I screw them on this; it's actually the right thing to do."

The fact is, in such a situation, where maybe it's a close call whether it's a good bill or a bad bill, and you vote on the side of Exxon, I feel like even you, the legislator, can't really know if the money corrupted you. People tend not to understand the depths of their psychology well enough. "No, no, the tax revenue is worth the environmental harm, we can spend that money to do more good for the environment than the little bit of bad this does."

But you can never really know if you would have made that same justification had your career not depended on it. Maybe you would have, but maybe it was too convenient for you to accept, that you couldn't take the affirmative mental action of internally challenging that justification such to discover that it was not truly merited.

In any event, if Exxon's support is a major factor in whether you'll be re-elected, your ability to consider your constituent's interests over Exxon's has been corrupted.

That's your appropriate definition of corruption. (I suppose this is Lessig's 'dependency corruption').

Redefining it as quid quo pro is just convenient for the 'anti-reformers'.

Also, for what it's worth, I naively ran for State Assembly when I was 20 years old (I say "naively", because I thought my superior policy goals ( http://tomcares.com/index901.html ) would give me an actual chance). It's very hard to imagine I would ever try that again without having first achieved a personal financial wealth that would allow me to self-fund. Before, I didn't realize how absolutely-necessary 6-figure fundraising was; I was thinking David vs. Goliath. It's more like a butterfly vs Goliath (I mean, from my experience, I was the only one really pounding hard talking about policy, I put in tons of effort. I got 5% of the vote, like a butterfly getting one cheap shot in Goliath's eye, before getting swatted. No one takes you seriously if you don't have campaign cash. Yes, my resume was weaker (which I perhaps did overcome, because I got about as many votes as the current mayor of Lawndale, who also had no real money), but If I had 6 figures, I would have been taken more seriously, and also could have reached more voters).

Anyway, why do I strongly doubt I would ever attempt that again without the ability to self-fund? Because I'm not sure I trust myself to not think something like "This Bill might be a little bad for my constituents, but voting for it will get me the money I need to be re-elected allowing me to do so many other things that do more good for my constituents than this does bad. It's actually a good deal for my constituents that I vote for this. Whoever would replace me would not do the great things that I would do in my 2nd term. It's really in their best interest that I screw them on this; it's actually the right thing to do."

I'm afraid that If I had to raise the money to win, I wouldn't win. The person holding the office wouldn't quite be me (I guess it would be a corrupted me). (Though to be honest, even if I became very wealthy - maybe doing the whole tech start up thing - I still doubt I'd ever run for anything again, because I've "matured" into thinking there are probably better ways for me to have a positive influence. I'd probably totally try to be a much better version of the Kochs though.)

As for your last paragraph, about corrupting safe incumbents, doesn't the California Medical Association contribute to every single state legislator? I don't think they do this because they really like each and all of them. I think they do it to "magically" immunize them to concern that the Micra cap hasn't adjusted for inflation in 40+ years, as well as other things.

And then back to IEs vs. contributions. I guess we'll agree to disagree on whether the fact that IEs can be less effective, for the reasons you stated -
I find most IEs to be absolutely ineffective. My cynical perspective on IEs is that an interest group makes money available to a consultant, who then spends it with no accountability and with no need to assess how it might help or hurt the candidate involved. All that after taking 15% off the top as a fee and then marking up everything for additional commissions. Often, the candidate has to disavow the actions of an IE that litters a district with signs on public property or does an over-the-line hit piece. That pulls the candidate off message and actually can hurt the campaign.
- provides a worthwhile candidate appreciation deficit, compared to direct contributions, which proves to be important in preventing corruptive effects of special interest money ("Exxon's IE is probably more likely, or at least just as likely, to hurt me than help me. #$%@ them.")

Also, your proposal really just gives them more options. If a special interest thinks a dirty smear that the candidate would never do themselves would help the candidate more than money or be appreciated more than money they'll still IE it. Unrestricting contributions won't get rid of the dirty stuff in IEs; it just gifts them flexibility. Essentially the point Justin Levitt made a few days ago:
IEs provide an avenue for individuals or groups to promote their own messages in ways that get them power and attention, which may serve the interest of some individuals or groups far better than a contribution.  And IEs also provide an avenue for negative ads that give candidates plausible deniability, which may serve the interest of some candidates far better than a contribution.

-Thomas Cares

On Sun, Apr 5, 2015 at 10:00 AM, Larry Levine <larrylevine at earthlink.net<mailto:larrylevine at earthlink.net>> wrote:
One of the difficulties of this discussion is the perception and definition of corruption. Reformers tend to see corruption everywhere they look; without corruption they would have no purpose. Some have argued that the advocacy of reforms is one of the factors causing the perception of corruption. I have argued for many years that in my 45 years of political consulting and 12 years as a news reporter I found the overwhelming majority of elected officials to be honest people who were sincerely interested in good public policy and law making. Reformers argue back that the simple act of giving a contribution that results in increased access to an elected official is in itself a form of corruption because the “average” – non-contributing – citizen doesn’t have that same access. And from there the reformers try to eliminate, or limit, the money going from any source to the campaign of the elected official. With that wide a gap in the interpretation of corruption, I’m not sure the two camps can ever agree.

As to one of your other points, I find most IEs to be absolutely ineffective. My cynical perspective on IEs is that an interest group makes money available to a consultant, who then spends it with no accountability and with no need to assess how it might help or hurt the candidate involved. All that after taking 15% off the top as a fee and then marking up everything for additional commissions. Often, the candidate has to disavow the actions of an IE that litters a district with signs on public property or does an over-the-line hit piece. That pulls the candidate off message and actually can hurt the campaign.

I did what may have been the most effective IE in history (fact, not brag) in 2013. Nury Martinez had finished 20 points behind Cindy Montanez in a Los Angeles City Council Primary. With six weeks to go before the runoff election, I was hired to do a $100,000 IE for Martinez. The result was a 10-point victory for Martinez – a 30-point turn around in six weeks. City Council President Herb Wesson said, “In 800 years of politics, I’ve never seen anything like this.” What was different about this IE? I live in the district and had the opportunity to watch the two campaigns as a consumer in the Primary. I had a feel for what needed to be done from the start and before getting started we built a strategy as we would have if we were doing the actual campaign instead of an IE. Most IEs don’t do that. They are cookie-cutter operations that take little or no heed of the particulars of the race at hand. When I’m doing a race and know there will be an IE for my candidate, I get very nervous. In one recent race I saw an IE produce five pieces of mail “supporting” my candidate with messages that had nothing to do with the message of our campaign. Later, I learned the consultant had done those same mail pieces for other candidates in other races.

Finally, while some “safe” incumbents may take advantage of their safe incumbency to cross the line, in most cases these are the people who have the least motivation to cross that line. They are safe and the contributing entity needs them more than they need the contribution. In general I believe people give money to candidates who represent positions with which they already agree and who will advocate for that position, not someone who disagrees and who they hope will change positions because of the contribution. That is true whether it’s a direct contribution to the candidate, or participation in an IE. I am not going to give money to the conservative, anti-union candidate because I hope he or she will suddenly become a  vote for or advocate of stronger pro-labor measures. The reverse also is true.
Thanks,
Larry

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