[EL] Opinion Analysis: A Small Victory for Minority Voters, or a Case with “Profound” Constitutional Implications?
Rick Hasen
rhasen at law.uci.edu
Wed Mar 25 09:15:16 PDT 2015
Opinion Analysis: A Small Victory for Minority Voters, or a Case
with “Profound” Constitutional Implications?
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=71257>
Posted onMarch 25, 2015 9:14 am
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=71257>byRick Hasen
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
/[cross-posted at SCOTUSBlog.]/
It is easy to read the Supreme Court’s5-4 decision
<http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-895_o7jq.pdf>in /Alabama
Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama/
<http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/alabama-legislative-black-caucus-v-alabama/> and
/Alabama Democratic Conference v. Alabama/
<http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/alabama-democratic-conference-v-alabama/>as
a mostly inconsequential case giving a small, and perhaps only
temporary, victory for minority voters in a dispute over the redrawing
of Alabama’s legislative districts after the 2010 census. Indeed,
although the Supreme Court sent this “racial gerrymandering” case back
for a wide and broad rehearing before a three-judge court, Alabama will
be free to junk its plan and start over with one that may achieve the
same political ends and keep it out of legal trouble. But Justice Scalia
in his dissent sees the majority as issuing “a sweeping holding that
will have profound implications for the constitutional ideal of one
person, one vote, for the future of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and
for the primacy of the State in managing its own elections.” Time will
tell if Justice Scalia’s warning against the implications of what he
termed a “fantastical” majority opinion is more than typical Scalian
hyperbole. And we may know soon enough as these issues get addressed in
racial gerrymandering cases fromVirginia
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/court-throws-out-virginia-congressional-map/2014/10/07/97fb866a-4e56-11e4-8c24-487e92bc997b_story.htm>,North
Carolina
<http://www.southerncoalition.org/north-carolina-supreme-court-upholds-racially-gerrymandered-districts/>and
elsewhere
* * *
As explained inthis case preview
<http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/10/argument-preview-racial-gerrymandering-partisan-politics-and-the-future-of-the-voting-rights-act/>,
this case concerns a challenge to state legislative districts drawn by
the Alabama Legislature after the 2010 census. The legislature, newly
controlled by Republicans, drew a redistricting plan that contained the
same number of majority-minority Senate districts and one additional
majority-minority House district compared to the 1990s plan drawn by a
court and the 2000s plan drawn by a Democratic legislature. Because of
population shifts and declines, as well as the composition of the
original 2001 districts, the African-American districts were the most
underpopulated of all the districts, meaning that many voters had to be
shifted into these districts to comply with “one person, one vote”
requirements.
The state legislative leaders in charge of redistricting set as a goal a
deviation in population of no more than two percent across districts.
Further, the leaders instructed the consultant charged with
redistricting to maintain not only the same number of majority-minority
districts in the two state houses but also the same percentage of
African Americans /within/ each district. The leaders and consultant
indicated they kept the same percentage of African-American voters in
each majority-minority district in order to comply with the
non-retrogression principle of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
The result of these two commands led to the shifting of many more
African Americans into these majority-minority districts. The upshot of
these changes in the context of Alabama was to pack more of the state’s
African Americans, the state’s most reliable Democratic voters, into
fewer districts, thereby strengthening Republican voting power in
districts throughout the rest of the state.
Black and Democratic legislators, voters, and groups brought a number of
challenges to the state redistricting plan, including a vote dilution
challenge under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and racial and
partisan gerrymandering claims. A three-judge federal court divided two
to one
<https://ecf.almd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2012cv0691-203> on the
racial gerrymandering claim, the only claim currently before the Supreme
Court. To win on a racial gerrymandering claim
<http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2057233072475851470&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr>,
the plaintiffs need to show that race was the “predominant factor” in
redistricting, more important than traditional redistricting principles.
If the state can show it complied with traditional districting
principles or even that its intention was purely partisan, not racial,
the state would win.
The lower court majority sided with Alabama, stating that the Republican
post-2010 census plan was just partisan politics no different than what
the Democrats did in the 2000 round of redistricting. On the specific
question whether the Alabama redistricting plan was an unconstitutional
racial gerrymander, the lower court majority held it was not: the
state’s predominant motive in redistricting was complying with the
two-percent population deviation maximum as part of the “one person, one
vote” principle, not dividing voters on the basis of race. Further, the
court held that any division of voters on the basis of race was
justified by the state’s requirement to comply with the
non-retrogression principle of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
The dissent disagreed on all counts, arguing that race was the
predominant factor in redistricting, and Section 5 did not require the
maintenance of the same percentage of minority voters in each
majority-minority district. Further, since the Supreme Court’s 2013
decision in /Shelby County v. Holder
<http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/shelby-county-v-holder/>,///holding
the preclearance formula unconstitutional, eliminated the preclearance
requirement for Alabama, compliance with Section 5 could no longer be a
compelling interest to justify a racial gerrymander.
* * *
In the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy sided with the more liberal
Justices, over the objections of the four more conservative Justices, to
rule against Alabama and send the case back for a do-over. Much of the
dispute between the majority and the dissent concerned issues likely to
be unimportant in other voting cases: whether one of the sets of
plaintiffs had standing and whether a key argument of the parties was
preserved on appeal. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion even included an
appendix to show where an argument was raised in the court below.
The majority said that the lower court erred in considering whether
Alabama’s legislative redistricting plan/as a whole/was an
unconstitutional racial gerrymander. The majority sent the case back to
a lower court to consider the issue on a/district-by-district/basis. It
said that the lower court could consider new evidence as well as other
claims which the Supreme Court did not reach, such as the one person,
one vote challenge.
But the Supreme Court majority did more than simply send the case back
for a new hearing. It very strongly suggested that at least some of the
districts were unconstitutional gerrymanders. It began by taking away
two of the state’s strongest arguments.
First, the Court said Alabama was wrong to the extent it believed that
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act required Alabama to pack more
African-American voters into districts in order to keep the same
percentage of African-Americans in each majority-minority district. This
was a misreading of what Section 5 required and such a reading could
actually hurt minority voters.
Second, the Court said that Alabama could not point to its desire to
have more equally populated districts as its real predominant factor in
redistricting. In other words, the majority rejected the argument that
the state could not engage in racial gerrymandering if its first order
of the day was to maintain equally populated districts. The majority
took compliance with this one person, one vote out of the equation,
saying this was something that was a “background” rule to be
considered/before/determining whether race is a predominant factor. It
calls into mindDaniel Lowenstein’s critique
<http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/1229324?sid=21106239815023&uid=2&uid=4>of
the predominant factor test from/Shaw v. Reno/as nonsensical when it
comes to how legislatures decide how to redistrict.
In the end, the majority all but instructed the lower court to find that
at least some of the districts were unconstitutional racial
gerrymanders: “For example, once the legislature’s ‘equal population’
objectives are put to the side—i.e., seen as a background principle—then
there is strong, perhaps overwhelming evidence that race did predominate
as a factor when the legislature drew the boundaries of Senate District
26, the one district the parties have discussed here in depth.”
The Court then left open the question whether compliance with Section 5
could be a compelling interest to justify what would be an otherwise
unconstitutional racial gerrymander and, no doubt at the urging of
Justice Kennedy, added this sentence: “Finally, we note that our
discussion in this section is limited to correcting the District Court’s
misapplication of the ‘predominance’ test for strict scrutiny discussed
in/Miller/, 515 U. S., at 916. It does not express a view on the
question of whether the intentional use of race in redistricting, even
in the absence of proof that traditional districting principles were
subordinated to race, triggers strict scrutiny. See/Vera/, 517 U. S., at
996 (KENNEDY, J., concurring).”
* * *
Justice Scalia, who wrote the principal dissent, argued mostly on the
question of standing and on whether the district-by-district issue was
preserved on appeal. He believed that the case was not properly
litigated or the issues preserved: “This disposition is based, it seems,
on the implicit premise that plaintiffs only plead legally correct
theories. That is a silly premise. We should not reward the practice of
litigation by obfuscation, especially when we are dealing with a
well-established legal claim that numerous plaintiffs have successfully
brought in the past.” Despite his opening hyperbolic statement, Justice
Scalia offered very little to explain what parade of horribles would
result from the interpretation of the racial gerrymandering claim in
this way. Justice Thomas, while joining (along with the Chief Justice
and Justice Alito) in Justice Scalia’s dissent, dissented separately as
well, to express his disagreement more broadly with Voting Rights Act
jurisprudence and the permissible consideration of race in redistricting.
* * *
What is the significance of today’s/Alabama/ruling? It seems likely on
remand that at least some of Alabama’s districts will be found to be
racial gerrymanders. This means that some of these districts will have
to be redrawn to “unpack” some minority voters from these districts. But
do not be surprised if Alabama preempts the lawsuit by drawing new
districts which are less racially conscious but still constitute a
partisan gerrymander which helps the Republicans have greater control
over the Alabama legislative districts. As I have noted, lurking in the
background of this case is the “race or party
<http://harvardlawreview.org/2014/01/race-or-party-how-courts-should-think-about-republican-efforts-to-make-it-harder-to-vote-in-north-carolina-and-elsewhere/>”
problem: with most Democrats in Alabama being African Americans and most
Republicans being white, how does one determine
<http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/11/alabama_redistricting_supreme_court_did_legislators_redraw_district_lines.html>whether
a predominant factor in gerrymandering is race or party?
On that score, the case may have somewhat broader implications even if
not the earthshattering ones promised by Justice Scalia. Although
Republican states which pack minority voters into districts can no
longer claim to do so to comply with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
(thanks to the/Shelby County/case), they still may claim to do so to
comply with Section 2 of the Act. Indeed, asProfessor Justin Levitt has
shown <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2487426>,
minority packing and reliance on the Voting Rights Act has become a
familiar tool for Republican legislatures looking to gain advantage by
packing likely Democratic voters into a smaller number of districts.
Many Democrats and minority voters have challenged such plans as
unconstitutional racial gerrymanders.
Today’s/Alabama/decision gives these challengers a new tool, making it
harder for states to use compliance with the Voting Rights Act as a
precinct to secure partisan advantage. All in all, this may help stop
some egregious gerrymanders, but there will still be plenty of ways for
states to draw district lines for partisan advantage without running
afoul of the Voting Rights Act. And depending upon how the Court
decidesthe Arizona redistricting case
<http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/arizona-state-legislature-v-arizona-independent-redistricting-commission/?wpmp_switcher=desktop>later
this term, states may have even a freer hand to draw lines for nakedly
political purposes.
So chalk this up as a small, albeit real, victory not only for minority
voters but also for irony. The “racial gerrymander” cause of action,
which was the basis for conservatives to challenge the creation of extra
majority-minority districts under the Voting Rights Act, has not become
a tool by those who hate the cause of action to protect minority voting
rights.
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--
Rick Hasen
Chancellor's Professor of Law and Political Science
UC Irvine School of Law
401 E. Peltason Dr., Suite 1000
Irvine, CA 92697-8000
949.824.3072 - office
949.824.0495 - fax
rhasen at law.uci.edu
http://www.law.uci.edu/faculty/full-time/hasen/
http://electionlawblog.org
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