[EL] ELB News and Commentary 5/7/15
Rick Hasen
rhasen at law.uci.edu
Thu May 7 07:15:54 PDT 2015
“The Supreme Court said judges can’t solicit campaign contributions.
This probably won’t matter” <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72297>
Posted onMay 7, 2015 7:12 am <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72297>byRick
Hasen <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
Chris Bonneau and Shane Redmanwrite
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/07/the-supreme-court-said-judges-cant-solicit-campaign-contributions-this-probably-wont-matter/>at
The Monkey Cage.
There is much in here I agree with. What I think the authors miss, and
why I touted the ruling<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72092>as a big
deal, is not the holding itself on the personal solicitation of campaign
contributions, but on the Court’s reasoning, and what it might mean for
other judicial election laws. As I wrote, “The big question will be
whether spending limits and limits on super pacs in judicial elections
can now pass constitutional muster. There’s the hint of that in
/Caperton/(though the Chief Justice dissented there and Justice Kennedy
was on the other side there). Certainly the door is open now for
respectable arguments on this side.”
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Posted incampaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>,judicial
elections <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=19>
Steve Klein on Rauch on Campaign Financing
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72295>
Posted onMay 7, 2015 7:03 am <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72295>byRick
Hasen <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
Here.
<http://an%20automated%20wordpress%20update%20has%20failed%20to%20complete%20-%20please%20attempt%20the%20update%20again%20now./>
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Posted incampaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>
“Inside Jeb Bush’s long game: A bet on peaking late”
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72293>
Posted onMay 6, 2015 7:29 pm <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72293>byRick
Hasen <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
WaPo reports.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/inside-the-jeb-bush-long-game-a-bet-on-big-money-and-peaking-late/2015/05/06/67ab8c78-f34f-11e4-84a6-6d7c67c50db0_story.html>
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Posted incampaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>,campaigns
<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=59>
Another View on Dysfunction at the FEC
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72291>
Posted onMay 6, 2015 7:20 pm <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72291>byRick
Hasen <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
Another reader writes:
Your correspondent <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72269>put a
strange slant on your old Slate article about Hans Von Spakovsky &
the FEC. Nowhere in your article did you suggest that Hans would
have acted/voted any differently than Don McGahn. You simply made
the point that Hans’s notoriety might have resulted in more
media/public attention to the FEC.
I also think your correspondent really muddies the waters by
claiming the opposition to Hans was purely partisan (or worse, a
“personal vendetta”). I’m willing to grant that the Voting Rights
Section & Civil Rights Division seem to be–or at least have recently
been <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=48325>–pretty nasty places to
work, but Hans & his crew really did stand out. The fact that they
were willing to destroy the careers ofRepublican U.S. Attorneys
<http://articles.latimes.com/2007/may/31/nation/na-usatty31>who
wouldn’t aid their wrong-doing is proof enough that the opposition
to Hans shouldn’t simply be seen as partisan or personal.
Maybe in the limited case of disclosure regulation, there are
grounds to argue that the dead-lock is partisan. However since
present-day Republicans are hostile to almost all federal
enforcement of election & voting laws (unless the NBPP are
defendants), I think it becomes less about the scope of regulations
than about whether there should be regulations at all. Furthermore,
although it’s true that removing unnecessary obstacles to
enfranchising poor non-white people is probably a boon to the
Democrats, such actions are also consistent with the 15th & 24th
Amendments.
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Posted incampaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>,federal
election commission <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=24>
“Baltimore, Make Your Vote Count” <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72289>
Posted onMay 6, 2015 7:14 pm <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72289>byRick
Hasen <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
Allegra Chapman blog post
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/allegra-chapman/baltimore-make-your-vote_b_7225824.html>.
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Posted invoting <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=31>
“Hillary Clinton to Court Donors for Super PAC”
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72287>
Posted onMay 6, 2015 2:46 pm <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72287>byRick
Hasen <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
NYT
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/07/us/politics/hillary-clinton-to-court-donors-for-super-pac.html?_r=0>:
Hillary Rodham Clinton
<http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/04/13/us/elections/hillary-clinton.html?inline=nyt-per>will
begin personally courting donors for asuper PAC
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/campaign_finance/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier>supporting
her candidacy, the first time a Democratic presidential candidate
has fully embraced the independent groups that can accept unlimited
checks from big donors and are already playing a major role in the
2016 race.
Her decision marks another escalation in what is expected to be the
most expensive presidential campaign in history. Mrs. Clinton’s
allies hope that with her support, Priorities USA Action, the top
Democratic super PAC, will be able to raise as much as $200 million
to $300 million, on par with what the largest Republican
organizations, such as the Karl Rove-founded American Crossroads
super PAC and its nonprofit affiliate, spent in 2012.
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Posted incampaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>,campaigns
<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=59>
“Hillary Clinton Isn’t Ready to Disclose Who’s Funding Her Campaign”
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72281>
Posted onMay 6, 2015 11:30 am
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72281>byRick Hasen
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
In arecent Slate piece,
<http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2015/04/hillary_clinton_and_campaign_finance_the_democratic_front_runner_s_suggestion.html>I
suggested Hillary Clinton might be offering lip service on campaign
finance: grandly supporting a constitutional amendment but not something
that is more realistic which could actually help.
Here’s agood indication from Mother Jones
<http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/05/hillary-clinton-bundler-disclosure-campaign-finance>that
she’s no better than President Obama on these issues:
Clinton’s campaign finance rhetoric appears to be aimed at
super-PACs, the quasi-independent organizations that bolster
campaigns by buying ads. But when it comes to the major funders
behind her own presidential campaign, the Democratic front-runner
has yet to answer questions about how transparent she’s willing to
be. When/Mother Jones/questioned the Clinton camp about whether it
will disclose the names and fundraising totals of the key
supporters—known as “bundlers”—who raise vast sums of cash, a
spokesperson declined to provide an answer, saying only that the
campaign was still figuring out its plans.
Disappointing but not surprising.
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Posted incampaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>,campaigns
<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=59>
“Leveling the Playing Field? The Role of Public Campaign Funding in
Elections” <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72279>
Posted onMay 6, 2015 11:26 am
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72279>byRick Hasen
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
Tilman Klumpp, Hugo Mialon, and Michael Williams have writtenthis
article
<http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/04/16/aler.ahv006.abstract>for
the /American Law and Economics Review./Here is the abstract:
In a series of First Amendment cases, the U.S. Supreme Court
established that government may regulate campaign finance, but not
if regulation imposes costs on political speech and the purpose of
regulation is to “level the political playing field.” The Court has
applied this principle to limit the ways in which governments can
provide public campaign funding to candidates in elections. A
notable example is the Court’s decision to strike down matching
funds provisions of public funding programs (/Arizona Free
Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett/, 2011
<http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/04/16/aler.ahv006.abstract#ref-1>).
In this paper, we develop a contest-theoretic model of elections in
which we analyze the effects of public campaign funding mechanisms,
including a simple public option and a public option with matching
funds, on program participation, political speech, and election
outcomes. We show that a public option with matching funds is
equivalent to a simple public option with a lump-sum transfer equal
to the maximum level of funding under the matching program; that a
public option does not always “level the playing field,” but may
make it more uneven and can decrease as well as increase the
quantity of political speech by all candidates, depending on the
maximum public funding level; and that a public option tends to
increase speech in cases where it levels the playing field. Several
of the Supreme Court’s arguments in/Arizona Free Enterprise/are
discussed in light of our theoretical results.
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Posted incampaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>,Supreme
Court <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=29>
“Court-Ordered Campaign Finance Deregulation and Stock Value of
Contributor” <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72277>
Posted onMay 6, 2015 11:22 am
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72277>byRick Hasen
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
Haishan Yuan has writtenthis article
<http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/content/17/1/1.abstract>for the
/American Law and Economics Review/. Here is the abstract:
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 addressed two issues,
soft money and independent expenditures on issue ads for electoral
advocacy. The Supreme Court initially upheld most provisions in 2003
but subsequently weakened and struck down provisions on independent
expenditures. I examine the stock value of firms with a long history
of campaign contributions around the key developments of three
Supreme Court cases. Stock prices of contributing firms react
positively to Court events associated with campaign finance
deregulation. It implies that the average rates of return to these
rights of political spending are between 1 and 2% of stock values.
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Posted incampaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>
“Hillary’s Constitutional Aversion to Criticism”
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72275>
Posted onMay 6, 2015 11:20 am
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72275>byRick Hasen
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
Don McGahn’sWSJ oped
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/hillarys-constitutional-aversion-to-criticism-1430868138>:
As with most campaign-finance reform measures, the Udall Amendment’s
goal is to get money out of politics. It seeks to accomplish this by
allowing Congress to regulate and limit how “candidates and others”
raise and spend money.
Yet free speech is toothless without money—especially when it
concerns elections and public policy. It is necessary to print
campaign mailers, organize phone banks, air television and radio
ads, build websites and pay for a thousand other things.
By giving legislators authority to regulate the money that finances
this speech, politicians would only succeed in making it harder for
Americans to make their voices heard in the political process. The
American Civil Liberties Union argued in a 2014 letter to Congress
that the Udall Amendment would “lead directly to government
censorship of political speech.” The ACLU also warned that it would
“fundamentally ‘break’ the constitution and endanger civil rights
and civil liberties for generations.”
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Posted incampaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>
“The SEC Pay-to-Play Rule: Lessons Learned from the Exemptive Relief
Process” <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72273>
Posted onMay 6, 2015 11:17 am
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72273>byRick Hasen
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
Charles E. Borden, Samuel C. Brown, and Claire N.
Rajanwrite<http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/The%20Investment%20Lawyer.pdf>for
/The Investment Lawyer. /It begins:
Although Election Day is more than a year away, the 2016 election
cycle has begun in earnest, with Presidential aspirants and elected
officials jockeying for position and dominating media coverage.
Candidates and potential candidates already are raising historic
sums for an increasingly varied set of fundraising vehicles and
non-profi t entities, and many individuals in the fi nancial
services sector are regularly being solicited to make political
contributions.1 Th ese developments have the potential to create
heightened pay-to-play risk for investment advisers. More than any
other election cycle since the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) pay-to-play rule for investment advisers (Rule 206(4)-5 or the
Rule) became effective in 2011, the 2016 elections are likely to
pose significant compliance challenges for investment advisers
subject to the Rule.
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Posted incampaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>,conflict
of interest laws <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=20>
“A Revealing Leftist Defense of Wisconsin’s Shameful Political
Prosecutions” <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72271>
Posted onMay 6, 2015 11:12 am
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72271>byRick Hasen
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
David French
<http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/417924/revealing-leftist-defense-wisconsins-shameful-political-prosecutions-david-french> at
NRO on John Doe.
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Posted incampaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>,chicanery
<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=12>
Is Dems’ Objection to Von Spakovsky the Real Source of FEC
Dysfunction? <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72269>
Posted onMay 6, 2015 9:21 am <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72269>byRick
Hasen <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
In response tomy earlier post <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=72257>, a
reader offers a different and very interesting perspective:
You say on your blog that the “origins” of the current “dysfunction”
trace to Don McGahn. “Don McGahn” may serve as a convenient origin
for those who disagree with the Republican Commissioners’ votes, but
that view forgets the highly politicized events that led to (and
caused) McGahn’s appointment. A few years ago, you acknowledged
that the left’s opposition to von Spakovsky might have been a
mistake.
(http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/01/the_fec_is_as_good_as_dead.html)
The challenge to the longstanding FEC nomination process directly
resulted in the appointment of the McGahn-Hunter-Petersen slate.
Campaign finance reform insiders, voting rights activists, others
on the left, objected to von Spakovsky’s confirmation, Democrats in
the Senate went along with this, and a Commission consisting of
Weintraub-Lenhard-Walther-Mason-von Spakovsky-[empty seat] wasn’t
confirmed. (Caroline Hunter was eventually nominated for the empty
seat, previously held by Michael Toner. McGahn was then nominated
for Mason’s seat, and Petersen replaced von Spakovsky. Bauerly
replaced Lenhard on the Democrats’ side.) The group that was broken
up after the recess appointments expired never faced the sort of
criticism that the FEC receives today.
There seems to be plenty of willingness to blame the Republicans for
the current condition of the FEC, and a very short memory of how we
actually got here. A few individuals’ objections to von Spakovsky
(some might call it a personal vendetta) ballooned into a series of
personnel decisions that have had very real consequences.
The FEC has been different since 2008 – but there is more to it than
just Don McGahn or any other single Commissioner. A question that
never gets asked is whether von Spakovsky’s opponents would make the
same choices knowing what they know today.
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Posted incampaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>,federal
election commission <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=24>
--
Rick Hasen
Chancellor's Professor of Law and Political Science
UC Irvine School of Law
401 E. Peltason Dr., Suite 1000
Irvine, CA 92697-8000
949.824.3072 - office
949.824.0495 - fax
rhasen at law.uci.edu
http://www.law.uci.edu/faculty/full-time/hasen/
http://electionlawblog.org
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