[EL] CCP v. Harris

[Ellen Aprill]

That may be so, but I think the point that donor disclosure CAN serve
charitable enforcement purposes still stands.

  Ellen

-------
Ellen P. Aprill
John E. Anderson Professor of Tax Law
Loyola Law School
919 Albany Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015
213-736-1157

On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 9:45 AM, Smith, Brad <BSmith at law.capital.edu> wrote:

> Ellen,
>
>
>
> The problem is that the AG example you point out was never raised in the
> briefs, and was never mentioned in the cert briefs. It was offered
> spontaneously in oral argument, and so was never really discussed. The
> reason it was never offered in briefs, it appears, is that it makes no
> sense—that is, knowing the name of the donor of some in-kind contribution
> would not help the AG spot the inflation of revenue any more than not
> knowing the name of the donor. And as appears from sworn testimony filed in
> the 9th circuit in AFPF v. Harris, the state’s top auditor admits that
> the donor info is not used in audits. In other words, a redacted 990B would
> do just fine, even if that were the state’s purpose.
>
>
>
> If, we note, the state wished to argue otherwise, it should have done so.
> A core purpose of requiring the State to state a reason for regulating
> peaceful activity of its citizens is, among other things, to weed out
> pretense, harassment, arbitrariness, and abuse of power by the state. Here,
> the court has abandoned that.
>
>
>
>
>
> *Bradley A. Smith*
>
> *Josiah H. Blackmore II/Shirley M. Nault *
>
> *  Professor of Law*
>
> *Capital University Law School*
>
> *303 East Broad Street*
>
> *Columbus, OH 43215*
>
> *(614) 236-6317 <%28614%29%20236-6317>*
>
> *bsmith at law.capital.edu <bsmith at law.capital.edu>*
>
> *http://www.law.capital.edu/faculty/bios/bsmith.asp
> <http://www.law.capital.edu/faculty/bios/bsmith.asp>*
>
>
>
> *From:* Ellen Aprill [mailto:ellen.aprill at lls.edu]
> *Sent:* Tuesday, November 10, 2015 12:32 PM
> *To:* Joe Birkenstock
> *Cc:* Sean Parnell; Rick Hasen; Smith, Brad;
> law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris
>
>
>
> Let me share some information as an exempt org person re tax rules and
> California nonprofit corporation rules.
>
>
>
> I think it is important to point out that private foundations, which are
> section 501(c)(3) organizations (generally funded by an individual, family,
> or corporation and which usually are engaged in grant making), must  like
> 527 organizations, publicly disclose their Schedule B.  See IRC sec.
> 6104(d)(3). In general, the many special federal rules applicable to
> private foundations (which include an elaborate set of excise taxes going
> back to 1969) relate to fears that a foundation will be run for the private
> benefit of its founders rather than for public benefit.
>
>
>
> The same concerns arise with so-called public charities and, in
> particular, with transactions for which the AG has enforcement authority.
> As the Ninth Circuit opinion notes, the AG pointed in particular to
> overestimation of the value of "in kind" donations that would inflate the
> organization's revenue.  A relatively recent article by Roger Colinvaux
> details issues with issues in connection with donations of property (
> http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2274825), which total
> nearly $46 billion a year. (Other provisions cited by the AG, on which the
> Ninth Circuit relies - CA Corp Code section 5233, 5236, 5227 - don't work
> as well for me on the facts of the case.  They all deal with directors and
> officer, who, admittedly, are often also donors, but apply only to
> nonprofit corporations organized in California - the so-called internal
> affairs doctrine - unlike other laws, such as the California Nonprofit
> Integrity Act (a watered down version of Sarbanes Oxley Act for charities,
> requiring audit committees and audits for many charities), which applies
> beyond California nonprofit corporations and thus is in the California
> Government Code, not the Corporations Code.)
>
>
>
> I hope this information is useful.
>
>
>
>    Ellen
>
>
>
>
>
>
> -------
>
> Ellen P. Aprill
>
> John E. Anderson Professor of Tax Law
>
> Loyola Law School
>
> 919 Albany Street
>
> Los Angeles, CA 90015
>
> 213-736-1157
>
>
>
> On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 8:18 AM, Joe Birkenstock <
> birkenstock at sandlerreiff.com> wrote:
>
> Well Sean, I’m afraid I’m also not interested in exploring the outer
> boundaries of “political” right now either. It’s an important topic, but
> unrelated to the question I have about CCP v. Harris.
>
>
>
> If a charitable donor is especially sensitive to disclosure, why not
> donate anonymously – not just privately, as in “let’s keep this between
> us,” but literally anonymously, as in the group itself doesn’t even know
> who gave the donation?
>
>
>
> So far as I know, it’s a perfectly legal and recognized option, reflected
> on page 6 of the Schedule B instructions here:
> https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990ezb.pdf, and there’s a good writeup
> about the practice from several years ago here:
> http://go.bloomberg.com/political-capital/2012-07-26/anonymous-donations-can-remain-secret-despite-irs-requirement-to-disclose/.
> Point being: it’s not like this approach itself is a secret, so I think
> it’s fair to assume that well-advised donors know this option exists but
> choose not to use it.
>
>
>
> OTOH, I freely admit that I don’t have the tax chops that many others on
> this list have, so it’s entirely possible I’m just missing something –
> hence my question. If I am just missing something, I’d love to know more
> about the considerations here. But if not this approach would seem to make
> a lot of sense for charitable donors concerned about disclosure even to the
> IRS, much less the CA AG or other state charitable oversight agencies.
>
>
>
>
>
> ___________________________________
>
> Joseph M. Birkenstock
>
> Sandler Reiff Lamb Rosenstein & Birkenstock, P.C.
>
> 1025 Vermont Avenue, NW, Suite 300
>
> Washington, DC 20005
>
> 202.479.1111
>
> *also admitted to practice in CA
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From: *<law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu> on behalf of Sean
> Parnell <sean at impactpolicymanagement.com>
> *Date: *Monday, November 9, 2015 at 9:22 PM
> *To: *Richard Hasen <rhasen at law.uci.edu>, "'Smith, Brad'" <
> BSmith at law.capital.edu>, "law-election at department-lists.uci.edu" <
> law-election at department-lists.uci.edu>
> *Subject: *Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris
>
>
>
> OK, anybody else who generally favors disclosure of c3 donors under
> certain circumstances want to step up to the plate on this? I’m still in
> the increasing marginal returns stage myself on this particular topic…
>
>
>
> Sean
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Rick Hasen [mailto:rhasen at law.uci.edu <rhasen at law.uci.edu>]
> *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 8:52 PM
> *To:* Sean Parnell; 'Smith, Brad'; law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris
>
>
>
> Sean,
> It is a great question but I'm afraid I've reached significantly
> diminishing marginal returns for continuing this discussion on the
> listserv.  At some point I might invest more time in the question. I do
> recall thinking about it a lot in relation to the McConnell disclosure
> provisions, which went even broader than electioneering communications.
>
> Rick
>
> On 11/9/15 5:37 PM, Sean Parnell wrote:
>
> Then, if you don’t mind, what definition of political activity would you
> like to see applied? For example:
>
>
>
> 1.      Lobbying
>
> 2.      Any communication published by a c3 that references a candidate,
> such as “*So Sen. McCain, who has gotten a great deal of positive press
> over the years with his crusade for campaign finance "reform" and
> repeatedly denounced the so-called "special interests" represented by
> lobbyists, must now explain how he can be friends with people who, as has
> so indelicately put it in the past, "corrupt" the government by
> representing their clients.*”*
>
> 3.      Any communication published by a c3 that, while it does not
> directly reference a candidate by name, addresses policy positions that are
> closely identified with particular candidates (say, McCain-Feingold or the
> flat tax in 1996).
>
>
>
> There are other possibilities as well of course, these are just a few that
> come to mind.
>
>
>
>
>
> Sean Parnell
>
> President, Impact Policy Management, LLC
>
> 571-289-1374 (c)
>
> sean at impactpolicymanagement.com
>
> Alexandria, Virginia
>
>
>
> *This is from a piece I wrote on CCP’s blog back in 2008, here
> <http://www.campaignfreedom.org/2008/02/23/perhaps-an-update-to-im-just-a-bill-is-in-order/>.
> Judging by some of the past campaign finance regulations I’ve seen proposed
> in the past, it seems like the sort of thing that might be considered
> “political” by some.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Rick Hasen [mailto:rhasen at law.uci.edu <rhasen at law.uci.edu>]
> *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 7:08 PM
> *To:* Smith, Brad; Sean Parnell; law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris
>
>
>
> I believe it depends upon what one considers to be political activity,
> which does not have to match either the IRS's stated definition or its
> actual enforcement practices
>
> On 11/9/15 3:59 PM, Smith, Brad wrote:
>
> C3 groups do not, by definition, engage in politics. And that is this
> case, CCP v. Harris.
>
>
>
> Now if you wish to change the traditionally understood definition of
> politics to include a whole bunch more stuff (and note, for IRS –i.e.
> 990—purposes it is already much broader than it is for FEC/political
> reporting) then go at it. But that’s asking for a quite a change in the law.
>
>
>
> In short, by supporting the state here, you have already announced your
> support for “public disclosure of the information of c3 groups that do
> not engage in political activities.”
>
>
>
>
>
> *Bradley A. Smith*
>
> *Josiah H. Blackmore II/Shirley M. Nault *
>
> *  Professor of Law*
>
> *Capital University Law School*
>
> *303 East Broad Street*
>
> *Columbus, OH 43215*
>
> *(614) 236-6317 <%28614%29%20236-6317>*
>
> *bsmith at law.capital.edu <bsmith at law.capital.edu>*
>
> *http://www.law.capital.edu/faculty/bios/bsmith.asp
> <http://www.law.capital.edu/faculty/bios/bsmith.asp>*
>
>
>
> *From:*law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu [
> mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu
> <law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu>] *On Behalf Of *Rick Hasen
> *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 6:34 PM
> *To:* Sean Parnell; law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris
>
>
>
> I think whatever is disclosed to the IRS should be disclosable to the AGs
> for enforcement purposes, provided of course that they can keep the
> information private (an allegation which I understand has not yet been
> considered in the case).  I would not support public disclosure of the
> information of c3 groups that do not engage in political activities.
>
> On 11/9/15 1:18 PM, Sean Parnell wrote:
>
> I’m curious what you think, Rick (and any other “reformers”) about the
> policy as a stand-alone issue, i.e. not in regards to what a ruling one way
> or another might mean for the regulation of money in an explicit campaign
> context, but as a policy issue in and of itself should state AG’s be able
> to require the revelation of donors to c3 entities? And what would you
> think of a policy of mandated disclosure to the public of donors/members to
> c3 entities?
>
>
>
>
>
> Sean Parnell
>
> President, Impact Policy Management, LLC
>
> 571-289-1374 (c)
>
> sean at impactpolicymanagement.com
>
> Alexandria, Virginia
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:*law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu [
> mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu
> <law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu>] *On Behalf Of *Rick Hasen
> *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 4:07 PM
> *To:* law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris
>
>
>
> I'd also look at what the trial court did in Doe v. Reed and Protect
> Marriage, as described in my "Chill Out" piece.
>
> On 11/9/2015 12:58 PM, Bill Maurer wrote:
>
> Thanks, Richard, I’ve read that case numerous times. It seems to prove my
> point that the standard is actually applicable only after the harassment
> has already occurred.
>
>
>
> I would also note that, in practice, the application of the case has been
> that only the Socialist Workers Party has been able to demonstrate
> harassment. They are a pristine example of something that is truly sui
> generis.
>
>
>
> Bill
>
>
>
> *From:* Richard Winger [mailto:richardwinger at yahoo.com
> <richardwinger at yahoo.com>]
> *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 12:49 PM
> *To:* Bill Maurer; Edward Still; Allen Dickerson
> *Cc:* law-election at uci.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris
>
>
>
> read Brown v Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459 US 87.
>
>
>
> Richard Winger 415-922-9779 PO Box 470296, San Francisco Ca 94147
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> *From:* Bill Maurer <wmaurer at ij.org>
> *To:* Edward Still <still at votelaw.com>; Allen Dickerson <
> adickerson at campaignfreedom.org>
> *Cc:* "law-election at uci.edu" <law-election at uci.edu>
> *Sent:* Monday, November 9, 2015 12:33 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris
>
>
>
> Rick’s commented that “There is no constitutional impediment to
> [disclosure], except as to those groups which can demonstrate a realistic
> threat of harassment.”
>
>
>
> I’ve never seen a discussion of what exactly a plaintiff would have to do
> to demonstrate a realistic threat of harassment. Wouldn’t evidence of a
> realistic threat be evidence of actual harassment (for instance, I don’t
> see those doing the harassing sending out a pre-harassment notice that they
> will be engaging in future harassment, although I suppose someone could do
> that)? And what about new groups with new issues? How are they supposed to
> demonstrate the realistic threat?
>
>
>
> In other words, I don’t see the “harassment” standard as protecting much
> of anything going forward—it is entirely backward looking and, for that
> reason, utterly useless as a protection against harassment in the first
> instance.
>
>
>
> That is exactly the point Brad made about the inadvertent disclosure
> analysis of the Ninth Circuit. The court essentially said, you can’t get
> protection from inadvertent disclosure until the information has been
> inadvertently disclosed. At which point, it doesn’t matter.
>
>
>
> And what’s the standard for harassment? Is it violence or coercion,
> because I’ve heard a number of commentators (including Justice Scalia)
> suggest that anything short of that is the price of being involved in
> politics? Be we already have laws against violence or coercion. So, are
> laws against assault supposed to be the things that demark the outer edge
> of how far the government can go in collecting information about those who
> decide to exercise their fundamental rights?
>
>
>
> Isn’t the real standard that anyone who participates in political activity
> in this country should be aware that by doing so they are opening
> themselves up to governmental scrutiny in perpetuity with no realistic
> protection against misuse of the information the government has collected?
>
>
>
> Of course, a legitimate response to this is “We don’t care if people are
> harassed or their information misused.” But, why not say that?
>
>
>
> Bill
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:*law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu [
> mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu
> <law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu>] *On Behalf Of *Edward
> Still
> *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 9:04 AM
> *To:* Allen Dickerson
> *Cc:* law-election at uci.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris
>
>
>
> The Questions Presented were:
>
> QUESTIONS PRESENTED
>
> 1. Whether a state official’s demand for all significant donors to a
> nonprofit organization, as a precondition to engaging in
> constitutionally-protected speech, constitutes a First Amendment injury.
>
> 2. Whether the “exacting scrutiny” standard applied in compelled
> disclosure cases permits state officials to demand donor information based
> upon generalized “law enforcement” interests, without making any specific
> showing of need.
>
> The cert petition is at http://electionlawblog.org/?p=74940.
>
>
>
>
> Edward Still
> Edward Still Law Firm LLC
>
> 429 Green Springs Hwy, STE 161-304
>
> Birmingham AL 35209
> 205-320-2882
> still at votelaw.com
> www.votelaw.com/blog
> www.edwardstill.com
> www.linkedin.com/in/edwardstill
>
>
>
> On Mon, Nov 9, 2015 at 10:48 AM, Allen Dickerson <
> adickerson at campaignfreedom.org> wrote:
>
> The point was to protect CCP's donors from scrutiny and potential leaks,
> inadvertent or otherwise, by a state AG who believed she was entitled to
> their identities without making any showing of need whatsoever. The case
> did not address the public informational interest behind campaign finance
> disclosure, which we couldn't do in any case because that wasn't the
> state's stated interest. Campaign finance simply wasn't involved.
>
>
>
> (Steve: the stated governmental interest was greater efficiency in
> exercising the AG's law enforcement duties).
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Nov 9, 2015, at 11:34 AM, Rick Hasen <rhasen at law.uci.edu> wrote:
>
> I think this case had the potential to undermine campaign disclosure rules
> if successful, and I think that was the point.
> And yes, I absolutely would have written the same comment if it were the
> Brennan Center or the ACLU suing the Texas AG.
> Rick
>
> On 11/9/2015 8:08 AM, Allen Dickerson wrote:
>
> Rick,
>
>
>
> Your post seriously misinterprets CCP v. Harris, a case that has nothing
> to do with political activity or campaign finance. California's
> registration policy applies only to 501(c)(3) organizations. And CCP, like
> all 501(c)(3) groups, is prohibited from engaging in political activity.
> The informational interest undergirding campaign finance disclosure simply
> isn't implicated here.
>
>
>
> A thought experiment: would you have written the same comment if the
> Brennan Center or ACLU had sued the Texas AG on the same claim?
>
>
>
> I recognize the ever-present danger of seeing campaign finance issues
> everywhere when that's one's area of expertise. But our case is a very poor
> fit for your political disclosure narrative.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Allen
>
>
>
>
> On Nov 9, 2015, at 10:48 AM, Rick Hasen <rhasen at law.uci.edu> wrote:
>
> “Democracy for GrownUps” <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77408>
>
> Posted on November 9, 2015 7:46 am <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77408>
>  by *Rick Hasen* <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
>
> I have written this review
> <http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/democracy-for-grownups> of
> Bruce Cain’s Democracy More or Less
> <http://www.amazon.com/Democracy-More-Less-Political-Cambridge/dp/1107612268> for
> the New Rambler Review. <http://newramblerreview.com/>  It begins:
>
> *Modern American democracy is often messy, increasingly polarized,
> sometimes stupefying, and surprisingly decentralized. Our Congress
> functions (or doesn’t) mainly along party lines under rules set in a
> Constitution more than 200 years old which does not recognize political
> parties, and indeed was designed to stifle their emergence. Divided
> government in times of polarized parties has undermined accountability as
> each side can blame the other for policy failures, and we lurch from one
> potential government shutdown to another thanks in part to polarization and
> in part to internal fighting within the Republican Party. Much power
> devolves to the state and local level, where we often see one-party rule
> rather than the partisan stalemate of Congress.*
>
> *State one-partyism extends even to the rules for conducting elections,
> where a majority of states use partisan election officials to set the rules
> of the game and to carry out our elections, and where state legislatures
> draw their own legislative districts only mildly constrained by Supreme
> Court one-person, one-vote requirements. Our campaign finance system is
> careening toward deregulation, with a series of Supreme Court decisions and
> partially enforceable congressional measures leading to the creation of
> political organizations, some of which can shield their donors’ identities,
> allowing the wealthiest of Americans to translate their vast economic power
> into political power. Money spent to influence elections is complemented by
> money spent to influence public policy through lobbying, creating a system
> in which those with great wealth and organizational ability have a much
> better chance of having their preferences enacted in law and having their
> preferred candidates elected, than average Americans have.*
>
> *It is no wonder that the reform impulse in American politics is strong.
> States with the initiative process have experimented with top-two primaries
> in which the top two vote getters, regardless of party, go to a runoff, and
> redistricting reform featuring either citizen commissions or substantive
> limits on legislative self-dealing. The National Popular Vote movement
> seeks an end run around the antiquated rules of the Electoral College,
> which violate modern accepted principles of one-person, one-vote by giving
> small states outsized power relative to their populations.*
>
> *Reformers push a constitutional amendment to overturn the Supreme Court’s
> decision in Citizens United and other cases which hamstring the
> government’s ability to control money in politics. Good government groups
> regularly clamor for redistricting reform (often joined by the political
> party on the losing side of redistricting in each state), expansion of
> voting rights for former felons and others, and the end of corruption and
> patronage. Some even call for constitutional conventions with citizen
> participants chosen by lottery.*
>
> *But as Bruce Cain argues in his terrific new book, the never-ending
> efforts at reform present tradeoffs, and attempts to achieve either pure
> majoritarianism or government meritocracy can have unintended and unwanted
> consequences. Further, many reform efforts are oversold as a cure for all
> that ails American democracy. Cain argues for a Goldilocks-like pluralist
> reform agenda which recognizes that busy citizens lack interest in
> governing and capacity to make complex decisions. Instead, politics is
> conducted through intermediaries across the range of local, state, and
> national governing arenas. Pluralism “prioritizes aggregation, consensus,
> and fluid coalitions as a means of good democratic governance.” (p. 11)*
>
> <share_save_171_16.png>
> <https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D77408&title=%26%238220%3BDemocracy%20for%20GrownUps%26%238221%3B&description=>
>
> Posted in theory <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=41>
> ELB Podcast Episode 6. Nate Persily: Can the Supreme Court Handle Social
> Science In Election Cases? <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77303>
>
> Posted on November 9, 2015 7:42 am <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77303>
>  by *Rick Hasen* <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
>
> Can the Supreme Court handle social science evidence in election law
> cases? Will lack of good data determine the outcome of the Supreme Court’s
> upcoming one person, one vote decision in *Evenwel v. Abbott*? What role
> will and should evidence play in assessing questions such as the
> constitutionality of McCain-Feingold’s soft money ban or Texas’s strict
> voter identification law.
>
> On Episode 6 of the ELB Podcast, we talk to law professor and political
> scientist Nate Persily <http://persily.com/> of Stanford Law School, one
> of the country’s leading redistricting and election law experts.
>
> You can listen to the ELB Podcast Episode 6 on Soundcloud
> <https://soundcloud.com/rick-hasen/elb-podcast-episode-6-nate> or subscribe
> at iTunes
> <https://geo.itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/elb-podcast/id1029317166?mt=2>.
>
>
>
> <share_save_171_16.png>
> <https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D77303&title=ELB%20Podcast%20Episode%206.%20Nate%20Persily%3A%20Can%20the%20Supreme%20Court%20Handle%20Social%20Science%20In%20Election%20Cases%3F&description=>
>
> Posted in ELB Podcast <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=116>, Supreme Court
> <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=29>
> “Democratic Group Called iVote Pushes Automatic Voter Registration”
> <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77406>
>
> Posted on November 9, 2015 7:38 am <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77406>
>  by *Rick Hasen* <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
>
> NYT:
> <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/10/us/politics/democratic-group-called-ivote-pushes-automatic-voter-registration.html?ref=politics&_r=0>
>
> *As Republicans across the country mount an aggressive effort to tighten
> voting laws, a group of former aides to President Obama and President Bill
> Clinton is pledging to counter by spending up to $10 million on a push to
> make voter registration automatic whenever someone gets a driver’s license.*
>
> *The change would supercharge the 1993 National Voter Registration Act
> <http://www.justice.gov/crt/about-national-voter-registration-act>, known
> as the “motor voter” law, which requires states to offer people the option
> of registering to vote when they apply for driver’s licenses or other
> identification cards. The new laws would make registration automatic during
> those transactions unless a driver objected.*
>
> *The group, called iVote — which is led by Jeremy Bird
> <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/30/us/politics/obama-campaign-confronts-voter-id-laws.html>,
> who ran Mr. Obama’s voter turnout effort in 2012 — is betting that such
> laws could bring out millions of new voters who have, for whatever reason,
> failed to register even when they had the opportunity at motor vehicle
> departments….*
>
> *Kris W. Kobach, the secretary of state in Kansas and a Republican, who
> has been a leading advocate of stricter voting laws, said he opposed
> automatic registration because people who chose not to register were
> clearly not interested in voting.*
>
> *“The assumption that by making what is already easy automatic that will
> somehow bring people to the polls is just erroneous,” Mr. Kobach said. “I
> just think it’s a bad idea. It’s not going to increase participation
> rates.”*
>
> *Mr. Kobach has pushed for some of the nation’s most restrictive voting
> laws, including one that requires proof of citizenship. He said automatic
> registration would make that kind of check impossible.*
>
> *“You’re going to end up with aliens on the voter rolls,” Mr. Kobach said.
> “It’s inevitable that an automatic registration system would result in many
> of them getting on.”*
>
> <share_save_171_16.png>
> <https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D77406&title=%26%238220%3BDemocratic%20Group%20Called%20iVote%20Pushes%20Automatic%20Voter%20Registration%26%238221%3B&description=>
>
> Posted in election administration <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=18>, The
> Voting Wars <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=60>, voter registration
> <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=37>
> “Inside the abandoned plans of Ted Cruz’s super PACs”
> <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77404>
>
> Posted on November 9, 2015 7:32 am <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77404>
>  by *Rick Hasen* <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
>
> Teddy Schleifer
> <http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/08/politics/ted-cruz-super-pac-abandoned-plans/index.html> for
> CNN:
>
> *The super PACs are staffed in part by a few individuals with no formal
> political experience, including Neugebauer, who has been the groups’ main
> fundraiser and formerly its chief executive officer — in addition to one of
> its lead donors. The groups have only recently begun hiring their first
> political professionals, including a new professional fundraiser: Campbell
> Smith, a finance official at the National Rifle Association, the super PACs
> confirmed to CNN.*
>
> *The ditched buy is at the heart of the dispute between the campaign and
> the super PAC — a dispute that spilled out into the public this week, with
> several campaign advisers telling Politico
> <http://www.politico.com/story/2015/11/ted-cruz-silent-super-pacs-2016-215422> that
> they want to see Keep the Promise purchase advertising time immediately.
> Campaigns and super PACs frequently read one another’s messages in the
> press with a fine-toothed comb to learn thinking that they cannot legally
> directly share with one another.*
>
> *It’s a reflection of the divided campaign finance world, where super PACs
> are allowed to raise unlimited amounts of cash (donations must still be
> reported to the Federal Election Commission), but the catch is that
> campaign and super PAC officials aren’t allowed to coordinate. Neugebauer’s
> pitch at The Broadmoor came without Cruz staffers in the room, for
> instance, a donor said.*
>
> *And amid increasing questions about the super PAC, campaign officials are
> coming to the defense of Neugebauer, who left his role at the super PAC in
> a shake-up, and are praising his ability to incentivize two more
> eight-digit donations with a $10 million check of his own.*
>
> <share_save_171_16.png>
> <https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D77404&title=%26%238220%3BInside%20the%20abandoned%20plans%20of%20Ted%20Cruz%26%238217%3Bs%20super%20PACs%26%238221%3B&description=>
>
> Posted in campaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>, campaigns
> <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=59>
> “The battle over campaign finance reform is changing. Here’s how.”
> <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77402>
>
> Posted on November 9, 2015 7:31 am <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77402>
>  by *Rick Hasen* <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
>
> WaPo talks
> <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/11/07/the-battle-over-campaign-finance-reform-is-changing-heres-how/> with
> Josh Silver of represent.us.
>
> <share_save_171_16.png>
> <https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D77402&title=%26%238220%3BThe%20battle%20over%20campaign%20finance%20reform%20is%20changing.%20Here%E2%80%99s%20how.%26%238221%3B&description=>
>
> Posted in campaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>
> Bauer on Justice Kennedy on Citizens United at Harvard
> <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77400>
>
> Posted on November 9, 2015 7:23 am <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77400>
>  by *Rick Hasen* <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
>
> Bauer blogs.
> <http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2015/11/justice-kennedy-harva>
>
> <share_save_171_16.png>
> <https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D77400&title=Bauer%20on%20Justice%20Kennedy%20on%20Citizens%20United%20at%20Harvard&description=>
>
> Posted in campaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>, Supreme
> Court <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=29>
> <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77396>
>
> ...
>
> [Message clipped]
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