[EL] CCP v. Harris

[Ellen Aprill]

I think we are just going to disagree.  To me, if a Schedule B shows gifts
of property that even at first glance seem of very questionable  fair
market value, the AG may well want to look at a charities' finances and, as
. For California corporations, it may well raise other issues it wants to
investigate re self-dealing, etc. It can also make clear that an
organization is not a private foundation or raise issues as to whether it
is (organizations do not always do the public support test to prove public
charity status correctly).
I know that looking at Schedule B of private foundations has raised
questions for me about the foundation's compliance with other private
foundations rules - which I have at times followed up in press reports and
questions to other exempt organization folks.

I also think the solicitation point is a good one.

IRC 6104(c)(2)(D) states:  "The Secretary may make available for inspection
or disclose returns an return information of of an organization . . . to an
appropriate State officer of any State if the Secretary determines that
such returns or return information MAY constitute evidence of noncompliance
under the laws within the jurisdiction of the appropriate State officer."
 (emphasis added) I have not ever had occasion to research the provision,
but do you read it as requiring the State to establish probable cause or as
giving the Secretary ability to share information under a lower standard?
To me, the latter seems a better reading.

Why do you think it is okay for the feds to get the Schedule B? Why is it
okay to require Schedule B to be public for private foundations? If the
feds can have such a requirement for federal tax exemption, do you think a
state could establish such a requirement for state tax exemption or
nonprofit status by legislation or regulation?

I think these questions do it for me on this.

    Ellen



-------
Ellen P. Aprill
John E. Anderson Professor of Tax Law
Loyola Law School
919 Albany Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015
213-736-1157

On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 10:05 AM, Smith, Brad <BSmith at law.capital.edu>
wrote:

> Does it? How? I did not get that from your message—at least not why donor
> ID is necessary. What I got was that a redacted Schedule B might be
> useful—which we have conceded throughout the litigation. We have also
> conceded, by the way, that the State could subpoena an unredacted Schedule
> B with probable cause.
>
>
>
> Concessions aside, should the state have some obligation to actually offer
> that reason up? Or is it enough for the State just to state “law
> enforcement” without ensuing judicial scrutiny? Because the state has not
> offered that argument in briefs. If it does offer that argument, must a
> reviewing court take the argument at face value? If the latter is enough,
> then we could have a fun debate about whether it should be enough to
> override 4th, 5th, 6th, and 8th Amendment protections as well—but for now
> we can save that for a later day.
>
>
>
> *Bradley A. Smith*
>
> *Josiah H. Blackmore II/Shirley M. Nault *
>
> *  Professor of Law*
>
> *Capital University Law School*
>
> *303 East Broad Street*
>
> *Columbus, OH 43215*
>
> *(614) 236-6317 <%28614%29%20236-6317>*
>
> *bsmith at law.capital.edu <bsmith at law.capital.edu>*
>
> *http://www.law.capital.edu/faculty/bios/bsmith.asp
> <http://www.law.capital.edu/faculty/bios/bsmith.asp>*
>
>
>
> *From:* Ellen Aprill [mailto:ellen.aprill at lls.edu]
> *Sent:* Tuesday, November 10, 2015 12:57 PM
> *To:* Smith, Brad
> *Cc:* Joe Birkenstock; Sean Parnell; Rick Hasen;
> law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris
>
>
>
> That may be so, but I think the point that donor disclosure CAN serve
> charitable enforcement purposes still stands.
>
>
>
>   Ellen
>
>
> -------
>
> Ellen P. Aprill
>
> John E. Anderson Professor of Tax Law
>
> Loyola Law School
>
> 919 Albany Street
>
> Los Angeles, CA 90015
>
> 213-736-1157
>
>
>
> On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 9:45 AM, Smith, Brad <BSmith at law.capital.edu>
> wrote:
>
> Ellen,
>
>
>
> The problem is that the AG example you point out was never raised in the
> briefs, and was never mentioned in the cert briefs. It was offered
> spontaneously in oral argument, and so was never really discussed. The
> reason it was never offered in briefs, it appears, is that it makes no
> sense—that is, knowing the name of the donor of some in-kind contribution
> would not help the AG spot the inflation of revenue any more than not
> knowing the name of the donor. And as appears from sworn testimony filed in
> the 9th circuit in AFPF v. Harris, the state’s top auditor admits that
> the donor info is not used in audits. In other words, a redacted 990B would
> do just fine, even if that were the state’s purpose.
>
>
>
> If, we note, the state wished to argue otherwise, it should have done so.
> A core purpose of requiring the State to state a reason for regulating
> peaceful activity of its citizens is, among other things, to weed out
> pretense, harassment, arbitrariness, and abuse of power by the state. Here,
> the court has abandoned that.
>
>
>
>
>
> *Bradley A. Smith*
>
> *Josiah H. Blackmore II/Shirley M. Nault *
>
> *  Professor of Law*
>
> *Capital University Law School*
>
> *303 East Broad Street*
>
> *Columbus, OH 43215*
>
> *(614) 236-6317 <%28614%29%20236-6317>*
>
> *bsmith at law.capital.edu <bsmith at law.capital.edu>*
>
> *http://www.law.capital.edu/faculty/bios/bsmith.asp
> <http://www.law.capital.edu/faculty/bios/bsmith.asp>*
>
>
>
> *From:* Ellen Aprill [mailto:ellen.aprill at lls.edu]
> *Sent:* Tuesday, November 10, 2015 12:32 PM
> *To:* Joe Birkenstock
> *Cc:* Sean Parnell; Rick Hasen; Smith, Brad;
> law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris
>
>
>
> Let me share some information as an exempt org person re tax rules and
> California nonprofit corporation rules.
>
>
>
> I think it is important to point out that private foundations, which are
> section 501(c)(3) organizations (generally funded by an individual, family,
> or corporation and which usually are engaged in grant making), must  like
> 527 organizations, publicly disclose their Schedule B.  See IRC sec.
> 6104(d)(3). In general, the many special federal rules applicable to
> private foundations (which include an elaborate set of excise taxes going
> back to 1969) relate to fears that a foundation will be run for the private
> benefit of its founders rather than for public benefit.
>
>
>
> The same concerns arise with so-called public charities and, in
> particular, with transactions for which the AG has enforcement authority.
> As the Ninth Circuit opinion notes, the AG pointed in particular to
> overestimation of the value of "in kind" donations that would inflate the
> organization's revenue.  A relatively recent article by Roger Colinvaux
> details issues with issues in connection with donations of property (
> http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2274825), which total
> nearly $46 billion a year. (Other provisions cited by the AG, on which the
> Ninth Circuit relies - CA Corp Code section 5233, 5236, 5227 - don't work
> as well for me on the facts of the case.  They all deal with directors and
> officer, who, admittedly, are often also donors, but apply only to
> nonprofit corporations organized in California - the so-called internal
> affairs doctrine - unlike other laws, such as the California Nonprofit
> Integrity Act (a watered down version of Sarbanes Oxley Act for charities,
> requiring audit committees and audits for many charities), which applies
> beyond California nonprofit corporations and thus is in the California
> Government Code, not the Corporations Code.)
>
>
>
> I hope this information is useful.
>
>
>
>    Ellen
>
>
>
>
>
>
> -------
>
> Ellen P. Aprill
>
> John E. Anderson Professor of Tax Law
>
> Loyola Law School
>
> 919 Albany Street
>
> Los Angeles, CA 90015
>
> 213-736-1157
>
>
>
> On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 8:18 AM, Joe Birkenstock <
> birkenstock at sandlerreiff.com> wrote:
>
> Well Sean, I’m afraid I’m also not interested in exploring the outer
> boundaries of “political” right now either. It’s an important topic, but
> unrelated to the question I have about CCP v. Harris.
>
>
>
> If a charitable donor is especially sensitive to disclosure, why not
> donate anonymously – not just privately, as in “let’s keep this between
> us,” but literally anonymously, as in the group itself doesn’t even know
> who gave the donation?
>
>
>
> So far as I know, it’s a perfectly legal and recognized option, reflected
> on page 6 of the Schedule B instructions here:
> https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990ezb.pdf, and there’s a good writeup
> about the practice from several years ago here:
> http://go.bloomberg.com/political-capital/2012-07-26/anonymous-donations-can-remain-secret-despite-irs-requirement-to-disclose/.
> Point being: it’s not like this approach itself is a secret, so I think
> it’s fair to assume that well-advised donors know this option exists but
> choose not to use it.
>
>
>
> OTOH, I freely admit that I don’t have the tax chops that many others on
> this list have, so it’s entirely possible I’m just missing something –
> hence my question. If I am just missing something, I’d love to know more
> about the considerations here. But if not this approach would seem to make
> a lot of sense for charitable donors concerned about disclosure even to the
> IRS, much less the CA AG or other state charitable oversight agencies.
>
>
>
>
>
> ___________________________________
>
> Joseph M. Birkenstock
>
> Sandler Reiff Lamb Rosenstein & Birkenstock, P.C.
>
> 1025 Vermont Avenue, NW, Suite 300
>
> Washington, DC 20005
>
> 202.479.1111
>
> *also admitted to practice in CA
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From: *<law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu> on behalf of Sean
> Parnell <sean at impactpolicymanagement.com>
> *Date: *Monday, November 9, 2015 at 9:22 PM
> *To: *Richard Hasen <rhasen at law.uci.edu>, "'Smith, Brad'" <
> BSmith at law.capital.edu>, "law-election at department-lists.uci.edu" <
> law-election at department-lists.uci.edu>
> *Subject: *Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris
>
>
>
> OK, anybody else who generally favors disclosure of c3 donors under
> certain circumstances want to step up to the plate on this? I’m still in
> the increasing marginal returns stage myself on this particular topic…
>
>
>
> Sean
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Rick Hasen [mailto:rhasen at law.uci.edu <rhasen at law.uci.edu>]
> *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 8:52 PM
> *To:* Sean Parnell; 'Smith, Brad'; law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris
>
>
>
> Sean,
> It is a great question but I'm afraid I've reached significantly
> diminishing marginal returns for continuing this discussion on the
> listserv.  At some point I might invest more time in the question. I do
> recall thinking about it a lot in relation to the McConnell disclosure
> provisions, which went even broader than electioneering communications.
>
> Rick
>
> On 11/9/15 5:37 PM, Sean Parnell wrote:
>
> Then, if you don’t mind, what definition of political activity would you
> like to see applied? For example:
>
>
>
> 1.      Lobbying
>
> 2.      Any communication published by a c3 that references a candidate,
> such as “*So Sen. McCain, who has gotten a great deal of positive press
> over the years with his crusade for campaign finance "reform" and
> repeatedly denounced the so-called "special interests" represented by
> lobbyists, must now explain how he can be friends with people who, as has
> so indelicately put it in the past, "corrupt" the government by
> representing their clients.*”*
>
> 3.      Any communication published by a c3 that, while it does not
> directly reference a candidate by name, addresses policy positions that are
> closely identified with particular candidates (say, McCain-Feingold or the
> flat tax in 1996).
>
>
>
> There are other possibilities as well of course, these are just a few that
> come to mind.
>
>
>
>
>
> Sean Parnell
>
> President, Impact Policy Management, LLC
>
> 571-289-1374 (c)
>
> sean at impactpolicymanagement.com
>
> Alexandria, Virginia
>
>
>
> *This is from a piece I wrote on CCP’s blog back in 2008, here
> <http://www.campaignfreedom.org/2008/02/23/perhaps-an-update-to-im-just-a-bill-is-in-order/>.
> Judging by some of the past campaign finance regulations I’ve seen proposed
> in the past, it seems like the sort of thing that might be considered
> “political” by some.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Rick Hasen [mailto:rhasen at law.uci.edu <rhasen at law.uci.edu>]
> *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 7:08 PM
> *To:* Smith, Brad; Sean Parnell; law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris
>
>
>
> I believe it depends upon what one considers to be political activity,
> which does not have to match either the IRS's stated definition or its
> actual enforcement practices
>
> On 11/9/15 3:59 PM, Smith, Brad wrote:
>
> C3 groups do not, by definition, engage in politics. And that is this
> case, CCP v. Harris.
>
>
>
> Now if you wish to change the traditionally understood definition of
> politics to include a whole bunch more stuff (and note, for IRS –i.e.
> 990—purposes it is already much broader than it is for FEC/political
> reporting) then go at it. But that’s asking for a quite a change in the law.
>
>
>
> In short, by supporting the state here, you have already announced your
> support for “public disclosure of the information of c3 groups that do
> not engage in political activities.”
>
>
>
>
>
> *Bradley A. Smith*
>
> *Josiah H. Blackmore II/Shirley M. Nault *
>
> *  Professor of Law*
>
> *Capital University Law School*
>
> *303 East Broad Street*
>
> *Columbus, OH 43215*
>
> *(614) 236-6317 <%28614%29%20236-6317>*
>
> *bsmith at law.capital.edu <bsmith at law.capital.edu>*
>
> *http://www.law.capital.edu/faculty/bios/bsmith.asp
> <http://www.law.capital.edu/faculty/bios/bsmith.asp>*
>
>
>
> *From:*law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu [
> mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu
> <law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu>] *On Behalf Of *Rick Hasen
> *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 6:34 PM
> *To:* Sean Parnell; law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris
>
>
>
> I think whatever is disclosed to the IRS should be disclosable to the AGs
> for enforcement purposes, provided of course that they can keep the
> information private (an allegation which I understand has not yet been
> considered in the case).  I would not support public disclosure of the
> information of c3 groups that do not engage in political activities.
>
> On 11/9/15 1:18 PM, Sean Parnell wrote:
>
> I’m curious what you think, Rick (and any other “reformers”) about the
> policy as a stand-alone issue, i.e. not in regards to what a ruling one way
> or another might mean for the regulation of money in an explicit campaign
> context, but as a policy issue in and of itself should state AG’s be able
> to require the revelation of donors to c3 entities? And what would you
> think of a policy of mandated disclosure to the public of donors/members to
> c3 entities?
>
>
>
>
>
> Sean Parnell
>
> President, Impact Policy Management, LLC
>
> 571-289-1374 (c)
>
> sean at impactpolicymanagement.com
>
> Alexandria, Virginia
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:*law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu [
> mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu
> <law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu>] *On Behalf Of *Rick Hasen
> *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 4:07 PM
> *To:* law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris
>
>
>
> I'd also look at what the trial court did in Doe v. Reed and Protect
> Marriage, as described in my "Chill Out" piece.
>
> On 11/9/2015 12:58 PM, Bill Maurer wrote:
>
> Thanks, Richard, I’ve read that case numerous times. It seems to prove my
> point that the standard is actually applicable only after the harassment
> has already occurred.
>
>
>
> I would also note that, in practice, the application of the case has been
> that only the Socialist Workers Party has been able to demonstrate
> harassment. They are a pristine example of something that is truly sui
> generis.
>
>
>
> Bill
>
>
>
> *From:* Richard Winger [mailto:richardwinger at yahoo.com
> <richardwinger at yahoo.com>]
> *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 12:49 PM
> *To:* Bill Maurer; Edward Still; Allen Dickerson
> *Cc:* law-election at uci.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris
>
>
>
> read Brown v Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459 US 87.
>
>
>
> Richard Winger 415-922-9779 PO Box 470296, San Francisco Ca 94147
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> *From:* Bill Maurer <wmaurer at ij.org>
> *To:* Edward Still <still at votelaw.com>; Allen Dickerson <
> adickerson at campaignfreedom.org>
> *Cc:* "law-election at uci.edu" <law-election at uci.edu>
> *Sent:* Monday, November 9, 2015 12:33 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris
>
>
>
> Rick’s commented that “There is no constitutional impediment to
> [disclosure], except as to those groups which can demonstrate a realistic
> threat of harassment.”
>
>
>
> I’ve never seen a discussion of what exactly a plaintiff would have to do
> to demonstrate a realistic threat of harassment. Wouldn’t evidence of a
> realistic threat be evidence of actual harassment (for instance, I don’t
> see those doing the harassing sending out a pre-harassment notice that they
> will be engaging in future harassment, although I suppose someone could do
> that)? And what about new groups with new issues? How are they supposed to
> demonstrate the realistic threat?
>
>
>
> In other words, I don’t see the “harassment” standard as protecting much
> of anything going forward—it is entirely backward looking and, for that
> reason, utterly useless as a protection against harassment in the first
> instance.
>
>
>
> That is exactly the point Brad made about the inadvertent disclosure
> analysis of the Ninth Circuit. The court essentially said, you can’t get
> protection from inadvertent disclosure until the information has been
> inadvertently disclosed. At which point, it doesn’t matter.
>
>
>
> And what’s the standard for harassment? Is it violence or coercion,
> because I’ve heard a number of commentators (including Justice Scalia)
> suggest that anything short of that is the price of being involved in
> politics? Be we already have laws against violence or coercion. So, are
> laws against assault supposed to be the things that demark the outer edge
> of how far the government can go in collecting information about those who
> decide to exercise their fundamental rights?
>
>
>
> Isn’t the real standard that anyone who participates in political activity
> in this country should be aware that by doing so they are opening
> themselves up to governmental scrutiny in perpetuity with no realistic
> protection against misuse of the information the government has collected?
>
>
>
> Of course, a legitimate response to this is “We don’t care if people are
> harassed or their information misused.” But, why not say that?
>
>
>
> Bill
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:*law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu [
> mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu
> <law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu>] *On Behalf Of *Edward
> Still
> *Sent:* Monday, November 09, 2015 9:04 AM
> *To:* Allen Dickerson
> *Cc:* law-election at uci.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris
>
>
>
> The Questions Presented were:
>
> QUESTIONS PRESENTED
>
> 1. Whether a state official’s demand for all significant donors to a
> nonprofit organization, as a precondition to engaging in
> constitutionally-protected speech, constitutes a First Amendment injury.
>
> 2. Whether the “exacting scrutiny” standard applied in compelled
> disclosure cases permits state officials to demand donor information based
> upon generalized “law enforcement” interests, without making any specific
> showing of need.
>
> The cert petition is at http://electionlawblog.org/?p=74940.
>
>
>
>
> Edward Still
> Edward Still Law Firm LLC
>
> 429 Green Springs Hwy, STE 161-304
>
> Birmingham AL 35209
> 205-320-2882
> still at votelaw.com
> www.votelaw.com/blog
> www.edwardstill.com
> www.linkedin.com/in/edwardstill
>
>
>
> On Mon, Nov 9, 2015 at 10:48 AM, Allen Dickerson <
> adickerson at campaignfreedom.org> wrote:
>
> The point was to protect CCP's donors from scrutiny and potential leaks,
> inadvertent or otherwise, by a state AG who believed she was entitled to
> their identities without making any showing of need whatsoever. The case
> did not address the public informational interest behind campaign finance
> disclosure, which we couldn't do in any case because that wasn't the
> state's stated interest. Campaign finance simply wasn't involved.
>
>
>
> (Steve: the stated governmental interest was greater efficiency in
> exercising the AG's law enforcement duties).
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Nov 9, 2015, at 11:34 AM, Rick Hasen <rhasen at law.uci.edu> wrote:
>
> I think this case had the potential to undermine campaign disclosure rules
> if successful, and I think that was the point.
> And yes, I absolutely would have written the same comment if it were the
> Brennan Center or the ACLU suing the Texas AG.
> Rick
>
> On 11/9/2015 8:08 AM, Allen Dickerson wrote:
>
> Rick,
>
>
>
> Your post seriously misinterprets CCP v. Harris, a case that has nothing
> to do with political activity or campaign finance. California's
> registration policy applies only to 501(c)(3) organizations. And CCP, like
> all 501(c)(3) groups, is prohibited from engaging in political activity.
> The informational interest undergirding campaign finance disclosure simply
> isn't implicated here.
>
>
>
> A thought experiment: would you have written the same comment if the
> Brennan Center or ACLU had sued the Texas AG on the same claim?
>
>
>
> I recognize the ever-present danger of seeing campaign finance issues
> everywhere when that's one's area of expertise. But our case is a very poor
> fit for your political disclosure narrative.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Allen
>
>
>
>
> On Nov 9, 2015, at 10:48 AM, Rick Hasen <rhasen at law.uci.edu> wrote:
>
> “Democracy for GrownUps” <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77408>
>
> Posted on November 9, 2015 7:46 am <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77408>
>  by *Rick Hasen* <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
>
> I have written this review
> <http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/democracy-for-grownups> of
> Bruce Cain’s Democracy More or Less
> <http://www.amazon.com/Democracy-More-Less-Political-Cambridge/dp/1107612268> for
> the New Rambler Review. <http://newramblerreview.com/>  It begins:
>
> *Modern American democracy is often messy, increasingly polarized,
> sometimes stupefying, and surprisingly decentralized. Our Congress
> functions (or doesn’t) mainly along party lines under rules set in a
> Constitution more than 200 years old which does not recognize political
> parties, and indeed was designed to stifle their emergence. Divided
> government in times of polarized parties has undermined accountability as
> each side can blame the other for policy failures, and we lurch from one
> potential government shutdown to another thanks in part to polarization and
> in part to internal fighting within the Republican Party. Much power
> devolves to the state and local level, where we often see one-party rule
> rather than the partisan stalemate of Congress.*
>
> *State one-partyism extends even to the rules for conducting elections,
> where a majority of states use partisan election officials to set the rules
> of the game and to carry out our elections, and where state legislatures
> draw their own legislative districts only mildly constrained by Supreme
> Court one-person, one-vote requirements. Our campaign finance system is
> careening toward deregulation, with a series of Supreme Court decisions and
> partially enforceable congressional measures leading to the creation of
> political organizations, some of which can shield their donors’ identities,
> allowing the wealthiest of Americans to translate their vast economic power
> into political power. Money spent to influence elections is complemented by
> money spent to influence public policy through lobbying, creating a system
> in which those with great wealth and organizational ability have a much
> better chance of having their preferences enacted in law and having their
> preferred candidates elected, than average Americans have.*
>
> *It is no wonder that the reform impulse in American politics is strong.
> States with the initiative process have experimented with top-two primaries
> in which the top two vote getters, regardless of party, go to a runoff, and
> redistricting reform featuring either citizen commissions or substantive
> limits on legislative self-dealing. The National Popular Vote movement
> seeks an end run around the antiquated rules of the Electoral College,
> which violate modern accepted principles of one-person, one-vote by giving
> small states outsized power relative to their populations.*
>
> *Reformers push a constitutional amendment to overturn the Supreme Court’s
> decision in Citizens United and other cases which hamstring the
> government’s ability to control money in politics. Good government groups
> regularly clamor for redistricting reform (often joined by the political
> party on the losing side of redistricting in each state), expansion of
> voting rights for former felons and others, and the end of corruption and
> patronage. Some even call for constitutional conventions with citizen
> participants chosen by lottery.*
>
> *But as Bruce Cain argues in his terrific new book, the never-ending
> efforts at reform present tradeoffs, and attempts to achieve either pure
> majoritarianism or government meritocracy can have unintended and unwanted
> consequences. Further, many reform efforts are oversold as a cure for all
> that ails American democracy. Cain argues for a Goldilocks-like pluralist
> reform agenda which recognizes that busy citizens lack interest in
> governing and capacity to make complex decisions. Instead, politics is
> conducted through intermediaries across the range of local, state, and
> national governing arenas. Pluralism “prioritizes aggregation, consensus,
> and fluid coalitions as a means of good democratic governance.” (p. 11)*
>
> <share_save_171_16.png>
> <https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D77408&title=%26%238220%3BDemocracy%20for%20GrownUps%26%238221%3B&description=>
>
> Posted in theory <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=41>
> ELB Podcast Episode 6. Nate Persily: Can the Supreme Court Handle Social
> Science In Election Cases? <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77303>
>
> Posted on November 9, 2015 7:42 am <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77303>
>  by *Rick Hasen* <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
>
> Can the Supreme Court handle social science evidence in election law
> cases? Will lack of good data determine the outcome of the Supreme Court’s
> upcoming one person, one vote decision in *Evenwel v. Abbott*? What role
> will and should evidence play in assessing questions such as the
> constitutionality of McCain-Feingold’s soft money ban or Texas’s strict
> voter identification law.
>
> On Episode 6 of the ELB Podcast, we talk to law professor and political
> scientist Nate Persily <http://persily.com/> of Stanford Law School, one
> of the country’s leading redistricting and election law experts.
>
> You can listen to the ELB Podcast Episode 6 on Soundcloud
> <https://soundcloud.com/rick-hasen/elb-podcast-episode-6-nate> or subscribe
> at iTunes
> <https://geo.itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/elb-podcast/id1029317166?mt=2>.
>
>
>
> <share_save_171_16.png>
> <https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D77303&title=ELB%20Podcast%20Episode%206.%20Nate%20Persily%3A%20Can%20the%20Supreme%20Court%20Handle%20Social%20Science%20In%20Election%20Cases%3F&description=>
>
> Posted in ELB Podcast <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=116>, Supreme Court
> <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=29>
> “Democratic Group Called iVote Pushes Automatic Voter Registration”
> <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77406>
>
> Posted on November 9, 2015 7:38 am <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77406>
>  by *Rick Hasen* <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
>
> NYT:
> <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/10/us/politics/democratic-group-called-ivote-pushes-automatic-voter-registration.html?ref=politics&_r=0>
>
> *As Republicans across the country mount an aggressive effort to tighten
> voting laws, a group of former aides to President Obama and President Bill
> Clinton is pledging to counter by spending up to $10 million on a push to
> make voter registration automatic whenever someone gets a driver’s license.*
>
> *The change would supercharge the 1993 National Voter Registration Act
> <http://www.justice.gov/crt/about-national-voter-registration-act>, known
> as the “motor voter” law, which requires states to offer people the option
> of registering to vote when they apply for driver’s licenses or other
> identification cards. The new laws would make registration automatic during
> those transactions unless a driver objected.*
>
> *The group, called iVote — which is led by Jeremy Bird
> <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/30/us/politics/obama-campaign-confronts-voter-id-laws.html>,
> who ran Mr. Obama’s voter turnout effort in 2012 — is betting that such
> laws could bring out millions of new voters who have, for whatever reason,
> failed to register even when they had the opportunity at motor vehicle
> departments….*
>
> *Kris W. Kobach, the secretary of state in Kansas and a Republican, who
> has been a leading advocate of stricter voting laws, said he opposed
> automatic registration because people who chose not to register were
> clearly not interested in voting.*
>
> *“The assumption that by making what is already easy automatic that will
> somehow bring people to the polls is just erroneous,” Mr. Kobach said. “I
> just think it’s a bad idea. It’s not going to increase participation
> rates.”*
>
> *Mr. Kobach has pushed for some of the nation’s most restrictive voting
> laws, including one that requires proof of citizenship. He said automatic
> registration would make that kind of check impossible.*
>
> *“You’re going to end up with aliens on the voter rolls,” Mr. Kobach said.
> “It’s inevitable that an automatic registration system would result in many
> of them getting on.”*
>
> <share_save_171_16.png>
> <https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D77406&title=%26%238220%3BDemocratic%20Group%20Called%20iVote%20Pushes%20Automatic%20Voter%20Registration%26%238221%3B&description=>
>
> Posted in election administration <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=18>, The
> Voting Wars <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=60>, voter registration
> <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=37>
> “Inside the abandoned plans of Ted Cruz’s super PACs”
> <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77404>
>
> Posted on November 9, 2015 7:32 am <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77404>
>  by *Rick Hasen* <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
>
> Teddy Schleifer
> <http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/08/politics/ted-cruz-super-pac-abandoned-plans/index.html> for
> CNN:
>
> *The super PACs are staffed in part by a few individuals with no formal
> political experience, including Neugebauer, who has been the groups’ main
> fundraiser and formerly its chief executive officer — in addition to one of
> its lead donors. The groups have only recently begun hiring their first
> political professionals, including a new professional fundraiser: Campbell
> Smith, a finance official at the National Rifle Association, the super PACs
> confirmed to CNN.*
>
> *The ditched buy is at the heart of the dispute between the campaign and
> the super PAC — a dispute that spilled out into the public this week, with
> several campaign advisers telling Politico
> <http://www.politico.com/story/2015/11/ted-cruz-silent-super-pacs-2016-215422> that
> they want to see Keep the Promise purchase advertising time immediately.
> Campaigns and super PACs frequently read one another’s messages in the
> press with a fine-toothed comb to learn thinking that they cannot legally
> directly share with one another.*
>
> *It’s a reflection of the divided campaign finance world, where super PACs
> are allowed to raise unlimited amounts of cash (donations must still be
> reported to the Federal Election Commission), but the catch is that
> campaign and super PAC officials aren’t allowed to coordinate. Neugebauer’s
> pitch at The Broadmoor came without Cruz staffers in the room, for
> instance, a donor said.*
>
> *And amid increasing questions about the super PAC, campaign officials are
> coming to the defense of Neugebauer, who left his role at the super PAC in
> a shake-up, and are praising his ability to incentivize two more
> eight-digit donations with a $10 million check of his own.*
>
> <share_save_171_16.png>
> <https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D77404&title=%26%238220%3BInside%20the%20abandoned%20plans%20of%20Ted%20Cruz%26%238217%3Bs%20super%20PACs%26%238221%3B&description=>
>
> Posted in campaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>, campaigns
> <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=59>
> “The battle over campaign finance reform is changing. Here’s how.”
> <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77402>
>
> Posted on November 9, 2015 7:31 am <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77402>
>  by *Rick Hasen* <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
>
> WaPo talks
> <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/11/07/the-battle-over-campaign-finance-reform-is-changing-heres-how/> with
> Josh Silver of represent.us.
>
> <share_save_171_16.png>
> <https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D77402&title=%26%238220%3BThe%20battle%20over%20campaign%20finance%20reform%20is%20changing.%20Here%E2%80%99s%20how.%26%238221%3B&description=>
>
> Posted in campaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>
> Bauer on Justice Kennedy on Citizens United at Harvard
> <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77400>
>
> Posted on November 9, 2015 7:23 am <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77400>
>  by  <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
>
> ...
>
> [Message clipped]
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