[EL] Efficacy of Campaign Finance Reform

Wed Oct 28 15:15:22 PDT 2015

Good points all.  I hadn't really thought of big spenders hurting the candidates they hope to help.  I imagine that retention of grants, subsidies, and contracts might be folded into an expansive definition of "policy outcomes," or, perhaps better prhased, "governmental action."  And perhaps reducing barriers to entry for new candidates can be contained within a broad definition of "electoral competition."

From: Robert Wechsler [mailto:catbird at pipeline.com]
Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 4:16 PM
To: law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
Cc: Steven John Mulroy (smulroy) <smulroy at memphis.edu>
Subject: Re: [EL] Efficacy of Campaign Finance Reform

Please don't limit your considerations to policy outcomes, or even to immedate outcomes. Campaign contributions are not given only to influence policies. Many are given to get (or keep) direct financial benefits, such as contracts, permits, grants, and subsidies. Most large local campaign contributions come from contractors, developers, unions, and others seeking financial benefits from the candidates' government.

Also, consider the other side of the coin:  candidates who lose control of their campaigns to independent spenders can lose an election that, left to themselves, they might have won. Election distortion doesn't always go the way big spenders mean it to, but that doesn't make it okay. Two recent instances occurred in Coralville, IA<http://www.cityethics.org/content/old-and-new-local-independent-spending-elections> and Contra Costa, CA<http://www.cityethics.org/content/how-huge-corporations-political-spending-can-change-citys-ethics-environment> (the links are to City Ethics blog posts I wrote on these instances).

And public campaign financing programs are effective not just with respect to who is elected, but also with respect to increasing the number of individuals who can run for office and make their views known to their communities.

Robert Wechsler
City Ethics
On 10/28/2015 4:28 PM, Steven John Mulroy (smulroy) wrote:
Since so many of you have asked me for clarification of my question and/or engaged me on my premise, and done so  to the entire list, I feel as though I owe the entire list some responses.

In short,  I was using "effective" as shorthand for such things as: corruption/appearance of corruption;  perceived/actual influence of lobbyists or special interests; competitiveness of elections; and in general, any decline in the extent to which "big money donors" control electoral outcomes and policy decisions. Some of you have pointed me to recent studies showing that at least some reforms can be effective.   E.g., Linda Powell, The Influence of Campaign Contributions in State Legislatures; J. Migin Cha, Miles Rapoport, Fresh Start: The Impact of Public Campaign Financing In Connecticut.  One gave an example of specific reform(s) which did not work,  Ray La Raja, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026137941300125X, or which can have unintended consequences not always for the better, Ray La Raha,  https://www.press.umich.edu/4882255/campaign_finance_and_political_polarization .  These are useful counters, though not necessarily proof that no reforms can be effective.

Then others question the premise of whether there is any problem to be fixed, thus doubting whether anything could ever truly be called "effective."  I respect this point of view while not sharing it.  Speaking only for myself, I have seen so many studies over the years about how large donations can effect legislative outcomes, that I am inclined to think that some sort of regulation, at least disclosure, is warranted-a position which it seems even the "skeptics" generally do not contest.  At any rate, I did not wish to open  up that can of worms, and was not intending to invite debate on that point.

Finally, I've seen personal testimonials about their own electoral experience.  For what it is worth (and I'm not claiming it's necessarily worth much), I can tell you that I, too, have won multiple elections in which I was outspent heavily-not 10 to 1, but over 2 to 1, and multiple times. So I know that money isn't always determinative of outcomes.  But I also have personal, anecdotal experience watching colleagues grant access, attention, and (willingness to sponsor initiatives) selectively to large donors-all things which, from a but-for causation perspective, do indeed influence policy outcomes.

SJM

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