[EL] Does the current recount effort meet the standards of the U of Michigan Computer Science Security expert

[Paul Lehto]

One of the expenses of the recount is reprogramming by the vendors. This
may or may not be identical to the original program.  According to the
Chicago Tribune, 19 counties in Wisconsin will use machines in the recount.

There have been documented problems with scanners properly reading SAT test
answers for example, where presumably there is no incentive for anyone with
access to hack the program. Sometimes vendors say scanners develop dirt or
defects on the scanning glass, resulting in either black or white stripes
that can cause misreads on ballots, which persists until cleaned or
corrected. There are some shapes of marks that humans would agree are votes
but scanners don't read, and some shades of ink that don't get picked up
well by scanners.

Although the scanners most likely duplicate the original result, whether
right or wrong, results could differ where there are circumstances like
disappearing software, dirty lenses that are cleaned, etc. If they are
committed to using the same machines as well as committed to fair
nvestigation, allowing the parties to bring in their own scanners and do a
hand count if they don't match up would be a clever and appropriate
approach.

Not everyone has the same level of interest in finding out more information
aboit this election.

But the bottom line is that re-using the same scanner (only) does not
eliminate scanner error from the picture, and doesn't eliminate a hacking
inference either.  Wherever ballots are hand counted and there is no issue
about chain of custody, a hand count would eliminate the hack hypothesis ,
provided the hand count is statewide. Unfortunately, since taking out only
four counties in various states would change the result of the presidential
election, when 19 counties refuse to hand count in Wisconsin, it can't
settle the issue.

Paul Lehto

On Friday, December 2, 2016, Charles Stewart III <cstewart at mit.edu> wrote:

> It won’t meet the standards of the types of post-election audits that
> Halderman and others (myself included) prefer, precisely because in some
> cases, the machines will simply be run again.  I just saw a summary of the
> methods that county boards of elections will use, and I think there will be
> more hand-recounting of scanner-tabulated ballots than some are supposing,
> but this will not be a pure post-election audit to satisfy the most
> skeptical.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> -------------------------------------------------
>
> Charles Stewart III
>
> Kenan Sahin Distinguished Professor of Political Science
>
> The Massachusetts Institute of Technology
>
> Cambridge, Massachusetts   02139
>
> 617-253-3127
>
> cstewart at mit.edu <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','cstewart at mit.edu');>
>
>
>
> *From:* law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu
> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu');>
> [mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu
> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu');>]
> *On Behalf Of *John Shockley
> *Sent:* Friday, December 02, 2016 10:46 AM
> *To:* lminnite at gmail.com
> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','lminnite at gmail.com');>
> *Cc:* law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','law-election at department-lists.uci.edu');>
> *Subject:* [EL] Does the current recount effort meet the standards of the
> U of Michigan Computer Science Security expert
>
>
>
>
>
> Dear Members:
>
> The article about Professor J. Alex Halderman is below:
>
>
> https://medium.com/@jhalderm/want-to-know-if-the-election-
> was-hacked-look-at-the-ballots-c61a6113b0ba#.9atvcvxmy
>
> I don't know if just putting the ballots through the optical scanning
> machines again to count the ballots, as most of Wisconsin is doing, would
> detect the hacking.  Do any of you know, or has Halderman said so?  If the
> malware was designed to disappear after the election, then it seems that
> putting the ballots through the optical scanner three weeks later would
> show different results.  I know that it is better is to physically count
> the ballots, as Minnesota did in the Franken/Coleman contest.  That way you
> can also count ballots the computer can't--if the circle is not filled in
> completely, or if someone circles the circle instead of filling it in,
> etc.  Counting those mistakes, where the intent of the voter is obvious,
> makes for a more accurate count, but that is unrelated to the issue of
> malware in the machines.
>
> For the record, I believe Halderman said that it was unlikely the hacking
> occurred, but possible, and that he and his Ph.D. students could design
> such a hacking program.
>
> John Shockley
>


-- 
Paul R Lehto, J.D.
P.O. Box 2952
Watford City, ND 58854
lehto.paul at gmail.com
906-204-4965 (cell)
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://webshare.law.ucla.edu/Listservs/law-election/attachments/20161202/ea45b8c8/attachment.html>