[EL] more news 2/3/16
Rick Hasen
rhasen at law.uci.edu
Wed Feb 3 07:24:16 PST 2016
No, Donald Trump Cannot Void Iowa Caucus Based on Cruz’s Alleged
Lies: Explained <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=79555>
Posted onFebruary 3, 2016 7:16 am
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=79555>byRick Hasen
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
The Washington Post recaps
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/02/03/donald-trump-tweets-that-ted-cruz-stole-iowa-illegally-and-quickly-deletes-the-illegally/>a
series of tweets by Donald Trump this morning in which he calls for a
do-over of the Iowa caucuses based on a claim that Ted Cruz “stole” the
election. (Trump initially said “illegally” stole the election but then
deleted that word).
The basis for the argument appears to be: (1) Cruz campaign telling
people just before voting that Ben Carson was dropping out (he wasn’t,
though the situation was unclear at the time) and (2) those “voter
violation” mailers intended to shame voters into voting. (There was some
evidence these mailers incorrectly stated people did not vote when they
didn’t).
Even if both of these activities by Cruz count as false campaign speech,
any claim by Trump to an election do-over would almost certainly fail.
To begin with, there is no federal law (and no state Iowa law I’m aware
of) against lying in campaigns. further, the appropriate remedy for a
lie in a campaign is most likely counter speech, not an election do
over, thanks to the First Amendment. Indeed, as I explain in this law
review article,A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections?
<https://t.co/ZKYNNCKWFd>, the Supreme Court and lower courts have been
very wary of allowing the government to determine when campaign speech
is false. To the extent there are /defamatory statements made with
actual malice/(that is a false statement damaging a candidate’s
reputation, made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless
disregard as to its truth or falsity), there may be a basis for a damage
claim, not an election do-over
Now we might have a different rule regarding lies about the election
itself. For example, if Cruz sent emails to Trump supporters telling
them the wrong polling place or date, there might constitutionally be a
remedy for that. But there’s no evidence of any of that in this election.
So to recap: no law against what Cruz did, and no remedy of a do-over
even if it can be proven that the campaign speech was a lie. Got it?
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Posted incampaigns <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=59>
“State NAACP to Redouble Efforts to Get Out Vote in Light of Photo
ID Requirement” <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=79553>
Posted onFebruary 3, 2016 6:54 am
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=79553>byRick Hasen
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
Michael Hewlett
<http://www.journalnow.com/news/elections/state-naacp-to-redouble-efforts-to-get-out-vote-in/article_95a9c014-13a7-5163-a086-c2ad8bd48a54.html?platform=hootsuite>reports
for the Winston-Salem Journal.
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Posted inelection administration
<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=18>,The Voting Wars
<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=60>,voter id
<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=9>
Donald Trump Accuses Ted Cruz of “Stealing” Election in Iowa
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=79551>
Posted onFebruary 3, 2016 5:54 am
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=79551>byRick Hasen
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
Here we go <https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/694879900256354304>.
False claims of voter fraud are the last refuge of a sore losing candidate.
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Posted infraudulent fraud squad <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=8>
“Virginia ‘Loyalty Oath’ To Cost Commonwealth More Than $62K – And
Might Not Be Used” <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=79549>
Posted onFebruary 3, 2016 5:53 am
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=79549>byRick Hasen
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
A ChapinBlog.
<http://editions.lib.umn.edu/electionacademy/2016/02/03/virginia-loyalty-oath-to-cost-commonwealth-more-than-62k-and-might-not-be-used/>
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Posted inelection administration <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=18>
“Shadowy companies, big bucks: Election mystery money returns”
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=79547>
Posted onFebruary 3, 2016 5:52 am
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=79547>byRick Hasen
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
AP
<http://bigstory.ap.org/article/3143e929c77641438ebea8163d1d19c2/shadowy-companies-big-bucks-election-mystery-money-returns>:
Super political action committees, or super PACs, helping White
House hopefuls like Marco Rubio and Hillary Clinton received big
checks recently from obscure corporations or from nonprofits that
don’t have to disclose their donors’ names.
A super PAC backing Rubio, a Republican senator from Florida,
benefited from companies with spectral names like “IGX LLC”
($500,000) and “TMCV #2 LLC” ($90,000). The Associated Press traced
IGX to a New York investor, and the other to an Idaho billionaire.
Meanwhile, Democratic-leaning American Bridge 21st Century reported
more than $1.5 million from its affiliated nonprofit, which doesn’t
have to name its donors. American Bridge, which said it used the
money to pay for shared expenses like rent and staff, was founded by
Clinton supporter David Brock.
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Posted incampaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>,campaigns
<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=59>,tax law and election law
<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=22>
“Iowa’s nightmare revisited: Was correct winner called?”
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=79545>
Posted onFebruary 3, 2016 5:51 am
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=79545>byRick Hasen
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
Des Moines Register:
<http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/elections/presidential/caucus/2016/02/02/iowas-nightmare-revisited-correct-winner-called-caucus-night/79702010/>
Even as Hillary Clinton trumpeted her Iowa win in New Hampshire on
Tuesday, aides for Bernie Sanders said the eyelash-thin margin
raised questions and called for a review
<http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/elections/presidential/caucus/2016/02/02/sanders-camp-questions-iowa-caucus-results/79698946/>.
The chairwoman of the Iowa Democratic Party rejected that notion,
saying the results are final.
The situation echoes the events on the Republican side in the 2012
caucuses, when one winner (Mitt Romney, by eight votes) was named on
caucus night, but a closer examination of the paperwork that
reflected the head counts showed someone else pulled in more votes
(Rick Santorum, by 34 votes). But some precincts were still missing
entirely.
Yet another reason tokill the caucuses
<http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/02/congress_should_kill_the_republican_and_democratic_state_caucuses_and_mandate_primaries_instead_.html>.
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Posted inelection administration
<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=18>,political parties
<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=25>,primaries
<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=32>
“The Conservative Case for Campaign-Finance Reform”
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=79543>
Posted onFebruary 3, 2016 5:48 am
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=79543>byRick Hasen
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
Richard Painter NYT oped:
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/03/opinion/the-conservative-case-forcampaign-finance-reform.html?smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share&_r=1>
Why should conservative voters care? First, big money in politics
encourages big government. Campaign contributions drive spending on
earmarks and other wasteful programs — bridges to nowhere, contracts
for equipment the military does not need, solar energy companies
that go bankrupt on the government’s dime and for-profit educational
institutions that don’t educate. When politicians are dependent on
campaign money from contractors and lobbyists, they’re incapable of
holding spending programs to account.
Campaign contributions also breed more regulation. Companies in
heavily regulated industries such as banking, health care and energy
are among the largest contributors. Such companies donate with the
hope of winning narrowly tailored exceptions to regulations that
help them and disadvantage their competitors. Politicians sometimes
say they want to roll back regulations wholesale, but they rarely
follow through because they know that less regulation will remove
the incentive for future contributions. Some would call it
extortion, but that is how the regulatory game is often played.
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Posted incampaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>,campaigns
<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=59>
“Mrs. Holland’s (and Mrs. McIntyre’s) Complaint”
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=79541>
Posted onFebruary 3, 2016 5:46 am
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=79541>byRick Hasen
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
Bauer blogs.
<http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2016/02/mrs-hollands-mrs-mcintyres-complaint/>
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Posted incampaign finance <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>
“Stealth Partisan Spoilers: Evaluating the Logic Behind Partisan
Disaffiliation Requirements for Independent and Third-Party
Candidates” <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=79539>
Posted onFebruary 3, 2016 5:46 am
<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=79539>byRick Hasen
<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
Adam Chamberlain and Carl Klarner have postedthis draft
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2726990>on SSRN.
Here is the abstract:
In this article, we evaluate the rationale behind partisan
disaffiliation laws, which prevent a candidate from running as an
independent or from switching parties if they have not adequately
severed their ties to an existing party. One prominent justification
for these laws is that they help prevent voter confusion, which may
result in the most preferred candidate losing. Utilizing a database
of state legislative elections from 1968 to 2014, we categorize
independent and third-party candidates into two groups: those who
have run in the past as a Democrat or Republican, who we refer to as
“stealth partisans,” and “pure” non-major party candidates. The
findings reveal that the latter appear to have expressive
motivations for running for office, making them less strategic about
where to run and unlikely to run again. In contrast, stealth
partisans are much more likely to have held state legislative
office, and are more likely to have run multiple times; they are
also more strategic, running under conditions that are advantageous
for non-major party candidates. Voters react to this, giving pure
non-major party candidates far fewer votes than stealth partisans
and being more apt to vote for them when “spoiling” an election is
less likely. As a result, pure non-major party candidates rarely
deny winning candidates majorities, while stealth partisans who have
won office in the past do so more than half the time. Our findings
regarding “vote stealing” do not indicate a systematic tendency for
stealth partisans to take substantially more votes from the party
they recently left in comparison to the other major party. Overall,
our findings indicate that partisan disaffiliation laws achieve the
objectives they are designed to promote.
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Posted incampaigns <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=59>,political
parties <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=25>
--
Rick Hasen
Chancellor's Professor of Law and Political Science
UC Irvine School of Law
401 E. Peltason Dr., Suite 1000
Irvine, CA 92697-8000
949.824.3072 - office
949.824.0495 - fax
rhasen at law.uci.edu
http://www.law.uci.edu/faculty/full-time/hasen/
http://electionlawblog.org
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