[EL] CCP v. Harris

Fri Mar 25 20:11:45 PDT 2016

We said in our litigation that California can request this info on the point you raise – “a Schedule B shows gifts of property that even at first glance seem of very questionable  fair market value.”

They can get this info from the redacted version.

According to IRS instructions a redacted Schedule B must show the amount of each gift and whether it was a gift is of property or not along with a description of the property.

In short, the redacted schedule B we were filing already had the info you thought they should have.

And at the AFPF trial, the auditor indicated Schedule B has “never been used” as “the
triggering document” to open an investigation.

Oh, and by the way, the state has published over 1700 “confidential” schedule Bs on the website.  Even when they learn of a breach, they don’t tell the donors or charities.

It is common knowledge among journalists to look at the AG’s website in the hope of finding private confidential donor info.

Basically, the office is unable to keep the information confidential.

And they don’t need or use the info from the confidential documents.

David
_________________________________________________
David Keating | President | Center for Competitive Politics
124 S. West Street, Suite 201 | Alexandria, VA 22314
703-894-6799 (direct) | 703-894-6800 | 703-894-6811 Fax
www.campaignfreedom.org<http://www.campaignfreedom.org/>

From: law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu [mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] On Behalf Of Ellen Aprill
Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 2:19 PM
To: Smith, Brad
Cc: law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
Subject: Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris

I think we are just going to disagree.  To me, if a Schedule B shows gifts of property that even at first glance seem of very questionable  fair market value, the AG may well want to look at a charities' finances and, as . For California corporations, it may well raise other issues it wants to investigate re self-dealing, etc. It can also make clear that an organization is not a private foundation or raise issues as to whether it is (organizations do not always do the public support test to prove public charity status correctly).
I know that looking at Schedule B of private foundations has raised questions for me about the foundation's compliance with other private foundations rules - which I have at times followed up in press reports and questions to other exempt organization folks.

I also think the solicitation point is a good one.

IRC 6104(c)(2)(D) states:  "The Secretary may make available for inspection or disclose returns an return information of of an organization . . . to an appropriate State officer of any State if the Secretary determines that such returns or return information MAY constitute evidence of noncompliance under the laws within the jurisdiction of the appropriate State officer."  (emphasis added) I have not ever had occasion to research the provision, but do you read it as requiring the State to establish probable cause or as giving the Secretary ability to share information under a lower standard? To me, the latter seems a better reading.

Why do you think it is okay for the feds to get the Schedule B? Why is it okay to require Schedule B to be public for private foundations? If the feds can have such a requirement for federal tax exemption, do you think a state could establish such a requirement for state tax exemption or nonprofit status by legislation or regulation?

I think these questions do it for me on this.

    Ellen

-------
Ellen P. Aprill
John E. Anderson Professor of Tax Law
Loyola Law School
919 Albany Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015
213-736-1157

On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 10:05 AM, Smith, Brad <BSmith at law.capital.edu<mailto:BSmith at law.capital.edu>> wrote:
Does it? How? I did not get that from your message—at least not why donor ID is necessary. What I got was that a redacted Schedule B might be useful—which we have conceded throughout the litigation. We have also conceded, by the way, that the State could subpoena an unredacted Schedule B with probable cause.

Concessions aside, should the state have some obligation to actually offer that reason up? Or is it enough for the State just to state “law enforcement” without ensuing judicial scrutiny? Because the state has not offered that argument in briefs. If it does offer that argument, must a reviewing court take the argument at face value? If the latter is enough, then we could have a fun debate about whether it should be enough to override 4th, 5th, 6th, and 8th Amendment protections as well—but for now we can save that for a later day.

Bradley A. Smith
Josiah H. Blackmore II/Shirley M. Nault
  Professor of Law
Capital University Law School
303 East Broad Street
Columbus, OH 43215
(614) 236-6317<tel:%28614%29%20236-6317>
bsmith at law.capital.edu<mailto:bsmith at law.capital.edu>
http://www.law.capital.edu/faculty/bios/bsmith.asp

From: Ellen Aprill [mailto:ellen.aprill at lls.edu<mailto:ellen.aprill at lls.edu>]
Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 12:57 PM
To: Smith, Brad
Cc: Joe Birkenstock; Sean Parnell; Rick Hasen; law-election at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:law-election at department-lists.uci.edu>
Subject: Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris

That may be so, but I think the point that donor disclosure CAN serve charitable enforcement purposes still stands.

  Ellen

-------
Ellen P. Aprill
John E. Anderson Professor of Tax Law
Loyola Law School
919 Albany Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015
213-736-1157<tel:213-736-1157>

On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 9:45 AM, Smith, Brad <BSmith at law.capital.edu<mailto:BSmith at law.capital.edu>> wrote:
Ellen,

The problem is that the AG example you point out was never raised in the briefs, and was never mentioned in the cert briefs. It was offered spontaneously in oral argument, and so was never really discussed. The reason it was never offered in briefs, it appears, is that it makes no sense—that is, knowing the name of the donor of some in-kind contribution would not help the AG spot the inflation of revenue any more than not knowing the name of the donor. And as appears from sworn testimony filed in the 9th circuit in AFPF v. Harris, the state’s top auditor admits that the donor info is not used in audits. In other words, a redacted 990B would do just fine, even if that were the state’s purpose.

If, we note, the state wished to argue otherwise, it should have done so. A core purpose of requiring the State to state a reason for regulating peaceful activity of its citizens is, among other things, to weed out pretense, harassment, arbitrariness, and abuse of power by the state. Here, the court has abandoned that.

Bradley A. Smith
Josiah H. Blackmore II/Shirley M. Nault
  Professor of Law
Capital University Law School
303 East Broad Street
Columbus, OH 43215
(614) 236-6317<tel:%28614%29%20236-6317>
bsmith at law.capital.edu<mailto:bsmith at law.capital.edu>
http://www.law.capital.edu/faculty/bios/bsmith.asp

From: Ellen Aprill [mailto:ellen.aprill at lls.edu<mailto:ellen.aprill at lls.edu>]
Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2015 12:32 PM
To: Joe Birkenstock
Cc: Sean Parnell; Rick Hasen; Smith, Brad; law-election at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:law-election at department-lists.uci.edu>
Subject: Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris

Let me share some information as an exempt org person re tax rules and California nonprofit corporation rules.

I think it is important to point out that private foundations, which are section 501(c)(3) organizations (generally funded by an individual, family, or corporation and which usually are engaged in grant making), must  like 527 organizations, publicly disclose their Schedule B.  See IRC sec. 6104(d)(3). In general, the many special federal rules applicable to private foundations (which include an elaborate set of excise taxes going back to 1969) relate to fears that a foundation will be run for the private benefit of its founders rather than for public benefit.

The same concerns arise with so-called public charities and, in particular, with transactions for which the AG has enforcement authority.  As the Ninth Circuit opinion notes, the AG pointed in particular to overestimation of the value of "in kind" donations that would inflate the organization's revenue.  A relatively recent article by Roger Colinvaux details issues with issues in connection with donations of property (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2274825), which total nearly $46 billion a year. (Other provisions cited by the AG, on which the Ninth Circuit relies - CA Corp Code section 5233, 5236, 5227 - don't work as well for me on the facts of the case.  They all deal with directors and officer, who, admittedly, are often also donors, but apply only to nonprofit corporations organized in California - the so-called internal affairs doctrine - unlike other laws, such as the California Nonprofit Integrity Act (a watered down version of Sarbanes Oxley Act for charities, requiring audit committees and audits for many charities), which applies beyond California nonprofit corporations and thus is in the California Government Code, not the Corporations Code.)

I hope this information is useful.

   Ellen

-------
Ellen P. Aprill
John E. Anderson Professor of Tax Law
Loyola Law School
919 Albany Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015
213-736-1157<tel:213-736-1157>

On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 8:18 AM, Joe Birkenstock <birkenstock at sandlerreiff.com<mailto:birkenstock at sandlerreiff.com>> wrote:
Well Sean, I’m afraid I’m also not interested in exploring the outer boundaries of “political” right now either. It’s an important topic, but unrelated to the question I have about CCP v. Harris.

If a charitable donor is especially sensitive to disclosure, why not donate anonymously – not just privately, as in “let’s keep this between us,” but literally anonymously, as in the group itself doesn’t even know who gave the donation?

So far as I know, it’s a perfectly legal and recognized option, reflected on page 6 of the Schedule B instructions here: https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990ezb.pdf, and there’s a good writeup about the practice from several years ago here: http://go.bloomberg.com/political-capital/2012-07-26/anonymous-donations-can-remain-secret-despite-irs-requirement-to-disclose/. Point being: it’s not like this approach itself is a secret, so I think it’s fair to assume that well-advised donors know this option exists but choose not to use it.

OTOH, I freely admit that I don’t have the tax chops that many others on this list have, so it’s entirely possible I’m just missing something – hence my question. If I am just missing something, I’d love to know more about the considerations here. But if not this approach would seem to make a lot of sense for charitable donors concerned about disclosure even to the IRS, much less the CA AG or other state charitable oversight agencies.

___________________________________
Joseph M. Birkenstock
Sandler Reiff Lamb Rosenstein & Birkenstock, P.C.
1025 Vermont Avenue, NW, Suite 300
Washington, DC 20005
202.479.1111<tel:202.479.1111>
*also admitted to practice in CA

From: <law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu>> on behalf of Sean Parnell <sean at impactpolicymanagement.com<mailto:sean at impactpolicymanagement.com>>
Date: Monday, November 9, 2015 at 9:22 PM
To: Richard Hasen <rhasen at law.uci.edu<mailto:rhasen at law.uci.edu>>, "'Smith, Brad'" <BSmith at law.capital.edu<mailto:BSmith at law.capital.edu>>, "law-election at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:law-election at department-lists.uci.edu>" <law-election at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:law-election at department-lists.uci.edu>>
Subject: Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris

OK, anybody else who generally favors disclosure of c3 donors under certain circumstances want to step up to the plate on this? I’m still in the increasing marginal returns stage myself on this particular topic…

Sean

From: Rick Hasen [mailto:rhasen at law.uci.edu]
Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 8:52 PM
To: Sean Parnell; 'Smith, Brad'; law-election at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:law-election at department-lists.uci.edu>
Subject: Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris

Sean,
It is a great question but I'm afraid I've reached significantly diminishing marginal returns for continuing this discussion on the listserv.  At some point I might invest more time in the question. I do recall thinking about it a lot in relation to the McConnell disclosure provisions, which went even broader than electioneering communications.

Rick
On 11/9/15 5:37 PM, Sean Parnell wrote:
Then, if you don’t mind, what definition of political activity would you like to see applied? For example:

1.      Lobbying

2.      Any communication published by a c3 that references a candidate, such as “So Sen. McCain, who has gotten a great deal of positive press over the years with his crusade for campaign finance "reform" and repeatedly denounced the so-called "special interests" represented by lobbyists, must now explain how he can be friends with people who, as has so indelicately put it in the past, "corrupt" the government by representing their clients.”*

3.      Any communication published by a c3 that, while it does not directly reference a candidate by name, addresses policy positions that are closely identified with particular candidates (say, McCain-Feingold or the flat tax in 1996).

There are other possibilities as well of course, these are just a few that come to mind.

Sean Parnell
President, Impact Policy Management, LLC
571-289-1374<tel:571-289-1374> (c)
sean at impactpolicymanagement.com<mailto:sean at impactpolicymanagement.com>
Alexandria, Virginia

*This is from a piece I wrote on CCP’s blog back in 2008, here<http://www.campaignfreedom.org/2008/02/23/perhaps-an-update-to-im-just-a-bill-is-in-order/>. Judging by some of the past campaign finance regulations I’ve seen proposed in the past, it seems like the sort of thing that might be considered “political” by some.

From: Rick Hasen [mailto:rhasen at law.uci.edu]
Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 7:08 PM
To: Smith, Brad; Sean Parnell; law-election at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:law-election at department-lists.uci.edu>
Subject: Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris

I believe it depends upon what one considers to be political activity, which does not have to match either the IRS's stated definition or its actual enforcement practices
On 11/9/15 3:59 PM, Smith, Brad wrote:
C3 groups do not, by definition, engage in politics. And that is this case, CCP v. Harris.

Now if you wish to change the traditionally understood definition of politics to include a whole bunch more stuff (and note, for IRS –i.e. 990—purposes it is already much broader than it is for FEC/political reporting) then go at it. But that’s asking for a quite a change in the law.

In short, by supporting the state here, you have already announced your support for “public disclosure of the information of c3 groups that do not engage in political activities.”

Bradley A. Smith
Josiah H. Blackmore II/Shirley M. Nault
  Professor of Law
Capital University Law School
303 East Broad Street
Columbus, OH 43215
(614) 236-6317<tel:%28614%29%20236-6317>
bsmith at law.capital.edu<mailto:bsmith at law.capital.edu>
http://www.law.capital.edu/faculty/bios/bsmith.asp

From:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu> [mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] On Behalf Of Rick Hasen
Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 6:34 PM
To: Sean Parnell; law-election at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:law-election at department-lists.uci.edu>
Subject: Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris

I think whatever is disclosed to the IRS should be disclosable to the AGs for enforcement purposes, provided of course that they can keep the information private (an allegation which I understand has not yet been considered in the case).  I would not support public disclosure of the information of c3 groups that do not engage in political activities.
On 11/9/15 1:18 PM, Sean Parnell wrote:
I’m curious what you think, Rick (and any other “reformers”) about the policy as a stand-alone issue, i.e. not in regards to what a ruling one way or another might mean for the regulation of money in an explicit campaign context, but as a policy issue in and of itself should state AG’s be able to require the revelation of donors to c3 entities? And what would you think of a policy of mandated disclosure to the public of donors/members to c3 entities?

Sean Parnell
President, Impact Policy Management, LLC
571-289-1374<tel:571-289-1374> (c)
sean at impactpolicymanagement.com<mailto:sean at impactpolicymanagement.com>
Alexandria, Virginia

From:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu> [mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] On Behalf Of Rick Hasen
Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 4:07 PM
To: law-election at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:law-election at department-lists.uci.edu>
Subject: Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris

I'd also look at what the trial court did in Doe v. Reed and Protect Marriage, as described in my "Chill Out" piece.
On 11/9/2015 12:58 PM, Bill Maurer wrote:
Thanks, Richard, I’ve read that case numerous times. It seems to prove my point that the standard is actually applicable only after the harassment has already occurred.

I would also note that, in practice, the application of the case has been that only the Socialist Workers Party has been able to demonstrate harassment. They are a pristine example of something that is truly sui generis.

Bill

From: Richard Winger [mailto:richardwinger at yahoo.com]
Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 12:49 PM
To: Bill Maurer; Edward Still; Allen Dickerson
Cc: law-election at uci.edu<mailto:law-election at uci.edu>
Subject: Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris

read Brown v Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459 US 87.

Richard Winger 415-922-9779<tel:415-922-9779> PO Box 470296, San Francisco Ca 94147

________________________________
From: Bill Maurer <wmaurer at ij.org<mailto:wmaurer at ij.org>>
To: Edward Still <still at votelaw.com<mailto:still at votelaw.com>>; Allen Dickerson <adickerson at campaignfreedom.org<mailto:adickerson at campaignfreedom.org>>
Cc: "law-election at uci.edu<mailto:law-election at uci.edu>" <law-election at uci.edu<mailto:law-election at uci.edu>>
Sent: Monday, November 9, 2015 12:33 PM
Subject: Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris

Rick’s commented that “There is no constitutional impediment to [disclosure], except as to those groups which can demonstrate a realistic threat of harassment.”

I’ve never seen a discussion of what exactly a plaintiff would have to do to demonstrate a realistic threat of harassment. Wouldn’t evidence of a realistic threat be evidence of actual harassment (for instance, I don’t see those doing the harassing sending out a pre-harassment notice that they will be engaging in future harassment, although I suppose someone could do that)? And what about new groups with new issues? How are they supposed to demonstrate the realistic threat?

In other words, I don’t see the “harassment” standard as protecting much of anything going forward—it is entirely backward looking and, for that reason, utterly useless as a protection against harassment in the first instance.

That is exactly the point Brad made about the inadvertent disclosure analysis of the Ninth Circuit. The court essentially said, you can’t get protection from inadvertent disclosure until the information has been inadvertently disclosed. At which point, it doesn’t matter.

And what’s the standard for harassment? Is it violence or coercion, because I’ve heard a number of commentators (including Justice Scalia) suggest that anything short of that is the price of being involved in politics? Be we already have laws against violence or coercion. So, are laws against assault supposed to be the things that demark the outer edge of how far the government can go in collecting information about those who decide to exercise their fundamental rights?

Isn’t the real standard that anyone who participates in political activity in this country should be aware that by doing so they are opening themselves up to governmental scrutiny in perpetuity with no realistic protection against misuse of the information the government has collected?

Of course, a legitimate response to this is “We don’t care if people are harassed or their information misused.” But, why not say that?

Bill

From:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu> [mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] On Behalf Of Edward Still
Sent: Monday, November 09, 2015 9:04 AM
To: Allen Dickerson
Cc: law-election at uci.edu<mailto:law-election at uci.edu>
Subject: Re: [EL] CCP v. Harris

The Questions Presented were:
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether a state official’s demand for all significant donors to a nonprofit organization, as a precondition to engaging in constitutionally-protected speech, constitutes a First Amendment injury.
2. Whether the “exacting scrutiny” standard applied in compelled disclosure cases permits state officials to demand donor information based upon generalized “law enforcement” interests, without making any specific showing of need.
The cert petition is at http://electionlawblog.org/?p=74940.

Edward Still
Edward Still Law Firm LLC
429 Green Springs Hwy, STE 161-304
Birmingham AL 35209
205-320-2882<tel:205-320-2882>
still at votelaw.com<mailto:still at votelaw.com>
www.votelaw.com/blog<http://www.votelaw.com/blog>
www.edwardstill.com<http://www.edwardstill.com>
www.linkedin.com/in/edwardstill<http://www.linkedin.com/in/edwardstill>

On Mon, Nov 9, 2015 at 10:48 AM, Allen Dickerson <adickerson at campaignfreedom.org<mailto:adickerson at campaignfreedom.org>> wrote:
The point was to protect CCP's donors from scrutiny and potential leaks, inadvertent or otherwise, by a state AG who believed she was entitled to their identities without making any showing of need whatsoever. The case did not address the public informational interest behind campaign finance disclosure, which we couldn't do in any case because that wasn't the state's stated interest. Campaign finance simply wasn't involved.

(Steve: the stated governmental interest was greater efficiency in exercising the AG's law enforcement duties).

On Nov 9, 2015, at 11:34 AM, Rick Hasen <rhasen at law.uci.edu<mailto:rhasen at law.uci.edu>> wrote:
I think this case had the potential to undermine campaign disclosure rules if successful, and I think that was the point.
And yes, I absolutely would have written the same comment if it were the Brennan Center or the ACLU suing the Texas AG.
Rick
On 11/9/2015 8:08 AM, Allen Dickerson wrote:
Rick,

Your post seriously misinterprets CCP v. Harris, a case that has nothing to do with political activity or campaign finance. California's registration policy applies only to 501(c)(3) organizations. And CCP, like all 501(c)(3) groups, is prohibited from engaging in political activity. The informational interest undergirding campaign finance disclosure simply isn't implicated here.

A thought experiment: would you have written the same comment if the Brennan Center or ACLU had sued the Texas AG on the same claim?

I recognize the ever-present danger of seeing campaign finance issues everywhere when that's one's area of expertise. But our case is a very poor fit for your political disclosure narrative.

Best,
Allen

On Nov 9, 2015, at 10:48 AM, Rick Hasen <rhasen at law.uci.edu<mailto:rhasen at law.uci.edu>> wrote:
“Democracy for GrownUps”<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77408>
Posted on November 9, 2015 7:46 am<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77408> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
I have written this review<http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/democracy-for-grownups> of Bruce Cain’s Democracy More or Less<http://www.amazon.com/Democracy-More-Less-Political-Cambridge/dp/1107612268> for the New Rambler Review.<http://newramblerreview.com/>  It begins:
Modern American democracy is often messy, increasingly polarized, sometimes stupefying, and surprisingly decentralized. Our Congress functions (or doesn’t) mainly along party lines under rules set in a Constitution more than 200 years old which does not recognize political parties, and indeed was designed to stifle their emergence. Divided government in times of polarized parties has undermined accountability as each side can blame the other for policy failures, and we lurch from one potential government shutdown to another thanks in part to polarization and in part to internal fighting within the Republican Party. Much power devolves to the state and local level, where we often see one-party rule rather than the partisan stalemate of Congress.
State one-partyism extends even to the rules for conducting elections, where a majority of states use partisan election officials to set the rules of the game and to carry out our elections, and where state legislatures draw their own legislative districts only mildly constrained by Supreme Court one-person, one-vote requirements. Our campaign finance system is careening toward deregulation, with a series of Supreme Court decisions and partially enforceable congressional measures leading to the creation of political organizations, some of which can shield their donors’ identities, allowing the wealthiest of Americans to translate their vast economic power into political power. Money spent to influence elections is complemented by money spent to influence public policy through lobbying, creating a system in which those with great wealth and organizational ability have a much better chance of having their preferences enacted in law and having their preferred candidates elected, than average Americans have.
It is no wonder that the reform impulse in American politics is strong. States with the initiative process have experimented with top-two primaries in which the top two vote getters, regardless of party, go to a runoff, and redistricting reform featuring either citizen commissions or substantive limits on legislative self-dealing. The National Popular Vote movement seeks an end run around the antiquated rules of the Electoral College, which violate modern accepted principles of one-person, one-vote by giving small states outsized power relative to their populations.
Reformers push a constitutional amendment to overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United and other cases which hamstring the government’s ability to control money in politics. Good government groups regularly clamor for redistricting reform (often joined by the political party on the losing side of redistricting in each state), expansion of voting rights for former felons and others, and the end of corruption and patronage. Some even call for constitutional conventions with citizen participants chosen by lottery.
But as Bruce Cain argues in his terrific new book, the never-ending efforts at reform present tradeoffs, and attempts to achieve either pure majoritarianism or government meritocracy can have unintended and unwanted consequences. Further, many reform efforts are oversold as a cure for all that ails American democracy. Cain argues for a Goldilocks-like pluralist reform agenda which recognizes that busy citizens lack interest in governing and capacity to make complex decisions. Instead, politics is conducted through intermediaries across the range of local, state, and national governing arenas. Pluralism “prioritizes aggregation, consensus, and fluid coalitions as a means of good democratic governance.” (p. 11)
<share_save_171_16.png><https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D77408&title=%26%238220%3BDemocracy%20for%20GrownUps%26%238221%3B&description=>
Posted in theory<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=41>
ELB Podcast Episode 6. Nate Persily: Can the Supreme Court Handle Social Science In Election Cases?<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77303>
Posted on November 9, 2015 7:42 am<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77303> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
Can the Supreme Court handle social science evidence in election law cases? Will lack of good data determine the outcome of the Supreme Court’s upcoming one person, one vote decision in Evenwel v. Abbott? What role will and should evidence play in assessing questions such as the constitutionality of McCain-Feingold’s soft money ban or Texas’s strict voter identification law.
On Episode 6 of the ELB Podcast, we talk to law professor and political scientist Nate Persily<http://persily.com/> of Stanford Law School, one of the country’s leading redistricting and election law experts.
You can listen to the ELB Podcast Episode 6 on Soundcloud<https://soundcloud.com/rick-hasen/elb-podcast-episode-6-nate> or subscribe at iTunes<https://geo.itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/elb-podcast/id1029317166?mt=2>.

<share_save_171_16.png><https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D77303&title=ELB%20Podcast%20Episode%206.%20Nate%20Persily%3A%20Can%20the%20Supreme%20Court%20Handle%20Social%20Science%20In%20Election%20Cases%3F&description=>
Posted in ELB Podcast<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=116>, Supreme Court<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=29>
“Democratic Group Called iVote Pushes Automatic Voter Registration”<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77406>
Posted on November 9, 2015 7:38 am<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77406> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
NYT:<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/10/us/politics/democratic-group-called-ivote-pushes-automatic-voter-registration.html?ref=politics&_r=0>
As Republicans across the country mount an aggressive effort to tighten voting laws, a group of former aides to President Obama and President Bill Clinton is pledging to counter by spending up to $10 million on a push to make voter registration automatic whenever someone gets a driver’s license.
The change would supercharge the 1993 National Voter Registration Act<http://www.justice.gov/crt/about-national-voter-registration-act>, known as the “motor voter” law, which requires states to offer people the option of registering to vote when they apply for driver’s licenses or other identification cards. The new laws would make registration automatic during those transactions unless a driver objected.
The group, called iVote — which is led by Jeremy Bird<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/30/us/politics/obama-campaign-confronts-voter-id-laws.html>, who ran Mr. Obama’s voter turnout effort in 2012 — is betting that such laws could bring out millions of new voters who have, for whatever reason, failed to register even when they had the opportunity at motor vehicle departments….
Kris W. Kobach, the secretary of state in Kansas and a Republican, who has been a leading advocate of stricter voting laws, said he opposed automatic registration because people who chose not to register were clearly not interested in voting.
“The assumption that by making what is already easy automatic that will somehow bring people to the polls is just erroneous,” Mr. Kobach said. “I just think it’s a bad idea. It’s not going to increase participation rates.”
Mr. Kobach has pushed for some of the nation’s most restrictive voting laws, including one that requires proof of citizenship. He said automatic registration would make that kind of check impossible.
“You’re going to end up with aliens on the voter rolls,” Mr. Kobach said. “It’s inevitable that an automatic registration system would result in many of them getting on.”
<share_save_171_16.png><https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D77406&title=%26%238220%3BDemocratic%20Group%20Called%20iVote%20Pushes%20Automatic%20Voter%20Registration%26%238221%3B&description=>
Posted in election administration<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=18>, The Voting Wars<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=60>, voter registration<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=37>
“Inside the abandoned plans of Ted Cruz’s super PACs”<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77404>
Posted on November 9, 2015 7:32 am<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77404> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
Teddy Schleifer<http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/08/politics/ted-cruz-super-pac-abandoned-plans/index.html> for CNN:
The super PACs are staffed in part by a few individuals with no formal political experience, including Neugebauer, who has been the groups’ main fundraiser and formerly its chief executive officer — in addition to one of its lead donors. The groups have only recently begun hiring their first political professionals, including a new professional fundraiser: Campbell Smith, a finance official at the National Rifle Association, the super PACs confirmed to CNN.
The ditched buy is at the heart of the dispute between the campaign and the super PAC — a dispute that spilled out into the public this week, with several campaign advisers telling Politico<http://www.politico.com/story/2015/11/ted-cruz-silent-super-pacs-2016-215422> that they want to see Keep the Promise purchase advertising time immediately. Campaigns and super PACs frequently read one another’s messages in the press with a fine-toothed comb to learn thinking that they cannot legally directly share with one another.
It’s a reflection of the divided campaign finance world, where super PACs are allowed to raise unlimited amounts of cash (donations must still be reported to the Federal Election Commission), but the catch is that campaign and super PAC officials aren’t allowed to coordinate. Neugebauer’s pitch at The Broadmoor came without Cruz staffers in the room, for instance, a donor said.
And amid increasing questions about the super PAC, campaign officials are coming to the defense of Neugebauer, who left his role at the super PAC in a shake-up, and are praising his ability to incentivize two more eight-digit donations with a $10 million check of his own.
<share_save_171_16.png><https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D77404&title=%26%238220%3BInside%20the%20abandoned%20plans%20of%20Ted%20Cruz%26%238217%3Bs%20super%20PACs%26%238221%3B&description=>
Posted in campaign finance<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>, campaigns<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=59>
“The battle over campaign finance reform is changing. Here’s how.”<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77402>
Posted on November 9, 2015 7:31 am<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77402> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
WaPo talks<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/11/07/the-battle-over-campaign-finance-reform-is-changing-heres-how/> with Josh Silver of represent.us<http://represent.us/>.
<share_save_171_16.png><https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D77402&title=%26%238220%3BThe%20battle%20over%20campaign%20finance%20reform%20is%20changing.%20Here%E2%80%99s%20how.%26%238221%3B&description=>
Posted in campaign finance<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>
Bauer on Justice Kennedy on Citizens United at Harvard<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77400>
Posted on November 9, 2015 7:23 am<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=77400> by
...

[Message clipped]

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://webshare.law.ucla.edu/Listservs/law-election/attachments/20160326/6a463343/attachment.html>