[EL] Information as a thing of value

Fri Jul 14 06:29:49 PDT 2017

But context does matter.  There is no suggestion in this case that the  
court analyzed the question under the First Amendment.  Obviously, the  
information Trump, Jr. hoped to receive, but did not, was directly related to a  
political campaign and thus protected by the First Amendment. Thus, this case 
is  irrelevant.

I really think that the proponents of this theory - that information is a  
thing of value for purposes of being a "contribution" under the federal 
campaign  law - should pause and consider the ramifications of this position, 
beyond their  hope that it will finally "get Trump." There are significant 
ramification to  viewing a campaign as having received a contribution if it 
receives information. 

Of course there are prohibitions, corporations and labor unions may not  
make contributions to federal candidates, for instance.  If the information  
is viewed as coming from that source, it is prohibited and a crime.

But even if not prohibited, if Joe Blow tells a campaign some information  
that someone would view as having value, say his opponent - say, "hey Jill 
Smith  likes you and you ought to contact her for a contribution" - it would 
be subject  to contribution limits and reporting. Failure to do that would 
also be a crime.  (And how much is this worth, another great issue for the 
opponent to  dispute.)

Thus, a candidate receiving a contribution always has some legal  
ramifications.

Under these circumstances, I just dont see how any campaign would ever be  
willing to discuss anything about the campaign with anyone. This would have 
a  devastating effect of the freedom of association protected by the First  
Amendment. Jim Bopp

In a message dated 7/14/2017 12:12:03 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,  
rhasen at law.uci.edu writes:

_9th Circuit 1980 Case:  “Information,” “State Secrets,” “Information 
Obtained for Political Advantage”  All “Things of Value”_ 
(http://electionlawblog.org/?p=93830)  
Posted on _July 13, 2017 12:44  pm_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?p=93830)  
by _Rick  Hasen_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3)  
_This  case_ 
(http://www.leagle.com/decision/19801225618F2d607_11114/UNITED%20STATES%20v.%20SHEKER)  presents a very different context than _Donald  
Trump, Jr._ 
(http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/07/donald_trump_jr_s_free_speech_defense_is_as_bogus_as_it_sounds.html) , 
but the discussion is instructive: 
II. Sufficiency of  the Indictment 
The indictment adequately  charged Sheker with impersonating a federal 
officer to obtain a thing of  value, within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 912._2_ 
(http://www.leagle.com/decision/19801225618F2d607_11114/UNITED%20STATES%20v.%2
0SHEKER#fid3)  See U. S. v.  Mitman, _459 F.2d 451_ 
(http://www.leagle.com/cite/459%20F.2d%20451)  (9th  Cir.), cert. den. 409 U.S. 863, 93 S.Ct. 154, 
34 L.Ed.2d 111 (1972).  We do not embrace the government’s sweeping position 
that 18 U.S.C. 912  extends to anything that has value to the defendant. 
Such a broad reading of  “value” negates any limitation the word could imply. 
By the same token, we  cannot accept Sheker’s suggestion that 18 U.S.C. 912 
covers only things having  commercial value.Information can be a thing of 
value. Whaley v. U.  S., _324 F.2d 356_ 
(http://www.leagle.com/cite/324%20F.2d%20356)  (9th  Cir. 1963). In normal English usage commercial worth is not 
the exclusive  measure of value. For instance, state secrets might trade 
hands without cash  consideration. Information obtained for political advantage 
might have value  apart from its worth in dollars. In each case the 
information sought would  have value to others,in addition to the seeker. Such is 
the case here.  Stokes would see value in keeping his whereabouts unknown to 
Sheker. The  criminal justice system, concerned with the safety of 
witnesses, has a similar  interest. Because the information sought had value in these 
broader senses, we  hold the indictment sufficient. 
In view of this  conclusion, we also hold that the challenged language in 
the indictment  (“concerning the location of a witness against him”) was not 
prejudicial  surplusage. The quoted words were properly included to explain 
why the  information sought was valuable. See generally, U. S. v. Root, 
_366 F.2d 377_ (http://www.leagle.com/cite/366%20F.2d%20377) , 381 (9th  Cir.), 
cert. den. 386 U.S. 912, 87 S.Ct. 861, 17 L.Ed.2d 784  (1966). 
The language of the  statute is not sufficiently ambiguous to call into 
play the rule of lenity. As  the Supreme Court said in Bell v. U. S., _349 U.S. 
81_ (http://www.leagle.com/cite/349%20U.S.%2081) , 83, 75  S.Ct. 620, 622, 
99 L.Ed. 905 (1955): 
[L]anguage used in  criminal statutes should not be read with the saving 
grace of common sense  with which other enactments, not cast in technical 
language, are to be  read. 
We find the statute  unambiguous. 

(https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http://electionlawblog.org/?p=93830&title=9th%20Circuit%201980%20Case:%20“Information,”%20“State%20Secrets,”%20“
Information%20Obtained%20for%20Political%20Advantage”%20All%20“Th)  
Posted in _Uncategorized_ (http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=1) 
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