[EL] NC redistricting
Justin Levitt
levittj at lls.edu
Sat May 6 14:58:57 PDT 2017
FWIW, as Rick P. mentions in his "issue 1B," one of North Carolina's
defenses is that it drew congressional district 1 at 50% in order to
comply with the VRA, even though actual data on the ground showed no
need to increase the district's African-American voting population in
order to give the minority community an equal opportunity to elect
candidates of choice. In a piece confronting several states' approach
to VRA "compliance" this cycle, I argued that this particular defense
amounts to a misreading of the Court's precedent, indulging racial
essentialism that the statute is designed to avoid. It's at p. 589-91
and 597-98 here
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2487426>.
Justin
--
Justin Levitt
Professor of Law
Loyola Law School | Los Angeles
919 Albany St.
Los Angeles, CA 90015
213-736-7417
ssrn.com/author=698321
@_justinlevitt_
On 5/6/2017 6:06 AM, Rick Hasen wrote:
> *What To Look for When the Supreme Court Decides the North Carolina
> Redistricting Case <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=92393>*
>
> Posted on May 5, 2017 11:57 am
> <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=92393> by *Richard Pildes*
> <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=7>
>
> The Court has already decided one major racial redistricting case this
> Term, /Bethune-Hill, /from Virginia. The other major racial
> redistricting case, /Cooper v. Harris/, from North Carolina, is now
> one of three cases outstanding the longest since argument. /Cooper
> /involves two congressional districts, CD 1 and CD 12 (by now, CD 12
> must have been litigated before the Supreme Court more times than any
> congressional district in history). I want to untangle the various
> issues at stake and provide perspective on which legal issues are the
> key ones to focus on when this opinion finally comes down.
>
> To begin, the issues concerning CD 1 and CD 12 are quite different –
> and the ones involving CD 1 have the broadest legal significance (that
> makes it a bit unfortunate that most of the oral argument focused on
> CD 12).
>
> For CD 1, the issues center on the legitimate role of race in the
> districting process, in a state where significant levels of white
> cross-over voting exist for candidates black voters also prefer. In
> CD 1, the North Carolina legislature increased the black voting-age
> population (BVAP) from 47.76% to 52.65%, even though at that lower
> population level the district had regularly performed as a successful
> Voting Rights Act (VRA) district – it had consistently elected the
> candidate of choice of black voters. But the State argues that to
> safely comply with the VRA, it sought to create a /majority/-black
> district. The plaintiffs argue that the VRA doesn’t require turning
> districts that are already working as VRA districts into
> majority-minority districts, and that NC therefore acted
> unconstitutionally by using race to an excessive and unjustified extent.
>
> At stake here is whether the VRA requires creating majority-minority
> districts, even when districts with interracial coalitions are
> effectively electing candidates of choice of minority voters without
> minority voters needing to constitute a majority.
>
> 1. For CD 1 the critical legal issues lie at the intersection of the
> VRA and the Constitution regarding the permissible role of race in
> the design of districts:
> 1. The first significant issue is whether “race predominated” in
> drawing CD 1 and – just as importantly – if so why. More
> colloquially, the question is whether CD 1 is a racial
> gerrymander (racial gerrymanders can be constitutional, but
> the districts must survive strict scrutiny). The lower court
> called CD a “textbook example of” a racial gerrymander. But
> it provided two different kinds of reasons for that
> conclusion; the way the Court responds to these two different
> approaches is critical.
>
> (1) Much of the lower court opinion concludes race predominated
> because the state set a specific racial target or floor on the BVAP
> the district had to have, which the redistricters said they did
> because that’s what the VRA requires. The lower court quoted the
> redistricters for making clear that the VRA required that CD have a
> BVAP “of at least 50 percent plus one person.” In passages like the
> following, the court suggested that it was the application of this
> racial floor, in itself, that required the conclusion that race had
> predominated: “Because traditional districting criteria were
> considered, if at all, solely insofar as they did not interfere with
> this 50-percent-plus-one person minimum floor, the quota operated as a
> filter through which all line-drawing decisions had to pass.”
>
> Passages like this suggest it is /sufficient /for a court to conclude
> that a racial gerrymander has occurred if the redistricters apply a
> specific racial floor that a district must be above.
>
> (2) But despite having said that, the court went on to provide a
> second type of reason to support concluding that race predominated in
> CD 1. The court found that the redistricters also split counties and
> precincts when needed to meet this 50% BVAP target. In legal terms,
> this means they subordinated traditional districting principles to the
> goal of meeting this target.
>
> The significant issue is whether in deciding whether race predominates
> the first type of reason is indeed sufficient or whether redistricters
> must, in addition, subordinate traditional districting principles by
> doing things like splitting counties and precincts. The Supreme Court
> already engaged these issues to an extent in /Bethune-Hill/, as I’ve
> discussed <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=91415>, where the Court
> announced “[r]ace may predominate even when a reapportionment plan
> respects traditional principles.” But everything the Court says about
> these questions is important and any additional clarification the
> Court offers regarding when race predominates in the legal sense will
> be meaningful.
>
> B. If CD 1 is a racial gerrymander and strict scrutiny applies, does
> the Court accept NC’s defense that increasing the BVAP to over the 50%
> level is an appropriate way to comply with the VRA here? In rejecting
> that defense, the lower court expressed its view in strong terms:
>
> /The suggestion that the VRA would somehow**require racial
> balkanization where, as here, citizens have not voted as racial blocs,
> where crossover voting has naturally occurred, and where a
> majority-minority district is created in blatant disregard for
> fundamental redistricting principles is absurd and stands the VRA on
> its head./
>
> How will the Court address NC’s defense?
>
> 2. For CD 12, the issues are more narrowly fact-bound ones about
> whether politics or race was the predominant reason for the
> district’s design. As with CD 1, the BVAP was much higher after
> the redistricting than before and was similarly increased to over
> the 50% line: it went from 43.7% to 50.66%. But for this
> district, the state’s defense is very different. The state does
> not assert that it did this because of the VRA and the state
> denies setting any racial target for the district. Pure partisan
> politics, the State argues, caused the district to be designed as
> it was; this increase in the BVAP was simply the fallout from a
> partisan gerrymander.
>
> If the Court concludes that CD 12 was a racial gerrymander, there is
> no doubt the district will be found unconstitutional. The state has
> offered no defense to the claim of racial gerrymandering for CD 12
> (unlike CD 1) because the defense here is that no racial gerrymander
> took place, period.
>
> The issue of untangling racial from political purposes is a recurring
> one in these cases, and the way the Court untangles those threads here
> will provide some guidance to lower courts. But because the disputes
> are largely factual ones, the legal issues at stake are not generally
> as broadly significant as those concerning CD 1.
>
> There is, though, one element the Court is likely to address that will
> affect many cases. The Court spent much time at oral argument over a
> passage (really, a sentence) authored by Justice Breyer in an earlier
> North Carolina redistricting opinion, /Easley v. Cromartie, /that has
> caused a good deal of uncertainty and confusion in the lower courts.
> Given how much attention the Court spent at argument on this passage,
> the Court is likely to try to clarify the meaning of this language
> from this earlier NC case.
>
> 3. There is also a complex procedural dimension to this case, which
> undoubtedly contributes to why the case has been pending so long.
> As is not uncommon in redistricting cases, we have two parallel
> sets of litigation here: both the North Carolina Supreme Court
> and the federal courts have addressed the same factual and legal
> issues. And the state and federal courts came to different
> conclusions, factually and legally, about both CD 1 and CD 12.
>
> The case before the Supreme Court arises out of the federal
> litigation. But the Court has to confront the issue of how to handle
> situations where we have competing state and federal court findings of
> fact involving the same federal legal claims. Normally, the Court
> would apply the clear-error standard of review to the findings of the
> trial court whose decision the Court is reviewing – here, the federal
> court. But should the clear-error standard be applied differently
> when there is an additional set of findings of fact (here, contrary
> ones) in a separate state court proceeding? These are interesting
> procedural issues in federal-courts law, but they do not directly
> involve the substantive questions about the legitimate role of race in
> the districting process and the relationship between the VRA and the
> Equal Protection clause of the Constitution.
>
> Short summary: even though the oral argument almost entirely neglected
> CD 1, that’s where I’ll be focused first when this case comes down.
> Posted in redistricting <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=6>, Supreme
> Court <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=29>, Voting Rights Act
> <http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=15>
>
>
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