[EL] Quick question about the Honest Ads Act

Mon Oct 23 12:54:45 PDT 2017

I don’t have time to dig it all up now, but there’s a part of CJ Rehnquist’s opinion in McConnell which is on point, and I recall that Marty Lederman wrote a lot about this issue at the time.  There are of course also the lobbying precedents, including Harriss.

From: "Foley, Edward" <foley.33 at osu.edu>
Date: Monday, October 23, 2017 at 12:52 PM
To: Rick Hasen <rhasen at law.uci.edu>, Adav Noti <anoti at campaignlegalcenter.org>, Nate Persily <npersily at law.stanford.edu>, Election Law Listserv <law-election at uci.edu>
Subject: RE: [EL] Quick question about the Honest Ads Act

Another question about this bill: insofar as it would require disclosures in connection with paid online messages concerning “a national legislative issue of public importance” or indeed “any political matter of national importance” – and not just express candidate advocacy, electioneering communications, or other election-specific messaging – what are the most directly relevant precedents on whether compelled disclosure relating to such issue advocacy is constitutional?  I can think of McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, but I confess I haven’t kept up with this particular aspect of disclosure law, and the point arose in class today.  I assume Doe v. Reed is less directly relevant, since it involved election-specific activity: signing a petition to put a referendum on the ballot.  Is there any other key precedent on this point of which my students and I should be aware?

And just to get a fix on what the potential scope of this proposed legislation might be, am I correct that it would require the disclosure of anyone who spends $500 in online messages to support (for example) sanctuary cities in their defiance of ICE efforts to detain and deport undocumented aliens?  (Like Nate with his question, I’m not trying to debate the merits; I’m just trying to get a handle on what seems potentially a significant issue.)

Thanks much, Ned

[he Ohio State University]
Edward B. Foley
Director, Election Law @ Moritz
Charles W. Ebersold and Florence Whitcomb Ebersold Chair in Constitutional Law
Moritz College of Law
614-292-4288

From: Law-election [mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] On Behalf Of Rick Hasen
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2017 11:42 AM
To: Adav Noti; Nate Persily; Election Law Listserv
Subject: Re: [EL] Quick question about the Honest Ads Act

Thanks to Adav, here’s the link for the bill:

Text of (House Version of) Honest Ads Act Now Available<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=95561>
Posted on October 20, 2017 8:40 am<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=95561> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
Find it here.<https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr4077/BILLS-115hr4077ih.pdf>

[are]<https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D95561&title=Text%20of%20(House%20Version%20of)%20Honest%20Ads%20Act%20Now%20Available>
Posted in campaign finance<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=10>

From: Adav Noti <anoti at campaignlegalcenter.org<mailto:anoti at campaignlegalcenter.org>>
Date: Friday, October 20, 2017 at 8:20 AM
To: Nate Persily <npersily at law.stanford.edu<mailto:npersily at law.stanford.edu>>, Election Law Listserv <law-election at uci.edu<mailto:law-election at uci.edu>>, Rick Hasen <rhasen at law.uci.edu<mailto:rhasen at law.uci.edu>>
Subject: RE: [EL] Quick question about the Honest Ads Act

I don’t think the bill makes platforms liable for disclaimer violations.  I believe the only penalty provision that applies to online platforms is at page 20, lines 18-22, which covers violations of “this subsection,” i.e., the political file requirements established by new section 30104(j).  That penalty provision doesn’t cover violations of the disclaimer requirements in section 30120.

Adav Noti
Senior Director, Trial Litigation and Strategy
Campaign Legal Center
1411 K St. NW, Washington, DC 20005
202.736.2203 | @AdavNoti<https://twitter.com/AdavNoti>
anoti at campaignlegalcenter.org<mailto:anoti at campaignlegalcenter.org>

[cid:image003.png at 01D34BFE.1974AE90]

From: Law-election [mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] On Behalf Of Nate Persily
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2017 10:50 AM
To: Election Law Listserv <law-election at uci.edu<mailto:law-election at uci.edu>>; Rick Hasen <rhasen at law.uci.edu<mailto:rhasen at law.uci.edu>>
Subject: [EL] Quick question about the Honest Ads Act

Yesterday Senators Warner and Klobuchar introduced the Honest Ads Act which attempts to provide a disclosure regime for on line ads akin to what is required on television.  One of the bill’s provisions makes on-line platforms liable for ads on their websites that do not contain the appropriate disclaimers.  Can anyone on the list provide me with examples of cases in which broadcasters or radio stations were held liable for ads that did not comply with applicable campaign finance law?  (This is just a factual/empirical question.  I am not trying to start a debate about the bill. There will be plenty of time for that.)

On Wed, Oct 18, 2017 at 7:41 PM Rick Hasen <rhasen at law.uci.edu<mailto:rhasen at law.uci.edu>> wrote:
Today’s Must-Read: “In North Carolina, Republicans Stung by Court Rulings Aim to Change the Judges”<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=95534>
Posted on October 18, 2017 7:37 pm<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=95534> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
Trip Gabriel <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/us/north-carolina-republicans-gerrymander-judges-.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fus&action=click&contentCollection=us&region=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=sectionfront&_r=0> for the NYT:
 Republicans with a firm grip on the North Carolina legislature — and, until January, the governor’s seat — enacted a conservative agenda in recent years, only to have a steady stream of laws affecting voting and legislative power rejected by the courts.
Now lawmakers have seized on a solution: change the makeup of the courts.
Judges in state courts as of this year must identify their party affiliation on ballots, making North Carolina the first state in nearly a century to adopt partisan court elections. The General Assembly in Raleigh reduced the size of the state Court of Appeals, depriving Gov. Roy Cooper, a Democrat, of naming replacements for retiring Republicans.
And this month, lawmakers drew new boundaries for judicial districts statewide, which critics say are meant to increase the number of Republican judges on district and superior courts and would force many African-Americans on the bench into runoffs against other incumbents.
[re]<https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D95534&title=Today%E2%80%99s%20Must-Read%3A%20%E2%80%9CIn%20North%20Carolina%2C%20Republicans%20Stung%20by%20Court%20Rulings%20Aim%20to%20Change%20the%20Judges%E2%80%9D>
Posted in judicial elections<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=19>, The Voting Wars<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=60>

“Justice Department Has Communicated With Controversial Election Commission, Sessions Confirms”<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=95532>
Posted on October 18, 2017 7:33 pm<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=95532> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
Pema Levy for Mother Jones<http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/10/justice-department-has-communicated-with-controversial-election-commission-sessions-confirms/>.
[re]<https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D95532&title=%E2%80%9CJustice%20Department%20Has%20Communicated%20With%20Controversial%20Election%20Commission%2C%20Sessions%20Confirms%E2%80%9D>
Posted in fraudulent fraud squad<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=8>

“Jocelyn Benson Enters Michigan Secretary of State Race”<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=95530>
Posted on October 18, 2017 7:31 pm<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=95530> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
AP:<http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2017/Election-law-expert-Jocelyn-Benson-is-running-again-to-be-Michigan-s-next-secretary-of-state/id-c99ae62465b844a2b29c6be8e5c032b1>
Election law expert Jocelyn Benson announced Tuesday that she is running for Michigan secretary of state, saying no one should have to wait more than 30 minutes to renew a driver’s license, register a vehicle or vote.
It is the second time the Democrat has sought the position. She was the party’s 2010 nominee but lost to Republican Ruth Johnson, who cannot run for a third term in 2018.
Benson, of Detroit, said the half-hour guarantee should apply to residents “no matter where you are in the state,” saying she waited two hours to vote in the August 2016 primary election. She launched her campaign outside a secretary of state branch in Detroit and at stops in Grand Rapids and Lansing.
[re]<https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D95530&title=%E2%80%9CJocelyn%20Benson%20Enters%20Michigan%20Secretary%20of%20State%20Race%E2%80%9D>
Posted in election law biz<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=51>

“Dem Senators Request GAO Probe Of Trump’s Bogus Voter Fraud Commission”<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=95528>
Posted on October 18, 2017 7:26 pm<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=95528> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
TPM reports.<http://talkingpointsmemo.com/muckraker/democratic-senators-gao-trump-voter-fraud-commission>

[re]<https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D95528&title=%E2%80%9CDem%20Senators%20Request%20GAO%20Probe%20Of%20Trump%E2%80%99s%20Bogus%20Voter%20Fraud%20Commission%E2%80%9D>
Posted in fraudulent fraud squad<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=8>, The Voting Wars<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=60>

“Trump Campaign Staffers Pushed Russian Propaganda Days Before the Election”<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=95525>
Posted on October 18, 2017 7:22 pm<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=95525> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
Daily Beast: <https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-campaign-staffers-pushed-russian-propaganda-days-before-the-election>
Some of the Trump campaign’s most prominent names and supporters, including Trump’s campaign manager, digital director and son, pushed tweets from professional trolls paid by the Russian government in the heat of the 2016 election campaign.
The Twitter account @Ten_GOP, which called itself the “Unofficial Twitter account of Tennessee Republicans,” was operated from the Kremlin-backed “Russian troll farm,” or Internet Research Agency, a source familiar with the account confirmed with The Daily Beast.
The account’s origins in the Internet Research Agency were originally reported by the independent Russian news outlet RBC<http://www.rbc.ru/technology_and_media/17/10/2017/59e4eb7a9a79472577375776>. @Ten_GOP was created on November 19, 2015, and accumulated over 100 thousand followers before Twitter shut it down. The Daily Beast independently confirmed the reasons for @Ten_GOP’s account termination.
The discovery of the now-unavailable tweets presents the first evidence that several members of the Trump campaign pushed covert Russian propaganda on social media in the run-up to the 2016 election….
President Trump’s son Donald Trump Jr. followed the account until its closure on August 23rd of this year<https://twitter.com/TrumpsAlert/status/900575918359420928>. Trump Jr. retweeted the account three times, including an allegation of voter fraud in Florida one week before the election.
“BREAKING: #VoterFraud by counting tens of thousands of ineligible mail in Hillary votes being reported in Broward County, Florida Please, RT,” the tweet read.
[re]<https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D95525&title=%E2%80%9CTrump%20Campaign%20Staffers%20Pushed%20Russian%20Propaganda%20Days%20Before%20the%20Election%E2%80%9D>
Posted in campaigns<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=59>, chicanery<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=12>

Eric Holder: “Voting Rights: The Struggle of Our Lifetime”<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=95523>
Posted on October 18, 2017 7:19 pm<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=95523> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
Holder has this post <https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/voting-rights-the-struggle-of-our-lifetime/> at the new Harvard Law Review blog.
[re]<https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D95523&title=Eric%20Holder%3A%20%E2%80%9CVoting%20Rights%3A%20The%20Struggle%20of%20Our%20Lifetime%E2%80%9D>
Posted in The Voting Wars<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=60>

Fowler: “The Negative Effect Fallacy, Gobbledygook, and the Use of Quantitative Evidence in the Supreme Court”<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=95521>
Posted on October 18, 2017 7:12 pm<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=95521> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
The following is a guest post from Anthony Fowler:<https://harris.uchicago.edu/directory/anthony-fowler>
The Negative Effect Fallacy, Gobbledygook, and the Use of Quantitative Evidence in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has a mixed track record when it comes to quantitative evidence, and that record was further blemished earlier this month, during oral arguments for Gill v. Whitford<https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/16-1161_n6io.pdf>, when Chief Justice John Roberts dismissed a quantitative metric as “sociological gobbledygook” without providing further explanation. This kind of convenient but vacuous argument is, unfortunately, a regular tactic for some of the justices. In a recent article in the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jels.12158/full>, Ryan Enos, Christopher Havasy, and I analyze another argument commonly used by the Court to justify the dismissal of quantitative evidence, and we call it the negative effect fallacy.
ourts often hear cases in which the answers to difficult empirical questions are relevant for decisions. Within the context of election law, consider Arizona Free Enterprise v. Bennett. A key question was whether the matching funds provision in Arizona’s campaign finance law chilled private political speech. The plaintiffs argued that it did; in other words, they felt that matching funds have a negative effect on private political contributions. Ryan Enos, Conor Dowling, Costas Panagopoulos, and I sought to quantitatively assess whether this claim was true, and we found no evidence to support it. In an amici brief<https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/previewbriefs/Other_Brief_Updates/10-238_RespondentAmCu4PoliticalScientists.authcheckdam.pdf> and a subsequent article in the Election Law Journal<http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/abs/10.1089/elj.2011.0143>, we showed that private political contributions did not increase relative to other states after an injunction against the matching funds provision. Chief Justice Roberts, writing the majority opinion, briefly considered this evidence but dismissed it, declaring “it is never easy to prove a negative.”
What’s going on here? Roberts has conflated the arithmetic and philosophical definitions of the word negative. We’ve all heard the adage that it’s difficult to prove a negative, meaning that it’s difficult to prove the absence of something (e.g., can we prove that Santa Claus does not exist?). However, the adage has no bearing on the quantitative estimation of an arithmetically negative effect![1]<http://electionlawblog.org/#_ftn1> There’s no reason that negative effects are harder to detect than positive ones.
The negative effect fallacy is not unique to Arizona Free Enterprise or election law. This mistake appears to have originated with Elkins v. United States in 1960. Again, an empirical question played a crucial role in the case. Does the exclusionary rule prevent illegal searches and seizures? In principle, quantitative evidence could be brought to bear on this question, but Justice Stewart rejected even the possibility by asserting that “it is never easy to prove a negative.” Since then, negative effect fallacy has been repeated in many Supreme Court and lower court cases across many legal domains including free speech, voting rights, and campaign finance. Our investigation<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jels.12158/full> explains the negative effect fallacy in more detail, documents its use in federal courts, and provides recommendations regarding the use of quantitative evidence in court decisions.
How can the greatest legal minds in our nation fall prey to something like the negative effect fallacy? And why would they insist that relatively simple quantitative methods are gobbledygook? We can only speculate regarding the underlying motivations of the judges. Perhaps they don’t understand the evidence. Perhaps they don’t like the results and look for convenient ways to dismiss them. Perhaps they have legitimate reasons to believe the evidence is uncompelling or irrelevant for the case, but they fail to articulate those reasons. In any case, the pattern whereby evidence is dismissed based on sweeping statements, gut reactions, and logical fallacies is a troubling one. At best, these practices hide the justices’ true reasons for arriving at their decisions, and at worst, the courts regularly make bad decisions because they fail to engage with relevant evidence.
The relevance of quantitative evidence for legal decisions will likely not dissipate anytime soon. Does a new voting technology differentially impact a particular racial group? Does a campaign finance regulation restrict free speech? Does a state’s redistricting plan deviate from a reasonable standard of fairness? Courts will have to consider a lot of questions like these going forward, and social scientists will continue to collect data and develop methods to help them. Whether the justices like it or not, answering these questions and making informed decisions requires engaging with quantitative evidence and evaluating it on its merits.
Anthony Fowler (anthony.fowler at uchicago.edu<mailto:anthony.fowler at uchicago.edu>) is Associate Professor in the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago. He applies econometric methods for causal inference to questions in political science, with particular emphasis on elections and political representation.
[1]<http://electionlawblog.org/#_ftnref1> Even in the canonical usage of this adage, the word negative is a red herring because we can always write positive statements to be negative, and vice versa. At best, this phrase reminds us that induction does not provide certain conclusions, but in the case of arithmetically negative statements, the adage has no bearing whatsoever.

[re]<https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D95521&title=Fowler%3A%20%E2%80%9CThe%20Negative%20Effect%20Fallacy%2C%20Gobbledygook%2C%20and%20the%20Use%20of%20Quantitative%20Evidence%20in%20the%20Supreme%20Court%E2%80%9D>
Posted in Supreme Court<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=29>

“Judge Pushes Back Against Trump Administration’s View of Emoluments Clause”<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=95515>
Posted on October 18, 2017 7:05 pm<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=95515> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
WSJ:<https://www.wsj.com/article_email/judge-pushes-back-against-trump-administrations-view-of-emoluments-clause-1508359374-lMyQjAxMTE3MzE3ODYxNTg2Wj/>
The hearing Wednesday marked the first public airing of arguments over the scope of the provisions and the definition of an “emolument.” Democrats in Congress and the attorneys general of the District of Columbia and Maryland filed similar lawsuits in June.
Brett Shumate, a Justice Department lawyer, told U.S. District Judge George Daniels that an emolument should be defined as a benefit conferred in return for a personal service provided by the officeholder.
“Why doesn’t emolument mean compensation?” asked Judge Daniels, who is considering the government’s motion to throw out the case. “Why do we need a more complicated definition?”
At one point, Mr. Shumate reluctantly agreed that the emoluments clauses could reach private business transactions, in response to a question from Judge Daniels, who asked whether the Constitution would allow the president to accept $1 million from a foreign government seeking his signature on a treaty.
Under Judge Daniels’ hypothetical, instead of paying the president directly, however, the foreign government would buy $1 million in hotdogs from the president’s hotdog-vending business.
[re]<https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D95515&title=%E2%80%9CJudge%20Pushes%20Back%20Against%20Trump%20Administration%E2%80%99s%20View%20of%20Emoluments%20Clause%E2%80%9D>
Posted in conflict of interest laws<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=20>

A.J. Pate: Systemic Poison in the Body Politic<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=95512>
Posted on October 18, 2017 3:28 pm<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=95512> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
The following is a guest post from A.J. Pate:
Systemic Poison in the Body Politic
Ned Foley’s recent commentary,<http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/election-law/article/?article=13415> “Of X-Rays, CT Scans and Gerrymanders”, was an interesting analogy linking advancements in cancer research to advances in identifying partisan gerrymandering. However, cancer is an organic disease which attacks disparate parts of the body, most of unknown causes, thus unpreventable and most often incurable. Two preventable exceptions are lung cancer and skin cancer. But cessation of smoking will not cure lung cancer. And total darkness will not cure skin cancer.
Perhaps a more apt analogy would be people being poisoned by self-interested criminals. Partisan gerrymandering is a systemic poisoning of the body politic, a deliberate, corrupt process to achieve predetermined results by self-interested politicians.
Much attention has been fixated recently on scientific solutions, which appear to be reaching the outer limits of practical application, improbably providing a definitive judicially manageable standard. There are no magic cures lurking within those penumbrae, complex calculations incomprehensible to most Americans. In concluding his relentless, decades-long pursuit to end partisan gerrymandering, absent a bright-line rule, Justice Kennedy would not want his valedictory and legacy to end in indeterminacy, “not with a bang but with a whimper.”
There is a curious silence on one of the most ancient scientific principles, dating back to Aristotle, and still viable today. That is Occam’s Razor: the simplest effective solution is the best solution. The Court should no longer attempt so ineffectively to treat symptoms of this poison or search for an antidote, but simply remove the source of the poison. Let Occam’s Razor slice through the Gordian Knot of partisan gerrymandering.
The obvious root source of partisan gerrymandering is the ready availability of partisan political data in redistricting software. The simplest solution would be for the Court to ban its use as a negative, poisonous input into the redistricting process, extrinsic manipulations adverse to the constitutional provision of fair and effective representation. Banning the use of partisan political data in redistricting would be easily judicially manageable at every court level. But, this simple prophylactic receives virtually nil attention. Two primary tools employed by gerrymanderers are zero deviation<https://electionlawblog.org/?p=67794>as a cover and the divided census tracts necessary to achieve that dubious goal. Yet there is also a strange silence on the root source of partisan gerrymandering and these tools of its implementation.
This bright-line rule, a simple ban on the use of partisan political data, has many distinct and significant advantages, and no disadvantages are readily apparent:

  *   could be implemented immediately by the states with minimal cost by simple software modification
  *   would be applied ex ante to statewide maps and subject to forensic analysis before implementation
  *   easily manageable by lower courts, drastically reducing years of appeals by shifting focus from ex post quantative litigation to ex ante qualitative compliance
  *   would make redistricting process and plans transparent and accessible
  *   would make judicial reviews strictly objective and technically neutral, with partisan consequences a nonfactor
  *   self-explanatory, easily understood by the general public, becoming one of the most popular decisions the Court could ever deliver.
Contrarily, the Court’s worse course would be to become a subjective arbiter between the major political parties in divining partisan winners and losers in our electoral process, stepping into quicksand in the middle of the political thicket. The current Court’s political polarization is obvious to the electorate and would render consequential decisions subject to intense suspicion of partisan bias, with resultant harm to respect for the Court and even the rule of law. The Court’s public approval would be in imminent danger of sinking to the depths of used car salesmen and the U.S. Congress.

[re]<https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=http%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D95512&title=A.J.%20Pate%3A%20Systemic%20Poison%20in%20the%20Body%20Politic>
Posted in redistricting<http://electionlawblog.org/?cat=6>

--
Rick Hasen
Chancellor's Professor of Law and Political Science
UC Irvine School of Law
401 E. Peltason Dr., Suite 1000
Irvine, CA 92697-8000
949.824.3072 - office
rhasen at law.uci.edu<mailto:rhasen at law.uci.edu>
http://www.law.uci.edu/faculty/full-time/hasen/
http://electionlawblog.org<http://electionlawblog.org/>
_______________________________________________
Law-election mailing list
Law-election at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:Law-election at department-lists.uci.edu>
https://department-lists.uci.edu/mailman/listinfo/law-election
--

----------------

Nate Persily

James B. McClatchy Professor of Law
Stanford Law School
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
(917) 570-3223
npersily at stanford.edu<mailto:npersily at stanford.edu>

www.persily.com<http://www.persily.com/>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://webshare.law.ucla.edu/Listservs/law-election/attachments/20171023/8ed1981f/attachment.html>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: image001.png
Type: image/png
Size: 3606 bytes
Desc: image001.png
URL: <http://webshare.law.ucla.edu/Listservs/law-election/attachments/20171023/8ed1981f/attachment.png>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: image002.png
Type: image/png
Size: 2022 bytes
Desc: image002.png
URL: <http://webshare.law.ucla.edu/Listservs/law-election/attachments/20171023/8ed1981f/attachment-0001.png>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: image003.png
Type: image/png
Size: 4014 bytes
Desc: image003.png
URL: <http://webshare.law.ucla.edu/Listservs/law-election/attachments/20171023/8ed1981f/attachment-0002.png>