[EL] RCV and eggheads
Terry Martin
tjm5da at virginia.edu
Mon Jul 2 15:42:54 PDT 2018
You obviously don't need to be a "simpleton" to be fatigued and to have
that fatigue translate into a less representative result. See A. Philip
Randolph Institute v. Johnson, 833 F.3d 656 (2016) (elimination of
straight-ticket voting "was likely to increase voter confusion and miscast
ballots" among African-Americans).
On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 3:15 PM, George Korbel <korbellaw at hotmail.com> wrote:
> Simplicity is as simpletons do
>
> Get Outlook for iOS <https://aka.ms/o0ukef>
> ------------------------------
> *From:* Terry Martin <tjm5da at virginia.edu>
> *Sent:* Monday, July 2, 2018 5:11:30 PM
> *To:* George Korbel
> *Cc:* D. A. Holtzman; Steven John Mulroy (smulroy);
> law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
>
> *Subject:* Re: [EL] RCV and eggheads
>
> I would think that a system which grants additional advantages to an
> otherwise losing candidate that voters have indicated that they can merely
> live with over the candidate that a plurality selects as their first choice
> would be more than a "pain in a finger" given our tradition of
> first-past-the-post elections in the U.S. and much of the public's
> understanding of elections generally tied to that concept. In an age of
> polarized party politics it may be tempting to support mechanisms that
> promise consensus-oriented results (whatever their real-life impact, see,
> e.g., Top 2 primary), but as the saying goes, the enemy of the great is the
> good.
>
> On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 6:23 AM, George Korbel <korbellaw at hotmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> And the way to cure a pain in a finger is to cut a hand off.
>>
>> Get Outlook for iOS <https://aka.ms/o0ukef>
>> ------------------------------
>> *From:* Terry Martin <tjm5da at virginia.edu>
>> *Sent:* Saturday, June 30, 2018 11:31:51 PM
>> *To:* D. A. Holtzman
>> *Cc:* George Korbel; Steven John Mulroy (smulroy);
>> law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
>> *Subject:* Re: [EL] RCV and eggheads
>>
>> As much as Californians loved having elections essentially every month
>> with Gov. Schwarzenegger, some have questioned whether frequent voting is
>> in fact the most effective option. This applies equally to municipal RCV
>> elections (revealed preference issues with whether the voter actually
>> wanted to choose a “second place, third place....” or whether they simply
>> did it because it was there and the voting scheme demanded it) as to
>> frequent special elections. Fatigue is real and impacts policy choices.
>> Whether the result is the most representative is a subject for debate.
>>
>> On Sat, Jun 30, 2018 at 9:16 PM D. A. Holtzman <d at lavotefire.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Some groups of people have eggshell skulls and literacy problems, you
>>> say, and ask,
>>> "Why make voting more complicated" with ranked-choice?
>>>
>>> Perhaps because the obvious alternative would be to make voting more
>>> frequent!
>>> You know, doing the simple "vote for one" thing over and over, say
>>> weekly, eliminating one candidate at a time (again, say weekly) until a
>>> candidate gets a majority of votes cast.
>>> It would make a great TV series. (Let's pitch it! Who'll sponsor?)
>>>
>>> - dah
>>>
>>> On 6/30/2018 7:27 PM, George Korbel wrote:
>>>
>>> To me the most significant of the White/Zimmer/senate factors are the
>>> socio economic educational differential in concert with racially polarized
>>> voting. That egg shell skull problem is at the heart of the analysis.
>>> When you make it more difficult to register, to remain registered, to
>>> obtain an Id or to cast a ballot The courts utilize the
>>> White/Zimmer/Senate factors. The problem dealing with illiteracy is an
>>> electoral mountain facing attempts at increasing or equalizing minority
>>> voting. Why make voting more complicated
>>>
>>> Get Outlook for iOS <https://aka.ms/o0ukef>
>>> ------------------------------
>>> *From:* Steven John Mulroy (smulroy) <smulroy at memphis.edu>
>>> <smulroy at memphis.edu>
>>> *Sent:* Saturday, June 30, 2018 8:29:59 PM
>>> *To:* George Korbel
>>> *Cc:* law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
>>> *Subject:* Re: [EL] Law-election Digest, Vol 86, Issue 26
>>>
>>> But is there actual data to back up that claim? Many worry about the
>>> supposedly confusing effect of RCV, but yet real world experience shows
>>> that voters, including minority voters, can figure it out fine.
>>>
>>> Sent from my iPhone. Please excuse typos.
>>>
>>> On Jun 30, 2018, at 8:26 PM, George Korbel <korbellaw at hotmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Well the whole argument is problematic. You are ignoring the fact that
>>> in the south and southwest the level of functional literacy that Hispanics
>>> operate on makes it very difficult for them to deal with the complications
>>> of these systems. In my view these things are potentially more
>>> discriminatory than gerrymandering and voter I’d requirements.
>>>
>>> Get Outlook for iOS <https://aka.ms/o0ukef>
>>> ------------------------------
>>> *From:* Law-election <law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu> on
>>> behalf of Steven John Mulroy (smulroy) <smulroy at memphis.edu>
>>> *Sent:* Saturday, June 30, 2018 5:14:50 PM
>>> *To:* law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
>>> *Subject:* Re: [EL] Law-election Digest, Vol 86, Issue 26
>>>
>>> This debate about whether RCV elections are truly majority result
>>> elections is semantics. In both two round regular elections and RCV
>>> elections, the ultimate winner has a majority of final round votes. In RCV
>>> elections, this is usually also a majority of total first-round votes. But
>>> very often this does not happen, because of exhausted ballots.
>>>
>>> But in two round elections, the ultimate winner is even less likely to
>>> have a majority of first-round votes, because of the sharp drop off in
>>> turnout between the first round and the runoff. So by this definition,
>>> neither is a majority winner system. And plurality is even less of a
>>> majority winner system.
>>>
>>> But if your criterion is the frequency with which the ultimate winner
>>> wins in the final round with a majority of first round total votes, then
>>> RCV is clearly superior to either plurality or two round run off systems,
>>> which are the two alternatives it is usually compared to in the real world
>>> in the US.
>>>
>>> Sent from my iPhone. Please excuse typos.
>>>
>>> > On Jun 30, 2018, at 3:00 PM, "law-election-request at departme
>>> nt-lists.uci.edu" <law-election-request at department-lists.uci.edu> wrote:
>>> >
>>> > Send Law-election mailing list submissions to
>>> > law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
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>>> > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
>>> > than "Re: Contents of Law-election digest..."
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > Today's Topics:
>>> >
>>> > 1. RCV in San Francisco (Kogan, Vladimir)
>>> > 2. Re: RCV in San Francisco (Thomas J. Cares)
>>> > 3. Re: RCV in San Francisco (Kogan, Vladimir)
>>> > 4. Re: RCV in San Francisco (Rob Richie)
>>> > 5. Re: RCV in San Francisco (Kogan, Vladimir)
>>> > 6. Re: RCV in San Francisco (Rob Richie)
>>> > 7. Re: RCV in San Francisco (Kogan, Vladimir)
>>> > 8. 4 or 5 states may elect statewide independent candidates this
>>> > year, a record (Richard Winger)
>>> > 9. Re: RCV in San Francisco (Rob Richie)
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> >
>>> > Message: 1
>>> > Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2018 21:38:29 +0000
>>> > From: "Kogan, Vladimir" <kogan.18 at osu.edu>
>>> > To: Rick Hasen <rhasen at law.uci.edu>, Election Law Listserv
>>> > <law-election at uci.edu>
>>> > Subject: [EL] RCV in San Francisco
>>> > Message-ID:
>>> > <DDC97B3393E2AB4C85D66A2817A2C348CA527D5B at CIO-TNC-D2MBX06.os
>>> uad.osu.edu>
>>> >
>>> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>>> >
>>> > Sorry to sound like a broken record, but the highlighted section below
>>> is clearly incorrect:
>>> >
>>> > ?SF Elections are Working ? and Getting Even Better?<
>>> http://electionlawblog.org/?p=99861>
>>> > Posted on June 28, 2018 3:53 pm<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=99861>
>>> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
>>> >
>>> > Oped<http://www.sfexaminer.com/sf-elections-working-getting-
>>> even-better/> from By SF election commissioners Charlotte Hill<
>>> http://www.sfexaminer.com/author/charlotte-hill/>, Christopher Jerdonek<
>>> http://www.sfexaminer.com/author/christopher-jerdonek/> and Viva Mo<
>>> http://www.sfexaminer.com/author/viva-mogi/>gi:
>>> >
>>> > The current RCV system also facilitated higher voter participation
>>> than the previous December runoff system, which San Francisco used until
>>> 2004. Under that system, the first election occurred in November, followed
>>> by a second race in December if no candidate won an initial majority. Voter
>>> turnout often plummeted in the December runoff, on average by 31 percent.
>>> In the 2001 runoff for city attorney, less than 17% of registered voters
>>> participated. In the 1995 mayoral election, the number of voters declined
>>> by nearly 10 percentage points from November to December.
>>> >
>>> > Some have asked why San Francisco does not use the ?plurality? voting
>>> method, in which the highest vote-getter wins. Plurality voting is used to
>>> elect many governors, senators, and the president. But if plurality had
>>> been used in our mayoral election, the winner would have been elected with
>>> less than 37% of the vote, with more than 60% of voters casting a ballot
>>> for another candidate. The goal of any runoff system is to ensure that the
>>> winner has a majority (50% + 1) of the vote and is the candidate preferred
>>> by the most voters. San Francisco?s ?instant runoff? elections fulfill both
>>> goals, but without the expense?both for taxpayers and candidates?of a
>>> separate runoff election. San Francisco saves approximately $3.5 million by
>>> not holding a second citywide election.
>>> > Due to high rates of ballot exhaustion<http://u.osu.edu/ko
>>> gan.18/files/2014/12/ElectoralStudies-2fupfhd.pdf>, the winner often
>>> does not get ?a majority (50%+1) of the vote and is the candidate preferred
>>> by the most voters.? The most recent mayoral election is Exhibit 1: London
>>> Breed won with 45.6 of the vote.
>>> >
>>> > Vlad Kogan
>>> >
>>> > [The Ohio State University]
>>> > Vladimir Kogan, Associate Professor
>>> > Department of Political Science
>>> > 2004 Derby Hall | 154 N. Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210
>>> <https://maps.google.com/?q=154+N.+Oval+Mall,+Columbus,+OH+43210&entry=gmail&source=g>
>>> -1373
>>> > 510/415-4074 Mobile
>>> > 614/292-9498 Office
>>> > 614/292-1146 Fax
>>> > http://u.osu.edu/kogan.18/
>>> > kogan.18 at osu.edu<mailto:kogan.18 at osu.edu <kogan.18 at osu.edu>>
>>> >
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>>> > ------------------------------
>>> >
>>> > Message: 2
>>> > Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2018 15:39:21 -0700
>>> > From: "Thomas J. Cares" <Tom at tomcares.com>
>>> > To: "Kogan, Vladimir" <kogan.18 at osu.edu>
>>> > Cc: Election Law Listserv <law-election at uci.edu>
>>> > Subject: Re: [EL] RCV in San Francisco
>>> > Message-ID:
>>> > <CADE9kw-PU2xd=HOHTBY=AA1xv8u3LYQ_=5T8vbuTMRKVbfSuWg at mail.gmail.com
>>> >
>>> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>>> >
>>> > Think of it as simulated runoffs. If you don?t rank one of the 2 final
>>> > contenders to-be, you?ve sat out the potential runoff between them,
>>> albeit
>>> > being as convenient as possible for you.
>>> >
>>> > No one will take into account the number of primary voters, who
>>> abstained
>>> > from the general, when they report Newsom?s percentage of votes in
>>> > November.
>>> >
>>> > -Tom Cares
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >> On Fri, Jun 29, 2018 at 2:40 PM Kogan, Vladimir <kogan.18 at osu.edu>
>>> wrote:
>>> >>
>>> >> Sorry to sound like a broken record, but the highlighted section
>>> below is
>>> >> clearly incorrect:
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> ?SF Elections are Working ? and Getting Even Better?
>>> >> <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=99861>
>>> >>
>>> >> Posted on June 28, 2018 3:53 pm <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=99861>
>>> by *Rick
>>> >> Hasen* <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
>>> >>
>>> >> Oped <http://www.sfexaminer.com/sf-elections-working-getting-even
>>> -better/> from By
>>> >> SF election commissioners *Charlotte Hill*
>>> >> <http://www.sfexaminer.com/author/charlotte-hill/>, *Christopher
>>> Jerdonek*
>>> >> <http://www.sfexaminer.com/author/christopher-jerdonek/> and *Viva
>>> Mo*
>>> >> <http://www.sfexaminer.com/author/viva-mogi/>gi:
>>> >>
>>> >> *The current RCV system also facilitated higher voter participation
>>> than
>>> >> the previous December runoff system, which San Francisco used until
>>> 2004.
>>> >> Under that system, the first election occurred in November, followed
>>> by a
>>> >> second race in December if no candidate won an initial majority. Voter
>>> >> turnout often plummeted in the December runoff, on average by 31
>>> percent.
>>> >> In the 2001 runoff for city attorney, less than 17% of registered
>>> voters
>>> >> participated. In the 1995 mayoral election, the number of voters
>>> declined
>>> >> by nearly 10 percentage points from November to December.*
>>> >>
>>> >> *Some have asked why San Francisco does not use the ?plurality? voting
>>> >> method, in which the highest vote-getter wins. Plurality voting is
>>> used to
>>> >> elect many governors, senators, and the president. But if plurality
>>> had
>>> >> been used in our mayoral election, the winner would have been elected
>>> with
>>> >> less than 37% of the vote, with more than 60% of voters casting a
>>> ballot
>>> >> for another candidate. The goal of any runoff system is to ensure
>>> that the
>>> >> winner has a majority (50% + 1) of the vote and is the candidate
>>> preferred
>>> >> by the most voters. San Francisco?s ?instant runoff? elections
>>> fulfill both
>>> >> goals, but without the expense?both for taxpayers and candidates?of a
>>> >> separate runoff election. San Francisco saves approximately $3.5
>>> million by
>>> >> not holding a second citywide election.*
>>> >>
>>> >> Due to high rates of ballot exhaustion
>>> >> <http://u.osu.edu/kogan.18/files/2014/12/ElectoralStudies-2fupfhd.pdf
>>> >,
>>> >> the winner often does not get ?a majority (50%+1) of the vote and is
>>> the
>>> >> candidate preferred by the most voters.? The most recent mayoral
>>> election
>>> >> is Exhibit 1: London Breed won with 45.6 of the vote.
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> Vlad Kogan
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> [image: The Ohio State University]
>>> >> *Vladimir Kogan*, Associate Professor
>>> >> *Department of Political Science*
>>> >>
>>> >> 2004 Derby Hall | 154 N. Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210
>>> <https://maps.google.com/?q=154+N.+Oval+Mall,+Columbus,+OH+43210&entry=gmail&source=g>
>>> -1373
>>> >> 510/415-4074 Mobile
>>> >>
>>> >> 614/292-9498 Office
>>> >>
>>> >> 614/292-1146 Fax
>>> >>
>>> >> http://u.osu.edu/kogan.18/
>>> >> kogan.18 at osu.edu
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> _______________________________________________
>>> >> Law-election mailing list
>>> >> Law-election at department-lists.uci.edu
>>> >> https://department-lists.uci.edu/mailman/listinfo/law-election
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>>> >
>>> > ------------------------------
>>> >
>>> > Message: 3
>>> > Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2018 22:43:17 +0000
>>> > From: "Kogan, Vladimir" <kogan.18 at osu.edu>
>>> > To: "Thomas J. Cares" <Tom at tomcares.com>
>>> > Cc: Election Law Listserv <law-election at uci.edu>
>>> > Subject: Re: [EL] RCV in San Francisco
>>> > Message-ID:
>>> > <DDC97B3393E2AB4C85D66A2817A2C348CA527E8C at CIO-TNC-D2MBX06.os
>>> uad.osu.edu>
>>> >
>>> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>>> >
>>> > Sure, but this is different from the claim that the winner has a
>>> majority of the votes. And much depends on why people don?t rank the two
>>> final contenders. If they are indifferent, we shouldn?t be too worried
>>> about. But if those with exhausted ballots have a preference between the
>>> two (not expressed on the ranked ballots, for whatever reason), then we
>>> can?t conclude that the candidate that wins is ?preferred by the most
>>> voters.?
>>> >
>>> > [The Ohio State University]
>>> > Vladimir Kogan, Associate Professor
>>> > Department of Political Science
>>> > 2004 Derby Hall | 154 N. Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210
>>> <https://maps.google.com/?q=154+N.+Oval+Mall,+Columbus,+OH+43210&entry=gmail&source=g>
>>> -1373
>>> > 510/415-4074 Mobile
>>> > 614/292-9498 Office
>>> > 614/292-1146 Fax
>>> > http://u.osu.edu/kogan.18/
>>> > kogan.18 at osu.edu<mailto:kogan.18 at osu.edu <kogan.18 at osu.edu>>
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > From: Thomas J. Cares [mailto:Tom at tomcares.com <Tom at tomcares.com>]
>>> > Sent: Friday, June 29, 2018 6:39 PM
>>> > To: Kogan, Vladimir
>>> > Cc: Election Law Listserv
>>> > Subject: Re: [EL] RCV in San Francisco
>>> >
>>> > Think of it as simulated runoffs. If you don?t rank one of the 2 final
>>> contenders to-be, you?ve sat out the potential runoff between them, albeit
>>> being as convenient as possible for you.
>>> >
>>> > No one will take into account the number of primary voters, who
>>> abstained from the general, when they report Newsom?s percentage of votes
>>> in November.
>>> >
>>> > -Tom Cares
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > On Fri, Jun 29, 2018 at 2:40 PM Kogan, Vladimir <kogan.18 at osu.edu<
>>> mailto:kogan.18 at osu.edu <kogan.18 at osu.edu>>> wrote:
>>> > Sorry to sound like a broken record, but the highlighted section below
>>> is clearly incorrect:
>>> >
>>> > ?SF Elections are Working ? and Getting Even Better?<
>>> http://electionlawblog.org/?p=99861>
>>> > Posted on June 28, 2018 3:53 pm<http://electionlawblog.org/?p=99861>
>>> by Rick Hasen<http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
>>> >
>>> > Oped<http://www.sfexaminer.com/sf-elections-working-getting-
>>> even-better/> from By SF election commissioners Charlotte Hill<
>>> http://www.sfexaminer.com/author/charlotte-hill/>, Christopher Jerdonek<
>>> http://www.sfexaminer.com/author/christopher-jerdonek/> and Viva Mo<
>>> http://www.sfexaminer.com/author/viva-mogi/>gi:
>>> >
>>> > The current RCV system also facilitated higher voter participation
>>> than the previous December runoff system, which San Francisco used until
>>> 2004. Under that system, the first election occurred in November, followed
>>> by a second race in December if no candidate won an initial majority. Voter
>>> turnout often plummeted in the December runoff, on average by 31 percent.
>>> In the 2001 runoff for city attorney, less than 17% of registered voters
>>> participated. In the 1995 mayoral election, the number of voters declined
>>> by nearly 10 percentage points from November to December.
>>> >
>>> > Some have asked why San Francisco does not use the ?plurality? voting
>>> method, in which the highest vote-getter wins. Plurality voting is used to
>>> elect many governors, senators, and the president. But if plurality had
>>> been used in our mayoral election, the winner would have been elected with
>>> less than 37% of the vote, with more than 60% of voters casting a ballot
>>> for another candidate. The goal of any runoff system is to ensure that the
>>> winner has a majority (50% + 1) of the vote and is the candidate preferred
>>> by the most voters. San Francisco?s ?instant runoff? elections fulfill both
>>> goals, but without the expense?both for taxpayers and candidates?of a
>>> separate runoff election. San Francisco saves approximately $3.5 million by
>>> not holding a second citywide election.
>>> > Due to high rates of ballot exhaustion<http://u.osu.edu/ko
>>> gan.18/files/2014/12/ElectoralStudies-2fupfhd.pdf>, the winner often
>>> does not get ?a majority (50%+1) of the vote and is the candidate preferred
>>> by the most voters.? The most recent mayoral election is Exhibit 1: London
>>> Breed won with 45.6 of the vote.
>>> >
>>> > Vlad Kogan
>>> >
>>> > [The Ohio State University]
>>> > Vladimir Kogan, Associate Professor
>>> > Department of Political Science
>>> > 2004 Derby Hall | 154 N. Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210
>>> <https://maps.google.com/?q=154+N.+Oval+Mall,+Columbus,+OH+43210&entry=gmail&source=g>
>>> -1373
>>> > 510/415-4074 Mobile
>>> > 614/292-9498 Office
>>> > 614/292-1146 Fax
>>> > http://u.osu.edu/kogan.18/
>>> > kogan.18 at osu.edu<mailto:kogan.18 at osu.edu <kogan.18 at osu.edu>>
>>> >
>>> > _______________________________________________
>>> > Law-election mailing list
>>> > Law-election at department-lists.uci.edu<mailto:Law-election at de
>>> partment-lists.uci.edu <Law-election at department-lists.uci.edu>>
>>> > https://department-lists.uci.edu/mailman/listinfo/law-election
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>>> >
>>> > ------------------------------
>>> >
>>> > Message: 4
>>> > Date: Sat, 30 Jun 2018 09:25:57 -0400
>>> > From: Rob Richie <rr at fairvote.org>
>>> > To: "Kogan, Vladimir" <kogan.18 at osu.edu>
>>> > Cc: Election Law Listserv <law-election at uci.edu>
>>> > Subject: Re: [EL] RCV in San Francisco
>>> > Message-ID:
>>> > <CAM2RZHYrRp5+MabCUV6oofZfnUmfQ5EF63U3uw=Ph02Lyv5bwQ at mail.gmail.com
>>> >
>>> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>>> >
>>> > Vlad,
>>> >
>>> > I find your "broken record" repetition on this topic overly selective.
>>> > I'll make three points that include a correction and what I trust are
>>> > several useful numbers
>>> >
>>> > * You suggested last week that FairVote has given up on the goal of
>>> > representative outcomes -- that is, fair representation of both those
>>> in
>>> > the majority and the minority. That's not true. We just accept the
>>> > realities of imperfection. You set up ranked choice voting in contrast
>>> to a
>>> > theoretical model of majoritarian perfection that our current systems
>>> don't
>>> > remotely achieve. Note, however, one could achieve your goal if we
>>> > followed Australia's model of mandating voting and mandating rankings.
>>> > Every RCV winner in Australia's House elections must earn a majority of
>>> > votes from registered voters who didn't want to risk being fined and
>>> who
>>> > cast a valid ballot.
>>> >
>>> > * But we don't mandate voting in the USA and that's not FairVote's
>>> fight.
>>> > Americans don't include the huge majorities of eligible and registered
>>> > voters who don't vote in our primaries (and most of our other
>>> elections)
>>> > in the "denominator" when we report percentages for winners. We don't
>>> > report undervotes when reporting winning majorities. If we did, we'd
>>> have
>>> > lots of low single digit "winners." And to be clear, the primary runoff
>>> > elections that you seem to give a free pass make it WORSE on average,
>>> not
>>> > better. We're now just over halfway through the primary season, and
>>> there
>>> > have been 23 primary runoff elections. Notably
>>> >
>>> > -- The median runoff primary winner earned LESS than their vote total
>>> in
>>> > the first round. This obviously can never happen with ranked choice
>>> voting
>>> >
>>> > --- The 23 winners all earned Vlad-defined "majorities" in the runoff,
>>> but
>>> > all but nine of them earned less than a third of the first round
>>> primary
>>> > vote. Only three surpassed the 46.2% earned by London Breed in San
>>> > Francisco despite the ballot that that limits rankings to three. (Vlad
>>> is
>>> > using the wrong denominator in San Francisco, as he counts first round
>>> > undervotes that no one uses when determining majorities in elections
>>> that
>>> > might go to runoffs.)
>>> >
>>> > -- Of those three relatively strong runoff showings, only two had
>>> > majorities of the 1st round: one got 50.6% of the 1st round and the
>>> other
>>> > 55.4%
>>> >
>>> > -- In addition the runoff candidates might not be the most
>>> representative
>>> > candidates. The top two finishers in runoffs can include candidates
>>> who get
>>> > to the runoff only due to split votes. We've in fact had important
>>> runoffs
>>> > recently under "Top Two primary" rules where no candidates from the
>>> party
>>> > with the most primary votes made the runoff - that happened in 2016 in
>>> the
>>> > Washington State treasurer race (affecting Democrats) and a Georgia
>>> state
>>> > senate special election (affecting Republicans.) RCV is far more
>>> reliable
>>> > to have the strongest two candidates make the final round -- not with
>>> 100%
>>> > perfection, but clearly an improvement over runoffs without an RCV
>>> ballot.
>>> >
>>> > --- Of course, most of our primaries this year have been held with
>>> > plurality rules. 10 winners of US House and US Senate primaries earned
>>> less
>>> > than 30%, and another 16 won less than 40%. Two (WV-3 and PA-13)
>>> Republican
>>> > primaries were won with less than 24% in heavily GOP district that
>>> Trump
>>> > won by more than 50%. Interesting to think about from a view of
>>> "majority
>>> > rule."
>>> >
>>> > * So let's look at RCV, which absolutely outperforms plurality and
>>> runoff
>>> > elections -- it's not even close. Maine used RCV for the 1st time, with
>>> > very limited state-financed voter education. Democrats had more valid
>>> > votes for governor in a primary than ever before in state history. Two
>>> > primaries requiring instant runoffs - the governor's race and the 2nd
>>> > congressional district. The impact of RCV were:
>>> >
>>> > - Governor: Janet Mills went 33.09% in the first round to 50.2% of the
>>> > first round vote total (and 54.1% of active votes in final round).
>>> >
>>> > - CD-2: Jared Golden went 46.4% of the first round from an instant
>>> runoff
>>> > found of 54.3% of the first round vote total - that is, a higher
>>> winning
>>> > percentage than all but one of the 23 congressional primary runoff
>>> winners
>>> > this year using the same measure.
>>> >
>>> > - But that's not all. These candidates were also seeking support from
>>> > backers of their final round opponent in a very real, meaningful way
>>> that
>>> > they knew might help them win in the campaign. London Breed was ranked
>>> 2nd
>>> > or 3rd by nearly half of her final round opponent's backers, giving
>>> her a
>>> > top three ranking from 63% of San Francisco voters In the governor's
>>> race
>>> > in Maine, Janet Mills was the top 2nd choice of backers of her final
>>> round
>>> > opponent Adam Cote, and 47% of his supporters ranked her 2nd or 3rd. In
>>> > other words, if you add the votes she had in the final round with Cote
>>> > votes ranking here highly she had the active backing of well over 70%
>>> of
>>> > Democrats. That's an impressive improvement from having only 33% of 1st
>>> > choices , and a nice reflection of the value of Mills "seeking
>>> consensus"
>>> > in her RCV campaign.
>>> >
>>> > So Vlad, please excuse me if I don't see your argument as a reason not
>>> to
>>> > improve our elections with ranked choice voting
>>> >
>>> > Thanks for reading,
>>> > Rob
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >> On Friday, June 29, 2018, Kogan, Vladimir <kogan.18 at osu.edu> wrote:
>>> >>
>>> >> Sorry to sound like a broken record, but the highlighted section
>>> below is
>>> >> clearly incorrect:
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> ?SF Elections are Working ? and Getting Even Better?
>>> >> <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=99861>
>>> >>
>>> >> Posted on June 28, 2018 3:53 pm <http://electionlawblog.org/?p=99861>
>>> by *Rick
>>> >> Hasen* <http://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
>>> >>
>>> >> Oped <http://www.sfexaminer.com/sf-elections-working-getting-even
>>> -better/> from By
>>> >> SF election commissioners *Charlotte Hill*
>>> >> <http://www.sfexaminer.com/author/charlotte-hill/>, *Christopher
>>> Jerdonek*
>>> >> <http://www.sfexaminer.com/author/christopher-jerdonek/> and *Viva
>>> Mo*
>>> >> <http://www.sfexaminer.com/author/viva-mogi/>gi:
>>> >>
>>> >> *The current RCV system also facilitated higher voter participation
>>> than
>>> >> the previous December runoff system, which San Francisco used until
>>> 2004.
>>> >> Under that system, the first election occurred in November, followed
>>> by a
>>> >> second race in December if no candidate won an initial majority. Voter
>>> >> turnout often plummeted in the December runoff, on average by 31
>>> percent.
>>> >> In the 2001 runoff for city attorney, less than 17% of registered
>>> voters
>>> >> participated. In the 1995 mayoral election, the number of voters
>>> declined
>>> >> by nearly 10 percentage points from November to December.*
>>> >>
>>> >> *Some have asked why San Francisco does not use the ?plurality? voting
>>> >> method, in which the highest vote-getter wins. Plurality voting is
>>> used to
>>> >> elect many governors, senators, and the president. But if plurality
>>> had
>>> >> been used in our mayoral election, the winner would have been elected
>>> with
>>> >> less than 37% of the vote, with more than 60% of voters casting a
>>> ballot
>>> >> for another candidate. The goal of any runoff system is to ensure
>>> that the
>>> >> winner has a majority (50% + 1) of the vote and is the candidate
>>> preferred
>>> >> by the most voters. San Francisco?s ?instant runoff? elections
>>> fulfill both
>>> >> goals, but without the expense?both for taxpayers and candidates?of a
>>> >> separate runoff election. San Francisco saves approximately $3.5
>>> million by
>>> >> not holding a second citywide election.*
>>> >>
>>> >> Due to high rates of ballot exhaustion
>>> >> <http://u.osu.edu/kogan.18/files/2014/12/ElectoralStudies-2fupfhd.pdf
>>> >,
>>> >> the winner often does not get ?a majority (50%+1) of the vote and is
>>> the
>>> >> candidate preferred by the most voters.? The most recent mayoral
>>> election
>>> >> is Exhibit 1: London Breed won with 45.6 of the vote.
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> Vlad Kogan
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> [image: The Ohio State University]
>>> >> *Vladimir Kogan*, Associate Professor
>>> >> *Department of Political Science*
>>> >>
>>> >> 2004 Derby Hall | 154 N. Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210
>>> <https://maps.google.com/?q=154+N.+Oval+Mall,+Columbus,+OH+43210&entry=gmail&source=g>
>>> -1373
>>> >> 510/415-4074 Mobile
>>> >>
>>> >> 614/292-9498 Office
>>> >>
>>> >> 614/292-1146 Fax
>>> >>
>>> >> http://u.osu.edu/kogan.18/
>>> >> kogan.18 at osu.edu
>>> > -------------- next part --------------
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>>> >
>>> > ------------------------------
>>> >
>>> > Message: 5
>>> > Date: Sat, 30 Jun 2018 14:04:01 +0000
>>> > From: "Kogan, Vladimir" <kogan.18 at osu.edu>
>>> > To: Rob Richie <rr at fairvote.org>
>>> > Cc: Election Law Listserv <law-election at uci.edu>
>>> > Subject: Re: [EL] RCV in San Francisco
>>> > Message-ID:
>>> > <DDC97B3393E2AB4C85D66A2817A2C348CA5284DA at CIO-TNC-D2MBX06.os
>>> uad.osu.edu>
>>> >
>>> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>>> >
>>> > Rob,
>>> >
>>> > Thanks for correcting my calculation! I would stop raising this point
>>> repeatedly if RCV proponents stopped continuing to claim that ?the goal of
>>> any runoff system is to ensure that the winner has a majority (50% + 1) of
>>> the vote and is the candidate preferred by the most voters. [Jurisdiction?s
>>> name] ?instant runoff? elections fulfill both goals.? When you say Fair
>>> Vote accepts the realities of imperfection, that sounds like you agree that
>>> RCV does not necessarily fulfill either goal. It would be great if
>>> advocates stopped making this argument.
>>> >
>>> > I completely agree with you that RCV can be an improvement in many
>>> cases. San Francisco?s previous system of holding the runoff in December
>>> when turnout was abysmal was definitely one case where RCV is almost
>>> certainly is better. Primaries with runoffs are another. I also think
>>> adding RCV to a top-two primary system would be desirable if one wants to
>>> have a top-two primary system, for the reason you point out.
>>> >
>>> > However, I think the case is less clear for other systems -- for
>>> example, when local jurisdictions have nonpartisan primaries in June and
>>> runoff elections on-cycle in November. In this scenario, the winner of the
>>> November run-off may end up with more votes than would be the case under an
>>> alternative system with no June primary and just an RCV election in
>>> November with considerable ballot exhaustion. (Whether the two candidates
>>> that make it to the final RCV redistribution round are ?better? or
>>> different than the candidates who make it to the November runoff is an
>>> empirical question.)
>>> >
>>> > I?m particularly skeptical of adding RCV to presidential general
>>> elections (an argument Ned Foley makes in the paper I linked to earlier),
>>> given how this would change the incentives for third-party and independent
>>> candidate entry; I can imagine scenarios where under RCV, a presidential
>>> candidate could win a state?s electoral votes with a smaller share of the
>>> total valid votes cast (given sufficiently high levels of exhaustion) than
>>> would be the case under the current plurality system used in most states.
>>> >
>>> > Vlad
>>> >
>>> > [The Ohio State University]
>>> > Vladimir Kogan, Associate Professor
>>> > Department of Political Science
>>> > 2004 Derby Hall | 154 N. Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210
>>> <https://maps.google.com/?q=154+N.+Oval+Mall,+Columbus,+OH+43210&entry=gmail&source=g>
>>> -1373
>>> > 510/415-4074 Mobile
>>> > 614/292-9498 Office
>>> > 614/292-1146 Fax
>>> > http://u.osu.edu/kogan.18/
>>> > kogan.18 at osu.edu<mailto:kogan.18 at osu.edu <kogan.18 at osu.edu>>
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > From: Rob Richie [mailto:rr at fairvote.org <rr at fairvote.org>]
>>> > Sent: Saturday, June 30, 2018 9:26 AM
>>> > To: Kogan, Vladimir
>>> > Cc: Rick Hasen; Election Law Listserv
>>> > Subject: Re: [EL] RCV in San Francisco
>>> >
>>> > Vlad,
>>> >
>>> > I find your "broken record" repetition on this topic overly
>>> selective. I'll make three points that include a correction and what I
>>> trust are several useful numbers
>>> >
>>> > * You suggested last week that FairVote has given up on the goal of
>>> representative outcomes -- that is, fair representation of both those in
>>> the majority and the minority. That's not true. We just accept the
>>> realities of imperfection. You set up ranked choice voting in contrast to a
>>> theoretical model of majoritarian perfection that our current systems don't
>>> remotely achieve. Note, however, one could achieve your goal if we
>>> followed Australia's model of mandating voting and mandating rankings.
>>> Every RCV winner in Australia's House elections must earn a majority of
>>> votes from registered voters who didn't want to risk being fined and who
>>> cast a valid ballot.
>>> >
>>> > * But we don't mandate voting in the USA and that's not FairVote's
>>> fight. Americans don't include the huge majorities of eligible and
>>> registered voters who don't vote in our primaries (and most of our other
>>> elections) in the "denominator" when we report percentages for winners. We
>>> don't report undervotes when reporting winning majorities. If we did, we'd
>>> have lots of low single digit "winners." And to be clear, the primary
>>> runoff elections that you seem to give a free pass make it WORSE on
>>> average, not better. We're now just over halfway through the primary
>>> season, and there have been 23 primary runoff elections. Notably
>>> >
>>> > -- The median runoff primary winner earned LESS than their vote total
>>> in the first round. This obviously can never happen with ranked choice
>>> voting
>>> >
>>> > --- The 23 winners all earned Vlad-defined "majorities" in the runoff,
>>> but all but nine of them earned less than a third of the first round
>>> primary vote. Only three surpassed the 46.2% earned by London Breed in San
>>> Francisco despite the ballot that that limits rankings to three. (Vlad is
>>> using the wrong denominator in San Francisco, as he counts first round
>>> undervotes that no one uses when determining majorities in elections that
>>> might go to runoffs.)
>>> >
>>> > -- Of those three relatively strong runoff showings, only two had
>>> majorities of the 1st round: one got 50.6% of the 1st round and the other
>>> 55.4%
>>> >
>>> > -- In addition the runoff candidates might not be the most
>>> representative candidates. The top two finishers in runoffs can include
>>> candidates who get to the runoff only due to split votes. We've in fact had
>>> important runoffs recently under "Top Two primary" rules where no
>>> candidates from the party with the most primary votes made the runoff -
>>> that happened in 2016 in the Washington State treasurer race (affecting
>>> Democrats) and a Georgia state senate special election (affecting
>>> Republicans.) RCV is far more reliable to have the strongest two candidates
>>> make the final round -- not with 100% perfection, but clearly an
>>> improvement over runoffs without an RCV ballot.
>>> >
>>> > --- Of course, most of our primaries this year have been held with
>>> plurality rules. 10 winners of US House and US Senate primaries earned less
>>> than 30%, and another 16 won less than 40%. Two (WV-3 and PA-13) Republican
>>> primaries were won with less than 24% in heavily GOP district that Trump
>>> won by more than 50%. Interesting to think about from a view of "majority
>>> rule."
>>> >
>>> > * So let's look at RCV, which absolutely outperforms plurality and
>>> runoff elections -- it's not even close. Maine used RCV for the 1st time,
>>> with very limited state-financed voter education. Democrats had more valid
>>> votes for governor in a primary than ever before in state history. Two
>>> primaries requiring instant runoffs - the governor's race and the 2nd
>>> congressional district. The impact of RCV were:
>>> >
>>> > - Governor: Janet Mills went 33.09% in the first round to 50.2% of
>>> the first round vote total (and 54.1% of active votes in final round).
>>> >
>>> > - CD-2: Jared Golden went 46.4% of the first round from an instant
>>> runoff found of 54.3% of the first round vote total - that is, a higher
>>> winning percentage than all but one of the 23 congressional primary runoff
>>> winners this year using the same measure.
>>> >
>>> > - But that's not all. These candidates were also seeking support from
>>> backers of their final round opponent in a very real, meaningful way that
>>> they knew might help them win in the campaign. London Breed was ranked 2nd
>>> or 3rd by nearly half of her final round opponent's backers, giving her a
>>> top three ranking from 63% of San Francisco voters In the governor's race
>>> in Maine, Janet Mills was the top 2nd choice of backers of her final round
>>> opponent Adam Cote, and 47% of his supporters ranked her 2nd or 3rd. In
>>> other words, if you add the votes she had in the final round with Cote
>>> votes ranking here highly she had the active backing of well over 70% of
>>> Democrats. That's an impressive improvement from having only 33% of 1st
>>> choices , and a nice reflection of the value of Mills "seeking consensus"
>>> in her RCV campaign.
>>> >
>>> > So Vlad, please excuse me if I don't see your argument as a reason not
>>> to improve our elections with ranked choice voting
>>> >
>>> > Thanks for reading,
>>> > Rob
>>> >
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>>> >
>>> > ------------------------------
>>> >
>>> > Message: 6
>>> > Date: Sat, 30 Jun 2018 10:24:05 -0400
>>> > From: Rob Richie <rr at fairvote.org>
>>> > To: "Kogan, Vladimir" <kogan.18 at osu.edu>
>>> > Cc: Election Law Listserv <law-election at uci.edu>
>>> > Subject: Re: [EL] RCV in San Francisco
>>> > Message-ID:
>>> > <CAM2RZHao1A80GjghGv-PaJ+-=ruwHdwknKVhW4ZFjRMrFiVDpQ at mail.gmail.com
>>> >
>>> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>>> >
>>> > I'm glad you do see RCV as a contextual improvement. Context always is
>>> > important.
>>> >
>>> > My final points on this today will be:
>>> >
>>> > * The data doesn't suggest that RCV will results in candidates winning
>>> with
>>> > fewer votes than plurality. Candidates of course do "forge on" within
>>> > plurality toady. When Perot ran in 1992, only one of 50 states was one
>>> with
>>> > a majority of the vote. RCV would clearly have been an improvement.
>>> And if
>>> > the major parties are truly so unrepresentative and so much in need of
>>> > "propping up" that we must maintain unfair voting rules, we have far
>>> deeper
>>> > problems to consider.
>>> >
>>> > * Winnowing the field to two in low turnout, highly unrepresentative
>>> > electorates to me is highly problematic. Several cities have gone to
>>> RCV
>>> > exactly because the data from such primaries revealed the disturbingly
>>> > small and unrepresentative nature of electorates that often determined
>>> > outcomes. That's one of my biggest concerns with Top Two in California
>>> in
>>> > contrast to ways that RCV could improve it: the turnout in June is
>>> much
>>> > less representative of the electorate than November especially among
>>> > Hispanic voters and young voters. Yet those Top Two primaries in June
>>> > effectively decide all but a handful of races, leaving the far more
>>> > representative November electorates with pretty rubber stamps, but
>>> little
>>> > meaningful role in defining their representation.
>>> >
>>> > * For those compelled to correct the "RCV is designed to uphold
>>> majority
>>> > rule" argument, I just hope they also rigorously challenge claims about
>>> > primary runoff elections, given their problems And I would say that
>>> what
>>> > advocates often say isn't unreasonable in a world in which we accept
>>> > imperfection: with RCV you can't win in the first round without a
>>> majority
>>> > and you can't win in the last round without a majority over your top
>>> > opponent, at least among those with a preference between those
>>> candidates
>>> > -- and that far more voters on average will express that final round
>>> > preference than come back for a runoff.
>>> >
>>> > Thanks,
>>> > Rob
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >> On Sat, Jun 30, 2018 at 10:04 AM, Kogan, Vladimir <kogan.18 at osu.edu>
>>> wrote:
>>> >>
>>> >> Rob,
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> Thanks for correcting my calculation! I would stop raising this point
>>> >> repeatedly if RCV proponents stopped continuing to claim that ?the
>>> goal of
>>> >> any runoff system is to ensure that the winner has a majority (50% +
>>> 1) of
>>> >> the vote and is the candidate preferred by the most voters.
>>> [Jurisdiction?s
>>> >> name] ?instant runoff? elections fulfill both goals.? When you say
>>> Fair
>>> >> Vote accepts the realities of imperfection, that sounds like you
>>> agree that
>>> >> RCV does not necessarily fulfill either goal. It would be great if
>>> >> advocates stopped making this argument.
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> I completely agree with you that RCV can be an improvement in many
>>> cases.
>>> >> San Francisco?s previous system of holding the runoff in December when
>>> >> turnout was abysmal was definitely one case where RCV is almost
>>> certainly
>>> >> is better. Primaries with runoffs are another. I also think adding
>>> RCV to a
>>> >> top-two primary system would be desirable if one wants to have a
>>> top-two
>>> >> primary system, for the reason you point out.
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> However, I think the case is less clear for other systems -- for
>>> example,
>>> >> when local jurisdictions have nonpartisan primaries in June and runoff
>>> >> elections on-cycle in November. In this scenario, the winner of the
>>> >> November run-off may end up with more votes than would be the case
>>> under an
>>> >> alternative system with no June primary and just an RCV election in
>>> >> November with considerable ballot exhaustion. (Whether the two
>>> candidates
>>> >> that make it to the final RCV redistribution round are ?better? or
>>> >> different than the candidates who make it to the November runoff is an
>>> >> empirical question.)
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> I?m particularly skeptical of adding RCV to presidential general
>>> elections
>>> >> (an argument Ned Foley makes in the paper I linked to earlier), given
>>> how
>>> >> this would change the incentives for third-party and independent
>>> candidate
>>> >> entry; I can imagine scenarios where under RCV, a presidential
>>> candidate
>>> >> could win a state?s electoral votes with a smaller share of the total
>>> valid
>>> >> votes cast (given sufficiently high levels of exhaustion) than would
>>> be the
>>> >> case under the current plurality system used in most states.
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> Vlad
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> [image: The Ohio State University]
>>> >> *Vladimir Kogan*, Associate Professor
>>> >> *Department of Political Science*
>>> >>
>>> >> 2004 Derby Hall | 154 N. Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210
>>> <https://maps.google.com/?q=154+N.+Oval+Mall,+Columbus,+OH+43210&entry=gmail&source=g>
>>> >> <https://maps.google.com/?q=154+N.+Oval+Mall,+Columbus,+OH+
>>> 43210&entry=gmail&source=g>
>>> >> -1373
>>> >> 510/415-4074 Mobile
>>> >>
>>> >> 614/292-9498 Office
>>> >>
>>> >> 614/292-1146 Fax
>>> >>
>>> >> http://u.osu.edu/kogan.18/
>>> >> kogan.18 at osu.edu
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> *From:* Rob Richie [mailto:rr at fairvote.org <rr at fairvote.org>]
>>> >> *Sent:* Saturday, June 30, 2018 9:26 AM
>>> >> *To:* Kogan, Vladimir
>>> >> *Cc:* Rick Hasen; Election Law Listserv
>>> >> *Subject:* Re: [EL] RCV in San Francisco
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> Vlad,
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> I find your "broken record" repetition on this topic overly
>>> selective.
>>> >> I'll make three points that include a correction and what I trust are
>>> >> several useful numbers
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> * You suggested last week that FairVote has given up on the goal of
>>> >> representative outcomes -- that is, fair representation of both those
>>> in
>>> >> the majority and the minority. That's not true. We just accept the
>>> >> realities of imperfection. You set up ranked choice voting in
>>> contrast to a
>>> >> theoretical model of majoritarian perfection that our current systems
>>> don't
>>> >> remotely achieve. Note, however, one could achieve your goal if we
>>> >> followed Australia's model of mandating voting and mandating rankings.
>>> >> Every RCV winner in Australia's House elections must earn a majority
>>> of
>>> >> votes from registered voters who didn't want to risk being fined and
>>> who
>>> >> cast a valid ballot.
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> * But we don't mandate voting in the USA and that's not FairVote's
>>> fight.
>>> >> Americans don't include the huge majorities of eligible and registered
>>> >> voters who don't vote in our primaries (and most of our other
>>> elections)
>>> >> in the "denominator" when we report percentages for winners. We don't
>>> >> report undervotes when reporting winning majorities. If we did, we'd
>>> have
>>> >> lots of low single digit "winners." And to be clear, the primary
>>> runoff
>>> >> elections that you seem to give a free pass make it WORSE on average,
>>> not
>>> >> better. We're now just over halfway through the primary season, and
>>> there
>>> >> have been 23 primary runoff elections. Notably
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> -- The median runoff primary winner earned LESS than their vote total
>>> in
>>> >> the first round. This obviously can never happen with ranked choice
>>> voting
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> --- The 23 winners all earned Vlad-defined "majorities" in the
>>> runoff, but
>>> >> all but nine of them earned less than a third of the first round
>>> primary
>>> >> vote. Only three surpassed the 46.2% earned by London Breed in San
>>> >> Francisco despite the ballot that that limits rankings to three.
>>> (Vlad is
>>> >> using the wrong denominator in San Francisco, as he counts first round
>>> >> undervotes that no one uses when determining majorities in elections
>>> that
>>> >> might go to runoffs.)
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> -- Of those three relatively strong runoff showings, only two had
>>> >> majorities of the 1st round: one got 50.6% of the 1st round and the
>>> other
>>> >> 55.4%
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> -- In addition the runoff candidates might not be the most
>>> representative
>>> >> candidates. The top two finishers in runoffs can include candidates
>>> who get
>>> >> to the runoff only due to split votes. We've in fact had important
>>> runoffs
>>> >> recently under "Top Two primary" rules where no candidates from the
>>> party
>>> >> with the most primary votes made the runoff - that happened in 2016
>>> in the
>>> >> Washington State treasurer race (affecting Democrats) and a Georgia
>>> state
>>> >> senate special election (affecting Republicans.) RCV is far more
>>> reliable
>>> >> to have the strongest two candidates make the final round -- not with
>>> 100%
>>> >> perfection, but clearly an improvement over runoffs without an RCV
>>> ballot.
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> --- Of course, most of our primaries this year have been held with
>>> >> plurality rules. 10 winners of US House and US Senate primaries
>>> earned less
>>> >> than 30%, and another 16 won less than 40%. Two (WV-3 and PA-13)
>>> >> Republican primaries were won with less than 24% in heavily GOP
>>> district
>>> >> that Trump won by more than 50%. Interesting to think about from a
>>> view of
>>> >> "majority rule."
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> * So let's look at RCV, which absolutely outperforms plurality and
>>> runoff
>>> >> elections -- it's not even close. Maine used RCV for the 1st time,
>>> with
>>> >> very limited state-financed voter education. Democrats had more valid
>>> >> votes for governor in a primary than ever before in state history. Two
>>> >> primaries requiring instant runoffs - the governor's race and the 2nd
>>> >> congressional district. The impact of RCV were:
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> - Governor: Janet Mills went 33.09% in the first round to 50.2% of
>>> the
>>> >> first round vote total (and 54.1% of active votes in final round).
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> - CD-2: Jared Golden went 46.4% of the first round from an instant
>>> runoff
>>> >> found of 54.3% of the first round vote total - that is, a higher
>>> winning
>>> >> percentage than all but one of the 23 congressional primary runoff
>>> winners
>>> >> this year using the same measure.
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> - But that's not all. These candidates were also seeking support from
>>> >> backers of their final round opponent in a very real, meaningful way
>>> that
>>> >> they knew might help them win in the campaign. London Breed was
>>> ranked 2nd
>>> >> or 3rd by nearly half of her final round opponent's backers, giving
>>> her a
>>> >> top three ranking from 63% of San Francisco voters In the governor's
>>> race
>>> >> in Maine, Janet Mills was the top 2nd choice of backers of her final
>>> round
>>> >> opponent Adam Cote, and 47% of his supporters ranked her 2nd or 3rd.
>>> In
>>> >> other words, if you add the votes she had in the final round with Cote
>>> >> votes ranking here highly she had the active backing of well over 70%
>>> of
>>> >> Democrats. That's an impressive improvement from having only 33% of
>>> 1st
>>> >> choices , and a nice reflection of the value of Mills "seeking
>>> consensus"
>>> >> in her RCV campaign.
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> So Vlad, please excuse me if I don't see your argument as a reason
>>> not to
>>> >> improve our elections with ranked choice voting
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> Thanks for reading,
>>> >>
>>> >> Rob
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > --
>>> > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>>> > Rob Richie
>>> > President and CEO, FairVote
>>> > 6930 Carroll Avenue, Suite 240
>>> <https://maps.google.com/?q=6930+Carroll+Avenue,+Suite+240+%0D%0A+Takoma+Park,+MD+20912&entry=gmail&source=g>
>>> > Takoma Park, MD 20912
>>> <https://maps.google.com/?q=6930+Carroll+Avenue,+Suite+240+%0D%0A+Takoma+Park,+MD+20912&entry=gmail&source=g>
>>> > rr at fairvote.org (301) 270-4616 http://www.fairvote.org
>>> > *FairVote Facebook <https://www.facebook.com/FairVoteReform>*
>>> *FairVote
>>> > Twitter <https://twitter.com/fairvote>* My Twitter
>>> > <https://twitter.com/rob_richie>
>>> >
>>> > Thank you for considering a *donation
>>> > <http://www.fairvote.org/donate>. Enjoy our video on ranked choice
>>> voting
>>> > <https://youtu.be/CIz_nzP-W_c>!*
>>> > (Note: Our Combined Federal Campaign number is 10132.)
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>>> > ------------------------------
>>> >
>>> > Message: 7
>>> > Date: Sat, 30 Jun 2018 14:41:36 +0000
>>> > From: "Kogan, Vladimir" <kogan.18 at osu.edu>
>>> > To: Rob Richie <rr at fairvote.org>
>>> > Cc: Election Law Listserv <law-election at uci.edu>
>>> > Subject: Re: [EL] RCV in San Francisco
>>> > Message-ID:
>>> > <DDC97B3393E2AB4C85D66A2817A2C348CA528574 at CIO-TNC-D2MBX06.os
>>> uad.osu.edu>
>>> >
>>> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>>> >
>>> > Rob,
>>> >
>>> > I don?t want to drag out the conversation/debate, and I agree with
>>> much of what you wrote. I do want to make one point: We?ve found<
>>> http://glenn.osu.edu/educational-governance/research/
>>> research-attributes/KLP_Timing.pdf> (much to my surprise) that the
>>> difference in the composition of the electorate between primary elections
>>> and November even-year midterm elections is actually smaller than the
>>> differences in composition between presidential November elections and
>>> midterm November elections. (The difference between primaries and odd-year
>>> November elections is even smaller.) So if one is concerned about
>>> electorate composition and representativeness, I think the distinction
>>> between presidential November elections and all others is more important
>>> than between different type of lower-turnout elections.
>>> >
>>> > Vlad
>>> >
>>> > PS: My concern is that we might see more ?Perot?-type candidacies
>>> under RCV than we do today, since the threat of potentially splitting the
>>> vote and producing the worst possible outcome, which kept Bloomberg from
>>> running, would be diminished.
>>> >
>>> > [The Ohio State University]
>>> > Vladimir Kogan, Associate Professor
>>> > Department of Political Science
>>> > 2004 Derby Hall | 154 N. Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210
>>> <https://maps.google.com/?q=154+N.+Oval+Mall,+Columbus,+OH+43210&entry=gmail&source=g>
>>> -1373
>>> > 510/415-4074 Mobile
>>> > 614/292-9498 Office
>>> > 614/292-1146 Fax
>>> > http://u.osu.edu/kogan.18/
>>> > kogan.18 at osu.edu<mailto:kogan.18 at osu.edu <kogan.18 at osu.edu>>
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > From: Rob Richie [mailto:rr at fairvote.org <rr at fairvote.org>]
>>> > Sent: Saturday, June 30, 2018 10:24 AM
>>> > To: Kogan, Vladimir
>>> > Cc: Rick Hasen; Election Law Listserv
>>> > Subject: Re: [EL] RCV in San Francisco
>>> >
>>> > I'm glad you do see RCV as a contextual improvement. Context always is
>>> important.
>>> >
>>> > My final points on this today will be:
>>> >
>>> > * The data doesn't suggest that RCV will results in candidates winning
>>> with fewer votes than plurality. Candidates of course do "forge on" within
>>> plurality toady. When Perot ran in 1992, only one of 50 states was one with
>>> a majority of the vote. RCV would clearly have been an improvement. And if
>>> the major parties are truly so unrepresentative and so much in need of
>>> "propping up" that we must maintain unfair voting rules, we have far deeper
>>> problems to consider.
>>> >
>>> > * Winnowing the field to two in low turnout, highly unrepresentative
>>> electorates to me is highly problematic. Several cities have gone to RCV
>>> exactly because the data from such primaries revealed the disturbingly
>>> small and unrepresentative nature of electorates that often determined
>>> outcomes. That's one of my bi
>>>
>>>
>
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