[EL] Polarization and reform

Sat Apr 13 11:54:36 PDT 2019

Whether costs of campaigning are related to the “threshold of favorable vote to get elected” is an empirical question, and I’m curious to know what the evidence shows. My intuitions would be that some of the costs are a function of district size – e.g., purchasing television ads in more media markets will always cost more than purchasing ads in fewer media markets; number of campaign offices that need to be leased and staffed are probably a function of geography/population, not the winning threshold.

[The Ohio State University]
Vladimir Kogan, Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
2004 Derby Hall | 154 N. Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210-1373
510/415-4074 Mobile
614/292-9498 Office
614/292-1146 Fax
http://u.osu.edu/kogan.18/
kogan.18 at osu.edu<mailto:kogan.18 at osu.edu>
[Twitter icon]@vkoganosu<https://twitter.com/vkoganosu>

From: Suresh S. [mailto:suresh_surya at protonmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, April 13, 2019 12:18 PM
To: Kogan, Vladimir
Cc: Rob Richie; law-election at UCI.EDU
Subject: Re: [EL] Polarization and reform

The reformed multi member district by meeting the one person, one vote criterion offers a lower threshold of favorable vote to get elected. A determined minority has a chance to get elected without requiring to canvass the support of 50%+1 of the larger district. If there was no proportional voting scheme, your concern about moderates finding it harder to raise campaign funds for coverage of a larger district would be valid. Please feel free to disagree as the above reasoning is book knowledge, no practical experience raising money or running political campaigns.

Regarding polarization, in my efforts to request elected officials attend to misuse of technology described earlier, their earnestness is subject to manipulation. Case in point, my efforts to seek the help of a Congressman from Maryland described in:
https://competitionunlimited.files.wordpress.com/2019/01/md_congressman_ruppersberger_request.pdf
and
https://competitionunlimited.files.wordpress.com/2019/01/md_congressman_ruppersberger_response.jpg
demonstrates the ability of the said form of coercion/manipulation silence any good intention the elected official may have.

Disallowing moderation* and marshalling support for polarizing topics is achieved by the said technology misuse. My 11+ years of meeting leaders in government and academia in the U.S. and India (where I currently live) go coy has made me recognize the inertia to conscientious decision-making. Not knowing (a) from which direction one is prone to be victimized, (b) recognize leading indicators of failing health, (c) how to defend oneself and (d) who the perpetrator is, gives valid cause for reticence.

Best Regards,
Suresh

[*] In this email sent to the National Treasury Employees Union, I describe the loss of moderating forces who give primacy to due process rather than personality politics https://competitionunlimited.files.wordpress.com/2019/03/nat_treasury_employees_union-john_mccain.pdf.

‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
On Saturday, 13 April 2019 20:14, Kogan, Vladimir <kogan.18 at osu.edu> wrote:

If one is convinced by Andy’s supply-side argument —that polarization has increased because the type of candidates who are willing to run have become more extreme, then there is reason to worry about reforms like Fair Representation Act. Andy argues that one of the major costs of running that discourages moderates is the need to raise money from donors. And increasing district size (as the Fair Representation Act would do) would almost certainly increase the costs of campaigning, and the contributions necessary, which may actually further shrink the supply of willing candidates and skew it to be more extreme.

[image001.png]
Vladimir Kogan, Associate Professor
Department of Political Science

2004 Derby Hall | 154 N. Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210-1373
510/415-4074 Mobile

614/292-9498 Office

614/292-1146 Fax

http://u.osu.edu/kogan.18/
kogan.18 at osu.edu<mailto:kogan.18 at osu.edu>

[image002.gif]@vkoganosu<https://twitter.com/vkoganosu>

From: Law-election [mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] On Behalf Of Rob Richie
Sent: Saturday, April 13, 2019 9:35 AM
To: law-election at UCI.EDU
Subject: [EL] ELB News and Commentary 4/11/19

Looks like an important read. As people discuss electoral  reform and polarization, I would urge them to zero in on the potential of two proposals associated with my organization FairVote before coming to any conclusions about the impact of reform on polarization.

One is the Fair Representation Act as first introduced in Congress in 2017, and soon to be introduced in updated form this year. This modest statutory revision of winner take all congressional elections would provide backers of both major parties with the power to elect candidates in every part of the country, and reliably represent the left, center and right in any given area. Both David Brooks and Matthew  Yglesias last year wrote commentaries with headlines to the effect that this is the best approach to save our democracy. We provide detailed simulations of how it might work, and relevant commentary here.

https://www.fairvote.org/fair_rep_in_congress#why_we_need_the_fair_representation_act

The other proposal is to the Top Four primary: that is, modify the top two primary to advance more than two candidates, allow writeins, allow candidates and parties association rights,  and use ranked choice voting. While not as comprehensive as the Fair Representation Act, its potential impact is worth a close look.

An impressive group of political scientists and law professors evaluated the potential impact of a slew of 37 reforms back in 2015, putting the Fair Representation Act atop the list.  See the final report here:

https://www.fairvote.org/comparative-structural-reform

- Rob Richie

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