[EL] Polarization and reform

Sat Apr 13 19:07:15 PDT 2019

The author of the book may not be aware (if on this list, please comment) of methods to arm twisting, especially the extralegal involving technology. If you or I were elected to any elected office, would we not be vulnerable to get coerced into taking a path that is un-opposing to a perpetrator (of extralegal harm) interest?

‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
On Sunday, 14 April 2019 06:33, Kogan, Vladimir <kogan.18 at osu.edu> wrote:

> The book finds no evidence that moderates become more polarized under duress (at least, as measured using Adam Bonica's CFscores). For example, incumbents don't become more extreme when they face a primary challenger.
>
> To clarify, I'm not saying moderates have a slim chance of getting elected. In fact, the book shows they are more likely to get elected. The argument is that they are less likely to run (compared to extremists) when the costs are higher. One cost is the amount of fundraising required.
> ---------------------------------------------------------------
>
> From: Suresh S. <suresh_surya at protonmail.com>
> Sent: Saturday, April 13, 2019 8:58:31 PM
> To: larrylevine at earthlink.net
> Cc: Kogan, Vladimir; law-election at uci.edu
> Subject: RE: [EL] Polarization and reform
>
> If your and Vladimir's view that lower threshold does not equate to less spending is true, i.e., moderates hold a slim chance of getting voted to the Congress, would you both disagree that an elected candidate who was considered moderate^ will not be forced to polarize from duress^^?
>
> [^] John Sides: I was struck by this statistic early in the book: Even if voters had picked the most moderate candidate in every U.S. House election between 1980 and 2014, 80 percent of the polarization between Democratic and Republican members would have occurred anyway.
>
> [^^] Any extralegal means to hold a person captive.
>
> Original Message
> On Sunday, 14 April 2019 01:35, <larrylevine at earthlink.net> wrote:
>
>> The flaw in this logic is that the need to spend is more dependent on the number of potential voters in a district. If one were to reduce spending as presented here, would that reduction be by 1) spending less to communicate with all likely voters, or b) omit certain voters from the universe in which you are campaigning. The first weakens the ability of winning support from all potential voters. The latter increases the need to garner an unlikely percentage of votes from a reduce universe. The threshold may be lower, but it is lower for everyone. The one(s) with the most money will be able to communicate more effectively with more voters.
>>
>> Larry
>>
>> From: Suresh S. <suresh_surya at protonmail.com>
>> Sent: Saturday, 13 April 2019 10:28 AM
>> To: larrylevine at earthlink.net
>> Cc: 'Kogan, Vladimir' <kogan.18 at osu.edu>; law-election at uci.edu
>> Subject: RE: [EL] Polarization and reform
>>
>> Can campaign spending increase due to din from elections to Congress, President equate to campaign spending _for_ Congress?
>>
>> My reasoning is, if spending to get elected to Congress being X with district size D for 50%+1 criteria, without proportional voting, district size D+ will proportionately increase expenses to X+. However, with proportional voting (lower threshold to get elected), X or a lower value appears to  be sufficient to muster support though the district size has increased to D+.
>>
>> Suresh
>>
>> Original Message
>>
>> On Saturday, 13 April 2019 21:57, <larrylevine at earthlink.net> wrote:
>>
>>> City of Los Angeles switched its municipal elections from odd numbered years to even numbered years. Odd year elections were drawing turnouts of 11 to 25 percent. To have more participation, the city switched to a cycle in which turnout would be between 50 percent and 75 percent. This led the city ethics commission to increase the spending limits for campaigns and increase the matching funds for which candidates could qualify. The executive director of the ethics commission testified at a hearing before the switch and said it would be more difficult for municipal candidates to raise funds in an environment that included statewide and legislative candidates, have their messages heard in the din of Presidential and gubernatorial campaigning, and raise the funds to campaign for the larger audience. She was correct on all fronts. Not a reason to not change; just a reality of campaigning for office.
>>>
>>> Larry
>>>
>>> From: Law-election <law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu> On Behalf Of Suresh S.
>>> Sent: Saturday, 13 April 2019 9:18 AM
>>> To: Kogan, Vladimir <kogan.18 at osu.edu>
>>> Cc: law-election at uci.edu
>>> Subject: Re: [EL] Polarization and reform
>>>
>>> The reformed multi member district by meeting the one person, one vote criterion offers a lower threshold of favorable vote to get elected. A determined minority has a chance to get elected without requiring to canvass the support of 50%+1 of the larger district. If there was no proportional voting scheme, your concern about moderates finding it harder to raise campaign funds for coverage of a larger district would be valid. Please feel free to disagree as the above reasoning is book knowledge, no practical experience raising money or running political campaigns.
>>>
>>> Regarding polarization, in my efforts to request elected officials attend to misuse of technology described earlier, their earnestness is subject to manipulation. Case in point, my efforts to seek the help of a Congressman from Maryland described in:
>>>
>>> https://competitionunlimited.files.wordpress.com/2019/01/md_congressman_ruppersberger_request.pdf
>>>
>>> and
>>>
>>> https://competitionunlimited.files.wordpress.com/2019/01/md_congressman_ruppersberger_response.jpg
>>>
>>> demonstrates the ability of the said form of coercion/manipulation silence any good intention the elected official may have.
>>>
>>> Disallowing moderation* and marshalling support for polarizing topics is achieved by the said technology misuse. My 11+ years of meeting leaders in government and academia in the U.S. and India (where I currently live) go coy has made me recognize the inertia to conscientious decision-making. Not knowing (a) from which direction one is prone to be victimized, (b) recognize leading indicators of failing health, (c) how to defend oneself and (d) who the perpetrator is, gives valid cause for reticence.
>>>
>>> Best Regards,
>>>
>>> Suresh
>>>
>>> [*] In this email sent to the National Treasury Employees Union, I describe the loss of moderating forces who give primacy to due process rather than personality politics https://competitionunlimited.files.wordpress.com/2019/03/nat_treasury_employees_union-john_mccain.pdf.
>>>
>>> Original Message
>>>
>>> On Saturday, 13 April 2019 20:14, Kogan, Vladimir <kogan.18 at osu.edu> wrote:
>>>
>>>> If one is convinced by Andy’s supply-side argument —that polarization has increased because the type of candidates who are willing to run have become more extreme, then there is reason to worry about reforms like Fair Representation Act. Andy argues that one of the major costs of running that discourages moderates is the need to raise money from donors. And increasing district size (as the Fair Representation Act would do) would almost certainly increase the costs of campaigning, and the contributions necessary, which may actually further shrink the supply of willing candidates and skew it to be more extreme.
>>>>
>>>> [image001.png]
>>>> Vladimir Kogan, Associate Professor
>>>> Department of Political Science
>>>>
>>>> 2004 Derby Hall | 154 N. Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210-1373
>>>> 510/415-4074 Mobile
>>>>
>>>> 614/292-9498 Office
>>>>
>>>> 614/292-1146 Fax
>>>>
>>>> http://u.osu.edu/kogan.18/
>>>> kogan.18 at osu.edu
>>>>
>>>> [image002.gif][@vkoganosu](https://twitter.com/vkoganosu)
>>>>
>>>> From: Law-election [mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu] On Behalf Of Rob Richie
>>>> Sent: Saturday, April 13, 2019 9:35 AM
>>>> To: law-election at UCI.EDU
>>>> Subject: [EL] ELB News and Commentary 4/11/19
>>>>
>>>> Looks like an important read. As people discuss electoral  reform and polarization, I would urge them to zero in on the potential of two proposals associated with my organization FairVote before coming to any conclusions about the impact of reform on polarization.
>>>>
>>>> One is the Fair Representation Act as first introduced in Congress in 2017, and soon to be introduced in updated form this year. This modest statutory revision of winner take all congressional elections would provide backers of both major parties with the power to elect candidates in every part of the country, and reliably represent the left, center and right in any given area. Both David Brooks and Matthew  Yglesias last year wrote commentaries with headlines to the effect that this is the best approach to save our democracy. We provide detailed simulations of how it might work, and relevant commentary here.
>>>>
>>>> https://www.fairvote.org/fair_rep_in_congress#why_we_need_the_fair_representation_act
>>>>
>>>> The other proposal is to the Top Four primary: that is, modify the top two primary to advance more than two candidates, allow writeins, allow candidates and parties association rights,  and use ranked choice voting. While not as comprehensive as the Fair Representation Act, its potential impact is worth a close look.
>>>>
>>>> An impressive group of political scientists and law professors evaluated the potential impact of a slew of 37 reforms back in 2015, putting the Fair Representation Act atop the list.  See the final report here:
>>>>
>>>> https://www.fairvote.org/comparative-structural-reform
>>>>
>>>> - Rob Richie
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