[EL] ELB News and Commentary 1/24/19

[Rick Hasen]

“Georgia official seeks to replace criticized voting machines”<https://electionlawblog.org/?p=103297>
Posted on January 23, 2019 7:56 pm<https://electionlawblog.org/?p=103297> by Rick Hasen<https://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

AP<https://www.abc4.com/news/politics/georgia-sos-seeks-to-replace-criticized-voting-machines/1719350863>:

 Georgia’s new elections chief asked lawmakers Wednesday for $150 million to replace the state’s outdated electronic voting machines. In doing so, he all but closed the door on a hand-marked paper balloting system that experts say is cheapest and most secure.

Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger told Georgia legislators meeting for budget hearings that a new voting system is his top priority. Cybersecurity experts and voting integrity activists say the touch-screen machines Georgia has used since 2002 are vulnerable to hacking and can’t be audited effectively because they produce no verifiable paper record
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Posted in voting technology<https://electionlawblog.org/?cat=40>


Gerry Hebert on von Spakovsky and Adams: “Setting the Record Straight”<https://electionlawblog.org/?p=103295>
Posted on January 23, 2019 7:48 pm<https://electionlawblog.org/?p=103295> by Rick Hasen<https://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

The great Gerry Hebert writes<https://campaignlegal.org/update/setting-record-straight>:

Frustrated supporters of voter suppression measures have decided that the way to advance their cause is by personally attacking those who have fought against voter suppression – including me.
Past posts by Hans von Spakovsky and Christian Adams called me a “heavily sanctioned election lawyer” with a “checkered history with the truth.” In 2017, when I submitted testimony opposing the nomination of Jeff Sessions to be Attorney General, Adams was at it again. He claimed that I have “a history of making things up about racial issues.”
He and others, including Senator Ted Cruz, claimed I had recanted my 1986 testimony against Jeff Sessions when he was nominated for a federal judgeship. I did no such thing, and I was pleased to see then-Senator Al Franken obliterate<https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4654153/sen-franken-statement-ag-nominee-jeff-sessions> Cruz’s and Adams’s claims, point by point, during the Sessions nomination hearing.
Last month, another article, this time regarding Thomas Farr, a judicial nominee who failed to be confirmed as a federal judge late last year because he was connected to a vote suppression scheme, referenced me again and repeated Adams’s false claim. I decided then that I would no longer let people like von Spakovsky, Adams, and others of their ilk obscure the real issues, and that their unfounded, inaccurate claims merit a short response.
This will be my first and only response to their false claims against me, even though I feel certain that they will be repeated again by the same people. Some people just can’t take the truth for an answer.
I am proud of my 45-year career in the Department of Justice and private practice, and I have never been “sanctioned” by any court, grievance committee, or anyone else.
What von Spakovsky and Adams constantly refer to is a case in which the Department of Justice – not me personally – was ordered to pay the opponents’ attorney fees because the court found that the Department’s claims were not “substantially justified.” I was one of the lead trial lawyers in the case, so it is worth a short description.
The case involved an election in which white county election officials improperly allowed dozens of white voters who lived outside a county commission district to vote, and the white candidate defeated the black candidate by only 10 votes. There was no question these votes were illegal, so the question boiled down to whether the officials’ actions were racially discriminatory, as the Department alleged, or simply a mistake, as the officials claimed.
The case, United States v. Jones, took place in Dallas County, Alabama (the county seat is Selma), and was one case in a decades-long series of voting discrimination cases brought there. Voting discrimination in Dallas County, accompanied by brutality, led to the Selma march in 1965 and prompted passage of the Voting Rights Act.
Even though black voters became a majority in Dallas County, the County Commission remained all-white because of the election system used there, so the Department of Justice sued in 1978 to achieve a non-discriminatory election system. That lawsuit resulted in new elections in 1988, which produced a 3-to-2 black majority on the Commission, with the third black commissioner being elected from a “swing” district that was closely divided between white and black voters. (Then, in 1990, DOJ had to go back to court because the County was trying to cut the normally 4-year terms to 2 years in order to force new elections again. The Department was successful again.)
Against this background, the 1992 elections took place, and somehow several dozen white voters who lived outside the closely-divided “swing” district that had elected a black commissioner in 1988 were allowed by white election officials to vote in that district. The official who permitted these white voters to vote illegally in the swing district was the white probate judge who had defended the racially discriminatory at-large county election scheme. The result of the 1992 election, as mentioned earlier, was a narrow victory by the white candidate by a margin of 10 votes.
These votes were plainly illegal, and while the black candidate sought relief in the state court, the Alabama courts took no action based on state law. Black voters complained to the Department of Justice (DOJ), and an investigation by the Department and the FBI took place. I was involved in that investigation, which was also approved by several levels of supervisors, which is standard DOJ procedure. Based on the investigation, the Department found that white voters had voted illegally in the election and concluded that allowing these illegal voters to cast ballots in the swing district had produced a racially discriminatory effect, and that county election officials intended this racially discriminatory result. DOJ filed a lawsuit making those allegations. I was part of the process of recommending the lawsuit, which again was approved by several levels of my DOJ supervisors.
The suit was tried before a single district judge without a jury. He ruled against the Department on grounds of both discriminatory purpose and effect. The judge found that the voters had indeed voted in the wrong district, as we had alleged, but he agreed with county officials that their actions were just mistakes and did not violate federal law. DOJ appealed (I had left DOJ by the time it appealed) and the court of appeals affirmed the decision. The defendants argued that the DOJ should have to pay legal fees incurred in defending the district court’s judgment, but the appeals court rejected the claim for fees.
After that, the case went back to the district court for further proceedings. By that time, as noted above, I had left the Department, and had no further involvement in the case. The county officials argued again that their fees should be paid by the Department, and even though the district court found that the Voting Rights Act claim was substantially justified, this time the district court agreed to award fees to defendants.
The decision to award fees was appealed by the Justice Department (both the Voting and Appellate Sections of DOJ’s Civil Rights Division urged an appeal, and the Solicitor General’s office approved, again standard DOJ procedure). This time, a court of appeals panel (consisting of different judges than the first time) agreed that the Department should pay fees for bringing a constitutional claim of intentional discrimination that had no substantial justification. The court of appeals opinion had harsh words for the Department’s case and expressed sympathy for the county officials and concern for what this “unjustified” case had done to harmonious race relations in Dallas County.
I still disagree with the courts’ decisions, especially the court of appeals’ non-credible statement that Dallas County and Selma had harmonious race relations that were undermined by the Department’s suit. Anyone who litigated civil rights cases in Alabama, as I did for more than 25 years between 1973 and 1998, knows that race relations in Selma and Dallas County were toxic. But my disagreement doesn’t matter, of course, because the courts’ decisions are the decisions.
What does matter is that this case, including the decisions, provides no basis for the accusations that I am a “heavily sanctioned” lawyer and other similar claims that von Spakovsky and Adams like to throw around.
One final point about this case: After I left the DOJ in 1994, the district judge who had ruled against the United States in that case and who had later imposed fees against DOJ sent me a gracious note complimenting my skill and professional approach to the litigation in his court. After that, when I had left the Department, the two of us had a cordial lunch when I visited him in Mobile.
I stand by my conduct in that case and the hundreds of civil rights and voting rights cases I have been involved in over the last 45 years. And I stand by my reputation. If we have issues to debate about judicial nominees like Jeff Sessions, Thomas Farr, or others, or if we have different views about vote suppression, and we certainly do, let’s debate them on the substance and not by name-calling and misrepresentations.

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Posted in fraudulent fraud squad<https://electionlawblog.org/?cat=8>


“Cuyahoga County elections board seeks public comment on new electronic voting equipment”<https://electionlawblog.org/?p=103292>
Posted on January 23, 2019 7:28 pm<https://electionlawblog.org/?p=103292> by Rick Hasen<https://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

Cleveland.com<https://www.cleveland.com/metro/2019/01/cuyahoga-county-elections-board-seeks-public-comment-on-new-electronic-voting-equipment.html>:

The Cuyahoga County Board of Elections invited public comment Wednesday on three proposals for replacing electronic voting equipment.

The elections board plans to replace hundreds of scanners at polling locations and several high-speed central scanners at board headquarters, all of which have been in use for over a decade.
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Posted in voting technology<https://electionlawblog.org/?cat=40>


Mulroy: The Electoral College: Time To Graduate [corrected post]<https://electionlawblog.org/?p=103261>
Posted on January 23, 2019 10:40 am<https://electionlawblog.org/?p=103261> by Rick Hasen<https://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

[Bumping to the top because this original post was inadvertently incomplete.]

The following is the first of three guest posts by University of Memphis law professor Steve Mulroy<https://www.memphis.edu/law/faculty-staff/steve-mulroy.php>, sounding some themes from his fascinating new book, Rethinking US Election Law: Unskewing the System<https://www.amazon.com/Rethinking-Us-Election-Law-Unskewing/dp/1788117506>:

We all know it is possible for a presidential candidate with fewer votes to win in the Electoral College over one with more votes. But we also saw elections in the House<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/11/06/in-2012-democrats-won-the-popular-vote-but-lost-the-house-not-this-year/?utm_term=.5f3e1ddce50a> (2012)  where the party with the majority of votes doesn’t control a majority of seats.[1]<http://electionlawblog.org/#_ftn1>   One can find similar results at the state and local level.

For all, the fundamental problem is holding winner-take-all elections within single-member political subdivisions—States for the Electoral College and Senate, and districts for the House as well as state and local elections.   Even where there is no counter-majoritarian result, these electoral features can often lead to a significant “skew” between votes and seats won by a political party, racial minority, or other politically cohesive group.

The skew likely will only get worse, as “demographic clustering” (aka “The Big Sort<http://www.thebigsort.com/home.php>”) continues, with Democrats overconcentrating in cities, leading to “natural gerrymanders.”  By 2040, 30% of Americans  <https://demographics.coopercenter.org/united-states-interactive-map> will control 70% of the Senate, and they will not be demographically representative of the nation as a whole.<https://twitter.com/normornstein/status/1016789064379334656?s=11>

We should be troubled by such results.  Elections are designed to measure popular will; they should reflect that will accurately.

In my book<https://books.google.com/books?id=P6V-DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT13&lpg=PT13&dq=since+WWII,+average+of+6%25+deviation+between+votes+and+seats+in+US+House+elections&source=bl&ots=ZQzMHY4bHJ&sig=ACfU3U2WH_v1eBfdbZ5VUe_2dqJpxYO1qw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiTxcacifvfAhULXKwKHcSpA1IQ6AEwDnoECAEQAQ#v=onepage&q=since%20WWII%2C%20average%20of%206%25%20deviation%20between%20votes%20and%20seats%20in%20US%20House%20elections&f=false>, I propose reforms to address these problems.  This post focuses on the Electoral College.

The Framers devised the College out of an inherent distrust of common voters<http://avalon.com.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_717.asp> ;  <http://avalon.com.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_717.asp> a desire to placate slave-holding states<https://academic.oup.com/jah/article-abstract/73/1/35/782082?redirectedFrom=fulltext> ; and as a compromise between large and small states.  None are persuasive today.  It’s not even clear the College really does protect small states.  Instead, it transfers power to about 10 swing states<https://www.cookpoliticalreport.com/analysis/national/2018-almanac-american-politics-preview/two-nations>, only 2 of which are in the bottom half of states by population.

The best modern defense of the College is the notion that it prevents a candidate with regionally isolated appeal from winning despite deep unpopularity in the rest of the nation’s regions.  But under any reasonable definition of “region” today, no one region would be enough to win the popular vote; a candidate would need to dominate in several major regions, by which time they’d likely be racking up Electoral College wins as well.

Abolishing the College through constitutional amendment is politically fanciful.  There are at least 10 swing states which would have every incentive to fight their loss of outsize influence, almost enough to defeat the ¾ majority required.  But there is a workaround: the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact<https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/>.

The NPV Compact builds on the settled<https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/146/1/> rule that state legislatures have plenary authority in allocating Electoral College votes.  State legislatures pass laws awarding all their Electoral votes to whichever candidate receives the national popular vote.  In an ingenious solution to the “Who goes first?” problem, the Compact only becomes effective once enough states sign on to control 270 Electoral College votes, and thus the election outcome.  The Compact is currently at 172 Electoral votes, almost 2/3 of the way there.

The common policy objections to the Compact are either retreads of the arguments over the College itself, or otherwise lacking in force.  The legal objections fare little better.

A common legal objection sounds in the Compact Clause<https://www.usconstitution.net/xconst_A1Sec10.html,>, which prohibits any State from entering into “any Agreement or Compact with another State” without the consent of Congress.  But the Supreme Court has long interpreted<https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/148/503/%C2%A0%C2%A0%C2%A0%20https:/supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/434/452/> that Clause narrowly to apply only to agreements which encroach on federal authority.  Another objection, that it somehow gives some other entity besides the state legislature the final say, both overlooks the fact that states can withdraw from the Compact, and seems less plausible in light of the broad reading of “state legislature” recently used by the Court in the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission<https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-1314_3ea4.pdf> case.

The Compact is the only viable way to fix an inherent non-majoritarian flaw in our presidential electoral scheme.  Reform advocates should urge states who haven’t yet adopted it to do so.

[1]<http://electionlawblog.org/#_ftnref1>  Similar non-majority results can be observed in recent Senate elections as well, although scoring them is more<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/06/us/elections/results-senate-elections.html> complicated<https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/11/07/some-democrats-are-complaining-about-senate-popular-vote-its-still-not-thing/?utm_term=.69dfc9307d03>.
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Posted in alternative voting systems<https://electionlawblog.org/?cat=63>, electoral college<https://electionlawblog.org/?cat=44>


“In 2018 Midterms, Liberal Dark Money Groups Outspent Conservative Ones for First Time Since Citizens United”<https://electionlawblog.org/?p=103287>
Posted on January 23, 2019 7:11 am<https://electionlawblog.org/?p=103287> by Rick Hasen<https://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

New report<https://www.issueone.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Post-CU-Dark-Money-Mini-Report.pdf> from Issue One.
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Posted in Uncategorized<https://electionlawblog.org/?cat=1>


“Anonymous ‘ghost ship’ is among groups flooding drug pricing debate”<https://electionlawblog.org/?p=103285>
Posted on January 23, 2019 7:10 am<https://electionlawblog.org/?p=103285> by Rick Hasen<https://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

WaPo:<https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/anonymous-ghost-ship-is-among-groups-flooding-drug-pricing-debate/2019/01/22/3d7356a8-1b3b-11e9-8813-cb9dec761e73_story.html?utm_term=.219ba3571cb6>

The political war over prescription drug practices is spawning a frenzy of activity by outside lobbying groups, some with names that mask their ties to industry and one that has gone to great lengths to disguise its origins.

The increase in advertising, advocacy and pressure tactics is aimed at thwarting some efforts to control drug costs proposed<https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/democrats-look-to-unlikely-ally-on-drug-pricing-donald-trump/2019/01/03/cea3582a-0ead-11e9-8938-5898adc28fa2_story.html?utm_term=.457b46ba808e> in the Democratic-controlled House, such as allowing Medicare to negotiate drug prices, as well as ideas pursued by the Trump administration to curb prices<https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-to-address-drug-prices-in-speech-shifting-focus-to-health-care-before-midterm-elections/2018/10/25/88e16e0a-d84b-11e8-a10f-b51546b10756_story.html?utm_term=.6436f77d2890>.

The operations of these groups often dovetail with work by corporate lobbying shops. Most, but not all, disclose industry funding sources on their websites….

But the group has murky origins. It has taken steps to remain anonymous, even as it publicly rails against efforts in Congress to lower drug prices and urges voters to directly contact lawmakers. Its website<https://www.citizensforamericanideas.com/> was formed using an Internet service that conceals the actual owner.

The physical address for the group leads to another dead end: It’s a UPS retail store in Washington with post-office boxes just a few steps from K Street NW. The organization does not show up in a search of the Internal Revenue Service’s online database of tax-exempt organizations.

Lobbyists and lawmakers who have reviewed the group’s activities say Citizens for American Ideas is the latest example of a corporate lobbying “ghost ship,’’ a term of art for a corporate advocacy operation that is meant to remain anonymous. It could have been launched by any one of the hundreds of lobbying shops in downtown Washington, lawmakers say.
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Posted in lobbying<https://electionlawblog.org/?cat=28>


Correction of the Day: Mitch McConnell Edition<https://electionlawblog.org/?p=103283>
Posted on January 23, 2019 7:07 am<https://electionlawblog.org/?p=103283> by Rick Hasen<https://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

From McConnell’s oped<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/call-hr-1-what-it-is-the-democrat-politician-protection-act/2019/01/17/dcc957be-19cb-11e9-9ebf-c5fed1b7a081_story.html?utm_term=.350f1dd1a627> opposing H.R. 1: “Correction: An earlier version of this column stated incorrectly that 23,000 ineligible voters were permitted to register to vote recently in California. The figure referred to registration errors such as wrongly recorded party affiliations, not ineligible voters. This version has been updated.”  (h/t Ken Jost<https://twitter.com/jostonjustice/status/1088075671253991424>)

Pam Fessler<https://twitter.com/pamelafessler/status/1088089461584547840>:
[https://pbs.twimg.com/profile_images/518852725388226560/Ik4JoyRW_bigger.jpeg]<https://twitter.com/pamelafessler>
<https://twitter.com/pamelafessler>
pam fessler<https://twitter.com/pamelafessler>
✔@pamelafessler<https://twitter.com/pamelafessler>

<https://twitter.com/pamelafessler/status/1088089461584547840>


He also calls a proposal (supported by D and R election officials) to allow federal workers time off to be poll workers "taxpayer-funded vacation for bureaucrats to hover around while Americans cast their ballots."
<https://twitter.com/jostonjustice/status/1088075671253991424>
Kenneth Jost at jostonjustice<https://twitter.com/jostonjustice/status/1088075671253991424>

Fake statistics watch: McConnell, in Wash Post op-ed [Jan 18], said 23K ineligible voters permitted to register recently in California. Correction [1/23]: "The figure referred to registration errors such as wrongly recorded party affiliations, not ineligible voters." Oops!<https://twitter.com/jostonjustice/status/1088075671253991424>

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7:01 AM - Jan 23, 2019<https://twitter.com/pamelafessler/status/1088089461584547840>
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See pam fessler's other Tweets<https://twitter.com/pamelafessler>

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Mulroy: Gerrymandering: Courts And Commissions Won’t Save Us<https://electionlawblog.org/?p=103263>
Posted on January 23, 2019 7:00 am<https://electionlawblog.org/?p=103263> by Rick Hasen<https://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>

The following is the second of three guest posts<https://electionlawblog.org/?p=103261> by University of Memphis law professor Steve Mulroy<https://www.memphis.edu/law/faculty-staff/steve-mulroy.php>, sounding some themes from his fascinating new book, Rethinking US Election Law: Unskewing the System<https://www.amazon.com/Rethinking-Us-Election-Law-Unskewing/dp/1788117506>:

This is the second of a series of blog posts discussing key arguments from my new book, Rethinking US Election Law: Unskewing The System<https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781788117500/9781788117500.xml>.  This post discusses gerrymandering, and why conventional remedies won’t fully fix it.

It’s well-established that gerrymandering is a problem in the U.S. House, one getting potentially worse<https://www.google.com/search?q=slaying+the+partisan+gerrymander&oq=slaying+the+partisan+&aqs=chrome.1.69i57j0.5483j0j4&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8%20%20https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/extreme-maps>  as our high-tech mapdrawing tools get ever more<https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/djclpp/vol5/iss1/5/> precise<https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/gerrymandering-technology-redmap-2020/543888/>.  Significantly, “partisan bias,” the deviation between a party’s overall vote percentage and percentage of seats gained, tends to be greatest in states with one-party control of the state House, Senate, and governorship<https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/extreme-maps>. This is strong evidence that conscious decisions by partisan politicians, at least in significant part, is the product of conscious decisions by partisan politicians.  So is the smoking gun evidence <https://electionlawblog.org/?p=99065>  of such intent by politicians, which, like a lot of the above, applies to state and local redistricting as well.  Gerrymandering is a thing.

The two most commonly advocated remedies are (a) more robust judicial scrutiny of redistricting, and (b) nonpartisan redistricting commissions.  Both are great ideas.  But they won’t fully solve the problem.

Take judicial scrutiny first.  Late-2018 disappointment in<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/us/politics/supreme-court-wisconsin-maryland-gerrymander-vote.html?module=inline> the Gill<https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-1161_dc8f.pdf>  and Benisek<https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/17-333_b97c.pdf> cases gave way to early-2019 renewed hope<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/04/us/politics/gerrymandering-supreme-court.html> that either a revived Benisek<https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legal-work/2018-11-07-Memorandum%20Opinion.pdf>    or the new Rucho<https://electionlawblog.org/wp-content/uploads/MDNC-Opinion.pdf> case would finally provide a judicial limit on gerrymandering (or fear that a Kavanaugh court could end such hope).  But given the Court’s consistent reluctance to enter the “political thicket” of redistricting<https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/328/549/#tab-opinion-1938775>, even the most optimistic view would see the Court intervening in only the most extreme gerrymandering cases, leaving many substantial but non-outlier gerrymanders intact.  And  even the Supreme Court Justices most inclined to police gerrymandering—e.g., Justice Kagan, dissenting in Gill<https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-1161_dc8f.pdf> –focus on proof of intentional gerrymandering.  This is seriously underinclusive for the obvious reason that proof of intent can be hard to obtain—start policing gerrymanders, and blatant, smoking gun evidence will start drying up fast—and for the more important reason that many gerrymanders are unintentional.

The 2008 book The Big Sort <http://www.thebigsort.com/home.php>  popularized the “demographic clustering” thesis, and more recent studies<http://electionlawblog.org/studies%20%20%20https:/sites.tufts.edu/vrdi/files/2018/06/Chen-Rodden-unintentional.pdf> have confirmed it. Democrats over-concentrate in urban areas, “self-packing” and causing “unintentional gerrymanders.”  As long as we insist on electing representatives from relatively compact, equipopulous, single-member districts, Democrats will be underrepresented.  Demographic clustering is a thing, too.

Clustering helps explain why the redistricting commission results have been so mixed.  A comprehensive 2002 study by Bruce Cain showed a median partisan bias of 4.7 percentage points in commission states versus 8.6 points in non-commission states—an improvement, to be sure, but partisan bias remains, significant enough to flip majority control or cause other real representational problems.  Nicholas Stephanopoulos found <http://electionlawblog.org/found%20https:/chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol2015/iss1/14/>  a median “efficiency gap” of 12% for legislator-drawn plans, versus 6% for commission-drawn plans; and using congressional over presidential election results as a measure of overall partisan preference, commission-drawn plan showed no statistically significant improvement at all.   Redistricting commissions are undoubtedly an improvement over the status quo, but won’t get us all the way.

Even without demographic clustering, commissions would be only a partial fix, for an even more fundamental reason.  Unintentional gerrymanders are inevitable in any winner-take-all, single-member district system. Carve the polity up into subunits, even with the best of intentions, and there will be a skew of some kind.  Strive mightily to minimize the partisan skew by drawing a fair number of Republican and Democratic districts, and you reduce the number of competitive districts.  This will make the general election a foregone conclusion, lowering turnout, increasing alienation, and incentivizing candidates to play to the extremes of their parties to avoid a primary challenge, thus making across-the-aisle compromises even harder to achieve.  It’s an inherent bug in the system.

The long-term solution is proportional representation, the subject of the next blog post.
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--
Rick Hasen
Chancellor's Professor of Law and Political Science
UC Irvine School of Law
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