[EL] Single-Transferrable Vote

Fri Jan 25 15:12:03 PST 2019

Doug (and interested parties),

Cambridge's random-transfer approach was grandfathered in (the Plan E
charter provision of the MA General Laws). It was known as the "Cincinnati
method" and used in the city of that name for 16 elections (1925-55). I
think there was also a Boulder method, but I can't remember the details.
There are a lot of methods. This Boulder LWV presentation by Celeste Landry
explains why random transfer isn't ideal but not awful either (see slide
titled "Nuts and Bolts of Cambridge STV"): www.lwvbc.org/docs.ashx?id=357521

My original point was about strategic coordination. I should have been
clearer. "Strategic coordination" means voters doing what it takes to win.
This usually involves some party or party-like entity, as voters don't
coordinate all on their own.

In an RCV world -- single- or multi-winner -- "party-like entity" and
"strategic coordination" can mean a preference-swapping deal along the
lines of what we saw in Maine's Democratic gubernatorial primary or the
2018 San Francisco mayoral race. When I see an election with a lot of
exhausted ballots (e.g., Oakland 2010), it suggests to me that elites
failed to coordinate.

All electoral systems involve coordination. Consider single-seat plurality
districts. Now consider such an election without parties or party-like
entities. How would the "Duvergerian" top two emerge? Someone or something
has to tell voters how to vote. STV works the same way. As does
vote-for-a-party PR, which is why I offered the Belgium example with its
D'Hondt allocation.

Have a great evening,
Jack

On Fri, Jan 25, 2019 at 5:41 PM Douglas Johnson <djohnson at ndcresearch.com>
wrote:
>
> I am missing where the congressional apportionment math used in the back
rooms of the Census Bureau relates to the question of how complicated a
system the voters are open to using to decide how to mark their ballots. Of
course we don’t ask anyone to vote using the Method of Equal Proportions.
The only folks that need to learn it are the Census statisticians and Clark
and Kim to predict and to check the work of those Census statisticians.
>
>
>
> Separately, thanks for the clarification on Cambridge. I did not realize
that. Is there awareness in the city that the 2nd round winners are
essentially chosen by random drawing?
>
>
>
> Bigger-picture, I think the Cambridge situation proves my point: if the
fractional-transfer approach – which is the only way to avoid a potential
random drawing election result – is too complicated for MIT voters, how
does one support an argument it would be practical nationwide? Or are
single transferrable vote advocates actually suggesting letting random
draws heavily influence the makeup of Congress? (I know all the lawyers on
this list are salivating at the business that would generate, but . . . )
>
>
>
> Regarding the Belgium modified-straight-party-voting system, I am not
aware of any jurisdiction in the US, nor any opinion poll, that has found
American voters have any interest in voting for a party list rather than
for individuals, even in the Belgium modified system. (And of course party
leaders like a party-ticket system where party leaders decide who gets on
the ticket in what order).
>
>
>
> Actually, let me correct myself: Americans did change our election system
nationally to straight-party-ticket voting for one office: the electoral
college. Anyone think that’s a good example to cite when trying to enact an
election system change?
>
>
>
> More seriously, I think the idea of replacing candidate names with party
label voting is a complete non-starter in the US. It may be fun for
academic papers to ponder, but I agree with Professor Mulroy (whose pro-STV
article started this conversation) that: “Most PR systems have voters vote
for parties rather than candidates, eschew primary elections, or foster the
instability of parliamentary systems, making them unsuitable for America.”
>
>
>
> Doug
>
>
>
> Douglas Johnson, Ph.D.
>
> Fellow, Rose Institute of State and Local Government
>
> at Claremont McKenna College
>
> douglas.johnson at cmc.edu
>
> direct: 310-200-2058
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> From: Law-election <law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu> On
Behalf Of Edelman, Paul
> Sent: Friday, January 25, 2019 11:35 AM
> To: John Tanner <john.k.tanner at gmail.com>; law-election at uci.edu
> Subject: Re: [EL] Single-Transferrable Vote
>
>
>
> The US has over 80 years of using the Hill method for apportionment.  Any
guesses on  how many people understand it?
>
>
>
> Paul H. Edelman
>
> Professor of Mathematics and Law
>
> Vanderbilt University
>
> paul.edelman at vanderbilt.edu
>
> 615-322-0990
>
>
>
> From: Law-election <law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu> On
Behalf Of John Tanner
> Sent: Friday, January 25, 2019 1:30 PM
> To: Jack Santucci <jms346 at georgetown.edu>
> Cc: Election Law Listserv <law-election at uci.edu>
> Subject: Re: [EL] Single-Transferrable Vote
>
>
>
> Well, the Belgians have had nearly 120 years to get used to the H’ondt
system, so most of them probably understand its operation
>
>
>
> On Jan 25, 2019, at 2:16 PM, Jack Santucci <jms346 at georgetown.edu> wrote:
>
>
>
> Doug and Vlad et al,
>
>
>
> It sounds like Doug is describing a fractional transfer method, which is
not what Cambridge (MA) uses. From a candidate with surplus, ballots are
randomly chosen for transfer. Others on the list know these details better
than I.
>
>
>
> To Vlad's point, how many Belgians can explain the mechanics of a D'Hondt
seat allocation under that country's closed-list PR system? I suspect most
cannot. Rather, a sufficient set of parties is happy enough with the system
to avoid referring to "lottery effects" and other confusing mechanics.
Parties simply tell their voters to vote for the party -- not unlike what
we saw here, when many cities had STV.
>
>
>
> Jack
>
>
> On Jan 25, 2019, at 13:42, Kogan, Vladimir <kogan.18 at osu.edu> wrote:
>
> Doug raises a very important point. I think the educational challenge in
terms of explaining the system to voters is only a piece of it. Imagine
also the voter education challenge in actually learning enough information
about a sufficient number of candidates to be able to rank them in a way
that makes your vote effective. I think that challenge is impractically
difficult for a significant minority of voters, especially for
lower-salience down-ballot races, and this explains why we see such high
rates of ballot exhaustion when IRV/RCV is used in local elections.
>
>
>
> An important, and I think woefully understudied, question is whether this
affects certain voters more than others. The answer has obvious political
and legal implications.
>
>
>
> From: Law-election <law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu> On
Behalf Of Douglas Johnson
> Sent: Friday, January 25, 2019 1:34 PM
> To: 'Rick Hasen' <rhasen at law.uci.edu>; 'Election Law Listserv' <
law-election at uci.edu>
> Subject: Re: [EL] Single-Transferrable Vote
>
>
>
> While single-transferable vote sounds nice in the simple description
below, I encourage list readers to consider how it works in practice, while
keeping in mind how hard states are working to remove obstacles to voter
participation and causes of voter confusion with our existing very simple
elections. Now swap that current simple system for this:
>
>
>
> If there are 5 seats open and 1,000 votes cast, then it takes 201 votes
(1/5 + 1) to meet the “quota” that guarantees a win.
>
> Now imagine a candidate receives 287 first-place votes. The candidate
only needs 201 (70% of 287) votes to win, so 86 votes, or 30%, of the
candidate’s votes will be allocated to the voters’ 2nd choice. But not all
of the 287 voters have the same 2nd choice. So for each of those 287
voters’ ballots, the 2nd choice receives 0.3 votes (30% of one vote). So a
candidate who was listed 2nd on 95 of those 287 ballots would gain 28.5
votes toward the 201 vote target in the second round of vote-counting (and
yes, we would now be announcing fractional votes).
>
>
>
> I suppose it is no surprise that such a complicated system is used in the
city that is the home of MIT, but can you imagine the voter-education
challenge explaining all of this anywhere else?
>
>
>
> -          Doug
>
>
>
> Douglas Johnson, Ph.D.
>
> Fellow, Rose Institute of State and Local Government
>
> at Claremont McKenna College
>
> douglas.johnson at cmc.edu
>
> direct: 310-200-2058
>
>
>
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