[EL] NPV Compact for Gerrymandering?

Steven John Mulroy (smulroy) smulroy at memphis.edu
Thu Jul 4 13:12:05 PDT 2019


Happy Independence Day.

This good Slate piece https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/07/democrats-gerrymandering-scotus-rucho.html suggests that progressives should embrace "retaliatory" or "defensive" gerrymanders (my terms not theirs) only to the extent that they would balance GOP gerrymanders in other states so as to achieve an overall nationwide rough Partisan proportionality. It mentions a MD bill which pledges to adopt an independent Redistricting commission (IRC) if 6 other designated states do. These ideas are supposed to provide a third way alternative to either {a gerrymandering arms race to the  bottom} or {unilateral disarmament}.

This made me wonder if some analog to the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact were feasible. One version would pledge to adopt IRCs once there were enough to control a majority of the US House. Another would reserve one or two seats per state as at large, awarding them to the winner of the nationwide vote, with the remaining seats each state has after reapportionment to be divided among districts of equal population. This would be similar to a mixed member proportional system, which has both district-based and at large seats, the latter used to adjust results to avoid Significant deviations from overall nationwide proportionality, especially counter majoritarian results. It would also be similar to the way Maine and Nebraska allocate presidential electoral votes, except that rather than awarding the at-large electoral votes to the overall state wide winner, they would go to the overall national winner.

It strikes me that the first variation is subject to only the same legal objections that the original NPV Interstate compact is, which in my view (as I discuss in my book) are not very compelling. Are there any additional legal arguments against this , unique to this specific proposal?

The second variation would be seen perhaps as more radical. I realize it would take at a minimum repeal of the congressional statute requiring that ALL US House seats be elected from single-member districts (which in my view ought to be repealed anyway to make room for states to opt into multi member districts, ranked choice voting, and proportional representation). But are there other legal obstacles which make this second variation impossible?

The Constitution requires that house districts be apportioned on the basis of population, and that either states (or Congress) set up the system there after.  Superficially at least, neither of these proposals necessarily violate that. So what are the other legal arguments against this that I'm missing, distracted as I am by the 4th of July sunshine?

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