[EL] Criticisms of New Ballot Marking Devices (BMDs) Hits New Los Angeles County Voting System

[D. A. Holtzman]

Greetings from Los Angeles County. Here are some comments on the 
County's new voting system:

The remarks below are based on comments I submitted on the VSAP 
(formerly “Voting Systems Assessment Project,” now “Voting Solutions for 
All People”) Amended Election Administration Plan, as solicited by the 
Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk (RR/CC) of Los Angeles County at 
https://vsap.lavote.net/election-administration-plan/ on December 27, 2019.

The Amended Election Administration Plan (EAP, or “plan”) is seriously 
flawed, because it includes use of the VSAP equipment’s “Poll Pass” 
(vote-by-QR-code) feature.RR/CC staff were unable to demonstrate the 
feature in public demonstrations of the new equipment, and the feature 
makes voting and elections vulnerable in several ways.

I saw and tried VSAP equipment at two VSAP Demo Centers.It is clear that 
election officials, to keep promises and to protect the security and 
integrity of elections, should disable and not use or advertise the 
QR-code scanning “Poll Pass” components and capability of the VSAP 
equipment in any election in the year 2020, or beyond.

Election officials promised to demonstrate the VSAP equipment at several 
Demo Centers according to a well-publicized schedule.At neither of the 
two Demo Centers I attended was the Poll Pass feature enabled.At one, I 
asked how I could find a Poll Pass app or generate a Poll Pass on my 
smartphone, but the Los Angeles County RR/CC’s employee there told me 
that no such app was available yet and that the Poll Pass feature was 
not being demonstrated at the Demo Centers.Having broken their promise 
and having not had the Poll Pass feature available for public 
inspection, elections officials should not use or advertise the Poll 
Pass feature for the 2020 elections.

Another broken promise is that the VSAP equipment would not be connected 
to the Internet.Connections via QR codes count as computer or internet 
connections because QR codes are inscrutable to humans via the naked 
eye.A QR code created on the Internet or by a program downloaded from 
the Internet, and then used by the VSAP equipment, is a connection of 
the VSAP equipment to the Internet.To the extent that the VSAP 
equipment’s certification depends on the equipment not being connected 
to the Internet, the certification is violated or invalid if the Poll 
Pass feature is used or advertised.

Elections officials have touted the inclusivity of the VSAP process and 
the accessibility of the VSAP equipment.Yet not everybody has a 
smartphone or the computer connectivity, time, and wherewithal to 
generate a Poll Pass QR code.The Poll Pass feature disrespects potential 
voters on the other side of the “digital divide.”It is not all-inclusive 
or universally accessible.Elections officials and the EAP should 
acknowledge that.

The Poll Pass feature does not speed up the voting process as the EAP 
claims it does.Connecting to the Internet, then finding, downloading, 
installing, and configuring and app, then looking up and entering 
information, takes time.And time is money, as they say.Printers, ink or 
toner, and paper cost money.Printing costs time, too.Most printers can 
only print one thing at a time.

I don’t think the current draft/amended EAP takes into account voters’ 
time outside the polling place (poll center).I do think the main reason 
for election officials’ enthusiasm for the Poll Pass feature is its 
ability to make people spend less time in the voting booth, lessening 
lines.Long lines can be an embarrassment to election officials, and 
often discriminate against poorer, minority, communities.

Election officials should plan on having enough VSAP equipment to 
prevent unduly long lines anywhere, without using the Poll Pass 
feature.And they and the EAP should not say that the feature speeds up 
the voting process.Deliberate voting takes time.Plan for it.

Elections officials and the EAP should acknowledge and consider the fact 
that the Poll Pass feature also makes the voting process vulnerable to 
manipulation by unscrupulous vendors and producers of “slate mailers” 
and similar handouts and communications.In elections using Poll Pass, QR 
codes are sure to be part of electioneering.Ordinary voters cannot see 
with their own eyes whether the QR code they’ve been asked to vote 
actually codes for the choices shown next to the code.True, they’ll have 
an opportunity to check after scanning the “Pass” at the polls, but 
(especially with the prevalent emphasis on keeping lines short) many 
will not take full advantage of that opportunity.

In addition, election officials and the EAP should encourage voters to 
vote carefully and check their ballots to ensure that the correct 
choices are listing, by programming delays into the VSAP equipment.A 
voter should not be able to cast a ballot without having taken time to 
check it.

Also regarding the time it takes to vote, if Poll Pass makes available 
reduced time at the polls, it could enable an old-fashioned form of vote 
corruption.Where there were voting machines featuring party levers, 
party hacks could buy votes by offering money to people to use their 
party’s lever, thereby voting quickly, and not give anything to anyone 
who took more time voting.Similarly, a party or organization could make 
available brightly colored or otherwise distinguishable QR code poll 
passes, and observe voters and compensate (maybe with gift cards) those 
who quickly use the “right” pass.

Including those discussed above, there are too many concerns about “Poll 
Pass” for it to be appropriate for use in government elections.It should 
not be used in LA.

That is especially true because “Poll Pass” has not been subject to the 
sorts of public processes required for a complete and transparent public 
review.Actually demonstrating the feature might have helped.And there is 
no time for a full review before the 2020 elections.

- David A. Holtzman, MPH, JD

/One more thing: /I noticed that cast ballots are stored in a neat stack 
in the ballot box in the order in which they enter the box.It will be 
easy to for someone to observe who votes first, second, third, ... 
second to last, and last (etc.) on a particular machine.If ballot boxes 
containing ballots that are ordered in the same way are to be opened at 
the polls/vote centers, there should be some shuffling beforehand.Anyone 
who can handle or see the ballots in the order they are cast should not 
be allowed to know or have any information regarding which voters cast 
those ballots and in which order.

//



On 1/21/2020 9:25 AM, Rick Hasen wrote:
>
>
>     Criticisms of New Ballot Marking Devices (BMDs) Hits New Los
>     Angeles County Voting System <https://electionlawblog.org/?p=109081>
>
> Posted on January 21, 2020 8:11 am 
> <https://electionlawblog.org/?p=109081>by *Rick Hasen* 
> <https://electionlawblog.org/?author=3>
>
> So far, most of the coverage of BMDs (voting machines in which voters 
> cast their votes on a touchscreen, the machine spits out a ballot 
> listing the voter’s choices and produces a bar code/QR code for a 
> ballot reading machine to tally the devices) have been of machines 
> produced by for-profit companies in Georgia and North Carolina.
>
> But Los Angeles County, the country’s largest electoral jurisdiction, 
> is about to roll out the use of BMD machines in the upcoming 
> elections, machines which the county designed rather than buying 
> through a vendor. (Disclosure: for a brief period when Justin Levitt 
> was serving at DOJ, I took his place on an advisory committee about 
> the new ballot machines, but because of scheduling conflicts I never 
> attended a meeting or gave an input on the design).
>
> Now it is time for the state of California to consider certification 
> of the new LA BMDs, and some computer scientists/election integrity 
> advocates are arguing that the machines are not secure enough to be 
> certified. For example, see this letter from UC Berkeley Professor 
> Philip Stark 
> <https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/vsap-sos-20.pdf>. 
> (More coverage at the Brad Blog. <https://bradblog.com/?p=13264>)
>
> Keep your eye on this issue in 2020.
>
> Share 
> <https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=https%3A%2F%2Felectionlawblog.org%2F%3Fp%3D109081&title=Criticisms%20of%20New%20Ballot%20Marking%20Devices%20(BMDs)%20Hits%20New%20Los%20Angeles%20County%20Voting%20System>
>
> Posted inelection administration 
> <https://electionlawblog.org/?cat=18>, voting technology 
> <https://electionlawblog.org/?cat=40>
>

-- 

Simple Instant Runoff Election Ballot

Acceptable candidates, in the order you prefer them:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
(...)

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