[EL] The Root Cause of Election Unrest is Non-transparency (Allowing People to Imagine Whatever They Will)

Thu Jan 7 17:31:09 PST 2021

Professor Schultz,

I appreciate you breaking the mold of "this never would have happened if we
had [campaign finance, election, human nature] reform," but I daresay
you've found something even more quixotic with the alternative.

No, no, before you all pile on, I'm with you: let's make eliminating t*he
anxiety about losing one's job* a cornerstone of the regime. No
cost-benefit here. And... Mexico will pay for it. Or something.

On Thu, Jan 7, 2021 at 8:25 PM Schultz, David <dschultz at hamline.edu> wrote:

> Hi folks:
>
> Let's be real.  Do any of you really think that more transparency  or
> other  small fixes like this to the election system  will ease election
> unrest?  If you do then you must also think that the fact that widespread
> voter fraud does not  exist will convince people that it does not exist.
> Whatever you mean by election unrest has deeper sociological and economic
> roots than adding more transparency.  Let's begin to think about the gross
> economic inequalities that plague our system, or the  shodding  health care
> system, or perhaps the anxiety  about losing one's job as the roots for
> why  people are politically angry.
>
> On Thu, Jan 7, 2021 at 7:13 PM Stephanie Singer <
> sfsinger at campaignscientific.com> wrote:
>
>>
>> On Jan 7, 2021, at 4:54 PM, Fredric Woocher <fwoocher at strumwooch.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> I’m sorry, but this is just silly.  In a jurisdiction like Los Angeles
>> County, it would take weeks to count all the ballots for a single
>> county-wide election, much less for the scores of contests that are on each
>> primary and election ballot.
>>
>> It depends on the level of involvement by citizens. The number of ballots
>> is directly proportional to the number of voters.
>>
>>  And the result would be less accurate than a machine count.
>>
>> Now that more and more jurisdictions are doing risk-limiting tabulation
>> audits, we are starting to have more data about accuracy. Without that kind
>> of check, the best we can say is that machines more reliably get the same
>> answer each time than people using the hash method. That’s at best a
>> statement about precision, not accuracy
>> <https://www.thoughtco.com/difference-between-accuracy-and-precision-609328>
>> .
>>
>>
>> We already have a transparent system:  If the election is close enough
>> (and even if it’s not), you can do a manual recount of the ballots and
>> check the results against the machine count.
>>
>> Depends on who “you” are, and what state you’re in. And depends on what
>> your state means by “manual recount”. In a Florida “manual recount", the
>> paper records people get to hold in their hands and evaluate with their
>> eyes are only the ones identified by the computers as having an undervote
>> or overvote.
>>
>>
>> And do really think having the votes counted by multiple people with
>> clickers is going to yield a uniform outcome that will convince the people
>> who listen to Donald Trump, Rudy Giuliani, and the Krakens that the vote
>> count was accurate when their preferred candidate loses?
>>
>> Depends on the level of involvement. If there were a culture of serving
>> and observing, there’s no reason to think we’d be worse off than we are
>> now. There’s nothing like taking part in a bit of election administration
>> to wake people up to the complexities.
>>
>>
>> Fredric D. Woocher
>> Strumwasser & Woocher LLP
>> 10940 Wilshire Blvd., Ste. 2000
>> Los Angeles, CA 90024
>> fwoocher at strumwooch.com
>> (310) 576-1233 x105
>> Direct: (310) 933-5739
>>
>> *IMPORTANT NOTICE**:* Pursuant to the Governor’s “Stay at Home” Order,
>> Strumwasser & Woocher LLP is CLOSED TO THE PUBLIC.  *Packages requiring
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>> consents to electronic service in all of its matters*.  Please serve by
>> electronic mail to *fwoocher at strumwooch.com <fwoocher at strumwooch.com>* AND
>> to our Senior Legal Assistant, LaKeitha Oliver, at loliver at strumwooch.com.
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>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Law-election [
>> mailto:law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu
>> <law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu>] *On Behalf Of *Paul
>> Lehto
>> *Sent:* Thursday, January 7, 2021 3:53 PM
>> *To:* John Tanner <john.k.tanner at gmail.com>
>> *Cc:* Election Law Listserv <law-election at uci.edu>; Virginia Martin <
>> virginiamartin2010 at gmail.com>
>> *Subject:* Re: [EL] The Root Cause of Election Unrest is
>> Non-transparency (Allowing People to Imagine Whatever They Will)
>>
>> So on one side we have nontransparency in the voting system which breeds
>> distrust which is then amplified by every partisan hope, fear, or piece of
>> evidence, all the way up to an insurrection on ONE SIDE,
>>
>> ...And on the other side we have some 75 year old who might be groggy.
>> And more hours to count.
>>
>> The balancing isn't even close, and I could add much more to the first
>> paragraph but recent events are enough.
>>
>> The nontransparency is a fatal flaw in the current system, and a
>> transparent system in the form of hand counted ballots is required to
>> secure and guarantee the right to vote vis-a-vis situations of corrupt
>> election officials, power outages and so on, and having tens of thousands
>> of summonses workers nationwide who can personally attest based on their
>> own observation and experience would restore public confidence.
>>
>> Paul Lehto, J.D.
>>
>> On Thu, Jan 7, 2021, 3:43 PM John Tanner <john.k.tanner at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Did you wakes up the 75 year old participants at 4 or 5 am and have them
>> work for 12 hours?   On a ballot with 30+ offices and ballot measures?
>> Sent from my iPhone
>>
>>
>> On Jan 7, 2021, at 6:38 PM, Stephanie Singer <
>> sfsinger at campaignscientific.com> wrote:
>>
>> I took part in a demo of the clicker method. I don’t know of any
>> academic research, but from my experience the clicker method is far better.
>> It makes sense psychologically — each person is focused on just one
>> physical spot on the ballot, not needing to look back and forth. And in the
>> demo we had several people tracking each candidate, and their tallies
>> matched at the end (or perhaps were occasionally off by one). It was quick
>> and easy and, with enough people clicking, convincing.
>>
>>
>>
>> Stephanie Singer <https://www.pdx.edu/profile/stephanie-singer>
>> Research Assistant Professor, Portland State University
>> Former Chair, Philadelphia County Board of Elections
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Jan 7, 2021, at 2:04 PM, John Tanner <john.k.tanner at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> One would think that “mark, mark, ... tally” would avoid differences,
>> since there’s a check every 5th vote.  One would be wrong.  And then you
>> have to go back and reconcile to find where the count got off — usually
>> several tallies back.  I suspect the clicker would be even worse
>>
>> Sent from my iPhone
>>
>>
>> On Jan 7, 2021, at 4:42 PM, Stephanie Singer <
>> sfsinger at campaignscientific.com> wrote:
>>
>> It’s undeniable that the counting happens at a time when everyone is
>> exhausted. And thanks for pointing out the difficulties of oversight in
>> primaries.
>>
>> At least one better counting method has been developed and tested by
>> Karen McKim of Wisconsin Election Integrity
>> <https://wisconsinelectionintegrity.org/>. Each person in a group of
>> observers has a hand-held clicker-counter (like the ones used to measure
>> people flowing through turnstiles). The ballots can then be shown one after
>> another, quite quickly. My understanding is that this is quite accurate and
>> efficient.
>>
>> The science and engineering of post-election tabulation audits for ballot
>> scanners is progressing, but I haven’t yet seen a workable proposal for
>> risk-limiting audits of precinct-counted ballots.
>>
>> If you don’t count at the precinct at the end of the voting period, you
>> have to solve the ballot custody problem, also quite knotty.
>>
>> —Stephanie
>>
>>
>> On Jan 7, 2021, at 1:26 PM, John Tanner <john.k.tanner at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> I agree completely that the election process should include at all levels
>> and locations poll officials and poll watchers appointed by both major
>> parties — and by all diverse candidates in primaries and nonpartisan
>> elections (easier said than done).   And posting the results at the polls
>> and centrally is or used to be common.    But hand counted paper ballots?
>> I recall monitoring primary elections with hand counted paper ballots at
>> relatively tiny precincts.  It takes forever, in part because of frequent
>> differences in the counts  (often resolved by splitting the difference) and
>> poll workers quitting fit the night and one (1) poll official taking the
>> materials home to safeguard them.  In one MS primary election, the count
>> wasn’t completed until Thursday evening , at which point I could finally go
>> to sleep (after helping polish off some beer the senior attorney had
>> bought).  There’s are reasons we use machines now.
>> Sent from my iPhone
>>
>>
>> On Jan 7, 2021, at 1:59 PM, Stephanie Singer <
>> sfsinger at campaignscientific.com> wrote:
>>
>> A big Plus One to what Paul has written.
>>
>> To move to the kind of resilient system Paul has described, we need to
>> face head on the downsides of such a system. There are people in this
>> country who physically cannot mark and review paper ballots without
>> assistance (either from people or technology). And there are people of this
>> country who cannot physically get to the polling place on the given day
>> (e.g., overseas deployed military).
>>
>> Companies that manufacture and maintain computerized voting systems have
>> exploited this downside for profit.
>>
>> I wonder what folks on this list think of proxy voting.
>>
>> —Stephanie
>> PS: a relevant piece I wrote was published a few hours before all hell
>> broke loose yesterday:
>> https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/01/06/stolen-election-trump-patriot/
>>
>>
>> On Jan 6, 2021, at 2:46 PM, Paul Lehto <lehto.paul at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> The short answer is voter-marked and hand counted paper ballots counted
>> in precincts with results posted at the precincts as well as reported to
>> the county or state. And also using a summonsing process to guarantee
>> sufficient labor or add additional independent observers as needed.
>>
>> This way any group can verify the tabulation by looking at precinct
>> posted results, and counts in precincts are monitored by all interested
>> political parties plus individuals drafted by a process similar to jury
>> summonsing. It is a labor intensive process but *most people would much
>> rather spend a day counting ballots than spend two weeks in a jury trial. *
>>
>> If ballot counting is observed by multiple observers adverse to each
>> other (the system used and assumed by the framers of the 12th amendment)
>> out of a combination of people we might not trust to count ballots alone,
>> we can nevertheless achieve a trustable result.
>>
>> We might also realize that the framers of the 12th amendment presupposed
>> HCPB, and might come to understand that a joint session is subservient to
>> the will of the people and *able to make only the objections and
>> corrections that vote counting clerks are able to make, not relitigate the
>> entire election*.
>>
>> More importantly, glitches, errors or frauds create observable evidence
>> that can be accessed, and inaccuracies are isolated to the precinct level.
>> Thus, if and when people tell stories about paper ballot fraud, that
>> actually proves both that fraud can happen and that *the voting system
>> actually worked to create evidence of the problem and thus allow us to tell
>> the story today*. It is up to the administrative and legal systems - not
>> the voting system - to actually prosecute or correct for the fraud or
>> error. The voting system only needs to be transparent and create clear
>> indelible evidence of voter intent.
>>
>> With a fully transparent vote counting process, I find that almost
>> everyone I talk to is willing to pay the labor and time pricetag for the
>> system, because of the rational confidence created in the results, and the
>> fact that it is the best guarantee of our right to vote actually working if
>> and when a criminal regime is in control of the vote counting process.
>> Given that voting is our most important right, and given the Declaration of
>> Independence recites that our government was setup for the purpose of
>> securing and guaranteeing our rights, this is not too much to ask. The
>> alternative is to have a voting system that is non-transparent and thus is
>> vulnerable to failing completely at the very moment we need it the most -
>> when criminality has invaded the governmental election processes.
>>
>> The human need for hand counts of valuable things is witnessed every day
>> when counting our own cash at the bank teller window or at the ATM. There
>> is just no substitute for hand counting when we deal with something
>> valuable AND there is incentive for one or more parties to count
>> inaccurately, as exists in elections.
>>
>> It would also have the added benefit of bringing statutes back into line
>> with reality, such as the requirement of a 0.5% lead or less to trigger a
>> recount. That kind of narrow window makes sense with HCPB, but with
>> electronic elections if there is fraud it is the same amount of effort to
>> create a lead outside the recount margin as there is to win by just a few
>> votes.
>>
>> And it would also bring back into alignment the call for public
>> confidence and acceptance of the results. That is a call for rational
>> acceptance of the results if counts are transparent but is a call for a
>> faith that losers find hard to develop when counts are nontransparent.
>>
>> Paul Lehto, J.D.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Jan 6, 2021, 2:10 PM David Mason <dmason12 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> What sorts of systems, policies, and procedures would you recommend to
>> achieve this level of transparency?
>>
>> Dave Mason
>>
>> On Wed, Jan 6, 2021 at 4:34 PM Paul Lehto <lehto.paul at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Obviously, things have gotten out of hand, but what is the root of the
>> problem?
>>
>> The problem is that *we do not have a voting system that the LOSERS of
>> the election can believe in* based on the transparency of the process. *If
>> we want peaceful transitions of power the system needs to lead to results
>> trustable by the "sore losers."*
>>
>> While people need to be held accountable for illegal actions,*going
>> forward*, instead of designing our voting systems with gaining the
>> consent of the governed among the losing side, we instead demand "public
>> confidence" in nontransparent computerized counts on pain of charges of
>> undermining democracy.
>>
>> *This lack of transparency in vote counting is the SEED to which either
>> facts or fevered dreams can attach*, and typically our partisan
>> affiliations and the media sources we select predetermine what information
>> we will receive and what conclusions we will draw.
>>
>> I have predicted this would eventually happen for over a decade.  I was
>> quoted in Politico a couple weeks ago about Trump activists because I was
>> active in investigating the 2004 elections after serving as one of Kerry's
>> "army" of lawyers (who were actually just assisting people to vote).
>> https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/12/19/2004-kerry-election-fraud-2020-448604
>> This article sought to find out what those who questioned 2004 thought of
>> those who questioned 2020.  A variety of opinions emerged.
>>
>>  In *Politico *I was quoted as saying the election disputes are the
>> equivalent of a religious war where both sides assert their strongly held
>> beliefs on the basis of faith rather than on the basis of*knowledge*.
>> All people must necessarily have beliefs rather than true personal
>> knowledge about the vote count results because the counts themselves are
>> nontransparent, being done on computers, so that literally no one has
>> personal knowledge the results are correct. Even election officials lack
>> the kind of personal knowledge we expect from any admissible affidavit,
>> Instead, officials believe them to be correct based on logic and accuracy
>> tests and such but they don't really KNOW.  Experts can add numerous
>> circumstantial reasons to support that belief, but our opinions remain in
>> the territory of trust and confidence rather than hard facts and
>> knowledge.
>>
>> The election results are simply the conclusions.  I've been entitled to
>> every data source any expert in court relies upon for his or her
>> conclusions, except in election law, where the computers are generally
>> deemed inaccessible.
>>
>> Our present system merely urges public confidence in those conclusory
>> results, which is the same as urging trust or faith. As a result, t*he
>> opinions on all sides about the election results amount to statements of
>> political religious faith*, and thus we have what amounts to a religious
>> war in which various sides insult the faith of the other side, eventually
>> leading to violence as we see today.
>>
>> Transparency is strongly effective at getting rid of conspiracy theories
>> because when facts are present, no theories, conspiracy or otherwise, are
>> necessary or possible.  Transparency would likely not reduce Republican
>> support for objections from Rasmussen's 73% released today down to zero,
>> but it would critically drop it below fifty percent at the very least.  And
>> that is the difference between peaceful transitions of power transitions of
>> power that are not peaceful.
>>
>> Trump supporters may not be able to prove fraud, but the reverse is also
>> true: Biden supporters can't prove Biden win, except with a full hand
>> recount and good chain of custody and no ballot box stuffing.  The solution
>> is to get it right on election night with a transparent counting system
>> that the large majority of losers can RATIONALLY trust.  Not faith-based
>> elections like we have now.
>>
>> --
>> Paul R Lehto, J.D.
>> PO Box 2796
>>
>> Renton, WA 98056
>> lehto.paul at gmail.com
>> 906-204-4965 (cell)
>>
>>
>>
>>
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> --
> David Schultz, Distinguished University Professor
> Hamline University
> Department of Political Science,
> Department of Legal Studies,
> Department of Environmental Studies
> 1536 Hewitt Ave
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-- 
Steve Klein
Attorney
https://www.linkedin.com/in/stephenrklein
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