[EL] AFP

[Lloyd Mayer]

On Rick Pildes' fourth point, I would note that in Citizens United Justice
Kennedy (joined by all of the other Justices at the time other than Justice
Thomas) essentially presumed that donor disclosure furthered a voter
educational interest without much evidence that is actually the case. So a
question I have going forward is whether a majority of the current Justices
still share that presumption, or whether instead governments may be
required to provide more evidence that donor disclosure in fact informs
voters (or may even face an opposite presumption with respect to
independent expenditure and electioneering communication groups - that what
matters for voter information purposes is the message, not who pays for it).

Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer <http://law.nd.edu/directory/lloyd-mayer/>
Professor of Law
Notre Dame Law School
P.O. Box 780
Notre Dame, IN 46556-0780
campus address:  3155 Eck Hall of Law
(574) 631-8057/cell:  (574) 598-0740
SSRN Author Page
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=504775>


On Thu, Jul 1, 2021 at 1:42 PM Rick Hasen <rhasen at law.uci.edu> wrote:

> I’m much less sanguine about both disclosure and campaign contribution
> laws---I make that point in a piece coming soon, which I will share.
>
>
>
>
>
> *From: *Law-election <law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu> on
> behalf of "Volokh, Eugene" <VOLOKH at law.ucla.edu>
> *Date: *Thursday, July 1, 2021 at 10:32 AM
> *To: *Election Law Listserv <law-election at uci.edu>
> *Subject: *Re: [EL] AFP
>
>
>
>                My tentative reaction is much like Rick’s; but as to the
> last point, didn’t *Shelton v. Tucker *generally hold the disclosure law
> unconstitutional?  (“The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the
> constitutionality of Act 10, on its face and as applied to the
> petitioners.”  “The unlimited and indiscriminate sweep of the statute now
> before us brings it within the ban of our prior cases. The statute's
> comprehensive interference with associational freedom goes far beyond what
> might be justified in the exercise of the State's legitimate inquiry into
> the fitness and competency of its teachers. The judgments in both cases
> must be reversed.”)
>
>
>
>                Eugene
>
>
>
> *From:* Law-election <law-election-bounces at department-lists.uci.edu> *On
> Behalf Of *Pildes, Rick
> *Sent:* Thursday, July 1, 2021 10:23 AM
> *To:* Election Law Listserv <law-election at uci.edu>
> *Subject:* Re: [EL] AFP
>
>
>
> A few thoughts on the *AFP *decision, which is a major one on how courts
> are to assess the constitutionality of disclosure laws.   The most
> important questions going forward are how this doctrinal shift will apply
> to disclosure requirements in the context of elections.
>
>
>
>    1.  The Court holds that laws which require disclosure of major donors
>    to organizations *inherently* burden freedom of association enough
>    that government must always have a sufficiently important interest to
>    justify such laws.   That means a plaintiff, such as an organization, does
>    not have to show that there are particular reasons disclosure will cause
>    specific injury to it – for example, that its donors are likely to suffer
>    various forms of reprisal or retaliation as a result of disclosure.
>    2. The most important point that follows is that disclosure laws must
>    always be “narrowly tailored” to achieving government’s important interests
>    – which includes considering other alternatives to achieving that goal
>    short of disclosure.
>    3. The CA law fails mainly because the Court concludes that CA hadn’t
>    shown that it had significant reasons to require the disclosures at issue.
>    As the Court read the facts, CA did not make much use of these forms as
>    tools to investigate potential charitable fraud or other illegal actions by
>    charities.  That makes for a major distinction between this decision and
>    how the Court views disclosure requirements in the election context.  In
>    the election setting, disclosure requirements already get over the first
>    hurdle in this analysis, unlike CA’s law.  The Court has recognized several
>    important interests that justify disclosure of donors in the election
>    context – including the important informational interest voters have in
>    knowing who is funding election activity.
>    4. The key question will be how the second hurdle – that disclosure
>    laws be narrowly tailored – will apply in the election context.  But given
>    the Court’s recognition of the informational interest voters have, laws
>    providing that information would seem to meet this narrow tailoring
>    requirement in general.
>    5. The Court has also recognized other important interests behind
>    disclosure requirements in the election context, such as aiding in
>    enforcement of the existing laws and reducing the risk of corruption (in
>    the context of disclosing campaign contributions).  But given the unique
>    and powerful informational interest the Court has long recognized in the
>    election context, it’s not clear AFP will have significant implications for
>    election disclosure laws – though I expect significant anxiety on that
>    score.
>    6. I believe this is the first time the Court has struck down a
>    disclosure law as a general matter (technically, on its face) rather than
>    as-applied, though it has entertained facial challenges to such laws
>    before.
>
> Will be interested to hear what others think of this assessment.
>
>
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Rick
>
>
>
> Richard H. Pildes
>
> Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law
>
> NYU School of Law
>
> 40 Washington Square So.
>
> NYC, NY 10014
>
> 347-886-6789
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