[EL] question about new DOJ suit against Georgia

Fri Jun 25 09:44:08 PDT 2021

Regardless of the statutory language, lower courts have read Section 2 as prohibiting intentional racial discrimination as well as discriminatory effects. Here’s how the lower court put it in Brnovich (DNC v. Hobbs, 958 F.3d 989, 1037-28 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc):
as indicated above, uncontested evidence in the district court established that before enactment of H.B. 2023, a large and disproportionate number of minority voters relied on third parties to collect and deliver their early ballots. Uncontested evidence also established that, beginning in 2011, Arizona Republicans made sustained efforts to outlaw third-party ballot collection. After a racially charged campaign, they finally succeeded in passing H.B. 2023. The question is whether the district court clearly erred in holding that H.B. *1038 2023 does not violate the “intent test” of Section 2.
1. The Intent Test
32<https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I4a252650414c11ea8f0e832f713fac0a/View/FullText.html?navigationPath=Search%2Fv1%2Fresults%2Fnavigation%2Fi0ad73aa50000017a44039d8e91ce4b91%3Fppcid%3D09bf74d319c0417a83cb9b88893076ad%26Nav%3DCASE%26fragmentIdentifier%3DI4a252650414c11ea8f0e832f713fac0a%26parentRank%3D0%26startIndex%3D1%26contextData%3D%2528sc.Search%2529%26transitionType%3DSearchItem&listSource=Search&listPageSource=0aaa456a8b279262f412d79570d0b287&list=CASE&rank=2&sessionScopeId=df0ccafdb9fb5e3a86d50df8631b46edfe5170a49f1bd70a63b2c6bd39b29375&ppcid=09bf74d319c0417a83cb9b88893076ad&originationContext=Search%20Result&transitionType=SearchItem&contextData=%28sc.Search%29#co_anchor_F322050230756>Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977)<https://1.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1977118707&pubNum=0000708&originatingDoc=I4a252650414c11ea8f0e832f713fac0a&refType=RP&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)>, provides the framework for analyzing a claim of intentional discrimination under Section 2. See, e.g., N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 220–21 (4th Cir. 2016)<https://1.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2039464113&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=I4a252650414c11ea8f0e832f713fac0a&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_220&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_506_220>. Under Arlington Heights<https://1.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1977118707&pubNum=0000780&originatingDoc=I4a252650414c11ea8f0e832f713fac0a&refType=RP&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)>, Plaintiffs have an initial burden of providing “[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265, 97 S.Ct. 555<https://1.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1977118707&pubNum=0000780&originatingDoc=I4a252650414c11ea8f0e832f713fac0a&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_780_265&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_780_265>. Plaintiffs need not show that discriminatory purpose was the “sole[ ]” or even a “primary” motive for the legislation. Id.<https://1.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1977118707&pubNum=0000780&originatingDoc=I4a252650414c11ea8f0e832f713fac0a&refType=RP&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)> Rather, Plaintiffs need only show that discriminatory purpose was “a motivating factor.” Id. at 265–66, 97 S.Ct. 555<https://1.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1977118707&pubNum=0000780&originatingDoc=I4a252650414c11ea8f0e832f713fac0a&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_780_265&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_780_265> (emphasis added).
33<https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I4a252650414c11ea8f0e832f713fac0a/View/FullText.html?navigationPath=Search%2Fv1%2Fresults%2Fnavigation%2Fi0ad73aa50000017a44039d8e91ce4b91%3Fppcid%3D09bf74d319c0417a83cb9b88893076ad%26Nav%3DCASE%26fragmentIdentifier%3DI4a252650414c11ea8f0e832f713fac0a%26parentRank%3D0%26startIndex%3D1%26contextData%3D%2528sc.Search%2529%26transitionType%3DSearchItem&listSource=Search&listPageSource=0aaa456a8b279262f412d79570d0b287&list=CASE&rank=2&sessionScopeId=df0ccafdb9fb5e3a86d50df8631b46edfe5170a49f1bd70a63b2c6bd39b29375&ppcid=09bf74d319c0417a83cb9b88893076ad&originationContext=Search%20Result&transitionType=SearchItem&contextData=%28sc.Search%29#co_anchor_F332050230756>34<https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I4a252650414c11ea8f0e832f713fac0a/View/FullText.html?navigationPath=Search%2Fv1%2Fresults%2Fnavigation%2Fi0ad73aa50000017a44039d8e91ce4b91%3Fppcid%3D09bf74d319c0417a83cb9b88893076ad%26Nav%3DCASE%26fragmentIdentifier%3DI4a252650414c11ea8f0e832f713fac0a%26parentRank%3D0%26startIndex%3D1%26contextData%3D%2528sc.Search%2529%26transitionType%3DSearchItem&listSource=Search&listPageSource=0aaa456a8b279262f412d79570d0b287&list=CASE&rank=2&sessionScopeId=df0ccafdb9fb5e3a86d50df8631b46edfe5170a49f1bd70a63b2c6bd39b29375&ppcid=09bf74d319c0417a83cb9b88893076ad&originationContext=Search%20Result&transitionType=SearchItem&contextData=%28sc.Search%29#co_anchor_F342050230756>“Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.” Id. at 266, 97 S.Ct. 555<https://1.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1977118707&pubNum=0000780&originatingDoc=I4a252650414c11ea8f0e832f713fac0a&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_780_266&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_780_266>. “[D]iscriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)<https://1.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976142392&pubNum=0000780&originatingDoc=I4a252650414c11ea8f0e832f713fac0a&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_780_242&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_780_242>. Because “[o]utright admissions of impermissible racial motivation are infrequent[,] ... plaintiffs often must rely upon other evidence,” including the broader context surrounding passage of the legislation. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553, 119 S.Ct. 1545, 143 L.Ed.2d 731 (1999)<https://1.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1999122479&pubNum=0000780&originatingDoc=I4a252650414c11ea8f0e832f713fac0a&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_780_553&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_780_553>. “In a vote denial case such as the one here, where the plaintiffs allege that the legislature imposed barriers to minority voting, this holistic approach is particularly important, for ‘[d]iscrimination today is more subtle than the visible methods used in 1965.’ ” N.C. State Conference of NAACP, 831 F.3d at 221<https://1.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2039464113&pubNum=0000506&originatingDoc=I4a252650414c11ea8f0e832f713fac0a&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_221&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_506_221> (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 109–478, at 6<https://1.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=0319972970&pubNum=0100014&originatingDoc=I4a252650414c11ea8f0e832f713fac0a&refType=TV&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)> (2006)).

The Republican Party in its merits brief in Brnovich also agrees with the point:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-1257/162044/20201130134020712_To%20File%20-%20Hobbs%20-%20Opening%20Merits%20Brief.pdf

P. 43:

1. The Fifteenth Amendment and § 2 of the VRA prohibit intentional racial discrimination. But as this Court has made clear, a law is not discriminatory just “because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). The legislature instead must act “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’” a disparate effect on a minority. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). The inquiry into legislative intent is guided by a series of familiar factors, Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977), against the fundamental backdrop principle that the “good faith of a state legislature must be presumed,” Miller, 515 U.S. at 915.

From: Rick Hasen <rhasen at law.uci.edu>
Date: Friday, June 25, 2021 at 9:23 AM
To: Lorraine Minnite <lminnite at gmail.com>
Cc: John Tanner <john.k.tanner at gmail.com>, Election Law Listserv <law-election at uci.edu>
Subject: Re: [EL] question about new DOJ suit against Georgia

I have not been able to get it yet.
The NAACP LDF complaint against the Georgia law alleges both discriminatory results and purpose under Section 2, as well as intentional discrimination claims under the 14th and 15th amendments.
https://www.naacpldf.org/wp-content/uploads/Sixth-District-of-the-AME-Church-v.-Brian-Kemp.pdf

From: Lorraine Minnite <lminnite at gmail.com>
Date: Friday, June 25, 2021 at 9:20 AM
To: Rick Hasen <rhasen at law.uci.edu>
Cc: John Tanner <john.k.tanner at gmail.com>, Election Law Listserv <law-election at uci.edu>
Subject: Re: [EL] question about new DOJ suit against Georgia

Does anyone have a copy of the complaint?

- Lori Minnite

On Fri, Jun 25, 2021 at 12:08 PM Rick Hasen <rhasen at law.uci.edu<mailto:rhasen at law.uci.edu>> wrote:
I guess my question is what is the “purpose prong” of Section 2 and could it survive a textualist challenge in the current Supreme Court?

(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 10303(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b).

Cf section 5:

a) Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 10303(a) of this title based upon determinations made under the first sentence of section 10303(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964, or whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 10303(a) of this title based upon determinations made under the second sentence of section 10303(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1968, or whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 10303(a) of this title based upon determinations made under the third sentence of section 10303(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 10303(f)(2) of this title, and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure:
..
Emphases added

From: John Tanner <john.k.tanner at gmail.com<mailto:john.k.tanner at gmail.com>>
Date: Friday, June 25, 2021 at 8:59 AM
To: Rick Hasen <rhasen at law.uci.edu<mailto:rhasen at law.uci.edu>>
Cc: Election Law Listserv <law-election at uci.edu<mailto:law-election at uci.edu>>
Subject: Re: [EL] question about new DOJ suit against Georgia

DoJ needs statutory authority.   I don’t see the Court erasing the purpose prong of Section 2, though.  Do you?

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 25, 2021, at 11:26 AM, Rick Hasen <rhasen at law.uci.edu<mailto:rhasen at law.uci.edu>> wrote:
There’s a press conference now where DOJ officials are discussing bringing a case against Georgia for its new voting law. The claim is that Georgia enacted its law with a discriminatory purpose in violation of Section 2 of the VRA.
Given the uncertainty about what Section 2 is going to mean in the context of vote denial cases with the pending Brnovich decision (and section 2’s focus on discriminatory results or effects rather than purpose), it seems this kind of claim should be coupled with a 14th/15th amendment intentional discrimination claim.

Does DOJ have authority to sue for such constitutional violations?  I recall Justin writing something about this on the list a while back, but he’s now working for the Biden Administration and so I can’t ask him.

Thanks!

--
Rick Hasen
Chancellor's Professor of Law and Political Science
UC Irvine School of Law
401 E. Peltason Dr., Suite 1000
Irvine, CA 92697-8000
949.824.3072 - office
rhasen at law.uci.edu<mailto:rhasen at law.uci.edu>
http://www.law.uci.edu/faculty/full-time/hasen/
http://electionlawblog.org<http://electionlawblog.org/>

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