Subject: Re: Transferable & non-transferable voting.
From: Craig Oren
Date: 4/21/2001, 2:28 PM
To: "richard.lung" <richard.lung@ic24.net>
CC: Paul Ryan <pryan@cgs.org>, election-law@majordomo.lls.edu

I saw single-list voting in action as a student at the University of
California, Berkeley, where it was used for student elections with
computer counting.  The big problem was maintaining security of the
computer program; an (accidental???) glitch one year led to announcement
of the wrong results. It is also completely un-transparent to the voters,
who have no idea what happened.

I am not nearly old enough to remember single-list voting for the New York
City Council in the 1930s/1940s, but it also seemed highly manipulable
based on what precincts you decide to count first. It seemed also a system
that rewarded intense single-preference political minorities (e.g.
Communists) and so arguably rewarded strategic behavior. I wrote a paper
on this as an undergraduate, but I have no idea what I said in it.

But these are all just impressions.


On Sat, 21 Apr 2001, richard.lung wrote:

Thankyou for your comments.
For the record and the sake of clarity, I should say that your classic criticism of PR does apply to list PR systems. It can also apply, with less likelihood, to simple majority systems, indeed to all non-transferable voting systems.

 It neednt happen with the single transferable vote ( or 'choice voting' ), provided that the voters decide to prefer candidates of the parties they would prefer to form a coalition, if no one party wins a majority.

Re the Rick Hasen attachment on redistricting, the conclusion is drawn that 
politics cannot be based on a 'racial spoils system'. But what you have in two-thirds of the world's democracies is something like a partisan spoils system
by list systems ( I am probably more 'unenthusiastic' about than you are ).
A list system in Guyana, for instance, is reported to have encouraged rigid racial
divisions. 
Transferable voting allows the crossing of party divisions, and race, ideology or whatever else those divisions may be founded on.

For more than any one could conceivably want to read on this, and related subjects, see my first web site given in the signature below.

Yours sincerely,
Richard Lung.

http://www.democracyscience.ic24.net

http://lit4lib.artshost.com

richard.lung@lineone.net    or
richard.lung@ic24.net
  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Craig Oren 
  To: richard.lung 
  Cc: Paul Ryan ; election-law@majordomo.lls.edu 
  Sent: Thursday, April 19, 2001 9:02 PM
  Subject: Re: Sweetheart gerrymandering


  Thank you. I tend to be unenthusiastic about proportional representation.
  It makes it unnecessary for parties to form broad coalitions of voters.
  Instead, the coalition formation tends to happen in the back room as
  parties negotiate for power. Moreover, it proliferates parties and thus
  further increases factionalism in elections. Israel strikes me as an
  example of the harm that PR can cause. I recognize that there can be
  situations of extreme ethnic or political polarization in which PR is
  necessary, but to me it is a last resort.

  On Thu, 19 Apr 2001, richard.lung wrote:

  > I believe the technical term for members of the opposite party colluding to give each other safe seats is called 'sweetheart' gerrymandering. 
  > 
  >  It is also, I believe, why, when push comes to shove, for the proportional representation of ethnic or ideological minorities, that we have seen in other English speaking countries, list systems are used to deny the election of individual represent
atives. 
  > Typically, a hybrid of the two undemocratic systems has been introduced.
  > 
  > Yours sincerely,
  > Richard Lung.
  > 
  > http://www.democracyscience.ic24.net
  > 
  > http://lit4lib.artshost.com
  > 
  > richard.lung@lineone.net    or
  > richard.lung@ic24.net
  >   ----- Original Message ----- 
  >   From: Craig Oren 
  >   To: Paul Ryan 
  >   Cc: election-law@majordomo.lls.edu 
  >   Sent: Wednesday, April 18, 2001 8:14 PM
  >   Subject: Re: Hunt v. Cromartie Decided
  > 
  > 
  >   I realize this shows that I am behind the times, but something strikes me
  >   as wrong about constructing a district "so that we'll have an equal number
  >   of Republicans and Democrats in the House." What room does that leave for
  >   elections? sorry for posting twice in one day.
  > 
  > 
  >   On Wed, 18 Apr 2001, Paul Ryan wrote:
  > 
  >   > The U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision today (4/18/2001) in Hunt v.
  >   > Cromartie, involving the ongoing saga of redistricting North Carolina's 12th
  >   > Congressional District.  The Court held that the district court's conclusion
  >   > that the State violated the Equal Protection Clause in drawing the 1997
  >   > boundaries was based on clearly erroneous findings.  In reversing the
  >   > district court, the Court described the basic question as "whether the
  >   > legislature drew District 12's boundaries because of race rather than
  >   > because of political behavior (coupled with tradition, nonracial districting
  >   > considerations)."  The Court found that the evidence does not show that
  >   > racial considerations predominated in the drawing of District 12's
  >   > boundaries because race, in this case, correlates closely with political
  >   > behavior.  The challenged majority-minority African American district is a
  >   > constitutionally valid result of a redistricting process establishing a safe
  >   > Democratic district, where African Americans register and vote Democratic
  >   > between 95% and 97% of the time.
  >   > 
  >   > The opinion can be found at:
  >   > 
  >   > http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/99-1864.ZS.html
  >   > 
  >   > 
  >   > Paul Ryan
  >   > Center for Governmental Studies
  >   > 10951 West Pico Blvd. Suite 120
  >   > Los Angeles, CA 90064
  >   > Ph. (310)470-6590 ext. 115
  >   > Fax (310)475-3752
  >   > 
  >   > 
  >   > 
  > 
  >   ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  >    Professor Craig N. Oren                    telephone *856-225-6365
  >    Rutgers School of Law-Camden               fax  *856-969-7921
  >    Rutgers-The State University of New Jersey
  >    217 N. 5th Street
  >    Camden, N.J. 08102-1203                    oren@camden.rutgers.edu
  > 
  >   *please note the new area code.
  >   ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  > 
  > 

  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Professor Craig N. Oren                    telephone *856-225-6365
   Rutgers School of Law-Camden               fax  *856-969-7921
   Rutgers-The State University of New Jersey
   217 N. 5th Street
   Camden, N.J. 08102-1203                    oren@camden.rutgers.edu

  *please note the new area code.
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------



------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Professor Craig N. Oren                    telephone *856-225-6365
 Rutgers School of Law-Camden               fax  *856-969-7921
 Rutgers-The State University of New Jersey
 217 N. 5th Street
 Camden, N.J. 08102-1203                    oren@camden.rutgers.edu

*please note the new area code.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------