Subject: election-law_gl-digest V1 #37
From: owner-election-law_gl@majordomo.lls.edu (election-law_gl-digest)
Date: 7/6/2001, 6:00 PM
To: election-law_gl-digest@majordomo.lls.edu

election-law_gl-digest      Friday, July 6 2001      Volume 01 : Number 037




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Date: Fri, 06 Jul 2001 11:40:37 -0400
From: Thomas Stratmann <tstratma@gmu.edu>
Subject: effects of contribution limits

The introduction of campaign contribution limits increases the number of
candidates as well as the competitiveness of elections, according to my new
study (co-authored with Mr. Aparicio-Castillo), “Competition Policy for
Elections: Do Campaign Contribution Limits Matter?”  

The study provides evidence regarding the effects of campaign finance
restrictions on election outcomes using data from state elections.  Our
examination of 1980s and 1990s state House single member district elections
has direct relevance to today’s federal debate on campaign finance reform.
Since, at the federal level, all House districts are single member
districts, the focus on single member districts in the states makes it easy
to transfer knowledge from the state level to the federal level.

Major findings of the study include:

- - Reducing individual contribution limits encourages additional candidates
to enter political races and leads to a reduction in the margin of victory
for the winning candidate;

- - Reducing campaign contribution limits, regardless of the number of
candidates that enter the race, also reduces the margin of victory for
incumbents;

- - The smaller margin does not lead to large increases in the turnover of
existing incumbents since their margin of victory is so large; and

- - Term limits and campaign finance restrictions have effects on electoral
outcomes of similar magnitude in that they reduce incumbent vote share,
reduce incumbency advantages, and increase the number of competitive elections.

A PDF file of the study is available from this page 

http://www.gmu.edu/jbc/stratmann/recent.shtml

Thomas

- ----------------------------------------------
Thomas Stratmann
Professor of Economics
Department of Economics
Center for the Study of Public Choice
1D3 - Carow Hall
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030-4444
Tel: 703.993.2317
Fax: 703.993.2323
http://www.gmu.edu/jbc/stratmann/index.shtml

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End of election-law_gl-digest V1 #37
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