Perhaps this is a chance for political scientists to steer the definitions
in a more precise and stipulative definition. How about something like ...
1. A "primary" is an election where, within each party, the winning
candidate[s] are deemed nominated or endorsed by that party for the general
election. Ie, a later election must follow even if, say, 6 out of 8 million
citizens vote in the Republocrat Party primary and of them, 5 million
prefer Bloggs. (The only ground for dispensing with the later election
would be if Bloggs were the only candidate: I assume the Supreme Court's
reading of the "uniform date" federal provisions impliedly allows for this
-- unlike, eg, Austria and Thailand, where even if s/he unopposed a
candidate must face a yes/ no referendum.)
It is therefore NOT a "primary" if a candidate can claim victory over one
or more surviving rival candidates by gaining the votes of some prescribed
quorum, majority or super-majority of the voters (or of the total enrolled
electorate, or the Voting-Age Population: Peru, I think, used to require
that the plurality Presidential candidate be supported by 33% of the total
adult population, whether or not s/he polled more than half the votes).
This usage would reflect the fact that "primary" is only used, outside the
USA, for mass ballots limited to party supporters (who usually must be
paid-up members) -- eg, in Israel to choose the Labour and Likud candidates
for prime Minister and to rank the party's Knesset list. The numerous
countries that use runoff systems for the President and/or legislature do
not seem to use "primary" (or its equivalent) for the first round.
2. I propose "first round" or "preliminary ballot" in cases where a
sufficiently popular candidate can defeat his/her rivals by outpolling them
decisively enough on that ballot.
After all, it is possible to have both a primary and a general election AND
to have two separate rounds of voting for each, if no candidate gets a
majority on either -- a total of four possible rounds.
One possible model might be to prescribe a minimum of two and a maximum of
three ballots for each office. On the first ballot (the "primary
election"), any candidate can enter. Candidates who are registered members
of the same party, and seeking the same office, are grouped together. A
voter may select one candidate regardless of party.
Then, only the following candidates may continue to the second round (the
"general election"), a month or two later (I'll leave aside whether
write-ins should be permitted):
[a] Either of the two candidates with the most votes (regardless of party)
(skipping over any who voluntarily withdraw).
[b] Any other candidate who individually receives more than [say] 10% of
the votes. (Modelled on the French rule, whose details fluctuate but which
now, I believe, requires 12.5% of the total enrolled electorate for third,
fourth, etc candidates to avoid elimination -- but not in Presidential
elections where only the top two remain, as M Jospin found to his chagrin a
few months ago).
[c] For each party whose candidates in total poll more than [say] 10% of
the votes -- whichever of those candidates receives the most votes
(skipping over any who voluntarily withdraw).. (So five Greens could run
against a single "unopposed" Democrat without losing the Green slot on the
general election ballot, provided that at least 10% vote Green in the
aggregate.)
Finally, if no candidate received 50% (or 40%, or whatever) of the votes in
the second "general election" round, a third, "runoff election" would be
held, a fortnight later. Only the two highest-polling candidates from the
second round may remain (skipping over any who voluntarily withdraw).
I'm floating this thought-experiment as a question of good policy, without
delving into its constitutionality -- especially the question of whether
associative rights would be unconstitutionally infringed if the XYZ Party's
official nominee could be selected in any part by voters who have
acknowledged no allegiance to the XYZ Party, even by the fairly minimal
step of registering as one (which is very minimal compared to most other
democracies where party members must usually pay fees, attend meetings,
etc). This is the advantage of not having a Bill of Rights in Australia:
that citizens other than Justice O'Connor get to put forward, even enact,
their convictions about what a fair electoral system means...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr Tom Round
BA (Hons), LL.B (UQ), PhD (GU)
Research Fellow, Key Centre for Ethics,
Law, Justice and Governance (KCELJAG)
Room 1.10, Macrossan Building, Nathan Campus
Griffith University, Queensland (Australia) 4111
Ph: (061 or 07) 3875 3817
Mbl: 0438 167 304
Fax: (061 or 07) 3875 6634
E-mail:
T.Round@mailbox.gu.edu.au
Web:
http://www.gu.edu.au/centre/kceljag/
--------------------------------------------------------------------------