Judge O'Scannlain on when a judge abuses his or her discretion in misapplying
the law In advance of today's Ninth Circuit opinion in the recall punch
card case, it is worth remembering what Judge O'Scannlain had to say about
the issue of the abuse of discretion standard when the judge gets the law
wrong in another controversial Ninth Circuit case, this one arising out of
Proposition 209's ban on affirmative action:
An abuse of discretion occurs if the district court "bases its decision on
an erroneous legal standard or on clearly erroneous findings of fact." American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1062 (9th Cir.1995) (citation
omitted). We review the legal issues underlying a decision to grant an injunction
de novo, as well as the conclusion that plaintiffs are likely to succeed
on the merits of those issues. [FN9] International Molders' and Allied Workers'
Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 799 F.2d 547, 551 (9th Cir.1986).
FN9. Plaintiffs contend, as an initial matter, that we have no authority
to review the "underlying merits" of the preliminary injunction that the
district court entered. Plaintiffs are correct to the extent that we will
not reverse a preliminary injunction just because we would have arrived at
a different result if we had applied the law to the facts of the case. Sports
Form, Inc. v. United Press Int'l, 686 F.2d 750, 752 (9th Cir.1982); see also
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Coalition for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d
1401, 1419 (9th Cir.1991) (O'Scannlain, J. concurring) (pointing out that
detailed discussion of statistical evidence to determine constitutionality
is inappropriate to determine constitutionality on appellate review of preliminary
injunction), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 1670, 118 L.Ed.2d 390
(1992). Where, as here, however, the issue is whether the district court
"misapprehended the law with respect to the underlying issues in litigation,"
Sports Form, 686 F.2d at 752 (citations omitted), we assuredly may assess
whether the district court got the law right. See Glick v. McKay, 937 F.2d
434, 436 (9th Cir.1991) (explaining that where facts established or of no
controlling relevance, constitutional issue subject to "plenary" review);
Nelson, 799 F.2d at 550 n. 1 (explaining that abuse of discretion will be
found if district court "applied incorrect substantive law") (citation omitted).
The parties to this appeal dispute whether the district court relied on
an erroneous legal standard, not whether the district court wrongly applied
the right legal standard to the facts of the case. Where the issue is whether
the district court got the law right in the first place, we do not defer
review and thereby allow lawsuits to proceed on potentially erroneous legal
premises.
Coalition of Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 701 (9th Cir.
1997).
Why is this language relevant? Because some of the judges at the hearing
yesterday, including Judge O'Scannlain, seemed to say that the appellate
court should defer to the district court under an abuse of discretion standard
if the district court judge came close enough to getting the law right.
Let's see if the standard enunciated today can be distinguished from the
Prop. 209 case. And of course, the ideological interests here are precisely
reversed.
Thanks to Sam Bagenstos for reminding me of this language in the Prop. 209
case.
--
Rick Hasen
Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow
Loyola Law School
919 South Albany Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015-1211
(213)736-1466
(213)380-3769 - fax
rick.hasen@lls.edu
http://www.lls.edu/academics/faculty/hasen.html
http://electionlaw.blogspot.com