Subject: RE: Potential problem with California vote-tallying?
From: "Steven Hertzberg" <steven@votewatch.us>
Date: 11/18/2003, 4:55 PM
To: "'electionlaw'" <election-law@majordomo.lls.edu>
CC: "'Toplak Jurij'" <jure.toplak@uni-mb.si>, "'Larry Levine'" <larrylevine@earthlink.net>, "'Eugene Volokh'" <volokh@mail.law.ucla.edu>

The second paper trail you mention is stipulated in the Hertzberg-Shelly
Act, see section 19234(e) of the election code: 

"Any voting system purchased using bond funds that does not require a voter
to directly mark on the ballot must produce, at the time the voter votes his
or her ballot or at the time the polls are closed, a paper version or
representation of the voted ballot or of all the ballots cast on a unit of
the voting system."

These paper representations are then supposed to be utilized during the
mandatory 1% count in order to validate the electronic count.

In our election monitoring observations in Santa Clara (Sequoia Edge
machines) on November 4th, these paper ballot representations were created
at each polling location as part of the machine shut-down procedure.

________________________________
Steven Hertzberg  
Votewatch Corporation

http://www.votewatch.us
Your Eye on Elections  

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-election-law_gl@majordomo.lls.edu
[mailto:owner-election-law_gl@majordomo.lls.edu] On Behalf Of Toplak Jurij
Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2003 11:30 AM
To: Larry Levine; Eugene Volokh; electionlaw
Subject: Re: Potential problem with California vote-tallying?

Among the scholars there are initiatives to require both kinds of paper
trail: Firstly, the voter-verifiable paper trail of his votes, so that he
can double-check whom he voted for. Anc secondly, the trail of all the votes
cast on certain voting machine. This one could be used in case that the
digital data on the disk gets erased or messed up (it can happen for
different reasons: because of the intentional act of someone or if the
machine just freezes).
This kind of data would not be "flawed" since it make authorities be able to
count vote by vote on them and get the final result.
Therefore, the reason of each of the kinds of paper trail is different:
first one prevents the unintentional undervotes & overvotes and the second
ones assures there is a possibility to get the results in case the machine
breaks down (what if someone burns or breaks the machine with the hammer?).
However, the second kind of the trail is just a cumulation of the first
ones.

As the articles below show, Sequoia and Diebold have both developed machines
which produce paper trail:
Computerized voting lacks paper trail, scholar warns
http://www.stanford.edu/dept/news/report/news/2003/february5/dillsr-25.html

Voting Machine Leaves Paper Trail
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,58738,00.html