1. I have a question regarding Eugene's initial comment about the Soros controversy. He wrote: "As I understand it, many opponents of spending caps argue that the proper check on billionaires throwing their weight around is disclosure and public condemnation, not legal suppression. Sure, they argue, let Ted Turner or General Motors spend money to support or oppose this or that candidate -- so long as their opponents can point out that this is potentially unfair or corrupting, or what have you."  Is that what Eugene himself believes?  In any case, I'm wondering from a strong First Amendment perspective what the "potentially unfair or corrupting" problem is with Ted Turner (or Soros) spending their money to promote or oppose a candidate for political office?  If the idea is that the billionaire could engage in spending that does not reflect public support for the ideas of the billionaire, then that seems to endorse what I have termed the "barometer equality rationale" for campaign finance reform put forward most forcefully by Justice Marshall in Austin (but whose history traces back much further, as I detail in Chapter 4 of my book).  But of course, Justice Scalia's dissent in Austin mocked this rationale (as well as questioned why it applied to corporations but not to individual billionaires).  I have trouble seeing from the strong First Amendment perspective what the problem is.  It cannot be, as Jim Bopp suggests, that it favors individuals versus groups.  Under BCRA, nothing stops a group today from taking unlimited sums from individuals (subject to reporting requirements) to make unlimited independent expenditures supporting or opposing a candidate for federal office---so long as it is not coordinated with the candidate or done through a political party.

2. Regarding Trevor's point: "[T]he new law DOES prohibit wealthy individuals (and corporations or unions) from giving that same unlimited amount of money to national party committees at the importuning of federal candidates and officeholders--and that restriction on wealthy individuals is significant and an welcome change in what had become a corrupt 'money for legislative policy' system. I fail to see how this change advantages Mr.. Soros or any other super-wealthy donor--they are now limited in what they can contribute to parties to buy access and effect legislative outcomes, while those who give $100 or $1,000 or even $10,000 now have proportionately more influence."  Trevor's argument depends upon the increasingly unrealistic assumption in Buckley that those who make very large independent expenditures cannot be buying access or influence with a candidate, simply by virtue of the fact that the spending must be independent.  Of course Soros will gain tremendous access to any Democratic nominee (and president, if the nominee defeats Bush) by virtue of such spending.