This argument might work as applied to state and local districting, but
not as to the congressional districting at issue in Vieth.
The Supreme Court has held that the states have no inherent power to
regulate federal elections, but have only such authority as the federal
Constitution delegates to them. The Colorado Supreme Court played a
variation on this theme in its recent decision, in which it said that
state law couldn't expand the legislature's power to redistrict beyond
the scope permitted by the U.S. Constitution and the relevant federal
statutes, but that state law could put additional limitations on the
legislature's power.
At 01:42 PM 12/09/2003 -0500, mleen@law.harvard.edu wrote:
Maybe, as a law student, I have to
formal a view of government, but I think
that Professor Askin misses an important point. The 14th Amendment
and the
Voting Rights Act place limits on a states power to gerrymander.
States do
not need constitutional or statutory permission from the federal
government to
act. The federal government is a limited government in which
affirmative
measures create its powers to act. The state government is a
general
government and affirmative measures limit its power to act. The
fact that no
explicit statutory or constitutional provision limit the state's actions
in
politically gerrymandering actually favors the existence of the
power. Of
course the courts jurisprudence under Baker in interpreting the 14th
Amendment
may actually be a provision that limits state power. This should be
the focus
of the argument.
Finally, as a conceptual matter, isn't all redistricting inherently
political
in that it comes from the political process?
Mark Leen
HLS 3L
Quoting Frank Askin <faskin@kinoy.rutgers.edu>:
> To the contrary, while Shaw v. Reno was a travesty for racial
gerrymandering
> cases -- where the objective was to protect minority voting rights
pursuant
> to the Voting Rights Act and the 14th Amendment (footnote 4 of
Carolene
> Products) -- it seems to me to establish a reasonable standard for
political
> gerrymandering cases, since political gerrymandering has no
explicit
> statutory or constitutional protection. Where districts are
not compact, not
> contiguous, and were foisted upon a political minority by a
political
> majority which controlled both the executive and legislative
branches, that
> seems to me to establish a pretty good prima facie case of
political
> interference in the electoral process.... If the governing
party cannot use
> its governing authority to dispense patronage jobs (Elrod v. Burns)
why
> should it be able to exercise that power to dispense legislative
seats! See
> my Op Ed in the December 1 Legal Times. FRANK
>
> Prof. Frank Askin
> Constitutional Litigation Clinic
> Rutgers Law School/Newark
> (973) 353-5687
>
> >>> rick.hasen@lls.edu 12/08/03 08:05PM >>>
> "Drawing a Line:" My commentary on Vieth
> My commentary in the Legal Times is available here. It begins:
"On Dec. 10,
> the Supreme Court will consider the invitation of some Pennsylvania
Democrats
> to impose a new set of constitutional rules to police claims of
partisan
> gerrymandering. Given the recent escapades of the Texas Legislature
and
> others in re-redistricting twice in a single decade to gain
partisan
> advantage, the Court may be tempted to accept the invitation. But it
should
> decline."One other interesting aspect of the case is the extent
to which the
> plaintiffs and some of their amici rely upon Shaw v. Reno's
"bizarre"
> district standard for evaluating claims of racial gerrymandering.
The
> suggestion is that the same kind of analysis might apply to
partisan
> gerrymandering. Put aside the inconsistencies of the analysis (Shaw
was
> premised on the "expressive harm" that comes from
separating people on the
> basis of race; it is hard to see that the same applies to separating
people
> on the basis of party); and put asid!
> e that Shaw shape test was significantly diluted by subsequent
racial
> gerrymandering cases such as Miller v. Johnson. I think the most
interesting
> aspect here is the fact that some of the people using Shaw here have
attacked
> it (as I have) as unprincipled or poorly reasoned in the racial
context.
> Maybe this is all a way to get O'Connor's vote, who had voted in the
earlier
> Davis v. Bandemer case that partisan claims were non-justiciable,
but who
> also authored Shaw -- Professor Rick HasenLoyola Law School919 South
Albany
> StreetLos Angeles, CA 90015-0019(213)736-1466 -
voice(213)380-3769 -
>
faxrick.hasen@lls.eduhttp://www.lls.edu/academics/faculty/hasen.htmlhttp://elec
tionlawblog..org
>
>
>
J. J. Gass
Associate Counsel, Democracy Program
212-998-6281
jj.gass@nyu.edu
Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law
161 Avenue of the Americas, 12th Floor
fax 212-995-4550
www.brennancenter.org